A framework for analysis of national interest: United States policy toward Taiwan

ABSTRACT

The rise of China in the 21st century has generated a new round of debates on American policy toward Taiwan. Generally speaking, one side suggests that Washington should adjust its Taiwan policy to improve its relations with China, while the other argues against downgrading the relations with Taiwan. Both sides invoke the concept of national interest, but the concept is not unproblematic, and cherry-picking different facts and arguments is far from convincing. This article has two purposes: using the concept of national interest to examine the Taiwan policy, and using this case to illuminate the concept itself. After reviewing the concept, I propose what I call ‘four Ps’ framework to facilitate policy-making and analysis. The framework comprises four factors that help determine which policy is in national interest. They are players (decision makers), preferences (foreign policy goals), prospects (possible outcomes), and power (the capability of achieving goals).

Acknowledgements

For their valuable comments and helpful suggestions, the author would like to thank Utteeyo Dasgupta, Cyril Ghosh, Aaron and Regina Karp, Martin Rivlin, Steve Snow, Yan Sun, and anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Shaohua Hu is Associate Professor of the Department of Government and Politics and the coordinator of the International Affairs programme at Wagner College. He is the author of Explaining Chinese Democratization (Praeger, 2000). His current book project examines major powers’ policies towards cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

Notes

1 See, for example, Bill Owens, ‘America must Start Treating China as a Friend’, Financial Times, 17 November 2009; Bruce Gilley, ‘Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1 (January/February 2010), pp.44–60; Chas W. Freeman Jr., ‘Beijing, Washington, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige: Remarks to the China Maritime Studies Institute.’ http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/beijing-washington-and-shifting-balance-prestige (accessed 13 May 2014); and Charles Glaser, ‘Will China's Rise Lead to War?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp.80–91.

2 See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Will We Abandon Taiwan?’, Commentary, Vol. 109, No. 5 (May 2000), pp.26–31; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp.23–37; John F. Copper, ‘Why We Need Taiwan’, The National Interest, 29 August 2011. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-we-need-taiwan-5815 (accessed 28 September 2013); Denny Roy, ‘Why the U.S. Shouldn't Abandon Taiwan’, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/ (accessed 28 September 2013).

3 Among the good analysis of the concept are Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York: Macmillan, 1934); James N. Rosenau, ‘National Interest,’ in David L. Sills and Robert K. Merton (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan/Free Press 1968), pp.34–40; Joseph Franke, National Interest (London: Pall Mall, 1970); and Scott Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theory (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

4 Rosenau, ‘National Interest’ (note 3), pp.34–40.

5 The first systematic investigation of how different schools approach the concept of national interest is Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theory (note 3).

6 Contemporary subjectivists view national interests as social constructions and many see democratic procedure as the yardstick to determine national interests. See, for example, Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1996), p.280; Miroslav Nincic, ‘The National Interest and Its Interpretation’, Review of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Winter 1999), p.48; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘The American National Interest and Global Public Goods’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (April 2002), p.237.

7 Foreign policy is shaped not only by interests of players, but also by their perception and misperception. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

8 H.W. Brands, ‘The Idea of the National Interest’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1999), p.261.

9 Ibid., p.244.

10 Edward Pessen, ‘George Washington's Farewell Address, the Cold War, and the Timeless National Interest’, Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1987), p.12.

11 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ‘Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China’, Journal of American History, Vol. 92, No. 1 (June 2005), p.110.

12 Nincic, ‘The National Interest and Its Interpretation’ (note 6), p.50.

13 John H. Kautsky, ‘The National Interest: The Entomologist and the Beetle’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May 1966), pp.226–7.

14 Nuechterlein divides national interests into four basic interests: defense, economy, world order, and ideology, and ranks issues in a descending order of importance: survival, vital, major, and peripheral by taking into account eight value factors (proximity of the danger; nature of the threat; economic stake; sentimental attachment; type of government; effect on balance of power; national prestige; attitude of allies and friends) and eight cost factors (economic costs of conflict; the number of troops needed; the probable duration of hostilities; the risks of enlarged conflict; the likelihood of success; the reaction of domestic opinion; world reaction; the impact on internal politics). See Donald E. Nuechterlein, United States National Interests in a Changing World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973); and ‘National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-making’, British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (October 1976), pp.246–66.

