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Original Articles

Regulating Private Military Companies: What Role for the EU?

Pages 103-125 | Published online: 04 Aug 2006
 

Abstract

Following allegations that private security guards were involved in the torture of Iraqi prisoners and in the wake an attempted coup by private mercenaries in Equatorial Guinea, the proliferation of so-called ‘private military companies’ (PMCs) is receiving considerable attention. Of particular concern is the lack of effective national and international controls of the industry. This article argues that much of the current debate about PMCs underestimates the extent of regulation that directly or indirectly applies to the industry. Especially in Europe, private military services are increasingly controlled by national and international legislation. The European Union (EU) plays a crucial role in this development because of two factors. First, the EU's free internal market in goods and services is putting pressure on the EU to harmonize national regulations on private security and policing and thus regulate the ‘soft’ end of the private military industry. Second, the growing role of the EU in foreign and defence issues is leading the EU to act as a driving force in assuring the implementation of non-proliferation policies among its member states. Following an examination of national and EU policies on the provision and export of specific private military services, this article concludes that, as the overlap and tensions between national and international policies grows, the EU is coming under increasing pressures to create common controls which subsume both.

Acknowledgement

This research was funded by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), grant reference RW8996. The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not represent those of USIP.

Notes

1. Antony Barnett and Patrick Smith, ‘British Guard Firm “Abused Scared Iraqi Shepherd Boy”’, Guardian, 14 Nov. 2004; Jamie Wilson, David Pallister and Paul Lashmar, ‘Thatcher and a Very African Coup’, Guardian, 26 Aug. 2004.

2. Juan Carlos Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law and the New World Disorder’, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.34, No.1 (1998), pp.75–162; Guy Arnold, Mercenaries. The Scourge of the Third World (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

3. Gerry Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power: The Privatization of Security in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol.33, No.1–2 (2000), pp.131–49, at pp.140–43; Herbert Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’, Strategic Forum, No.140 (May 1998), available from <http://www.ndu/edu/inss/strforum/forum140.html>; Robert Mandel, ‘The Privatization of Security’, Conference Paper (International Studies Association, 41th Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA., 14–18 March 2000) <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/mar01/>.

4. Christopher Spearin, ‘American Hegemony Incorporated: The Importance and Implications of Military Contractors in Iraq’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.24, No.3 (2003), pp.26–47; David Isenberg, ‘A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq’, Research Report 2004.4 (London: BASIC, Sept. 2004) <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.pdf>.

5. Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power’; Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’; Arnold, Mercenaries; Greg Mills and John Stremlau, The Privatisation of Security in Africa (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1999). Studies with a European and North American focus on the privatization of military force include Martin Edmonds, ‘Defense Privatization: From State Enterprise to Commercialism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.13, No.1 (1998), pp.114–29; Eric Fredland and Adrian Kendry, ‘The Privatisation of Military Force: Economic Virtues, Vices and Government Responsibility’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.13, No.1 (1998), pp.147–64.

6. Doug Brooks, ‘Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Military Services’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.7, No.4 (2000), pp.129–44; Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’.

7. Brooks, ‘Messiahs or Mercenaries?’, p.131. See also James Larry Taulbee, ‘Mercenaries, Private Armies and Security Companies in Contemporary Policy’, International Politics, Vol.37, No.4 (2000), pp.433–56, at p.448; and Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War’, p.124.

8. Brooks, ‘Messiahs or Mercenaries?’, p.131. See also Mandel, ‘The Privatization of Security’, p.8; Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’, p.308.

9. Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War’, pp.146–7; Thomas K. Adams, ‘The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict’, Parameters (Summer 1999), pp.103–16.

10. Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power’, p.143; Damian Lilly, The Privatization of Security and Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action (London: International Alert, 2000), p.25.

11. David Shearer, Private Armies and International Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1998), pp.43–5; less so: Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power’, pp.139–40; Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’, pp.318–20.

12. Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power’, p. 141; Taulbee, ‘Mercenaries’, p. 447; Lilly, The Privatization of Security, p. 21.

