Rising bipolarity in the South China Sea: the American rebalance to Asia and China's expansion

ABSTRACT

This article synthesizes three elements of power and balancing in the South China Sea (SCS): analytical perspectives on China's behaviour and intentions, the American rebalance to Asia and the dispositions of American allies and partners. Based on extensive interviews and theoretical analysis, it concludes that ‘soft balancing’ backed by American military power provides the optimum chance for resolving the growing dispute. Short to medium-term weakness of Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Japan, means the United States must provide much of the military power while working to build their forces. The most promising alternative is multilateral diplomacy through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Regional Forum, a vehicle for negotiating a Code of Conduct and implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. If China remains motivated mainly by defense of realist interests, the costs imposed against expansion will eventually cause recalculation of Beijing's strategy, and soft balancing by the United States and its partners has a chance of working. The constructivist perspective, stressing self-conceptualization of Chinese strategic culture, supports Chinese confidence that patience will eventually bring dominance. If China tries offensively to change the status quo, soft balancing is less likely to influence Beijing. President Xi Jin Ping appears to be offensively asserting power, seeking regional dominance before he is due to step down in 2023. This supports the finding of enhanced risks of unintended escalation in the SCS and the East China Sea.

Acknowledgement

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and policies of the U.S. Air War College, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the United States Government.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Stephen F. Burgess has been Professor of International Security Studies, US Air War College since June 1999. His three books are South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe, and The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992–97. He has published numerous articles, book chapters and monographs on Asian and African security and strategic issues. He holds a doctorate from Michigan State University (1992) and has been on the faculty at the University of Zambia, University of Zimbabwe, Vanderbilt University, and Hofstra University.

Notes

1 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?' International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 18–20.

2 Sarah Raine and Christian Le Mière, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013), pp. 179–193.

3 Robert Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), pp. 164–183.

4 Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Debate over American China Strategy', Survival, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2015), pp. 89–110.

5 Peter Lee, ‘It's Official: America has a China-containment Policy', Asia Times (17 June 2015).

6 Jason J. Blazevic, ‘Defensive Realism in the Indian Ocean: Oil, Sea Lanes and the Security Dilemma', China Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009), pp. 59–71.

7 Howard French, ‘The South China Sea Could Become a Dangerous Game of Military Might: Here's How the United States Can Prevent That', Foreign Policy (5 June 2015). French believes that American ratification of the Law of the Sea would provide greater leverage with China.

8 Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012). Luttwak believes that China's internal situation will prevent it from challenging the United States in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

9 Robert Anthony Pape. ‘Soft Balancing against the United States', International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7–45.

10 Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?' pp. 7–48.

11 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', International Security, Vol. 25, issue 3 (2001), pp. 128–161.

12 Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical realism and the rise of China', European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, (March 2012), pp. 53–75.

13 Ralf Emmers, Associate Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, interviewed 12 August 2014.

14 Ibid. China may eventually want to conduct electronic surveillance off the coast of Guam or India, so its claim of a 200-mile EEZ off the coast of Hainan Island may cause problems.

15 Ibid.

16 Aileen Baviera, Professor, Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, interviewed 17 August 2014. Chinese fishermen from Hainan are forced into Philippine waters by Chinese authorities who are concerned about overfishing during fishing season.

17 The U.S. Energy Intelligence Agency estimates that the South China Sea has about 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas rated as proved or probable reserves. See Chris Horton, ‘China Zeroes in on Energy Potential of the South China Sea', The New York Times (28 October 2014).

18 Interviews with American officials in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014 and briefings by American officials at U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), 22–23 September 2014.

19 Lee, ‘America has a China-containment policy.'

20 Tim Huxley, Executive Director, William Choong, Senior Fellow, and Alexander Neill, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014. Andrew Browne, ‘After Chinese Stock Plunge, a Hole Shows in Xi's “China Dream”’, Wall Street Journal (15 July 2015). While China seems to be making major multilateral moves to gain influence in Asia, it has not always followed up on its pledges of aid. For example, China actually transferred only six per cent of $66 billion in pledged aid to Pakistan from 2003 to 2011.

21 Li Mingjiang, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014. China will experience difficulties meeting the criteria for the TPP.

