NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour?

Abstract

The security landscape in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been marked by the dominance of NATO as the sole credible structure for military security. This situation is undergoing a transformation. There is now the existence of an embryonic division of labour between the European Union, through its ESDP, and NATO. To understand how this situation has arisen requires an understanding of the manner in which the EU has developed a military security identity and this article will commence by examining the recent historical development of the ESDP. The article then proceeds to identify the nature of the emerging division of labour between the EU/ESDP and NATO. The examination is structured by identifying four sets of reasons behind the development of the emergent division of labour: the development of an EU consensus on military security; the ‘new’ NATO dynamic; atrophy in transatlantic relations; and finally, operational developments.

He is at Chatham House on secondment from the University of Westminster, where he is Professor of European Studies.

Notes

He is at Chatham House on secondment from the University of Westminster, where he is Professor of European Studies.

The notion of Europe as a civilian power represents a touchstone for debates on the international role of the EU because of the premise that it is conducting a distinctive form of diplomacy, in both form and substance, in the absence of the ability to use military force. François Duchêne's notion of a ‘civilian power Europe’ has resonated through the debate on the international role of the EC/EU. F. Duchêne, ‘Europe's Role in World Peace’, in R. Mayne, ed., Europe Tomorrow, Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (London: Fontana, 1972). As illustrative of the use of the concept see P. Tsakaloyannis, ‘The EC: From Civilian Power to Military Integration’, in J. Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989); F. Laursen, ‘The EC in the World Context: Civilian Power or Superpower?’, Futures (1991), pp.747–59; J. Lodge, ‘From Civilian Power to Speaking with a Common Voice: The Transition to a CFSP’, in idem (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 2nd ed. (London: Pinter, 1993); A. Treacher, ‘From Civilian Actor to Military Power: The EU's Resistible Transformation’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.9, No.1 (2004), pp.49–66.

Duchêne, ‘Europe's Role in World Peace’.

R. Prodi, ‘2000–2005 Shaping the New Europe’. Speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February, 2000 (Speech/00/41), Brussels, European Commission, 2000.

S. Everts et al., A European Way of War (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004).

F.N.E. Fursden, The European Defence Community: A History (London: Macmillan, 1980).

G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998).

This was as part of the settlement with other member states of the EU to address the Danish public's concerns on the TEU, expressed as a ‘no’ vote in a ratification referendum in June 1992, and to ensure that Danes voted ‘yes’ in their second referendum on the treaty.

Richard Whitman, Amsterdam's U nfinished B usiness? The Blair G overnment's I nitiative and the F uture of the Western European Union, Occasional Paper 6 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999).

• The declaration suggested common ground on five points:

  	1.	The EU must have the capacity to decide to act, to be able to act autonomously and to be ready to do so in international crisis situations requiring military force.
  	2.	NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for Europeans through Article Five of the Washington Treaty. However, a collective defence commitment must be maintained as currently through Article V of the Brussels Treaty.
  	3.	The institutional arrangements for decision-making by the EU on defence matters are to remain intergovernmental and to take place through the EU institutions of the European Council, General Affairs Council and a forum for the meeting of Defence Ministers. Defence is not to be ‘communitarised’.
  	4.	The EU will need to have capabilities to analyse and have access to sources of intelligence, and to be able to plan to facilitate the decision-making and approval of eventualities in which military action is to be undertaken without the involvement of the whole Atlantic Alliance.
  	5.	The EU – meaning its member states – needs to give attention to creating armed forces that are capable of undertaking the military tasks that may be required without the involvement of the whole Atlantic Alliance.

For all subsequent references to European Council conclusions and other official documentation related to the development of the ESDP see the ‘core documents’ series produced by the WEU Institute for Security Studies and its successor the EU Institute for Security Studies. Available as Chaillot Papers, nos 47, 51, 57, 59 and 67 at http://www.iss-eu.org/.

Four ad hoc NATO–EU working groups were established at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council in June 2000 to facilitate the development of an EU–NATO interface and which are now in operation. They cover security issues; the EU's military capabilities; EU access to NATO assets and capabilities; and the definitive arrangements to be concluded between the EU and NATO. The group responsible for permanent EU–NATO arrangements is a joint meeting of COPS and the NATO Council (at Ambassador level) and this first met in September 2000.