13. Brooks, ‘Messiahs or Mercenaries?’, p. 137; David Shearer, ‘Private Military Force and Challenges for the Future’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.13, No.1 (1999), pp.80–94, at p.92.

14. Kim Richard Nossal, ‘Global Governance and National Interests: Regulating Transnational Security Corporations in the Post-Cold War Era’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol.2, No.2 (2001), pp.459–76, at pp.460–61; Mills and Stremlau, The Privatisation of Security in Africa.

15. Nossal, ‘Global Governance and National Interests’, pp.470–72; David Kassebaum, ‘A Question of Facts – The Legal Use of Private Security Firms in Bosnia’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.38, No.3 (2000), pp.581–602, at p.589; Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War’, pp.120–23.

16. Nossal, ‘Global Governance and National Interests’, pp.473–4; Bruce D. Grant, ‘U.S. Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool of Foreign Policy’, Strategy Essay Competition Essay (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998) <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/essaysch4.html>, p.2; Ken Silverstein, ‘Privatizing War. How Affairs of State Are Outsourced to Corporations Beyond Public Control’, National Magazine, No.4 (Aug. 1997) <http//:faculty.lls.edu~/manheim/ns/priv_war.htm>, p.1; Taulbee, ‘Mercenaries’, p.440.

17. Taulbee, ‘Mercenaries’, p.449; Mills and Stremlau, ‘The Privatisation of Security in Africa’, p.14; Jeffrey Herbst, ‘The Regulation of Private Security Forces’, in Greg Mills and John Stremlau (eds.), The Privatisation of Security in Africa (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1999), pp.107–27, at p.117; Nossal, ‘Global Governance and National Interests’, p.461.

18. United Nations, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, A/RES/44/34, 4 Dec. 1989 <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm>. See also Kassebaum, ‘A Question of Facts’, pp.590–92; Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War’, pp.123–5, 131.

19. Geneva Convention, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I), Article 47 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm>.

20. Nossal, ‘Global Governance and National Interests’, p.471; Zarate, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War’, pp.127–8.

21. Nossal, ‘Global Governance and National Interests’, pp.464–8. For a critique of the South African law see Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, Mercenaries and Mischief: The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill (Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, Occasional Paper, 1997).

22. Elke Krahmann, ‘Controlling Private Military Services in the UK and Germany: Between Partnership and Regulation’, European Security (forthcoming 2005); Ann R. Markusen, ‘The Case Against Privatizing National Security’, Governance, Vol.16, No.4 (2003), pp.471–501.

23. ‘From Building Camps to Gathering Intelligence, Dozens of Tasks Once in the Hands of Soldiers Are Now Carried Out by Contractors’, Financial Times, 11 Aug. 2003.

24. Isenberg, ‘A Fistful of Contractors’, pp.80–99.

25. Thomas Catan, ‘Private Military Companies: Seeking a Change of Image’, Financial Times, 1 Dec. 2004; Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Big Role Predicted for Security Firms’, Guardian, 7 Dec. 2004.

26. ArmorGroup, Global Reach – Middle East <http://www.armorgroup.com/region_middleEast.asp>. See also Andrew Pierce, ‘Rifkind is Made Head of Security Company’, The Times, 13 April 2004.

27. Erinys, Iraq <http://www.erinysinternational.com/iraq/iraq.shtml>. See also Linda S. Heard, ‘History Won't Ignore Pentagon's Role in Iraq’, Financial Times, 20 April 2004; David Barstow, ‘Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq’, New York Times, 19 April 2004.

28. Anthony Loyd and Daniel McGrory, ‘5 British Civilians Die in Baghdad Bomb Ambush’, The Times, 25 May 2004. Further information on the services offered by Control Risks Group is available from their website <http://www.crg.com/html/service_level3.php?id=588>.

29. News Release, ‘CSC's DynCorp International awarded $50 million contract to support law enforcement functions in Iraq’ <http://www.csc.com/newsandevents/news/2072.shtml>.

30. Press Release, ‘Northrop Grumman awarded $48 million contract to train new Iraqi army’ <http://www.capitol.northgrum.com/contracts/ngcontr070203.html>.