22 Andrew Chubb, ‘The South China Sea: Defining the Status Quo', The Diplomat (11 June 2015).

23 Jihyun Kim, ‘Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond', Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2015), pp. 107–141.

24 David E. Sanger and Rick Gladstone, ‘Piling Sand in a Disputed Sea, China Literally Gains Ground', The New York Times (8 April 2015). Interviews with American officials in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 14 August 2014. One American official believes that once China builds enough bases in the South China Sea that it will dispose of the nine-dash line and its appeals to Chinese nationalism.

25 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, ‘Guided by Identities? A constructivist approach to Sino-American relations', Estudos Internacionais, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan–Jun 2014), pp. 49–53. China's leaders believe that they possess “the mandate of heaven” (tianming) to dominate “all under heaven” (tianxia). This belief informs China's strategic culture and Chinese nationalism.

26 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

27 Choong, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014. Recently China has added another dash near Taiwan to create a “ten-dash line”.

28 Li Mingjiang, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014. Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, Head, ASEAN Study Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), University of Singapore, interviewed 4 August 2014. China's leaders believe that the United States is behind the Philippines case, and some even think that it was a mistake for China to accede to UNCLOS. In contrast, other Chinese leaders and experts are using UNCLOS to argue China's claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands against Japan. Choong, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014.

29 Li Mingjiang, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

30 Rex Li, A Rising China and Security in East Asia (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 18.

31 Zachary Keck, ‘Most Chinese Expect a War with China', The Diplomat (11 September 2014). http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/poll-majority-of-chinese-expect-war-with-japan/ (accessed 11 January 2016).

32 Li Mingjiang, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014. Chinese officials wonder why the United States is pressing observance of UNCLOS when Washington refuses to ratify the convention.

33 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

34 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

35 Zhang Baohui, ‘Xi Jin Ping, ‘Pragmatic’ Offensive Realism and China's Rise', Global Asia, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2014), pp. 71–79.

36 Dingding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘Correspondence: Debating China's Assertiveness', International Security, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/2014), pp. 177–180.

37 Feng Zhang, ‘Beijing's Master Plan for the South China Sea', Foreign Policy (23 June 2015).

38 Jane Perlez, ‘China is Rapidly Adding Coast Guard Ships, U.S. Navy Says', The New York Times (10 April 2015). Several experts think that, before Xi came to power in 2013, the PLA Southern Command and Coast Guard and other forces were operating to a large extent on their own. There is a widespread view that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its “peaceful rise” campaign have been marginalized since 2008.

39 Huxley, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014.

40 Neill, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014. However, some experts see partnerships as providing greater flexibility for the United States than traditional alliances: Malcolm Cook, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, interviewed 7 August 2014.

41 Fareed Zakaria, ‘With an absent United States, China marches on', The Washington Post (3 July 2015). China has provided hundreds of billions of dollars of aid to SEA countries and the Asia Infrastructure Bank promises to provide even more. However, China has also pledged aid to countries like Pakistan but delivered only a fraction.

42 Emmers, Singapore, interviewed 12 August 2014.

43 Carlos D. Sorreta and Mary Fides A. Quinto, ‘Moratorium in the South China Sea: Charting a Course Towards Peace', Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (The Philippines), Commentaries, (Vol. 1, No. 5, August 2014).

44 Michael McDevitt, The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analysis Occasional Paper, November 2014).

45 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, ‘Pacific Rim Deal Could Reduce Chance of Unintended Conflict in Contested Seas', The New York Times (23 April 2014), http://nyti.ms/1I0swx1 (accessed 1 February 2015).

46 Interviews with think tank and academic experts and US officials in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014 and briefings by US officials at U.S. PACOM, PACAF, and MARFORPAC, 22–23 September 2014.

47 Ankit Panda, ‘Obama: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security Treaty', The Diplomat (24 April 2014).

48 Ely Ratner, ‘A Summer Calendar for Advancing U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea', Center for New American Security (May 2014), pp. 1–9. http://www.cnas.org/2014-agenda-for-south-china-sea#.VQyDhjgcTxg (accessed 1 February 2015).

