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Abstract
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) marks an important political moment when European integration has been extended to the issue of defence. Understandably, there has been extensive commentary on the ESDP, most of which has focused on the ESDP's institutional, industrial or military deficiencies. These commentaries have been illuminating but by concentrating on the manifest weaknesses of the ESDP, scholars have perhaps neglected to discuss explicitly how a coherent ESDP could develop. Drawing on recent work by Ben Tonra, this paper discusses the social conditions which are likely to be necessary if the ESDP is to develop into a robust policy. Above all else, a coherent ESDP depends upon the development of a binding sense of mutual obligation between France, Germany and Britain. These nations need to commit themselves to collective defence goals. The paper goes on to argue that for this collective commitment to be developed between these nations, the ESDP requires missions. Only through missions, in which these nations together experience a shared threat, will enduring collective interests and the political will to address them be developed. The future of the ESDP will thus be finally determined by the actions which are carried out in its name. In the end, this may mean that a European defence identity develops not through an independent ESDP but through NATO.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Terry Terriff and to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Notes
01. See, William Johnsen, Stephen Blank and Thomas-Durrell Young, ‘Building a Better European Security Environment’, European Security, Vol.8, No.3 (Autumn 1999), pp.1–25; Jolyon Howorth, ‘European Defence and the Changing Politics of the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.39, No.4 (Nov. 2001), pp.65–89; Jolyon Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.33–55; John Boranski, ‘NATO Beyond 2000: A New Flashpoint for European Security’, European Security, Vol.9. No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.1–12; Stanley Hoffman, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.38, No.2 (June 2000), pp.189–98; Richard Youngs, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy: What Impact on the EU's Approach to Security Challenges?’, European Security, Vol.11, No.2 (Summer 2002), pp.101–24; Mark Webber, Terry Terriff, Jolyon Howorth and Stuart Croft, ‘The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the “Third Country Issue”’, European Security, Vol.11, No.2 (Summer 2002), pp.75–100.
02. Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, p.36.
03. Youngs, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’, p.102; Council of Europe, The Common Foreign and Security Policy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the Europe Communities, 2002) pp.5–6.
04. Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, Vol.77, No.3 (July 2001), pp.587–603; Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2000); Nicole Gnesotto, ‘Common European Defence and Transatlantic Relations’, Survival, Vol.38, No.1 (Spring 1996), pp.19–31; Charles Kupchan, ‘In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective’, Survival, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.16–32; Elisabeth Pond, ‘Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe’, Washington Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4 (Autumn 1999), pp.77–92.
05. See: Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, ‘The Arithmetic of Defence Policy’, International Affairs, Vol.77, No.3 (July 2001), pp.509–29; Terence Guay and Robert Callum, ‘The Transformation and Future Prospects of Europe's Defence Industry’, International Affairs, Vol.78, No.4 (Oct. 2001), pp.757–76; Keith Hayward, ‘The Globalisation of Defence Industries’, Survival, Vol.43, No.2 (Summer 2001), pp.115–32.
06. See: Alistair Shepherd, ‘The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: A Policy Without Substance?’, European Security, Vol.12, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp.39–63; Alistair Shepherd, ‘Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?’, European Security, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.13–30; Reinhard Rummel and Jorg Wiedemann, ‘Identifying Institutional Paradoxes’. Florence: EUI working paper, RSC 97/67, 1997; Fraser Cameron, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish, ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit’, International Affairs, Vol.87, No.4 (Oct. 2002), pp.777–88; G. Edwards, ‘Europe's Security and Defence Policy and Enlargement: The Ghost at the Feast?’ Florence: EUI, RSC working paper 2000/69, 2000; Hoffman, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’; A. Smith, ‘National Identities and “Europe”’: National Identity and the Idea of European Union', International Affairs, Vol.68, No.1 (Jan. 1992), pp.55–76; Webber et al., ‘The Common European Security and Defence Policy’; Francois Heisbourg, ‘Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity’, Survival, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.5–15; Julian Lindley-French, ‘Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September’, Chaillot Papers, No.52 (2002) <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai52e.pdf>; Julian Lindley-French, ‘In the Shades of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing’, International Affairs, Vol.78, No.4 (Oct. 2002), pp.789–811.
07. See: Antonio Missiroli, ‘European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.6 (2001), pp.177–96; Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Europe's Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reforms, 2001); Paul Teunissen, ‘Strengthening the Defence Dimension of the EU: An Evaluation of Concepts, Recent Initiatives and Development’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.4, No.3 (1999), pp.327–52.
08. See Ben Tonra, ‘Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.41, No.4 (Sept. 2001), p.744.
09. Ibid., p.745.
10. In their discussion of the CFSP, Andreani et al. adopt a very similar position to Tonra. They note the importance of peer pressure and shame in forcing member states to contribute more to the ESDP, see Andreani et al., Europe's Military Revolution, pp.63–4.