31. The US armaments companies Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, for instance, are seeking to enter the domestic security market after its expansion due to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (New York Times, 6 April 2003).

32. Brooks, ‘Messiahs or Mercenaries?’, p.129; Lilly, The Privatization of Security, p.8; Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power’, p.136; Taulbee, ‘Mercenaries’, p.437.

33. For similar reasons, Mandel, Armies without States, pp.99–106, suggests a taxonomy of ‘privatized security’ according to the scope, source, form and function of private security services.

34. Isenberg, ‘A Fistful of Contractors’, p.15; Taulbee, ‘Mercenaries’, p.437; Cleaver, ‘Subcontracting Military Power’, p.136.

35. CoESS, Panoramic Overview of Private Security Industry in the 25 Member States of the European Union (CoESS, 2004) <http://www.coess.org/studies.htm>.

36. Tina Weber, Vergleichender Überblick über die Rechtsvorschriften zur Regelung des Wach- und Sicherheitsgewerbes in der Europäischen Union (Birmingham: ECOTEC, 2002), p.5.

37. Ibid.; CoESS, Panoramic Overview.

38. CoESS, Panoramic Overview.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP of 22 June 2000 concerning the control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses, Official Journal L159 (30 June 2000).

42. Ibid.

43. Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering, Official Journal L156 (25 June 2003).

44. Ibid.

45. BAFA, Export Controls – Brief Outline (Eschborn: Federal Office of Economics and Export Control, 2004) <http://www.bafa.de/1/en/service/pdf/export_brief_outline.pdf>, pp.8–9.

46. Ibid.

47. DTI, Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003, Statutory Instrument 2003 No.2764 <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2003/20032764.htm>.

48. Legislative Decree No.96, 9 April 2003 <http://www.mincomes.it/dualuse/dualuse_norme/090403_en.pdf>. See also Alberto Traballesi (ed.), ‘Controlling the Transfer of Military Equipment and Technologies in Italy’, Supplemento All'Oservatorio Strategico No.12 (Rome, 2004) <http://www.difesa.it/NR/rdonlyres/B6310BF6-E884-4881-9F56-2EEA658E782E/4686/suppl_12_04.pdf>.

49. Ibid.

50. BAFA, Export Controls, p.7; DTI, Consultation Document on Draft Orders to be made under the Export Control Act 2002, p.30.

52. DTI, Trade in Controlled Goods (Embargoed Destinations) Order 2004, Statutory Instrument 2004 No. 318 <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2004/20040318.htm>; DTI, Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003, Statutory Instrument 2003 No.2765 <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2003/20032765.htm>.

53. DTI, Trade in Controlled Goods (Embargoed Destinations) Order 2004.

54. DTI, Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003.

56. Act on the Export and Transit of Defence Materiel (242/1990; amendments up to 900/2002 included) <http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Finland/finleg.htm>.

57. Government Communication 2001/02:114, Report on Sweden's Export Control Policies and Exports of Military Equipment in 2001 <http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/prefak/files/skr0102_114e.pdf>.

59. Janice E. Thompson, ‘State Practices, International Norms and the Decline of Mercenarism’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.34, No.1 (1990), pp.23–47, at p.35.

60. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation, HC577 (London: The Stationary Office, 2002) <http://files.fco.gov.uk/und/hc577.pdf>. See also the discussion of the Green Paper in the Commons and the formal response by the British government in Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report ‘Private Military Companies, HC 922 (London: The Stationary Office, 1 Aug. 2002) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/922.pdf"> and Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee ‘Private Military Companies’, Oct. 2002 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/cm5642.pdf>.

61. Clayton Hirst, ‘No More Must They Cry Havoc and Let Slip the Dogs of War’, Independent, 28 Nov 2004.

62. FCO, Private Military Companies, pp.22–6.

63. Ibid., p. 23; Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report, para.102.

64. FCO, Private Military Companies, p.24.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p.25.

67. Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report, para.123.

