Nuclear norms in global governance: A progressive research agenda

ABSTRACT

We argue that the framework of norms has generated a progressive research agenda in the field of global nuclear politics, providing important insights that traditional realist and materialist analyses ignore or dismiss. These insights are not on the margins of nuclear politics; rather, they answer central questions about nuclear non-use, possession, and the nonproliferation regime at large. These findings are not a fluke; instead, they stem from the powerful analytical framework of norms, which provides complexes of linked propositions about actor expectations and behavior in global nuclear politics. This article examines three of those propositions: the importance of the logic of appropriateness, the role of norm contestation, and the changes brought about by norm entrepreneurs. Finally, we identify other norms-related ideas that can further illuminate the dire policy crises facing global nuclear governance, as well as specific areas of nuclear politics that would benefit from norms-related scrutiny.

KEYWORDS:

• Norms
• nuclear proliferation
• nuclear nonproliferation
• nuclear disarmament
• constructivism
• global governance

Contemporary global nuclear politics face serious strains and major challenges. At the heart of those challenges are contesting normative claims about the legitimate exercise of state power, the (un)importance of treaty obligations, and even what “security” and “stability” mean. Without rejecting the utility of some realist, materialist, or quantitative analyses in untangling issues related to nuclear politics, we assert—in defiance of traditional wisdom—that ideas about appropriate conduct as well as justice and fairness are central to those challenges.

In this introductory article to the special issue, we argue that the use of norms in understanding global nuclear governance provides a progressive, productive, and fast-growing research agenda to understand contemporary global nuclear politics, yielding an “overarching analytical framework that generates complexes of related propositions” (Martin, 1999, p. 75). We first explore the critical scholarly literature on nuclear politics to assess its current landscape. In the next section, we outline the basic conceptual analytical framework that a norms-based approach provides, investigating three related key ideas that underpin and highlighting much of the literature on the topic, including the articles in this special issue. We conclude with a discussion of other promising avenues of investigation into how norms can enhance our understanding of nuclear governance and politics.

Throughout all of this, we pay special attention to the value of using norms to understanding policy puzzles in global nuclear governance. Indeed, we stress that norms are not mysterious, nor impervious to study with rigor. Rather, their impact on global nuclear politics can be studied in a systematic way using real-world cases and empirical evidence. As a result, we can use that knowledge to make both predictions and policy recommendations.

The current landscape of critical nuclear politics scholarship

For many decades, nuclear politics was usually understood through a materialist lens, most commonly realism. The realist focus on proliferation, deterrence, and strategy dominated thinking throughout the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the slowdown of the U.S.–USSR/Russia arms race opened up space for new thinking about nuclear weapons. New accounts of nuclear politics began flourishing outside the materialist tradition, arguing for the importance of ideas, norms, and beliefs in shaping both domestic and international nuclear policy. Non-materialist analyses have dramatically proliferated in the area of nuclear politics (as well as other areas of security studies). While non-positivist work was done before the end of the Cold War, it was often marginalized in journals not frequented by security studies scholars (for example, Cohn, 1987). The publication of Sagan’s (1997) article, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” in International Security brought non-materialist arguments about nuclear decision-making to the attention of mainstream security studies. In it, he argued that normatively driven considerations shape decisions to acquire nuclear weapons, in addition to domestic political machinations and more traditional national security concerns.

Since Sagan’s ground-breaking article, ideational analyses of nuclear politics have increased dramatically, and today they are truly mainstreamed. For example, Hymans (2006) and O’Reilly (2014) use the political psychology of elites to understand both proliferation and nonproliferation, while Long and Grillot (2000) tackle nuclear disarmament using leadership beliefs. Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010) argue that trust between states is an essential part of the success of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Identity considerations also influence and shape nuclear-related behavior, including German nonproliferation policy (Müller, 2003), British decisions on Trident renewal (Ritchie, 2010, 2012), and the Indo-Pakistan nuclear diplomacy (Carranza, 2016). In a related vein, Duncanson and Eschle (2008) use feminist analysis to highlight the identity contradictions in British nuclear policy. Examining discourse and representation gives us greater insight into both Iranian nuclear policy (Moshirzadeh, 2007) and Iranian nuclear diplomacy (Duncombe, 2016).

A number of authors use critical and poststructuralist methods to shine attention on how experts shape nuclear discourse in ways that encourage secrecy and delegitimize nuclear disarmament (Cohen, 1998, 2010; Cooper, 2006; Craig & Ruzicka, 2013; Pelopidas, 2011, 2016). Indeed, even the attempt to separate civilian from military nuclear capacity is not easily drawn, and the West’s traditional insistence upon this distinction may have contributed to pushing some states toward open military capabilities (Abraham, 2006). Nuclear weapons may even be understood, anthropologically speaking, as fetish objects (Harrington de Santana, 2009), and belief in nuclear deterrence may be seen as a myth rather than grounded in empirical evidence (Wilson, 2007).

