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ABSTRACT
Most debates on U.S. military strategy in the Western Pacific revolve around the question of how to deter China. Advocates of deterrence by punishment believe that the Chinese threat is serious but not critical, because the United States can leverage its global military-technological advantages to preserve a position of regional military primacy. Those in favor of deterrence by denial point to China’s potential and “home advantages,” and argue that the United States should settle for more modest objectives such as preventing Chinese regional military dominance. I argue that the high level of uncertainty around Chinese capabilities and the evolving Sino-American regional military balance have led the United States to adopt a flexible strategy, and embrace distinct–even contradictory–operational concepts to deter Beijing: The United States itself mostly focuses primarily on deterrence by punishment, while actively encouraging and enabling its regional allies to develop deterrence by denial.
Acknowledgements
For useful and constructive feedback, the author would like to thank Jordan Becker, Caterina Carta, Jonathan Caverley, Zack Cooper, Linde Desmaele, Robert Jervis, Alexander Lanoszka, Alexander Mattelaer, Hugo Meijer, Evan Brayden Montgomery, Florian Trauner, Toshi Yoshihara, and three anonymous reviewers.
Disclose statement
No potential conflict of interest has been reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Luis Simón is professor of international security at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. He is also an Associate Fellow at the Baltic Defense College, and a member of the editorial board of Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly. Luis received his PhD from the University of London, and held a postdoctoral fellowship at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies (Columbia University). His research has appeared in such journals as Security Studies, International Affairs, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Geopolitics, Survival, and The RUSI Journal.
Notes
1 My research focuses on the period following the Obama administration’s announcement of its rebalance to Asia in 2011. I draw on relevant academic and expert literature, and multiple confidential interviews with current and former U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials. Between October 2015 and November 2019, I have conducted 31 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with senior U.S. defense officials and experts over multiple field trips to Washington, DC. Most of the officials and experts interviewed have or have been directly involved in strategic planning, policy planning, international security affairs, or Asia and Pacific security affairs. The information extracted from the interviews has been triangulated with data from official U.S. government documents and secondary literature.
2 Anti-access capabilities are used to prevent or constrain the deployment of opposing forces into a theater of operations, whereas area-denial capabilities are used to reduce their freedom of maneuver once in a theater. For a discussion of A2/AD in the context of Chinese strategy see Mahnken, Citation2011a.
3 I thank Robert Jervis for raising this point.
4 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
5 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
6 The depiction of optimism and pessimism hereby presented is based on an assessment of the military balance, not on a perception of Chinese intentions. In this sense, those who advocate for punishment may be optimistic about the military balance, but pessimistic about Chinese intentions. In turn, some denial advocates can be more optimistic about Chinese intentions. I thank Robert Jervis for raising this important point.
7 ASB has been subject to a good share of criticism, especially from the U.S. Army. Efforts to find a role for the Army led to a re-labeling of the concept to Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in January 2015. See Schwartz and Greenert (Citation2012); Van Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich Jr., and Thomas (Citation2010); Friedberg (Citation2014).
8 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
9 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
10 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
11 On the risks of entrapment in East Asia see Cha (Citation2000).
12 Interview with former U.S. defense official, October 26, 2016.
13 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
14 Interview with U.S. defense official in Washington, DC, November 3, 2017. See also Ross (Citation2002).
15 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019. On the importance of dualism in Chinese strategy see Rosydin (Citation2019).
16 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
17 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
18 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
19 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.
20 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019. See also Rehman, Stillion, and Thomas (Citation2014).
21 Interview with U.S. defense official, October 29, 2019.
22 Interview with U.S. defense official, October 27, 2016.
23 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019. See also Gunzinger and Clarke (2013).
24 Interview with U.S. defense official, October 29, 2019. See also Watai (Citation2018).
25 Interview with former U.S. defense official, October 27, 2016.
26 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2017.
27 Interview with U.S. defense official, October 26, 2016.
28 Interviews with multiple U.S. defense officials and experts in Washington, DC, October 2015-November 2019.