Winter-safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence

Abstract

A new line of nuclear winter research shows that even small, regional nuclear wars could have catastrophic global consequences. However, major disarmament to avoid nuclear winter goes against the reasons nuclear weapon states have for keeping their weapons in the first place, in particular deterrence. To reconcile these conflicting aims, this paper develops the concept of winter-safe deterrence, defined as military force capable of meeting the deterrence goals of today's nuclear weapon states without risking catastrophic nuclear winter. This paper analyses nuclear winter risk, finding a winter-safe limit of about 50 nuclear weapons total worldwide. This paper then evaluates a variety of candidate weapons for winter-safe deterrence. Non-contagious biological weapons (such as anthrax or ricin), neutron bombs detonated at altitude, and nuclear electromagnetic weapons show the most promise. Each weapon has downsides, and the paper's analysis is only tentative, but winter-safe deterrence does appear both feasible and desirable given the urgency of nuclear winter risk.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Tony Barrett, Dave Denkenberger, Jacob Haqq-Misra, Ira Helfand, Robert de Neufville, Alan Robock, Jim Scouras, Brian Toon, Aaron, and Regina Karp, four anonymous reviewers, and participants at an expert meeting of the UN Security Council P5 countries all provided helpful feedback on an earlier version of the paper. Steven Umbrello provided excellent assistance in formatting the manuscript. Any remaining errors are the author's alone. The views expressed in the paper are the author's alone and do not represent the views of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute or any other organization.

ORCID

Seth D. Baum http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2429-5232

Notes

1. 1980s nuclear winter policy research and debates are reviewed in Lawrence Badash, A Nuclear Winter's Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009). Some notable works include Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Between an Unfree World and None: Increasing Our Choices’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 5 (Summer 1985), pp. 962–94; J.J. Gertler, ‘Some Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter’, Rand Corporation publication P-7045 (1985); and Richard Turco and Carl Sagan, ‘Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter’, Ambio, Vol. 18, No. 7 (1989), pp. 372–6.

2. Mechanisms for surviving nuclear winter are discussed in David Denkenberger and Joshua M. Pearce, Feeding Everyone No Matter What: Managing Food Security After Global Catastrophe (Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 2014).

3. Paul J. Crutzen and John W. Birks, ‘Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon’, Ambio, Vol. 11, Nos. 2–3 (1982), pp. 114–25; R.P. Turco, O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack and Carl Sagan, ‘Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear-Explosions’, Science, Vol. 222 (23 December 1983) pp. 1283–92.

4. Carl Sagan and Richard Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race (New York: Random House, 1990); Badash, A Nuclear Winter's Tale (note1); Paul Rubinson, ‘The Global Effects of Nuclear Winter: Science and Antinuclear Protest in the United States and the Soviet Union During the 1980s’, Cold War History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 2013), pp. 47–69.

5. Mark Hertsgaard, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev Explains What's Rotten in Russia’, Salon, 7 September 2000, http://www.salon.com/2000/09/07/gorbachev/ (accessed 18 December 2014).

6. O.B. Toon, R.P. Turco, A. Robock, C. Bardeen, L. Oman and G. L. Stenchikov, ‘Atmospheric Effects and Societal Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism’, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7 (19 April 2007); Alan Robock, Luke Oman and Georgiy L. Stenchikov, ‘Nuclear Winter Revisited with a Modern Climate Model and Current Nuclear Arsenals: Still Catastrophic Consequences’, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 112, No. D13107 (2007).

7. The latest publication is Michael J. Mills, Owen B. Toon, Julia Lee-Taylor and Alan Robock, ‘Multi-Decadal Global Cooling and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict’, Earth's Future, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1 April 2014), pp. 161–76.

8. Michael J. Mills, Owen B. Toon, Richard P. Turco, Douglas E. Kinnison and Rolando R. Garcia, ‘Massive Global Ozone Loss Predicted Following Regional Nuclear Conflict’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 105, No.14 (2008), pp. 5307–12.

9. Ibid., p. 5310.

10. Ira Helfand, ‘Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk’, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (2013), p. 20. http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/nuclear-famine-two-billion-at-risk-2013.pdf (accessed 18 December 2014).

11. One teragram is one trillion grams, or 10¹² grams. For more detailed India–Pakistan nuclear war scenarios than those used in the nuclear winter studies, see Robert T. Batcher, ‘The Consequences of an Indo-Pakistani Nuclear War’, International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 135–62.

12. Mills, Toon, Lee-Taylor and Robock, ‘Massive Global Ozone Loss Predicted Following Regional Nuclear Conflict’ (note 8).