If non-materialist analyses have become mainstreamed into the study of nuclear politics, then what is the importance and novelty of this special issue? The critical point is that the authors in this issue focus on norms, which is one specific approach to ideational analysis. Within the field of international relations, norms are typically associated with the research agenda of constructivism. The central tenant of constructivism is that politics is socially constructed; material reality is interpreted by political actors and that interpretation is what gives meaning to material conditions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Wendt, 1992). Norms shape these political interpretations, but so do identity, emotions, culture, rhetoric, and processes of socialization (see, for example, Adler, 1997; Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008; Crawford, 2000; Fierke, 2002; Hopf, 2013; Kier, 1995; Krebs & Jackson, 2007). Norms are one distinct part of the constructivist research program.

This special issue does more than just bring together one strand of constructivist-related research on nuclear politics, however. We argue that norms as an analytical framework provide great insight to understand the current roiling in nuclear politics. The actual literature on norms in nuclear politics is rather small, but it illustrates the potential for this powerful framework in grappling with a range of nuclear-related issues and problems, as we discuss next. The focus on norms is not meant to suggest that other ideational approaches such as identity are not useful, but rather to highlight how the analytically linked ideas from the norms literature have moved the field forward—and can do so even more.

Norms as an analytical framework in international relations

What qualifies as a progressive research agenda in international relations? Martin’s (1999) explanation is useful:

Social science does not consist simply of compiling lists of propositions and a tally of which are true, false, or undecided. Instead, it contributes to human knowledge by showing how sets of related propositions are tied to an underlying set of core assumptions and methods of analyzing social interaction. When a framework exists that ties together coherent sets of assumptions and propositions, one strong empirical finding, positive or negative, has myriad implications. It is this multiplier effect that makes theorizing worthwhile and creates at least the possibility of cumulative knowledge. (pp. 75–76)

While such discussion draws from Lakatos’s conception of a positivist research program (1970), a productive research agenda need not be locked into the rigid construct of a foundationalist, “objective” knowledge-production empire. With openness to the tentative nature of research findings, as well as awareness of the ever-present possibility of cultural biases, scholars can test, interrogate, and build upon each other’s work to advance understanding.

The use of norms in international relations clearly meets these criteria, with contributions from both positivist and critical academics. Although norm-related analysis has been used in the field for many decades, the current research agenda began in the late 1990s with the explosion of constructivist research around how norms shape state behavior. Much of the early research focused on disproving the realist contention that norms had little or superficial influence on international politics (and thus, it was implied, were not worthy of study). Finnemore and Sikkink’s seminal 1998 article on the norm life cycle gave scholars a conceptual framework to examine—investigate, test, critique, and ultimately modify. From this springboard, academics argued about the importance of transnational versus domestic norms, the roles of norm entrepreneurs, the epistemic foundations of norms, and whether—and to what extent—norm’s “coming of age” should figure into the life cycle.

While much of the early research was been positivist in nature, critical constructivists, and others have joined the conversation in important ways. These non-positivist and post-positivist scholars have pointed out the limitations of a static view of norms (Krook & True, 2012), criticized the over-focus on Western liberal norms (Heller & Kahl, 2013) and the marginalization of non-Western norms (Engelkamp, Glaab, & Renner, 2014), and implicit delegitimizing of local voices in the norm diffusion process (Acharya, 2004). As a result, the field has progressed and expanded, with a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of how norms arise, are contested, and influence elite thinking and decision-making.

In the same way, this rich, theoretically informed framework has advanced our theoretical and practical understanding of some of the most important questions in global nuclear governance, involving nuclear use, nuclear acquisition, nuclear acknowledgement and nuclear disarmament. Norms are “standards of appropriate behavior among actors of a given identity,” and have an essential component of “ought” to them—they are not just descriptive statements, but make moral and social demands of their audience (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). So the idea that normative claims lie at the center of global nuclear politics means that in addition to concerns about material power, states, decision-makers, and the public have conceptions about appropriate behavior that shape policy outcomes.

Numerous analytically linked ideas from the norms literature have stimulated the study of nuclear politics; in this article, we focus on three. At the highest level is the hypothesis that actors do things not only according to the logic of consequences, but also according to the logic of appropriateness (some deontological Kantian-inclined thinkers would call it “the logic of obligations”). At the mid-range, research on norms highlights the importance of norm contestation: How do differences in interpretations of norms, and norm violations, play out in the real world? Finally, at the agent level, the construct of “norm entrepreneur” has allowed an investigation into the actors responsible for norm change.

The logic of appropriateness in global nuclear governance

A fundamental proposition of norms literature is that actors do not rely solely on a cost-benefit calculation of utility when making decisions: They also are motivated by logics of appropriateness. As March and Olsen (2011) describe it, the logic of appropriateness can be characterized as “actors following internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility” (p. 479). Checkel (2005, p. 804) notes that the logic of appropriateness can be described as conscious role playing, whether one likes the role or not: The point is to know what is expected in a given community. Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004) suggest that when using the logic of appropriateness, “people making decisions ask themselves (explicitly or implicitly), ‘What does a person like me do in a situation like this?’” (p. 281).