The WEU Council meeting in Porto in May 2000 tasked its Permanent Council to look at what future was left for the WEU. Meeting in Marseilles in November 2000 the Council adopted a transition plan to transform itself into a residual organization.

There were two main changes made by the ToN to the TEU CFSP provisions dealing with defence. The provisions of the TEU referring to the WEU as the provider of the operational capability of the common defence policy were removed (Article 17). This was an acknowledgement of the agreement at the Helsinki European Council that the member states were to collectively develop the military security provisions of the CFSP within the EU rather than at arm's length through the WEU. A second change was that Article 25 of the TEU was amended to change references to the Political Committee to the Political and Security Committee. The amendment confirmed that COPS will be responsible for both the CFSP and ESDP. The important new role of COPS as the centrepiece of the ESDP was recognized in the ToN amendments stating that ‘this Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations’. The ToN also explicitly ruled out enhanced cooperation as not applying to matters having military or defence implications.

The crucial document in this regard was the presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy that formed an appendix of the ‘Conclusions’ that are normally agreed as the outcome of European Council meetings. The presidency report detailed all that had been agreed by the member states on the ESDP over the previous two years and detailed the work still to be undertaken to realize the objectives in this policy area.

• A number of specific milestones were set that included:

  	1.	The establishment as early as possible in 2004 of a civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff, with the capacity rapidly to set up an operations centre for a particular operation.
  	2.	The establishment of a Defence Agency in the course of 2004.
  	3.	The implementation by 2005 of EU strategic lift joint co-ordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land, sea) in support of anticipated operations.
  	4.	The complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battle groups.
  	5.	The availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008.
  	6.	Developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets, both terrestrial and space-based, by 2010.

For fuller accounts of NATO's evolution since 1991 see the Introduction and Conclusion in this collection.

• There were four key elements in the Washington Declaration:

  	1.	The EU was to be given assured access to NATO planning for EU-led operations.
  	2.	The presumption that previously identified NATO capabilities and assets would be available for use in EU-led operations.
  	3.	The identification of command options for EU-led operations.
  	4.	A commitment to adapt NATO's planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

NATO agreed at the Istanbul summit that ISAF would assume overall command of the UK-led PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymana, the German-led PRT in Feyzabad (the German PRT in Kunduz was already under ISAF responsibility) and the Netherlands-led PRT in Baghlan. During the Afghan elections each ISAF is to be reinforced by 100 extra troops or military observer teams. Additional forces were also pledged with a 1,000 strong quick reaction force and two additional battalions on a high state of readiness to reinforce ISAF if necessary.

Ian Forbes, ‘Minding the Gap’, Foreign Policy (2004), p.77.

Ian Forbes, ‘Minding the Gap’, Foreign Policy (2004), p.77.

The coalitionists and their fellow travellers were the UK, Italy, Spain (subsequently changing its position after the elections of March 2004), Denmark, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (‘the Eight’ that signed a public pro-US letter in late January 2003); and eight of the EU's new member states (all excluding Malta and Cyprus) supported the coalition. The Vilnius Ten (Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania) echoed the view of the Eight. This generated the now-famous splenetic reaction from President Chirac.

Madeleine Albright, ‘The Right Balance will Secure NATO's Future’, Financial Times, 7 December 1998.

Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003). For potential difficulties in restoring the relationship see Ivo Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, Survival, Vol.45, No.2 (2003), pp.147–66.

The European Voice, 23–29 October, 2003, p.3.

That Europeans have considerable forces deployed internationally is often under-appreciated. As a corrective see Bastian Giegerlich and William Wallace, ‘Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces’, Survival, Vol.46, No.2 (2004), pp.163–82.

Graeme Herd, ‘Out of Area, Out of Business?’, The World Today (2004), p.6.

A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003).

J. Lindley-French and G. Agieri, A European Defence Strategy (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2004).

The force deployed consisted of 320 troops including EUFOR led by a German Admiral (also the DSACEUR).