49 Zakaria, ‘With an absent United States, China marches on.'

50 Interviews with American officials, Manila, the Philippines, 18 August 2014.

51 Choong, Huxley, and Neill, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014.

52 The 12 TPP states are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. Negotiations succeeded in November 2015, and ratification will be attempted in 2016.

53 Deborah Elms, Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre, Singapore interviewed on 7 August 2014. Judith Fergin, Executive Director, American Chamber of Commerce, Singapore, interviewed 11 August 2014.

54 Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air–Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia, Adelphi Book 444 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, April 2014).

55 U.S. Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: United States Navy, March 2015).

56 American officials in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014 and at US PACOM, PACAF and MARFORPAC, 22 September 2014.

57 American officials in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014 and at US PACOM, PACAF and MARFORPAC, 22 September 2014. One estimate is that American military presence in the Asia-Pacific increased by ten per cent from 2011–2014.

58 Carnes Lord and Andrew Erickson, Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press, 15 May 2014).

59 Steven Sashwick, ‘Naval Buildups in the South China Sea: Southeast Asian naval capabilities are surging. But how meaningful is that?' The Diplomat (15 July 2015). See also Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle.

60 David Lai, ‘Learning from the Stones: a “Go” Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept’, Federation of American Scientists (May 2014). As in the game of “Go”, China can continue to expand in the South China Sea by creating territory, surrounding its adversaries, and seizing space, and there is very little that the United States and its allies can do to stop it.

61 American officials in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014 and at US PACOM, PACAF and MARFORPAC, 22–23 September 2014. However, too many exercises will stress their militaries.

Also, Dzirhan Mahadzir, Jane's Defense Weekly, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 13 August 2014. Multilateral military cooperation among SEA states may be difficult, evidenced by the fact that an American offer of Global Hawk surveillance aircraft to several fell apart when those states realized that the offer was being made to several states and not on a bilateral basis.

62 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America and the Future of the Pacific (Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press, 2014). Haddick believes that China's navy will be able to challenge the U.S. Navy in the next decade. In opposition, Bill Hayton concludes that the U.S. Navy is so powerful that the current order in the South China Sea will be preserved for years to come, Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: A Struggle for Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).

63 Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific', International Security, Vol. 38. No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 115–149. In regard to ways in which the United States can project air, space and cyber power, the dispersal of American forces to FOLs could make it more difficult to attack air bases and make it easier for the United States to project air power. Medium-range attack capabilities could be based in Australia and Papua New Guinea. Logistics would be problematic in a dispersal strategy. Another option is “global strike” based in the United States. A combination of the three would be optimal strategically but expensive. Global strike alone is the alternative strategy to dispersal. However, the United States would lose presence and influence in Southeast Asia if it pursues the global strike option alone.

64 In the hunt for Malaysian Airlines MH 370, American forces used three Australian bases.

65 Robert C. Owen, ‘Sea-Land Basing of Air Refueling Forces: A Concept for Resiliency and Efficiency', Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2 (March-April 2015), pp. 3–20.

66 American officials in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014 and at US PACOM, PACAF and MARFORPAC, 22–23 September 2014.

67 Huxley, Choong, and Neill, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014. Weak alignment by Singapore with the United States is evidenced by frequent joint exercises and forward operating locations where American military ships and planes make frequent stops. Singapore has been encouraging the American presence in the region for four decades as a security guarantor. Also, there are 4,500 American companies in the country, with the prospect of more foreign direct investment when the TPP becomes a reality. Hedging is evidenced by the lack of protests at Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea and lack of preparations with the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia to dissuade China from acting aggressively. See Cai Dexian, ‘Hedging for Maximum Flexibility: Singapore's Pragmatic Approach to Security Relations with the US and China', Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Vol. 39, No. 2, 25 July 2013. Also, there has been growing Chinese influence in Singapore, especially with increased trade and investment and with the importation of Chinese from the PRC to ensure that the population ratio remains constant with a 60% Chinese majority. See Anthony Kuhn, ‘Millions of Immigrants Cause Problems in Singapore', National Public Radio, 26 July 2012.