Nuclear (non-)use

The logic of appropriateness has inspired a great deal of research in nuclear politics, and has the potential to generate much more. The most obvious thread relates to the profound phenomenon of lack of nuclear use (after its first introduction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), what is often referred to by scholars as the nuclear taboo. If nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of defense, and deterrence requires a credible threat of use, why have nuclear weapons not been used since their advent at the end of World War II? The answer is because of an evolving normative prohibition over nuclear use that has over time “stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction,” as Tannenwald (1999, p. 433) argues in her ground-breaking research on nuclear use. The logic of appropriateness is central to this normative prohibition. The value of this work is illustrated by the numerous challenges it has faced, for example, in Paul’s argument (2009) that the nuclear non-use should be better understood as a “tradition” instead of a “taboo,” and Press, Sagan and Valentino’s public opinion research (2013) that shows the American public may not feel beholden by the nuclear taboo or non-use tradition.

However, we suggest, both challenges to the nuclear taboo reinforce the value of the logic of appropriateness in understanding nuclear non-use. Paul (2009) argues that interest turned into tradition rather than deontological morality is what has motivated nuclear non-use; for him, the credibility of reputation has motivated non-use at least as much as the credibility of deterrence. This internalized decision calculus is by social pressure, as one would expect with regards to the logic of appropriateness. This conclusion is reinforced by Carranza (2018) in his article in this special issue in which he tackles the issue of the nuclear taboo outside the United States, in South Asia. He argues that while the non-use norm is indeed fragile in the cases of both India and Pakistan, the lack of nuclear conflict (so far) between the two states is best understood in reputational terms rather than because of military reasoning.

Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) focus on the American public. From the point of view of the logic of appropriateness, it is not surprising that ordinary citizens, when asked about nuclear use, may feel constrained by breaking a taboo or tradition. The logic of appropriateness requires an actor to ask, “What should a person like me do in a situation like this?” Members of the American public have no realistic possibility of ever making actual decisions on nuclear use, nor have they been socialized as actual nuclear decision-makers have. Indeed, recent work by Pauly (2017) using evidence from U.S. government war games indicates that both morality and tradition inform expert decision-making on nuclear use in simulated crises, confirming the logic of appropriateness strongly influences behavior in this critical area of nuclear politics.

Nuclear (non-)acquisition

Another key area where the logic of appropriateness has informed research in nuclear global governance concerns the decision whether to acquire nuclear weapons. A number of scholars argue that in particular, the nonproliferation norm embedded in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) rewrote what was and was not appropriate regarding nuclear possession, and this in turn shaped public debate and ultimately state decision-making around the world. The NPT clearly forbade nuclear acquisition; it transformed what had been an act of national pride into “an act of international outlawry” (Graham, 2004, p. 90).

Using the case of Sweden, Arnett (1998) argues that domestic political actors can greatly galvanize and enhance the sense of inappropriateness of nuclear weapons possession within countries, even when nuclear acquisition had been once a popular idea. Jonter (2016) adds an international dimension to this logic, noting that as Sweden became more invested in the global disarmament movement, political elites found it harder to justify a domestic nuclear weapons program as legitimate. Jasper (2012, p. 279) looks at the Swiss case more broadly through the lens of narrative and discourse. She concludes that as Swiss identity changed from “resistant neutral” to “humanitarian neutral,” the emerging nonproliferation norm helped solidify the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Rublee (2008, 2009) offers a broader generalization, contending the nonproliferation norm influenced nuclear restraint in both democracies and authoritarian states. In the same vein as Arnett, Jonter, and Jasper, her research indicates that in democracies, nuclear restraint is due in large part because the international norm against acquisition has been used by domestic peace advocates to paint their conservative, pro-nuclear opponents as on the inappropriate side of whatever domestic political fights into which nuclear weapons had been embedded. In authoritarian states, such as Egypt and Libya, while export controls and sanctions bought the global community time in slowing down nuclear acquisition, ultimately it was leadership decisions that accepted the global community’s judgment that nuclear possession was inappropriate (and also too costly) which ultimately led to the closing of their nuclear weapons programs.

In both democracies and authoritarian countries, Rublee (2009) argues, “most state elites absorbed and accepted the normative message of the nuclear nonproliferation regime over the course of rethinking what a successful state looked like” (p. 222). In other words, when it came to nuclear acquisition, leaders asked, “What should a person like me do in a situation like this?” and concluded that leaders like them would abide by their treaty commitments. It is important to note that none of these authors ignore the influence of material factors. Instead, they conclude that the interaction of domestic and international narratives around nuclear weapons led actors to reinterpret those material factors.

Nuclear disarmament

The logic of appropriateness has also generated important work about the legitimacy of nuclear possession and growing questions about nuclear disarmament. For example, Budjeryn’s work (2015) on Ukraine’s decision to return Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia provides clear insight into the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness faced by Ukrainian decision-makers. She argues that the NPT gave Ukraine only two choices: to act appropriately or inappropriately.