13. Alan Robock, ‘Nuclear Winter’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May/June 2010), pp. 418–27.

14. Lili Xia and Alan Robock, ‘Impacts of a Nuclear War in South Asia on Rice Production in Mainland China’, Climatic Change, Vol. 116 (5 May 2012), pp. 357–72; Mutlu Özdoğan, Alan Robock and Christopher Kucharik, ‘Impacts of a Nuclear War in South Asia on Soybean and Maize Production in the Midwest United States’, Climatic Change, Vol. 116 (2012), pp. 373–87.

15. Helfand, ‘Nuclear Famine’ (note 10).

16. Robock, ‘Nuclear Winter’ (note 13).

17. Ibid., p. 424.

18. Timothy M. Maher Jr. and Seth D. Baum, ‘Adaptation to and Recovery from Global Catastrophe’, Sustainability, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2013), pp. 1461–79.

19. Badash, A Nuclear Winter's Tale (note 1); Rubinson, ‘The Global Effects of Nuclear Winter’(note 4).

20. For general discussion of the controversies of global warming, see Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).

21. In addition to the studies by Alan Robock and colleagues, see also A. Stenke, C. R. Hoyle, B. Luo, E. Rozanov, J. Gröbner, L. Maag, S. Brönnimann and T. Peter, ‘Climate and Chemistry Effects of a Regional Scale Nuclear Conflict’, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 13, No. 19 (2013), pp. 9713–29.

22. Robock, ‘Nuclear Winter’ (note 13).

23. Xia and Robock, ‘Impacts of a Nuclear War in South Asia on Rice Production in Mainland China’ (note 14); Özdoğan, Robock and Kucharik, ‘Impacts of a Nuclear War in South Asia on Soybean and Maize Production in the Midwest United States’ (note 14); Helfand, ‘Nuclear Famine’ (note 10).

24. Helfand, ‘Nuclear Famine’ (note 10).

25. See for example Seth D. Baum, Timothy M. Maher, Jr. and Jacob Haqq-Misra, ‘Double Catastrophe: Intermittent Stratospheric Geoengineering Induced by Societal Collapse’, Environment, Systems and Decisions, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2013), pp. 168–80.

26. Carl Sagan, ‘Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter 1983), pp. 257–92.

27. Maher and Baum, ‘Adaptation to and Recovery from Global Catastrophe’ (note 18); Nick Bostrom, ‘Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority’, Global Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013), pp. 15–31; Nicholas Beckstead, ‘On The Overwhelming Importance Of Shaping The Far Future’, Doctoral Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2013.

28. Ibid.

29. For general discussion of incorporating future generations into present decisions, see Kristian Skagen Ekeli, ‘Giving a Voice to Posterity: Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People’, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 18 (2005), pp. 429–50; Matthew W. Wolfe, ‘The Shadows of Future Generations’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 57 (2008), pp. 1897–932; Seth D. Baum, ‘Description, Prescription and the Choice of Discount Rates’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2009).

30. For more on this sort of cautious approach, see Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Martin L. Weitzman, ‘On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2009), pp. 1–19.

31. Futurist Bruce Tonn suggests an acceptable limit of 10⁻²⁰ for the probability of human extinction. See Bruce E. Tonn, ‘Obligations to Future Generations and Acceptable Risks of Human Extinction’, Futures, Vol. 41, No. 7 (2009), pp. 427–35.

32. Turco and Sagan propose a limit of ‘of at most a few hundred survivable warheads on each side’. See ‘Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter’ (note 1) at p. 373. More recently, Robock and Toon propose ‘rapid reduction of the US and Russian arsenals to about 200 weapons each’, while leaving other states' nuclear arsenals intact. See Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, ‘Self-Assured Destruction: The Climate Impacts of Nuclear War', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68, No. 5 (2012), pp. 66–74.

33. Federation of American Scientists, Status of World Nuclear Forces.http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces (accessed 18 December 2014).

34. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Pedro Motta Pinto Coelho, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament. Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Third Session, New York (28 April 2014).

35. For related discussion, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy After 9/11', Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008), pp. 229–65; Patrick M. Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2012), pp. 85–107. Morgan writes that ‘nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence … have been relegated by most nuclear powers to residual functions, primarily hedging against the possible return of serious conflicts’ (p. 88). Yet these states retain nuclear deterrence doctrines and further cite deterrence in refusing the rapid nuclear disarmament that other states and civil society call for.

36. United States Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Report' (2010).

37. ‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security’, (2013).

38. Prime Minister David Cameron, ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review’ (2010).

39. Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China. ‘The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces’, Beijing, 2013.

40. Утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), 2010.

41. John Borrie, ‘Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban’, International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3 (2014), pp. 625–46.

42. Ward Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2013).

43. Martin Hellman, ‘Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence’, The Bent of Tau Beta Pi (Spring 2008), pp. 14–22.

44. Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons (note 42).

