Managing, reconciling, and manipulating the deterrence and disarmament norms: The case of the United Kingdom

ABSTRACT

Norm contestation and the search for legitimate and acceptable compromise have been persistent features of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They have also marked the domestic politics of nuclear weapons, especially within democracies. How do those internal and external contestations and searches for compromise interact? Attention will focus on the United Kingdom that stands out for the openness of domestic debate on nuclear policy, division within political parties, and the role granted to parliament. The United Kingdom has held to an idea of order and responsible stewardship entailing the managed coexistence of nuclear deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation. Active pursuit of multilateral nuclear disarmament to this end has also helped governments to constrain domestic opposition to the nuclear force's (Trident's) renewal and modernization. The United Kingdom's alignment of domestic and international stances on nuclear weapons is today being jeopardized by its internal turmoil and by international discord over nuclear norms and rules.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear norms
• multilateral disarmament
• contestation
• United Kingdom
• Trident

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

William Walker is Professor Emeritus of International Relations, University of St Andrews. Prior to 1996, he worked at the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. His publications include, with D. Albright and F. Berkhout, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (1997); Nuclear Entrapment: THORP and the Politics of Commitment (1999); “Entrapment in large technology systems: institutional commitment and power relations” (Research Policy, 29, 2000); with M. Chalmers, Uncharted Waters: The UK, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question (2001); Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order (Adelphi Paper, 2004); “The UK, threshold status and responsible sovereignty” (International Affairs, 86, March 2010); “The absence of a taboo on the possession of nuclear weapons,” Review of International Studies, 36, October 2010; A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (2012); with N. Wheeler, “The problem of weak nuclear states” (Nonproliferation Review, 20, November 2013).

Additional information

Funding

This article has benefited from funding under U.S. Institute of Peace Annual Grant, Nuclear Norms in Global Governance [#160-12F].