Besides guarding a separate normative space for nuclear possession, the NPT provided two, starkly dichotomous categories: [nuclear weapons state, NWS] and [non-nuclear weapons states, NNWS]. There was no category for nuclear ownership, distinct from possession, even substantiated by the succession norm, in the international normative space. Ukraine was ultimately incapable of creating and legitimizing a new category of nuclear ownership as an exception to the nonproliferation norm, and thus could only be, though not formally a violator, an aberration to the nuclear order, if it did not join the NPT. (2015, p. 222)

Budjeryn’s findings harmonize with Sagan’s earlier work on Ukraine. He argues, “[w]ithout the NPT, a policy of keeping a nuclear arsenal would have placed Ukraine in the category of France and China; instead, it placed Ukraine in the company of dissenters like India and Pakistan and pariahs like Iraq and North Korea” (1996/1997, p. 82). Of course, other factors influenced Ukrainian decision-making, including American pressure and concern about the Soviet response. But both superpower responses were funneled through, and legitimized by, the nonproliferation norm codified in the NPT (Rublee, 2015). Without the NPT, there would be no universal logic of appropriateness when it comes to nuclear acquisition and possession—only logic of consequences. But with the NPT, the logic of appropriateness is able to influence decisions in a variety of geographic and governance settings.

In this special issue, two articles illustrate how the logic of appropriateness shapes much of the discourse and action around nuclear disarmament. Hanson (2018) and Walker (2018) both examine disarmament-related norms—one looking at NNWS and the other at a NWS. Hanson’s work on “normalizing zero” outlines the struggle that both NNWS states and civil society have faced in making nuclear weapons possession inappropriate. When it comes to nuclear disarmament, the NWS face the question, “What should an actor like me do in a situation like this?” and currently, their clear answer is, “Keep nuclear weapons.” Whether the humanitarian initiative is able to delegitimize and taint this response enough so that their answer changes remains to be seen. But in terms of understanding what the pro-disarmament actors have been doing, as Hanson’s (2018) research shows, they are intent on making disarmament the only appropriate choice for civilized states. Walker’s (2018) article documents the response of one NWS to this type of moral and social scrutiny. He argues that both domestically and internationally, the United Kingdom has been trying to legitimize their continued nuclear possession as appropriate because they are restrained and responsible.

Norm contestation in nuclear politics

Norm contestation is a burgeoning area of research in international relations, with scholars examining resistance to norms in areas as diverse as the responsibility to protect to environmental norms, democratic governance to territorial integrity (Burai, 2016; Hensengerth, 2015; Rhodes & Harutyunyan, 2010; Welsh, 2013). This research is particularly relevant for nuclear politics. Does the norm contestation around the NPT signal that the treaty is in crisis, in retreat or in actual collapse, or in reasonably good health? Arguments about the strength of the NPT and/or the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime vary wildly.

At least part of the variation in arguments lies in confusion or disagreement over the normative content of the NPT. Almost all discussion of the NPT and norms focuses on the nonproliferation norm; there is little recognition that several other norms are also embedded within the NPT. Moreover, these norms are not necessarily mutually supportive, and in today’s diplomatic and strategic environment, they even seem to be in real tension with each other. Recognizing and relieving this tension is critical to moving forward in both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Norm contestation in international relations

The typical approach to norm contestation is to see it as a problem to be solved, as disturbances in the force, or even as obstacles to norm compliance. In contrast, norm contestation literature casts normative resistance in an entirely new light, arguing that norm contestation is largely a sign of health for a number of reasons. When norm contestation is permitted or encouraged, it plays a key role in legitimizing the products of that contestation. And this is very important: a norm that cannot be contested cannot be legitimate. As Wiener (2014) argues:

The principle of contestedness reflects the global agreement that, in principle, the norms, rules and principles of governance are contested and that they therefore require regular contestation in order to work. For the legitimacy gap between fundamental norms and standardised procedures to be filled, therefore, access to regular contestation (as opposed to ad-hoc contestation) needs to be facilitated, in principle, for all involved stakeholders. (p. 3)

Additionally, refusal to adhere to a norm should not be viewed be merely or primarily rule-breaking motivated by self-interest. Rather, norm non-compliance can be an act of contestation, a way to show dissatisfaction with the norm, even the regime, and a desire to open a discourse about it. Havercroft (2017) explains:

Just as breaking a domestic law disrupts political order, breaking international norms disrupts international order. Wiener, following Tully and Wittgenstein, argues that not every instance of norm transgression is a case of a state either not understanding a norm or breaking it to simply advance self-interest. In some instances, states can engage in transnational disobedience (i.e. the international equivalent of civil disobedience) in order to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with a norm. (p. 104)

In this way, norm contestation can help to modify norms or even generate new ones—with the advantage of being produced through a process that engenders legitimacy. Instead of seeing norm creation as mainly stemmed from the domain of transnational norm entrepreneurs (as implied by the norm life cycle), Havercroft (2017) identifies many different actors—often with very different motivations—throughout the international system play a part in norm generation “through contestations over appropriate behavior across the different cultures of the system” (p. 101).

Thus, norm contestation is not something to be stamped out. Rather, it should be looked at as the legitimate exercise of an actor’s rights to interrogate the norms by which they are judged. By allowing access to contestation, we improve norm legitimacy and hence can end up producing stronger and more precise norms that can generate better compliance.