45. Anthony M. Barrett, Seth D. Baum and Kelly R. Hostetler, ‘Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War between the United States and Russia’, Science and Global Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2013), pp. 106–33.

46. This prospect is discussed in United Stated Department of State, International Security Advisory Board. ‘Mutual Assured Stability: Essential Components and Near Term Actions’, Washington, DC (14 August 2012); David Atwood and Emily Munro, Security in a World without Nuclear Weapons: Visions and Challenges (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2013).

47. For recent arguments along these lines see Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking Books, 2011); Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Plume, 2011).

48. Denkenberger and Pearce, Feeding Everyone No Matter What (note 2).

49. Maher and Baum, ‘Adaptation to and Recovery from Global Catastrophe’ (note 18).

50. For a similar ‘nuclear-user-pays' idea for mitigating international nuclear risk, see Lyndon Burford, ‘No Such Thing As A Free Lunch: A Nuclear-User-Pays Model of International Security’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2012), pp. 229–39.

51. For example, Bruno Tertrais, ‘Going to Zero: A Sceptical French Position’, Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World, Nuclear Abolition Forum, No. 2 (2013), pp. 13–17.

52. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Power Balances and the Prospects for a Stable Post-Nuclear-Weapons World’, in David Atwood and Emily Munro (eds), Security in a World without Nuclear Weapons: Visions and Challenges (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2013), pp. 79–88.

53. A history of minimum deterrence debates can be found in Graham Barral, ‘The Lost Tablets: An Analysis of the Concept of Minimum Deterrence’, Arms Control, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1992), pp. 58–84. For more recent discussions, see among others James Wood Forsyth Jr., ‘The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 2012), pp. 93–111; Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).

54. Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich and Pavel Zolotarev, ‘Smaller and Safer’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5 (September–October 2010), pp. 9–16.

55. The New Deterrent Working Group, U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st century: Getting it Right (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy Press, 2009), p. 14.

56. James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman and Gary Schaub Jr., ‘Minimum Deterrence and its Critics’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 3–12.

57. See discussion in note 32.

58. Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States (12 June 2013), p. 5.

59. John Mueller, ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World’, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55–79.

60. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Power Balances and the Prospects'.

61. Ibid., p. 87.

62. Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University, 18 February 2010.

63. President of Russia, Meeting on Developing High-precision Weapons, 29 November 2013. http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6346 (accessed 18 December 14).

64. M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?’, National Defense University Strategic Forum, No. 263 (February 2011).

65. Ibid.

66. Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014).

67. Bunn and Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike’ (note 64).

68. Tong Zhao, ‘Conventional Counterforce Strike: An Option for Damage Limitation in Conflicts with Nuclear-Armed Adversaries?’, Science & Global Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), pp. 195–222.

69. The Russian and Chinese concern about US conventional prompt global strike is discussed in Bunn and Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike’ (note 64), pp. 19–20. The Russian and Chinese concern about US ballistic missile defence is discussed in Reuben Steff, ‘Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence for America, China, and Russia’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2013), pp. 99–102.

70. National Research Council Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008).

71. Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Won't Work’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2013) pp. 107–22.

72. Jorma K. Miettinen, ‘The Neutron Bomb and the Related Doctrine’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 8 (1977), pp. 316–317; Michael A. Aquino, ‘The Neutron Bomb’, Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, 1980.

73. Charles Platt, ‘Overview and Postscript: The Profits of Fear’, in Sam Cohen (eds), Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb (Singapore: World Scientific Pub Co. Inc., 1999), pp. 267–68; See also Samuel T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb, Political, Technological, and Military Issues (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1978); and Samuel T. Cohen, The Truth About the Neutron Bomb: The Inventor of the Bomb Speaks Out (New York: Morrow, 1983).

74. Kristina Spohr Readman, ‘Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 21 (2010), pp. 259–85; Sherri L. Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics (New York: Praeger, 1984).

75. Miettinen, ‘The Neutron Bomb and The Related Doctrine’ (note 72).

76. Aquino, ‘The Neutron Bomb’ (note 72), p. 22.

77. Ibid.

78. Gertler, ‘Some Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter’ (note 1).

79. Readman, ‘Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’ (note 74).

80. Ibid.

81. John Mueller argues that chemical weapons may not even cause more suffering than bullets, contrary to popular belief. See John Mueller, ‘At Issue: Does Use of Chemical Weapons Warrant Military Intervention? No.’, in ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons: Can They be Eliminated or Controlled?’, CQ Researcher (13 December 2013), p. 1069.

82. For arguments that the harm and deterrence value is less for biological and chemical weapons than it is for nuclear weapons, see Christian Enemark, ‘Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), pp. 382–400; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Dissuading Biological Weapons Proliferation’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2013), pp. 488–89. The harm is of course dependent on the amount and manner in which the weapons are used. The deterrence value may be similar.