11. In his interesting article on the ESDP, Mikkel Rasmussen expresses a similar point. The viability of the ESDP requires a unified strategic culture and concept in the first instance. Capabilities are irrelevant if there is disagreement on when and how to use them: see Mikkel Rasmussen, ‘Turbulent Neighbourhoods: How to Deploy the EU's Rapid Reaction Force’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.23, No.2 (Aug. 2002), pp.39–60. Rasmussen goes on to discuss the criteria when the European Rapid Reaction Force might be deployed rather than analyzing the conditions in which a unified strategic culture might emerge.
12. Andreani et al., Europe's Military Revolution, p.85; Lindley-French, ‘Terms of Engagement’, p.60; Lindley-French, ‘Shades of Locarno’, p.810.
13. Clarke and Cornish, ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit’, p.783.
14. Shepherd, ‘The European Union's Security and Defence Policy’, p.58; Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p.278.
15. Günther Lachmann, ‘Strucks Weltstreitmacht’, Die Welt, 18 Jan. 2004 <http://web.lexis‐nexis.com/executive>.
16. In May 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union tasked the High Representative, Javier Solana, to draw up a draft document on the European strategic concept. Solana presented ‘A Secure European in a Better World’ to the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003 where it was approved as the ‘European Security Strategy’ and eventually adopted by the December 2003 European Council. Solana's report highlighted the new strategic threats which now confront Europe – terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organized crime – and exhorted European member states to increase their defence capabilities so that, collectively, member states were capable of responding to contemporary threats. See Javier Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (2003) <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>; European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World. (2003) <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. Solana emphasized the strategic importance of the nations to the East of the new 25-nation EU and the borders of the Mediterranean but he also noted that EU states had intervened in the Balkans, Afghanistan, East Timor and the Congo and it was likely that such deployments would continue to be necessary, see Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, p.11. Solana's vision of a European Security Concept has informed those articles of the Draft Constitution of the European Union which deal with security and defence issues. Like Solana, the Constitution expands the security and defence definitions which had appeared in previous Treaties since Maastricht. Significantly, the Draft Constitution goes some way beyond the Petersberg tasks which were central to the St Malo Declaration and the subsequent Treaty signed at Nice; see Martin Ortega, ‘Beyond Petersberg: Missions for the EU Military Forum’, in Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy. Solana's document draws on and reflects the understandings of European member states and, above all, those of France, Britain and Germany.
17. General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: Time Warner, 1999); Jolyon Howorth, ‘European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge’, Chaillot Papers, 43, (2000) <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot.chai43e.html>, p.13; General Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p.330; Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p.137.
18. Janet Bryant, ‘France and NATO from 1966 to Kosovo: Coming Full Circle?’, European Security, Vol.9, No.3 (2000), p.26; Robert Grant, ‘France's New Relationship with NATO’, Survival, Vol.38, No.1 (Spring 1996), pp.58–80; Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO Enters the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
19. Philip Gordon, ‘Actors and Witnesses: Comment’, in Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy, p.218.
20. Therese Delpech, ‘Dreierdiplomatie der Zukunft’, in A. Volle and W. Weidenfeld (eds.), Europaische Sicherheitspolitik in der Bewährung (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 2000), p.50; Rachel Utley, ‘The Case for Coalition: Motivation and Prospects. French Military Intervention in the 1990s’, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, No.41 (June 2001), pp.1–52.
21. See: Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘The Gulf War: The German Resistance’, Survival, Vol.45, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp.102–10; Tom Dyson, ‘Civilian Power and “History-Making” Decisions: German Agenda Setting on Europe’, European Security, Vol.11, No.1 (Spring 2002), pp.27–48; Hanns Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: still a “Civilian Power”?’, Survival, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), p.62; Mary Sarotte, ‘German Military Reform and European Security’, Adelphi Paper 340 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
22. See Kerry Longhurst, ‘The Reform of the German Armed Forces: Coming of Age?’, European Security, Vol.9, No.4 (Winter 2000), p.33; Dyson, ‘Civilian Power and “History-Making” Decisions’, p.43.
23. Noah Barkin, ‘Schroeder Rules Out Troops for Iraq’, 14 Oct. 2004 <http://www.rense.com/general58/schroederrulesoutgerman.htm>.
24. Patrick Bratton, ‘France and the Revolution in Military Affairs’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.23, No.2 (Aug. 2002), p.92.
25. Ibid., p.98; Justin McKenna, ‘Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France’, West European Politics, Vol.20, No.4 (Oct. 1997), p.136; Johnsen et al., ‘Building a Better European Security Environment’, p.63.
26. Utley, ‘The Case for Coalition’, p.28.
27. Hans-Jurgen Leersch, ‘Bundeswehr-Verband begrüßt radikalen Umbau; Pläne des Generalinspekteurs umstritten’, Die Welt, 19 Dec. 2003 <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/form?_index=exec_en.html&_lang=en&ut=3283169693>.
