The Netherlands: Procurement without debate

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Notes

1. The recent American consent to the appointment of the then (2003) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to become Secretary General of NATO is a testimony to the trust that he would not put the interests of the US in jeopardy.

2. For consecutive surveys of the evolution of defence and security policies in the Netherlands see Philip P. Everts and R.A. Koole, ‘Un atlantisme de plus en plus pragmatique’, in Patrice Buffotot (ed.), La défense en Europe. De la guerre du Golfe au conflit yougoslave (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1995), pp.121–9; Philip P. Everts, ‘L'innocence perdue’, in Patrice Buffotot (ed.), La défense en Europe. Les adaptations de l'après-guerre froide (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1997), pp.171–83; Philip P. Everts, ‘Une adaptation encore incertaine’, in Patrice Buffotot (ed.), La Defense en Europe. Nouvelles realités, nouvelles ambitions (Paris: Les Études de la Documentation Française, 2001), pp.153–62; id., ‘Faire mieux en faisant moins’, in: La Defense en Europe (2001-2004), (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2005), pp.125–34.

3. See for a discussion of this problem Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, Defence Research and Parliamentary Scrutiny, Advice No. 16 (The Hague: Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, Nov. 2002).

4. The coalition also included the small liberal left party D66.

5. For one example of such analysis by two military experts, see Kees Homan and Bert Kreemers, NMD: de Amerikaanse Waterlinie (The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Affairs ‘Clingendael’, 2000); the Dutch word Waterlinie refers to the old-fashioned system of forts and inundations that was traditionally thought to protect (at least the western part of) the country against foreign invaders (in vain – as proven in 1940).

6. David S. Yost, ‘Debating Security Strategies’, NATO Review (Winter 2003), < www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art4.html > .

7. Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, An analysis of the US missile defence plans: pros and cons of striving for invulnerability, Advice No. 28 (The Hague: Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, July 2002). The government reacted officially to this report on 1 Nov. 2002. See < www.aiv-advies.nl/N1000AD/N128/N128RR.htm > .

8. Surveys and analyses of polls and developments in public opinion on international affairs are given in the chapter by Philip Everts in the annual Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid (Nijmegen: Centrum voor Internationaal Conflict – Analyse & Management, 1991–2004).

9. The PvdA also went along later in 2003 with sending troops to Iraq to participate in the ‘coalition’ efforts to re-establish peace and security, but became increasingly critical of keeping the troops there as the situation in Iraq became worse in 2004.

10. See, for example, ‘Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal’, 5 July 2001, 27857, No. 1.

11. Recognized, for instance, in NATO's ‘Prague Capabilities Commitment’ and EU's ‘European Capabilities Action Plan’. See < www.nato.int > .

12. ‘Brief van de minister van Defensie aan de Kamer’, 2 July 2002, Tweede Kamer, 28000-x, No. 33.

13. ‘Lockheed Martin Receives $505 Million for PAC-3 Missile Production’, SpaceDaily.com, 20 Feb. 2004, < www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04h.html > . The decision was taken despite the poor performance of the system in operational tests between February and May 2002. ‘Out of seven PAC-3 missiles to be fired, just two destroyed their targets, while three did not even launch’, Wade Boese, ‘PAC-3 Production to Pick Up’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2003), < www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/pac3_janfeb03.asp > .

14. This development programme has temporarily been stopped in the US due to cost overruns.

15. Russia, for instance, has warned that it sees the coupling between Norwegian radars and TMD vessels as a threat to its (strategic) missiles in the Barents Sea.

16. ‘Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie aan de Kamer’, 7 Feb. 2003, Tweede Kamer, 23432, No.75. The mission of these units, including 350 men, was originally planned for six months, but did not need to engage in action and, due to the short duration of the war, could return in the course of April 2003. Incidentally, the missiles (in the GEM configuration) were borrowed – because the Netherlands does not possess this version – from Germany, which for political reasons had abstained from direct engagement in the war by sending soldiers to Iraq.

17. SBS6/Stem van Nederland, 7 Feb. 2003. See for an (annual) analysis of development of public opinion on international affairs and defence, the relevant chapter by the author: Philip P. Everts, ‘Ontwikkelingen in de publieke opinie’, in Bert Bomert, Theo van den Hoogen and Ramses Wessel (eds.), Jaarboek vrede en veiligheid 2003. Internationale veiligheidsvraagstukken en het Nederlands perspectief (Nijmegen: Centrum voor Internationaal Conflict – Analyse & Management, 2003), pp.233–63.