83. Leonard A. Cole, ‘The Poison Weapons Taboo: Biology, Culture, and Policy’, Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 17, No. 2 (September 1998), pp. 119–32; Nina Tannenwald, ‘Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 5–49; Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

84. Jessica Stern, ‘Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 89–123.

85. In principle, biological and chemical weapons could cause global catastrophe if they are actually used across the globe, but the same point applies to any weapon and does not change the structure of the argument.

86. Itsuki C. Handoh and Toru Kawai, ‘Bayesian Uncertainty Analysis of the Global Dynamics of Persistent Organic Pollutants: Towards Quantifying the Planetary Boundaries for Chemical Pollution’, in Koji Omori, Xinyu Guo, Naoki Yoshie, Naoki Fujii, Itsuki C. Handoh, Atsuhiko Isobe and Shinsuke Tanabe (eds), Interdisciplinary Studies on Environmental Chemistry – Marine Environmental Modeling & Analysis (Tokyo: TERRAPUB, 2010), pp. 179–87.

87. Ali Nouri and Christopher F. Chyba, ‘Biotechnology and Biosecurity’, in Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković (ed.), Global Catastrophic Risks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 450–80.

88. Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 1999).

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Gregory D. Koblentz, ‘Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare’, Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999.

92. United States Office of Civil Defense, ‘Survival Under Atomic Attack’, Government Printing Office (1951); Cresson H. Kearney, Nuclear War Survival Skills (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1979); E. Kuzmenko, O. Korolev and V. Zemitan, Гражданская оборона (Civil Defence), Fifth ed. (Kiev: Vissaja School, 1986).

93. Joseph and Reichart, Deterrence and Defense (note 88).

94. Koblentz, ‘Pathogens as Weapons’ (note 91).

95. Enemark, ‘Farewell to WMD’ (note 82), p. 390.

96. Robert Ayson, ‘After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 7 (2010), pp. 571–93.

97. W. Seth Carus, ‘“The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb”? Biological Weapons in the Middle East’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 23 (1991); Daniel J. Kevles, ‘“The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb” (review of War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda, by Jonathan B. Tucker)’, New York Review of Books, Vol. 54, No. 6 (2007).

98. See for example Michael Barletta, ‘Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence’, Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998), pp. 115–36.

99. Filippa Lentzos, ‘Hard to Prove: Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention’, King's College London (August 2013); Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Dissuading Biological Weapons Proliferation’ (note 82).

100. Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Dissuading Biological Weapons Proliferation’ (note 82).

101. Magnus Hjortdal, ‘China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence’, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 1–24.

102. Andrew Colarik and Lech Janczewski, ‘Establishing Cyber Warfare Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012), pp. 31–48.

103. Hjortdal, ‘China's Use of Cyber Warfare’ (note 101); Larry M. Wortzel, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs: China's Approach to Cyber Operations: Implications for the United States, 10 March 2010.

104. Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Cyber Deterrence’, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2012), pp. 773–824.

105. Ibid.

106. Colarik and Janczewski, ‘Establishing Cyber Warfare Doctrine’ (note 102).

107. Jensen, ‘Cyber Deterrence’ (note 104).

108. Carlo Kopp, ‘The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction’, Monash University, October 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA332511 (accessed 18 December 14).

109. John S. Foster, Jr., et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures (April 2008).

110. William R. Forstchen, One Second After (New York: Forge Books, 2009).

111. Colin R. Miller, Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, United States Air War College, November 2005), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463475 (accessed 18 December 2014).

112. Ibid.

113. Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Weapon EMP Effects, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/emp.htm (accessed 18 December 2014).

114. The feasibility of protecting electromagnetic weapons for second-strike is discussed in Clay Wilson, ‘High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments’, Congressional Research Service, 21 July 2008.

115. Miller, ‘Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010’ (note 111).

116. Kopp, ‘The Electromagnetic Bomb’ (note 108).

117. John Foster, a former head of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, has suggested that electromagnetic weapons can disable the command and control systems on aircraft carriers. See Rachel Oswald, ‘U.S. Should Pursue Nuclear EMP Weapon: Ex-Lab Head’, Global Security Newswire, 20 February 2013.

118. Maher and Baum, ‘Adaptation to and Recovery from Global Catastrophe’ (note 18).

119. Wilson, ‘High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse’ (note 114).

120. For related discussion see Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘The Concept of Nuclear Learning’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 79–93.

121. ‘Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security’, First Report of the Deep Cuts Commission (April 2014).

122. Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons (note 42).

123. Borrie, ‘Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban’ (note 41).

124. Denkenberger and Pearce, Feeding Everyone No Matter What (note 2).

125. United Stated Department of State, ‘Mutual Assured Stability’ (note 46).