28. See Richard von Weizsäcker, Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (2000) <http://www.bundeswehr.de/misc/pdf/wir/00_bericht_kommission.pdf>, p.72; Girhard von Kirchbach, Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Eckwerte fur die Konzeptionelle und Planerische Weiterentwicklung der Streitkraefte (2000) <http://www.friederle.de/krieg/kirchbacheckwerte.pdf>, p.7; Rudolf Scharping, Der Bundesminister Der Vertidigung, Die Bundeswehr sicher in 21.Jahrhundert: Eckpfeiler fur eine Erneurung von Grund auf (2000) <http://www.friederle.de/krieg/scharpingeckpfeiler.pdf>, p.12.
29. Since its formal ratification at the European Council meeting at Nice, the ESDP has been invoked for four interventions; the European Union Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina from January 2003, a military peace support operation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) from March 2003, crisis management in the Democratic Republic of Congo from June until September 2003 and a further police mission in FYROM from December 2003 called Operation Proxima. See A. Missiroli, ‘ESDP – Post-Iraq. Building a European Security and Defence Policy: What are the Priorities? The Cicero Foundation’ (2003) <http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/missiroli_jun03.html>; G. Lindstrom, ‘On the Ground: ESDP Operations’, in Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy, pp.111–130. This paper focuses only on the two military missions.
30. Missiroli, ‘ESDP – Post-Iraq’, pp.5–6.
31. Malcolm Chalmers cited in House of Commons, ‘Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report’, Research Paper 00/84 (2000) <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-084.pdf>, p.16.
32. Paul Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.22, No.3 (December 2001), pp.140–60.
33. Theo Sommers, ‘Actors and Witnesses: Comment’, in Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy, p. 250.
34. In January 1994, NATO developed the European Security Defence Identity as part of a new concept, the Combined Joint Task Force. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC) was developed as a result of this new concept. See Trevor Salmon, The European Union and the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Crisis or Opportunity? The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Defence (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996), p.11; James Sperling (ed.), Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the European Union and NATO (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.48; J. Ruggie, ‘Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future’, Washington Quarterly, Vol.20, No.1 (1997), pp.109–24; Grant, ‘France's New Relationship with NATO’, p.58; Roger Palin, ‘Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects’, Adelphi Paper 294 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.55–8. This force consisted of a combination of NATO's European partners. Britain, in particular, was the framework nation and eventually became the permanent commander of this force, despite opposition from Germany, See Ann Deighton, ‘On the Cusp: Britain, Maastricht and European Security’. Florence: EUI Working Paper RSC 97/59 (1997), p.9; Wolfgang Schlor, ‘German Security Policy’, Adelphi Paper 277 (London: Brasseys for the Institute of International Strategic Studies, 1993), p.30; Lawrence Freedman and Antoine Menon, ‘Conclusion: Defence, States and Integration’, in Jolyon Howorth and Antoine Menon, The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge, 1997). ARRC is not structured for light, ‘out of area’ deployment and, consequently, the NRF has been developed independently; see Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, Survival, Vol.44, No.3 (Autumn 2002), p.125.
35. Binnendijk and Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, p.127; Clarke and Cornish, ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit’, p.787.
36. Binnendijk and Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, p.127.
40. See <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/>.
41. See <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html>.
42. Klaus Naumann, ‘Europa in NATO’, in Volle and Weidenfeld (eds.), Europaische Sicherheitspolikik in der Bewährung, p.48.
43. Ibid., p.47.
44. Burkard Schmitt, ‘European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?’, in Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy, p.98; See Terry Terriff, ‘The European Union Rapid Reaction Force: An Embryonic Cosmopolitan Military?’, in L. Elliott and G. Cheeseman (eds.), Forces for Good? Cosmopolitan Militaries in the 21st Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.150–67.
45. See <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html>.
46. Patrick Wintour, ‘Blair's Mission on Africa’, The Guardian, 8 Oct. 2004 <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,11538,1322773,00.html>.
47. Trevor Salmon and Alistair Shepherd, Towards a European Army: A Military Power in the Making? (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp.99–104.
48. Currently, Austria is the only EU member state outside NATO. It is likely that by 2010 Austria would also have become a member of the Atlantic Alliance but even if it did not it is unlikely that it would object to the EU employing NATO as its military means.
49. See: Joseph Nye, ‘The US and Europe: Continental Drift?’, International Affairs, Vol.76, No.1 (Jan. 2000), pp.51–9; Ivo Daalder, ‘Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce’, International Affairs, Vol.77, No.3 (July 2001), p.565; Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Mark Webber, ‘NATO's Triple Challenge’, International Affairs, Vol.76, No.3 (July 2000), pp.495–518; Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, ‘America, Russia and Europe: A Re-Alignment?’, Survival, Vol.44, No.4 (Winter 2002), p.126; Philip Gordon, ‘NATO after 11 September’, Survival, Vol.43, No.4 (Winter 2001), p.92.
50. Gordon, ‘NATO after 11 September’, p.92.
51. See Brian Crowe, ‘A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?’, International Affairs, Vol.79, No.3 (May 2003), pp.533–46; Terry Terriff, ‘Fear and Loathing in NATO: The Atlantic Alliance after the Crisis over Iraq’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.5, No.3 (2004), pp.419–46.