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Notes
For more detail on this see Bernd W. Kubbig, ‘Coping with Weapons of Mass Destruction’, paper presented to the Annual Review Meeting, Mountbatten Centre International Missile Forum, 26–29 May 2002, Southampton, available at <http://www.hsfk.de/abm/forum/pdfs/mciskubb.pdf>(rev. 12 Oct. 2004).
A point of terminological clarification: Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) = (National) Missile Defense ([N]MD) + Tactical Missile Defense (TMD) in terms of regional defense/Eurodefense.
Of course ‘deterrence’ is a constructed term itself. For a helpful working definition which I implicitly use in this paper see Colin S. Gray, ‘Deterrence in the 21st Century’, Comparative Strategy, No.19 (2000). pp.255–61: ‘Deterrence is what social scientists pompously and obscurely call a “relational variable”. Both of those words really matter. Deterrence is the product of a relationship, it is not something one can generate unilaterally. And it is a variable; it is a shifting value. To go back a step, deterrence is a condition wherein a deterree – the object of deterrent menaces – chooses not to behave, in ways in which he would otherwise have chosen to behave, because he believes that the consequences would be intolerable. Deterrence, the theory, is quite independent of the means one has available or the strategies one favors. Deterrence is deterrence. Nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, deterrence for fear of asymmetric action, deterrence for fear of punishment of your society, deterrence for fear of military defeat in war (and its consequences) – it is all deterrence, the same theory and subject. Deterrence in the 21st century is no different in theory, and in the structure of practice, from deterrence in the 20th century or indeed in the fifth century BC. You may, or may not, find nuclear holocaust more deterring than the prospect of mass rape, slavery, and impalement (among other less than wholly amusing consequences of defeat), but the prospect of either basket of unpleasantness may well deter. How does deterrence work? This deceptively simple question requires the most uncompromisingly sharp-edged answer. Specifically, deterrence works because a policy maker (or a polity, collectively) decides that it is deterred’.
See Alexander Kelle, ‘Germany’, in Harald Miiller (ed.), Europe and Nuclear Disarmament. Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1998), p.97.
See, for example, Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotentiale, Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2000, (Berlin: Bundesregierung, 2001), p.52. The same holds true for the most recent annual report, 2001. See Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotentiale, Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2001 (Berlin: Bundesregierung, 2002), pp. 53–4.
Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2000, p.44 and Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2001, p.44.
Quoted in ‘NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept’, statement by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC, 23–24 April 1999, available through ⟨http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/l999/p99-065e.htm⟩.
Harald Müller, Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition, PRIF Reports No.55 (Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, August 2000), p.14.
It states that nuclear weapons ‘will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability’. Quoted from Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘NATO's Nuclear Future: A Rationale for NATO's Deterrence Capabilities’, paper presented at the International Conference on European Security and Translanticism at the beginning of the 21st Century, Vancouver, Canada, 15–19 May 2001, p.17.
It states that nuclear weapons ‘will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability’. Quoted from Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘NATO's Nuclear Future: A Rationale for NATO's Deterrence Capabilities’, paper presented at the International Conference on European Security and Translanticism at the beginning of the 21st Century, Vancouver, Canada, 15–19 May 2001, p.17.
Interview with Ludger Vollmer in Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 March 2002.
Müller, ‘Nuclear Weapons and German Interests’.
Quotations in Erwin Häckel, Die Bundesrepublik und der Atomwaffensperrvetrag. Rückblick und Ausblick, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik No.53 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V, April 1989), p.20.
Interview with Ludger Vollmer.
See for example an interview with Herman Scheer, a leading SPD member of the Bundestag criticizing the government for being too soft on its reaction to the Pentagon plans, in Spiegel online, 15 March 2002, ⟨http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0, 1518,187108,00.html⟩.
On this see Harald Müller and Niklas Schörnig, ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’: Abgesang kooperativer Sicheritspolitik der Demokratien?, HSFK-Report 8/2001 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktsforschung, 2001), esp. pp.20–24.
Quotations in statement by Michael Glos during the BMD-related discussion on transatlantic relations in the Bundestag, 15 March 2001, in Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, 158. Sitzung, 15 March 2001, ⟨http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/l4/14158.pdf⟩, pp.18, 20.
See Müller, ‘Nuclear Weapons and German Interests’, esp. p.5.