Norm contestation in nuclear politics

Norm contestation enlightens one of the most acrimonious conflicts in global nuclear governance: the Western charge that NNWS are dragging their feet on strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, and the NNWS response that they refuse to add more nonproliferation obligations when the NWS have not met their disarmament obligations. Understanding this conflict requires an understanding of the different norms embedded in the NPT, particularly the norms of nonproliferation (Articles I–II), civilian peaceful use (Article IV), and disarmament (Article VI). The nonproliferation norm delegitimizes the spread of nuclear weapons outside of the five states permitted (for the time being) to possess nuclear weapons under the NPT. The civilian peaceful use norm, however, makes it “appropriate” for law-abiding states to develop civilian nuclear technology without fear of being cast as threatening or war-like. Finally, the disarmament norm places a moral obligation on all states to work towards general disarmament, that is, a world free of nuclear weapons—a burden heaviest on the five NPT nuclear weapons states.

Norm contestation has occurred in relation to all of these norms. However, perhaps the most serious conflict has occurred because of what many NNWS perceive to be the elevation of the nonproliferation norm over the civilian use and disarmament norms. Many NNWS, particularly those not allied with the NWS, argue that they have fulfilled their own nonproliferation commitments, but the NWS instead of fulfilling their own disarmament commitments, they rather focus on enhancing the NNWS nonproliferation obligations, to the detriment of the civilian peaceful use norm. Hence, when the NWS and their allies seek to improve ways to prevent proliferation, the NNWS resist strongly, only to face criticism that they are undermining nonproliferation and safeguards.

A good example is the largely North–South political struggle over the Additional Protocol (AP), which goes far beyond the technical issue of inspections to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a great deal more access to a state’s nuclear facilities to ensure compliance. While many states support the universalization of the AP, others argue that as long as the NWS refuse to fulfill their disarmament obligations, they will not increase their own nonproliferation obligations (Rublee, 2014, p. 90).

A great deal of research has been done on this particular normative conflict. Some authors frame the question as a matter of NNWS resistance to nonproliferation measures; one volume dedicated to the question begins by characterizing the resistance as playing the spoiler and uncooperative behavior (Fields, 2014, p. 3). Grotto (2010) posits the dilemma in this way: “Why do states that oppose nuclear proliferation resist initiatives to strengthen the nonproliferation regime? There is virtually universal support for the basic principle of nonproliferation—all countries but four are states-party to the NPT” (p. 1).

Krause and Latham’s work (1998) on the construction of arms control norms provide insight into Grotto’s question: non-Western countries resist “universal” norms because they are not truly universal. While the emphasis on nonproliferation over disarmament may seem rational to Western analysts, Krause and Latham point out that this judgment is culturally loaded rather than objective in nature. They argue:

Within non-Western countries, the dominant Western cultural account competes and interacts with indigenous cultural accounts to produce a wide range of nation-specific security-building scripts which are then enacted by foreign policy officials. Thus it should come as no surprise that, even in this era of globalization, many non-Western states are ambivalent, antagonistic or resistant to “global” norms. Nor should it be too surprising that Western arms control, non-proliferation and confidence-building processes or concepts have not necessarily taken root when they have been exported to different regional contexts, or to more multilateral forums. (p. 46)

In a special issue of the Nonproliferation Review, a number of authors investigate a similar question: To what extent did U.S. President Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review influence various states’ attitudes on stronger nonproliferation measures? Knopf (2013) also examines the issue. All the authors share similar conclusions: Empirical evidence confirms that Washington’s attitude toward disarmament influences NNWS willingness to agree to strong nonproliferation measures. Progress on disarmament is not the only variable influencing state willingness to participate in additional nonproliferation measures, but as Sagan and Vaynman (2011, p. 240) put it, it is a necessary although not sufficient condition.

This conclusion is an important one. NNWS norm contestation—their resistance to additional nonproliferation burdens as a protest of the lack of progress on disarmament—is not simply cynical or disruptive rhetoric intended to cover nuclear hedging. If this were the case, one would not expect them to react with concrete, positive steps on nonproliferation in response to U.S. nonproliferation initiatives. However, this is exactly what was found.

Resistance in search of justice

Another group of researchers investigate why this contestation is so common, examining NNWS explicit concerns over justice and fairness in global nuclear governance. NPT norms have been enforced inequitably, they argue, with nonproliferation prioritized over disarmament and even civilian peaceful use (Tannenwald, 2013). It is no surprise that the NPT has been characterized as the “most brilliant half-successful arms control agreement in history” ever, because of its excellent record on containing proliferation but complete failure to produce nuclear disarmament (Thakur, 2015, p. 191).

Therefore, many have concluded that NPT is fundamentally unjust. In their article in this special issue, Müller and Wunderlich (2018) note that:

[t]he belief in the justice of a claim has the power to put emotions behind seemingly rational demands. That should not be underrated: In the history of the NPT, options for reasonable compromises repeatedly escaped the contenders because of this emotional dimension. (p. 344)

In his analysis of the disarmament norm, Freedman (2013) asserts the importance of nonproliferation, non-use, and deterrence, but cautions that they “are all vulnerable to being rejected by those who see them as cynical instruments of their opponents and the prejudicial morality of patronizing Western elites” (p. 105).

