Marching NATO eastward: Can international relations theory keep pace?

Summary

Despite the different approaches taken by the various authors, it is interesting to note that at least one conclusion is almost universally shared: while many factors influenced NATO enlargement, there is a general consensus that the US was the driving force behind the policy, and that the US's preponderance of power is an important part of the explanation. It is interesting to note that while the contributors often disagree over the degree to which NATO's level of institutionalization and specific organizational characteristics matter, there is agreement that they do matter to some extent.

Readers will find that the volume also provides an excellent example of how practically and non‐dogmatically to use theory to explain particular political events. None of the contributors to this volume, for instance, is so wedded to a theory that he or she forces the facts to fit. Most of the contributors show a clear willingness to point out the limitations of their own framework rather than lead readers astray. Many of the contributors are forced to extend or supplement their approaches in order to explain why the United States wants NATO to enlarge. Although different approaches are able to offer partial explanations, it seems clear that no single theory could be taken off the shelf and applied without modification.

Notes

For their valuable comments and suggestions, I thank Ashlee Bailey, Beverly Crawford, Kevin Donovan, James M. Goldgeier, Michael Gorges, Kenneth P. Miller, Kenneth N. Waltz and two anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to Richard Andreas for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of any organization with which the author is affiliated.