15 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace Brief edition revised by Kenneth W. Thomson (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1993), p.5; Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations’, in Alexander L. George (ed.), Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), p.224; Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster and Rita Hauser, Co-Chairs, America's National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America's National Interests, 2000 (Washington, DC: The Commission on America's National Interests, 2000).

16 Maslow ranks physiological needs, the need for safety, the need for belonging and love, the need for self-esteem, and the need for self-actualization in descending order of potency. See A.H. Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’, Psychological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1943), pp.370–96; A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

17 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), pp.72–7.

18 T. Knecht and M.S. Weatherford, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 3 (September 2006), p.705. According to the Almond–Lippmann thesis, public opinion should not be relied upon, since it is volatile, inconsistent, and unimportant. Ole R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond–Lippman Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), pp.439–66.

19 Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

20 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September–October 1997), p.29.

21 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need A Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p.28.

22 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.), China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996 (New York: Columbia University Press), p.243.

23 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, ‘Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1 (February 2005), pp.107–23.

24 Suffice to mention two cases. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. supported the presidential power to act without congressional authorization; in Goldwater v. Carter, the court basically dismissed some lawmaker’ argument that, without Senate approval, President Carter could not nullify the American defense treaty with Taiwan.

25 For their relative power, see, for example, David Leyton-Brown, ‘The Role of Congress in the Making of Foreign Policy’, International Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1982/1983), pp.59–76; Phillip R. Trimble, ‘The President's Foreign Affairs Power’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 4 (October 1989), pp.750–57; Paul E. Peterson, ‘The President's Dominance in Foreign Policy Making’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp.215–34.

26 Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘American Diplomacy: Around the World and along Pennsylvania Avenue’, in Thomas E. Mann (ed.), A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), p.160.

27 James M. Lindsay, ‘From Deference to Activism and Back Again: Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy’, in Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick (eds), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p.184.

28 Oksenberg elaborates on the pivotal role played by Congress in four cases: the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, McCarthyism, and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Michel Oksenberg, ‘Congress, Executive–legislative Relations, and American China Policy’, in Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds), The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), pp.207–30.

29 Chas W. Freeman Jr., ‘Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan—and Beijing’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4 (July–August 1998), p.7.

30 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp.1–2.

31 Lindsay and Ripley, ‘How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy’, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 47, No. 6 (March 1994), pp.7–32.

32 For the controversy over Wildavsky's two presidencies thesis, see Steven A. Shull (ed.), The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1991).

33 The role of bureaucracy in modern societies is highlighted by Max Weber, ‘Bureaucracy,’ in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.196–244.

34 David L. Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 1861–1898 (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1985), pp.viii–ix.

35 Tucker (ed.), China Confidential (note 22), p.146.

36 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). A good assessment is Dan Caldwell, ‘Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 21, No. 1 (September 1977), pp.87–110.

37 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p.127.

38 Scholars have provided different lists of personal factors that affect policy-making. Greenstein's six factors in his The Presidential Difference are effectiveness as a public communicator, organizational capacity, political skill, vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. Herman identifies four types of personal characters: beliefs (nationalism and belief in one's ability to control events); motives (need for power and need for affiliation); decision style; and interpersonal style (paranoid and Machiavellianism). Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1980), pp.7–46.

39 Norton E. Long, ‘Power and Administration’, Public Administration Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn 1949), p.260.

40 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 186–211.

41 Ronald Reagan, Reagan: A Life in Letters, Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson and Martin Anderson (eds) (New York: Free Press, 2003), pp.525–31.

42 It was in Taiwan that Governor Clinton made his first speech on global economics to a foreign audience in 1986. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), p.326.

43 For early American interest and involvement in Taiwan, see, for example, Thomas R. Cox, ‘Harbingers of Change: American Merchants and the Formosa Annexation Scheme’, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (May 1973), pp.163–84; Leonard Gordon, ‘Early American Relations with Formosa, 1849–1870’, The Historian, Vol. 19, No. 3 (May 1957), pp.262–89; Harold D. Langley, ‘Gideon Nye and the Formosa Annexation Scheme’, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 (November 1965), pp.397–420; Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounter with the East and the West (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2009), pp.105–27; Sophia Su-fei Yen, Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations 1836–1874 (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1965), pp.48–73.