68. Ibid., para.134.

69. FCO, Private Military Companies, p.26; Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report, para.137.

70. For an overview of security related export controls in the EU see <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ExportCTRL/en/main.htm#SCRL4>.

71. See Court of Justice of the EU, Case Law, Rulings C-114/97 (vs. Spain), C-355/98 (vs. Belgium), C-283/99 (vs. Italy), and C-189/03 (vs. Netherlands).

72. The Legislative Observatory, Reference CNS/2002/0802. See also ‘Draft Report on the Initiative by the Kingdom of Spain for the adoption of a Council decision on the setting up of a Network of contact points of national authorities responsible for private security’, Provisional 2002.0802 (CNS), PR\462973EN.doc.

73. Official Journal C153/1 (27 June 2002).

74. News Message, ‘CoESS signs a Code of Conduct for Private Security Sector’ <http://www.coess.org/ne030718.htm>.

75. For a list (in French) of all negative measures against third countries adopted through the CFSP see <http://ue.eu.int/Pesc/default.asp?lang=en>.

76. EU Commission – External Relations, ‘Sanctions or Restrictive Measures in Force’ (Jan. 2005) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm>.

77. Common Position 96/746/CFSP of 17 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on EU concerning the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment on Afghanistan, Official Journal L342 (31 Dec. 1996).

78. Common Position 1999/206/CFSP of 15 March 1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on EU, concerning Ethiopia and Eritrea, Official Journal L72 (18 March 1999).

79. Common Position 96/184/CFSP of 26 February 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on EU concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia, Official Journal L58 (7 March 1996).

80. Council Decision 93/614/CFSP of 22 November 1993 on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on EU with regard to the reduction of economic relations with Libya, Official Journal L295 (30 Nov. 1993), and Council Regulation (EC) No.3274/93 of 29 November 1993 preventing the supply of certain goods and services to Libya, Official Journal L295 (30 Nov. 1993).

81. Common Position 95/515/CFSP of 20 November 1995 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on EU, on Nigeria, Official Journal L298 (11 Dec. 1995).

82. Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2003 of 16 June 2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Liberia, Official Journal L150 (18 June 2003). Italics added.

83. Sami Makki, Sarah Meek, Abdel Fatau Musah, Michael Crowley and Damian Lilly, Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors (London: International Alert, 2001).

84. Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP of 17 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on EU on the EU's contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons, Official Journal L9 (15 Jan. 1999).

85. Ibid.

86. Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the EU's contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, Official Journal L191 (19 July 2002).

87. Council Decision 1999/730/CFSP of 15 November 1999 implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP with a view to a EU contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in Cambodia, Official Journal L294 (16 Nov. 1999) and Council Decision 2002/904/CFSP of 11 November 2002 extending and amending Decision 1999/730/CFSP concerning a EU contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in Cambodia, Official Journal L313 (16 Nov. 2002).

88. Council Decision 2000/803/CFSP of 14 December 2000 implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP with a view to a EU contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in South Ossetia, Official Journal L326 (22 Dec. 2000).

89. Council Decision 1999/845/CFSP of 17 December 1999 implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP with a view to a EU contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in Mozambique, Official Journal L326 (18 Dec. 1999).

90. EU, The Council, EU Code of Conduct on Armaments Exports, Brussels, 5 June 1998, 8675/2/98 Rev 2.

91. Annual Report in Conformity with Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Official Journal C315 (3 Nov. 1999).

92. Second Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Official Journal C379 (29 Dec. 2000); Third Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Official Journal C351 (11 Dec. 2001).

93. Fifth Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Official Journal C320 (31 Dec. 2003).

94. See Annual Reports 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003.

96. Second Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Official Journal C379 (29 Dec. 2000), p.3.

97. Third Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Official Journal C351 (11 Dec. 2001), pp.3–4.

98. Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering, Official Journal L156 (25 June 2003).

99. See for instance, Amnesty International, Undermining Global Security: The European Union's Arms Exports (Feb. 2004) <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact300032004>.

100. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, Official Journal L159 (30 June 2000).

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