A theory of nuclear disarmament: Cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime

ABSTRACT

What might prompt a nuclear-armed state to give up its arsenal? Nuclear disarmament has provided a nominally shared goal for virtually all the world’s states for decades, yet surprisingly little effort has been devoted to systematically theorizing its drivers. This article aims to begin filling this void. I proceed in three steps. First, I discuss the conceptual, material, and ideational features of renunciation to arrive at a rudimentary understanding of what, fundamentally, nuclear disarmament as a political process involves. Second, I scope out the empirical evidence on which a general theory of nuclear renunciation might be based. Third, synthesizing the dominant explanations for the cases discussed in the second part, I outline a basic account of nuclear relinquishment and discuss the compatibility of this account with common assumptions about disarmament practice. I conclude that the best evidence available suggests that adversarial politics and stigmatization are necessary conditions for renunciation.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear disarmament
• theory
• case studies
• analogies
• norms
• adversarial politics

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Benoît Pelopidas, Thomas Fraise, CSP’s editor-in-chief, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and corrections.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In this paper, the term “nuclear disarmament” is used interchangeably with “renunciation,” “relinquishment,” and “abolition” to signify the physical dismantlement of a state’s nuclear arsenal. As understood here, nuclear disarmament would also involve the destruction or conversion of the state’s wider nuclear weapons program, though not necessarily the irreversible elimination of all fissile material or all nuclear facilities.

2 While on one end of the spectrum theorists subscribing to neo-materialist ontologies have conceptualized nuclear arms as just one of a myriad of transitory or “unstable” technologies (Bourne, 2016), subscribers to the theory of the nuclear revolution see nuclear weapons as exceptional and incomparable to any other invention (e.g., Craig, 2020).

3 It has been suggested that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine disarmed because they, in contrast to Russia, did not possess robust command and control systems and, by extension, did not have secure second strike capabilities and were thus vulnerable to disarming strikes by Russia (e.g., Tagma, 2010). However, simple command and control systems could probably have been devised relatively quickly had the necessary political will been present. Pending that, the three states (or at any rate Ukraine and Kazakhstan) could easily have issued public statements that nuclear field commanders were authorized and obliged to counter any surprise attack with use of tactical nuclear weapons, something that would arguably yield more than enough credibility for an “existential deterrence” posture. It seems doubtful that any aggressor could have been confident that a bolt from the blue would fully disarm the target state, in particular with respect to Belarus and Ukraine, which held large arsenals.

4 As discussed above, the security environment may have been of less direct relevance in this case.

Additional information

Funding

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 841764 (SNNO), Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions.

Notes on contributors

Kjølv Egeland

Kjølv Egeland is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at the Nuclear Knowledges Program at the Center for International Studies (CERI) at Sciences Po in Paris, lecturer in International Security at the Paris School of International Affairs, and a researcher at the Norwegian Academy of International Law in Oslo. His work focuses on disarmament and global nuclear order.