44 Morgenthau, ‘Another “Great Debate”: The National Interest of the United States’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1952), p.977.

45 Robert Ross, ‘The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p.113.

46 Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’ (note 20), p.36.

47 The first island chain includes Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo; the second consists of Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia.

48 Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison, ‘U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues’ (Congressional Research Service, 22 April 2014), p.43.

49 Michael S. Chase, ‘U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship’, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.171.

50 Benjamin T. Harrison and Christopher L. Mosher, ‘John T. McNaughton and Vietnam: The Early Years as Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1964–1965’, History, Vol. 92, No. 308 (October 2007), p.507.

51 The different view can be found in Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

52 Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America: The Story of Their Relations Since 1784 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p.98.

53 Robert Kagan, ‘American Power—A Guide for the Perplexed’, Commentary, Vol. 101, No. 4 (April 1996), p.30.

54 Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’ (note 20), pp.28–35.

55 Kissinger, Does America Need A Foreign Policy? (note 21), p.31.

56 Tucker (ed.), China Confidential (note 22), p.39.

57 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China's Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p.105.

58 Brad Simpson, ‘The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 36, No. 4 (September 2012), pp.675–94.

59 Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.179–205.

60 Benjamin I. Page, Julia Rabinovich and David G. Tully, ‘How Americans Feel About Asian Countries and Why’, Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January–April 2008), p.35.

61 A good example is Alfred Vagts, ‘The United States and the Balance of Power’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (November 1941), pp.401–49.

62 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005), pp.219–23.

63 For pre-modern Chinese interactions with the outside world, see Shaohua Hu, ‘Revisiting Chinese Pacifism’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter 2006), pp.256–78. Power transition theory was proposed by A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958).

64 Christopher Layne, ‘China's Challenge to U.S. Hegemony’, Current History (January 2008), p.15.

65 Copper, ‘Why We Need Taiwan’ (note 2).

66 Pieces written by Owens, Gilley, Glaser, and Freeman are cited in note 1.

67 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Taiwan's Dire Straits’, The National Interest (March–April 2014), pp.29–39.

68 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p.35.

69 Reagan's assurances are: not revising the TRA, altering its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, setting a date for ending arms sales, holding prior consultations with China, serving as a mediator, or pressuring Taiwan to negotiate with China. Clinton's ‘three nos’ policy are: no seat in the UN for Taiwan, no two-China policy, and no independence for Taiwan.

70 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p.427.

71 The seminal work is Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March 1979), pp.263–92.

72 Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Preventing a War over Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March/April 2005), p.55.

73 Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), p.256.

74 Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Online Threat: Should We Be Worried About a Cyber War?’ The New Yorker, 1 November, 2010. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all (accessed 22 April 2014).

75 Fu Ying, ‘How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow Are Close, but Not Allies’, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2016) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia (accessed 19 December 2015).

76 Kissinger, Does America Need A Foreign Policy? (note 21), pp.283–4.

77 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (note 15), pp.124–79.

78 Tsai, Maritime Taiwan (note 43), p.197.

79 Ray Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University), 1975.

80 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp.117–8.

81 Robert D. Kaplan. ‘How We Would Fight China’, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 295, No. 5 (June 2005), p.49.

82 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

83 An excellent analysis of cross-strait economic relations and their impact is T.J. Cheng's ‘China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Superconductivity’, in Tucker (ed.), Dangerous Strait, pp.93–130.

84 Dennis E. Showalter, ‘Total War for Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German Grand Strategy’, in Paul Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), p.107.

85 Greg Jaffe, ‘U.S. Model for a Future War Fans Tensions with China and Inside Pentagon’, Washington Post, 1 August 2012.

86 Mearsheimer, ‘Taiwan's Dire Straits’ (note 67), p.32.

87 Nathan and Scobell, China's Search for Security (note 57), p.225.

88 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill), p.168.

89 Shaohua Hu, ‘The Korean Factor in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations’, in Baogang Guo and Chung-chian Teng (eds), China's Quiet Rise: Peace Through Integration (New York: Lexington Books), p.116.