In this special issue, Knopf (2018) looks at this issue from a different end—showing how difficult it is to approach non-compliance as a mere enforcement issue, both because of general problems in enforcing norms and also because of specific issues with the nuclear nonproliferation regime itself (lack of universality, conflicting norms, and difficulties with using tit-for-tat to enforce norms). This dynamic reflects a norm conflict, in this case over the relative priority of nonproliferation versus disarmament. Knopf suggests that NNWS may consider additional resistance to nonproliferation measures as a way to potentially “enforce” NWS compliance with their disarmament obligations, although he acknowledges such a strategy may not succeed.

The policy conclusions from this literature are blunt: Norm contestation over nuclear disarmament is not simply sour grapes or a cover for nuclear hedging. Rather, active resistance to increased nonproliferation measures is, at least in part, an exercise of contestation of the (mis)prioritization of global nuclear norms by the NNWS. The response to this contestation should not be “shaming,” a sort of arm-twisting. From the perspective of NWS, this is a valuable insight into how to get more countries on board with stronger nonproliferation measures. It may also serve as a warning that the nonproliferation regime itself is threatened by the NWS unwillingness to take disarmament more seriously. On the other hand, if normative dialogue is allowed on the issues of justice and fairness, on the perceived equitable prioritization of the global nuclear order, this could result in a greater legitimacy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Norm entrepreneurs in nuclear politics

The concept of “norm entrepreneurs” has been critical to the development of the constructivist research agenda a quarter of a century ago. As scholars in the 1990s struggled to understand how international norms changed, the idea of norm entrepreneurs allowed constructivists to produce research into the norm diffusion process in a way that affirmed the mutually constitutive relationship between actors and structure.

Norm entrepreneurs as intentional agents

Within international relations, the term “norm entrepreneur” became popularized with Finnemore and Sikkink’s article on the norm life cycle. For Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), a norm entrepreneur had a specific role to play: in the emergence phase of the norm life cycle, individual activists or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—the norm entrepreneurs—“attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms” (p. 895). However, most of the literature uses the term “norm entrepreneur” more broadly. For example, in the first known use of the term, Müller defined a norm entrepreneur as “an individual or organization that sets out to change the behavior of others” (as cited in Florini, 1996, p. 375). Scholars working on norms generally refer to the term as shorthand for people who promote norm change by challenging the appropriateness of the existing norms or standards. However, we argue here for a more specific definition: norm entrepreneurs are those actors who seek to “sell” their normative judgments so that they are incorporated into policy. Norm entrepreneurs do not simply want to change norms—they want to see policy altered to reflect changed norms. For this reason, norm entrepreneurs need some connection to the policy-making process.

Research on norm entrepreneurs goes beyond simply identifying key actors in normatively driven policy changes. Rather, it identifies the significance of agency, as well as the multidimensional nature of those agents, in domestic, national, and international policy contexts. Norm contestation does not take place in a policy vacuum without engaged individuals who care enough to resist or disrupt. For this reason, we can find norm entrepreneurs at all stages of the norm life cycle—not just in the norm emergence phase. As Müller and Wunderlich (2013) note in their edited volume on norm dynamics:

In each phase (establishment, development, decay), norms do not change automatically. The factors just discussed do not work like forces in physics, such as impulse, pressure or gravity. They need human agency to gain social meaning and take effect … Salient events are almost completely uncertain as to how they are interpreted, and thus become translated into regime-related activities. It all depends on the way actors deal with such events. There is no norm dynamics without intentional agency. (p. 13)

Even structural drivers of change, such as technology innovative or major power transitions, depend on agents to translate material reality into policy challenges. The direction of challenges—whether to reinforce or disrupt existing norms—require individuals to interpret, make prioritized decisions, and then set purposeful courses of action.

Norm entrepreneurs and nuclear restraint

Recent studies in nuclear politics have already identified the importance of norm entrepreneurs at multiple levels of analysis. At the individual level, numerous scholars have indicated the importance of domestic anti-nuclear opponents in preventing states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Rublee (2014) notes the pattern:

Civil society groups engaged in a battle to construct nuclear weapons as incompatible with their country’s national identity—in contestation with conservative elites, and in some cases the military, who sought to frame nuclear weapons as a neutral technological advancement that any country with a sophisticated military would acquire. In this fight over the meaning of nuclear weapons, the international norm against proliferation was essential. In each case, civil society groups used the international norm to batter their conservative opponents, arguing that acquiring nuclear weapons would pit them against global opinion and make their country out to be aggressive and militaristic. The international norm allowed domestic peace groups to show that opposition to nuclear weapons wasn’t simply their quirky or naïve opinion, but rather that the weight of the world was on their side. (p. 40)

While the international norm against proliferation was in itself very important, it was the talent and agency of these domestic anti-nuclear norm entrepreneurs in harnessing that international sentiment in winning the fight against domestic nuclear acquisition. This reflects the argument of Müller and Wunderlich (2013) referenced earlier: “[Norms] need human agency to gain social meaning and take effect” (p. 13). This general pattern of domestic anti-nuclear norm entrepreneurs battling—and defeating—pro-nuclear groups can be seen in Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and Norway (Arnett, 1998; Jasper, 2012; Jonter, 2016; Rublee, 2009).