As to the traditional notion of extended deterrence see the definition by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, in The Future of the US.–Soviet Nuclear Relationship (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1991), p.15: ‘any concept of “extended” deterrence, to deter massive non-nuclear attack on one's own country or its allies, suffers from a basic tension of values. The credibility of a US threat of nuclear retaliation against a non-nuclear attack, however dire its consequences, is impaired if the US homeland would then itself be subject to a nuclear counterstrike (as symbolized by the remark that the United States would not have traded New York for Paris). Therefore an aggressor planning to initiate a massive non-nuclear attack may or may not be willing to accept the risk of nuclear escalation’.
See the statement by Ruprecht Polenz, in: Deutscher Bunderstag, 14. Wahlperiode, 193. Sitzung, 12 October 2001, (http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/l4/14193.pdf), pp.18888–90.
On this see Oliver Thränert, Terror mit chemischen und biologischen Waffen. Risikoanalyse und Schutzmöglichkeiten, SWP-Studie S14 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2002).
Quotations in Oliver Thränert, ‘Nach dem Terror: Ein Schutzschild bleibt notwendig’, Neue Gesellschaft, Vo1.48, No.11 (Nov. 2001), p.656.
General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, ‘What Defence does Europe Need?’, AECMA Evening Lecture, Brussels, 25 September 2001, p.8: ‘This [vulnerability of Western societies, B.W.K.] underlines the necessity to put more emphasis on defence than hitherto instead of deterrence. The reason for that is very simple: Western superiority means that the opponents will use terrorism, WMD and cyberattacks. They will try to hit Western nations at their Achilles' heels, i.e. the home territories and the deployed forces. Emphasis on defence therefore means to gain strategic flexibility which will be further enhanced the less dependent a country or an alliance are on access and basing rights.’
On the need to protect German expeditionary forces see Torsten Sohns, ‘Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. A German Perspective’, in Oliver Thränert (ed.), Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Arms Control? A German–American Dialogue, (Bonnl/Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 141–52.
See the statement by Günther Friedrich Nolting, in Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, 108. Sitzung, 8 June 2000, ⟨http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/l4/14108.pdf⟩, p.10258; see also the motion of the Parliamentary Group of the Free Democrats as of 14 March 2001 which does not mention the decoupling issue. See Drucksache 14/5570.
See the statement by Uta Zapf, in Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, 108. Sitzung, 8 June 2000, (http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/l4/141.pdf), p.10257.
There is one minor exception: Representative Wolfgang Gehrcke, a member of the Party of Democratic Socialism, which categorically opposes the American BMD plans, has used this argument, too. But none of the PDS motions introduced against BMD mentions it.
For more detail on this see Bernd W. Kubbig ‘Coping with Weapons of Mass Destruction’.
The fact that this question is hardly debated in the political system may have to do with old Cold War thinking, bureaucratic inertia, lack of interest, and the fear of waking up barking and biting dogs (peace movement).
As the actual numbers are classified, publicly available figures vary widely. 13 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, between 150 and 700 tactical nuclear bombs are stored in several NATO countries, including Germany (supposedly at Ramstein air base). None of the original rationales apply any longer. Neither do they enable the European partners within the Alliance to participate in nuclear consultations and planning processes within NATO nor do they contribute to NATO's credible nuclear-deterrent capability. In case of a conflict in the Middle East or a concrete WMD threat, the Alliance would probably send its message of deterrence on the basis of US (nuclear) cruise missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and not via European-based nuclear bombs. They have to he put under a Tornado aircraft to be flown over vast distances into the given crisis region. Moreover, the nuclear weapons in Europe do not provide an indispensable political and military link between the old and the new continent, symbols of cohesion within NATO and of Alliance solidarity need not be demonstrated by these tactical nuclear weapons. See Kamp, NATO's Nuclear Future, p.20.
As far as the US position is concerned, the Pentagon briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) made no reference to tactical nuclear weapons, of which the United States not only deploys several hundreds as mentioned but stockpiles in operational condition more than 1,000. See Philipp C. Bleek, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Released, Stresses Flexible Force Planning’, Arms Control Today, Vol.32, No.1 (Jan./Feb. 2002), ⟨http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/nprjanfeb02.asp⟩.
Nevertheless, the last White Paper by the Ministry of Defence in 1994 is living proof that the withdrawal option had at that time already conquered the military minds in Germany at least on paper. It surprisingly treated the ‘complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons … from German territory’ as a fait accompli – the Weißbuch in 1994 was way ahead of its time. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1994: Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr (Bonn: 1994), p.24.