68 Emmers, Singapore, interviewed 12 August 2014 and Basiron, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014. Indonesia's exclusive economic zone is within the nine dash line and there is a growing dispute with China over SCS territory. By some estimates, Indonesia has the best maritime domain awareness in ASEAN, given the archipelago that comprises its territory. With ASEAN headquarters based in Jakarta, Indonesia is vested in the ASEAN Way and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. In 2015, the new Indonesian government began to assertively develop its maritime capabilities.

69 Zack Cooper and Darren Lim, ‘Balancing for Stability: The Logic of Hedging Strategies in Asia' paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, 30 August 2014. Huxley, Choong and Neill, IISS Asia, 8 August 2014.

70 Ian Storey, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), University of Singapore, interviewed 26 July 2014 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Also, Huxley, 8 August 2014.

71 Chubb, ‘The South China Sea'. Vietnam occupies 21 features of which 17 could be considered to have territorial status.

72 Cooper and Lim, ‘Balancing for Stability'.

73 Cook, Singapore, interviewed 7 August 2014; Baviera, Manila, The Philippines, interviewed 17 August 2014. The Philippines considers the Scarborough Shoals to be more important than the Spratly Islands, given the proximity of the shoals to Manila and main population centers. Nevertheless, the Philippines needs the energy resources that lie beneath both.

74 Baviera, Manila, The Philippines, interviewed 17 August 2014.

75 Interviews with American officials, Manila, the Philippines, 18 August 2014.

76 Cook, Singapore, interviewed 7 August 2014. Singapore quietly but strongly criticized the Philippines for bringing the UNCLOS case. Vietnam will probably not file an UNCLOS case, unless China acts provocatively. Mohamed Nizam Basiron, Research Fellow, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, MIMA, Kuala Lumpur, interviewed 14 August 2014. The International Court of Arbitration will not allow Malaysia and Vietnam to join the Philippines case.

77 Julio Amador III, Assistant Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, The Philippines, interviewed 19 August 2014.

78 Ibid.

79 Cook, Singapore, interviewed 7 August 2014. In the May 2006 election, Vice President Jejomar Binay of the United Nationalist Alliance is predicted to be the winner. Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte and Senator Grace Poe of the Liberal Party are trailing in the opinion polls.

80 There is a debate among security experts in Manila over the UNCLOS case before the ICA. Several view the case as mainly symbolic. In contrast, there are some who think that ICA invalidation of the nine dash line will provide leverage over China and that it could lead Vietnam and Malaysia to file cases.

81 Amador III, Manila, interviewed 19 August 2014.

82 American officials, Manila, interviewed 18 August 2014.

83 Ibid. The United States offered the Philippines Customs and Border Patrol King Air 350s with anti-submarine warfare capability, but President Aquino rejected the offer. After 2012, the Philippines could have procured more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability but instead purchased FN Minimi machine guns. Several different American military commands want to double the size of exercises with the Philippines, but the country is not prepared to do so.

84 American officials, Manila, interviewed 18 August 2014. In 2013, the United States injected $30 million into the Philippines Coast Guard with the promise of more to come. Japan has a much increased presence and is providing security assistance to the Philippines, including maritime security facilities.

85 Felix K. Chang, ‘Comparative Southeast Asian Military Modernization', The Asian Forum (1 October 2014), pp. 7–10.

86 American officials, Manila, The Philippines, interviewed 18 August 2014.

87 In regard to the South China Sea, some experts think that EDCA cooperation will eventually enable Philippines to defend its waters by itself. A few think that EDCA includes a “tripwire” that will lead the United States to intervene against encroachment by China.

88 Rommel C. Banlaoi, ‘US-Philippines Alliance: Addressing 21st Century Challenges', Philippine Security in the Age of Terror (London: Taylor and Francis CRC Press, 2010), pp. 55–66.

89 American officials, Manila, 18 August 2014 and PACOM, PACAF and MARFORPAC, 22–23 September 2014. Some Filipino and American security experts think that Typhoon Haiyan cooperation created basic interoperability between United States and Philippine militaries.

90 American officials, Manila, 18 August 2014.

91 Basiron, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014. American officials interviewed Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 14 August 2014.