States as nuclear norm entrepreneurs

States have also taken on the role of norm entrepreneur in global nuclear governance, and not always along anti-nuclear lines. In the Müller and Wunderlich edited volume (2013), authors analyze how numerous states have attempted to shape international nuclear norms: established and rising powers (the United States, Russia, China, and India), good international citizens (Canada, Germany, and Sweden), and non-aligned reformers and revolutionaries (Egypt, South Africa, Iran, and North Korea). In most of these cases, the direction of the normative advocacy has been against the NPT norms as generally understood. For example, at times (including very recently) the United States has spearheaded campaigns to undermine the norms of disarmament and peaceful use (Fey, Hellmann, Klinke, Plümmer, & Rauch, 2013).

In this special issue, Lantis (2018) provides an in-depth case study of Washington engaging in what some perceived as the weakening of the nonproliferation norm: procuring a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow India to purchase uranium, despite Delhi’s refusal to sign the NPT. Lantis argues that President George W. Bush and his advisors used norm redefinition—that proliferation was problematic primarily for “bad” actors—and norm substitution—that proliferation security was more important than the nonproliferation norm.

One possible criticism of these new studies is that their authors seem to use “norm entrepreneurship” as equivalent to policy promotion. Because the concept of norm entrepreneur must have some roots in morality—otherwise it is mere synonym for lobbyist or policy advocate—it is not entirely clear that in this case, the United States qualifies, given the lack of normative passion in its policy promotion efforts. Regardless, the importance of this research lies in understanding how the United States has been able to engage with the normative cloth of building global nuclear governance, using techniques to soften the criticism to status-quo norms. As a result, Washington’s efforts appear to be more successful than if they had attempted to simply dismiss those norms outright.

Other research on nuclear norm entrepreneurs highlights the role of norm contestation in today’s turbulent nuclear governance. Chapters in the Müller and Wunderlich (2013) volume, as well as other recent research, show through careful case studies that political opposition to the NPT often has normative dimensions, in addition to national interest. For example, India played an important role in promoting nuclear disarmament in the early days of the nuclear age; its refusal to join the NPT and its peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 clearly fit as norm contestation—resistance to what it saw as a discriminatory, unjust regime (Fey et al., 2013). However, despite its own development of military nuclear capability, India, in fits and starts, continued its normatively driven advocacy of disarmament, for example, with the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988. As Kumar (2014) notes, “India seems to have traversed all conceivable role expressions of the word ‘agency’ in the norm construction process” (p. 102). Iranian nuclear development, while often perceived as rogue behavior with the intent of acquiring nuclear weapons, also can be understood at least partially as norm entrepreneurship to promote what it seems a return to the original nuclear order, in which NNWS are permitted full access to civilian nuclear technology and NWS uphold their nuclear disarmament obligations (Wunderlich, Hellmann, Müller, Reuter, & Schmidt, 2013). Elsewhere, Wunderlich (2014) argues that Iranian nuclear behavior is useful as a case study to understand “‘rogue states’ as entrepreneurs rather than as subjects of hegemonic intervention” (p. 84).

Finally, academics have looked at norm entrepreneurship of states promoting nuclear disarmament. Becker-Jakob, Hofmann, Müller, and Wunderlich (2013) analyze the policies of Canada, Germany and Sweden, arguing that the countries’ activist roles waxed and waned with their own domestic political leadership, but overall, the states contributed a great deal to norm initiation and activation in the disarmament space. In a similar vein, Hanson (2010) discusses the work of “advocacy states”—Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway—and argues that while national stances ebbed and flowed, their work over two decades laid the groundwork for President Obama’s disarmament push.

Norms and global nuclear governance: Toward future research agendas

In this article, we have argued that using the framework of norms to understand global nuclear governance provides us with insights that traditional realist and materialist analyses do not notice. These insights are not on the margins of nuclear politics. They answer key questions about nuclear non-use, nuclear possession, and nuclear nonproliferation. These findings are not a fluke. They stem from the powerful conceptual framework of norms, which provides context and linkages between actor expectations and conduct in nuclear politics.

This article has examined carefully three of those propositions: the relevance and importance of the logic of appropriateness, the role of norm contestation, and the changes brought about by norm entrepreneurs. All of these point towards the need for additional research. With the logic of appropriateness, other nuclear weapons states may view the U.S.’s abandonment of the disarmament agenda as a proper role for them to play as well. An empirical investigation into what extent the American disregard for Article VI influenced elites in other nuclear-armed states would be a real contribution. Research on norm contestation shows that allowing contestation can improve norm legitimacy and hence can end up producing stronger and more precise norms that can generate better compliance. Given the lack of avenues for contestation in the NPT, how could the international community increase the ability of actors to authentically contest nuclear-related norms? Are formal avenues necessary, or would informal but regularized mechanisms be enough? Norm entrepreneurs have played an important role in preventing states from acquiring nuclear weapons; how might their successes be used to influence disarmament policy in nuclear-armed states?

