France, the United Kingdom and deterrence in the twenty-first century

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Notes

This is the criterion found in the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, though it is now generally acknowledged that certain types of fission devices are technically credible without having been fully tested in this manner.

For a more detailed account of the evolution of French policy see Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp.75–178.

Pascal Boniface, French Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War, Occasional paper (Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1998), p.11.

Pascal Boniface, French Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War, Occasional paper (Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1998), pp.6–7.

President Jacques Chirac, Defense Nationale, (Aug.–Sept. 1996), p.9 as quoted in Boniface, French Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War, p.4, ref.9.

NPT/CONF.2000/2000/21, 1 May 2000.

Arguably this has always been a characteristic of French, though not UK policy. It's best known early exposition was Charles Ailleret ‘Defense dirigée ou defense tous azimuts’, Defense Nationale (Dec.1967).

In the UK case this was because NATO continued with the posture they had adopted when facing a perceived superior WTO conventional threat. In the French case the argument was that it was consistent with the right to national self defence recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter: see Bruno Tertrais, ‘National Policy: France Stands Alone’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2004, Vo1.4, p.51. Tertrais also argues that both France and the UK subscribe to the norm of ‘belligerent reprisals’, which implies that any non-nuclear weapon state breaking its non-proliferation commitments automatically forfeits the protection offered by its nuclear security assurances.

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm5566, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 2002), p.12 para.21.

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm5566, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 2002), p.12 para.21.

IThe Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm5566, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 2002), paras 21, 22.

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm5566, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 2002), para.23.

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm5566, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 2002), para.22.

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm5566, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 2002), para.26.

Delivering Security in a Changing World Defence White Paper, HMSO, London, December 2003, Cm6041-I, p.9.

Tertrais, op cit., p.51.

Tertrais, op cit., p.52, quoting General Henri Bentegeat, Chief of Defence.

Tertrais, op cit., p.52, quoting General Henri Bentegeat, Chief of Defence.

For a French assessment of the current situation see Therese Delpech, ‘The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean’, RUSI Journal, Vol.147, No.4 (August 2002), pp.46–52.

For a comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson and Mark Smith, Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, Southampton Papers in International Policy, No.4 (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2001).

The most recent version of these commitments were annexed to letters sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Permanent Representatives of China (A/50/155-S/1995/265), France (A/50/154-S/1995/264), Russia (A/50/151-S/1995/261), the United Kingdom (A/50/152-S/1995/262), and the United States (A/50/153-S/1995/263) in New York on 5–6 April 1995.

Allain Juppé, ‘Quel Horizon pour la politique étrangère de la France?’, Politique Etrangére, (Spring 1995), p.147 as quoted in Boniface, French Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War.

One reason for having easily recognisable distinctions between conventional and nuclear delivery systems, or having nuclear warheads known to be in storage, would be to prevent self-deterrence. This could arise in situations where nuclear and conventional warheads were deployed on the same delivery system, and an opponent was believed to be operating a nuclear force on the basis of ‘fire on warning’. In that situation, a conventional attack could be inhibited by the fear that it would generate an automatic nuclear response.