92 Huxley, IISS Asia, 8 August 2014.

93 Basiron, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014.

94 Elina Noor, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), interviewed 15 August 2014. Reed Bank is the possible site of the next oil rig placement by China in waters claimed by Malaysia.

95 Interviews with American officials in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 14 August 2014.

96 Juliet Eilperin, ‘Obama says “There's more to be done” on Human Rights in Malaysia', The Washington Post, 27 April 2014.

97 Sidhu and Rogers, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014. Also, American officials in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014.

98 Laos, which is pro-China, is due to be ASEAN chair in 2016 and the Philippines in 2017 with a new president and the South China Sea dispute unresolved.

99 Ibid.

100 Mahadzir, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 13 August 2014; Sidhu, Rogers and Varkey, 14 August 2014; Noor, 15 August 2014.

101 Dzirhan Mahadzir, Jane's Defense Weekly, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 13 August 2014.

102 Jatswan S. Sidhu, Professor, Department of International and Strategic Studies (DISS), University of Malaya; Roy Rogers, Head, DISS, University of Malaya; and Helena Muhamad Varkey, Senior Lecturer, DISS, University of Malaya, interviewed 14 August 2014, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

103 Sidhu and Rogers, 14 August 2014. Kuala Lumpur does not know how to resolve the insurgency and migrant problems in Sabah. With millions of migrants, the population has grown by 40 per cent in the past 40 years and has become a vote bank for the ruling party. Therefore, the regime does not feel hard-pressed to tackle these issues.

104 Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow, Military Transformation, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

105 Chang, ‘Comparative Southeast Asian Military Modernization', p. 15.

106 Sidhu and Rogers, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014.

107 American officials in Malaysia, 14 August 2014. Mahadzir, 13 August 2014. Kei Koga, Japan expert, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

108 ‘Vietnam and America: Power Plays: Vietnam's new friendship with America reflects political drama at home', The Economist (4 July 2015).

109 American officials, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014.

110 Greg Torode, Thomson-Reuters, Hong Kong, interviewed 14 August 2015.

111 Chang, “Comparative Southeast Asian Military Modernization,” pp. 10–13.

112 American officials, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014. Mahadzir, Malaysia, interviewed 13 August 2014. Koga, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

113 Euan Graham, Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and Kei Koga, interviewed 6 August 2014. Japan has struggled with maintaining influence in SEA and developing a SEA strategy.

114 Graham, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

115 Huxley and Choong, Singapore, interviewed 8 August 2014.

116 Graham and Koga, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014. In contrast to views in Southeast Asia, the prevailing opinion in Tokyo is that Japan has not been sufficiently strong on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines view the islands as belonging to Japan.

117 Interviews with think tank and academic experts in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4–20 August 2014.

118 Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, ‘Can a Sino-Japanese War be Controlled?' Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 56, No. 6 (November 2014), pp. 135–166.

119 Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?' pp. 7–48

120 Graham, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

121 Emmers, Singapore, interviewed 12 August 2014.

122 William Choong, The Ties that Divide: History, Honour and Territory in Sino-Japanese Relations, Adelphi book 445, (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 2014).

123 Bitzinger, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

124 Ambassador Tan Seng Chye, Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, interviewed 7 August 2014. Rodolfo Severino, interviewed 4 August 2014.

125 Evan Resnick, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014. Richard Javad Heydarian, Lecturer, Ateneo de Manila University and Advisor, House of Representatives, Manila, The Philippines, interviewed 20 August 2014.

126 Emmers, Singapore, interviewed 12 August 2014. Sidhu, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, interviewed 14 August 2014.

127 Daljit Singh, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, interviewed 4 August 2014. As the 2014 chair of ASEAN, Myanmar worked to build consensus around the CoC, which could be a sign of moving away from alignment with China and towards hedging between the United States and China.

128 Daljit Singh, Singapore, interviewed 4 August 2014.

129 Emmers, Singapore, interviewed 14 August 2014.

130 Bitzinger, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.

131 Malcolm Cook, Singapore, interviewed 7 August 2014.

132 American officials, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, 4 August 2014 and PACOM, PACAF and MARFORPAC, 22–23 September 2014.

133 Michael Raska, Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, interviewed 6 August 2014.