In addition to these three propositions, a number of other norms-related ideas that can further illuminate the challenges facing global nuclear governance, as well as specific areas of nuclear politics whose understanding would benefit from norms-based scrutiny.

The extensive social psychology literature on norms, and the growing international relations body of work making use of that literature, provides many other potential fruitful lines of research for academics and policy-makers concerned about global nuclear politics. A serious challenge in global nuclear governance is that transnational norms tend to be interpreted through local filters and contexts. The rich theoretical and empirical work on norm localization—the process by which global norms are digested locally—would be a useful lens through which to study this issue. Questions about how to improve norm effectiveness, and thus norm compliance, are clearly of interest to the nuclear community; research from social psychology could be especially useful for academics and policymakers (see, for example, Nelissen & Mulder, 2013). International relations scholars have theorized about the dynamics of, and impact of, norm life cycle, especially decay and death. This growing literature would be especially helpful given contemporary concerns around the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Some particular topics within global nuclear governance especially lend themselves to a norms-based analysis. For example, the recently negotiated Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty—enhanced by the awarding of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty—are often seen as a naïve attempt by NNWS to force the hand of NWS. However, if framed in normative terms, the ban treaty passion is a fresh effort to introduce new space, infused with morality and norms, into the global nuclear politics discourse.

The main spaces for discussion and disagreement over nuclear politics have been the NPT Review Conferences, held every five years. However, these fora are shaped by the agendas of the NWS. Even when the NNWS were able to make significant progress—for example, with the Thirteen Practical Steps for nuclear disarmament at the 2000 NPT RevCon—they still find themselves at the mercy of the NWS. For example, in 2005 RevCon, the United States and other Western states refused to acknowledge the Thirteen Practical Steps, and the United States even said there were no disarmament (Article VI) issues. Any contestation that was allowed through the NPT RevCons seems to be largely rhetorical. So it should come as no surprise that NNWS decided to create a new weapons treaty that would allow them to contest the flouting of the disarmament norm under the NPT.

North Korea is another challenging issue in nuclear politics. Pyongyang’s insistence to continue its nuclear program may seem resistant to norms-based analysis or policy-making. However, research on norms has in fact much to say about norm violators. Given that norms are standards of appropriate conduct for actors with a given identity, it follows that actors without that given identity are unlikely to be influenced by normative sanctions. In this way, these actors could potentially undermine global nuclear norms. As Freedman (2013) notes, “[t]hose most likely to end the tradition of non-use are Kim Jong-un of North Korea, some future leader of Pakistan, or even a non-state actor who has gained access to a nuclear device—not one of the established nuclear powers” (p. 104).

Norm-based analysis may prove relevant to other aspects of nuclear politics. Farrell and Lambert (2001) investigated the norms behind U.S. nuclear targeting; their approach, expanded, and updated, may be relevant to the cases of all other nuclear-armed states. The role of the CTBT and the IAEA in promoting nuclear-related norms, such as non-testing and civilian use, should also be interrogated: How effective have they been, and in what ways their work be strengthened?

Finally, following the lead of Krause (2011), scholars can take the broader view to uncover and interrogate the norms that underlie how we think about arms control and disarmament. He notes that transparency and intrusiveness—critical to any arms control agreement today—are comparatively new norms and yet embraced as though they intuitively necessary (p. 24). However, verification itself is a socially constructed concept. The level of verification needed for parties to feel assured of compliance is directly related to trust and strength of the relationship between the parties. What other norms underlie key nuclear policies, including deterrence and nonproliferation, and to what effect?

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the workshop participants for their constructive ideas, including Scott Sagan, Nina Tannenwald, George Perkovich, Anne Harrington, Lyndon Burford, Benoît Pelopidas, and Steven Lee. They also thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Maria Rost Rublee is an associate professor at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. Her book, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint, received the Alexander George Book Award for best book in political psychology. She has received grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Studies Association (ISA), the Asia:NZ Foundation, and the Japan Foundation. Interest on her work on constructivism and nuclear politics has led to over 20 international talks as keynote or plenary speaker to academics and policy-makers. Her work has been published in a variety of international journals, including International Studies Review, Comparative Political Studies, Pacific Focus, and the Nonproliferation Review. She edited a four-volume Major Works series Nuclear Politics through Sage, with co-editor Professor Ramesh Thakur. She is Chair of the International Security Studies Section of ISA.

Avner Cohen is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS). He is widely known for his path-breaking historical studies of the Israeli nuclear program. He is a two-time winner of the MacArthur Foundation research and writing awards, 1990 and 2004. He was also a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 1997–1998 and 2007–2008. Currently, he is also a Global Fellow with the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is the co-editor of Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity (1986) and The Institution of Philosophy (1989), and the author of The Nuclear Age as Moral History (in Hebrew, 1989). His most acclaimed book, Israel and the Bomb, was published in 1998. His latest book, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb, was published in 2010.

ORCID

Maria Rost Rublee http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5225-6698

Additional information

Funding

This article, and the special issue it introduces, were developed from the Nuclear Norms in Global Governance workshop, funded by the United States Institute of Peace [160-12F].