Russia: In search of strategy, in search of self

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Notes

1. The White House, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, 20 May 2003, p.2 (typescript). In a November 2003 interview to Izvestia former MDA Director Gen. Ronald Kadish reiterated the US official position that ‘distinction between the theater and strategic levels cannot be applied to missile threats or MD’ (Natalia Kornelyuk, ‘Ronald Kadish: My sozdayem sistemu PRO na vse sluchai zhizni’, Izvestia, 18 Nov. 2003, <www.izvestia.ru/world/article41192>.

2. Russia's ‘ABM-for-Europe’ Plan: Remarks by Foreign Minister Ivanov. Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov's Press Conference in the Interfax News Agency, 22 Feb. 2001, <www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd54/54abm.htm>.

3. The Russian initiative for a Global Control System sought to supplement the already existing international missile technology control regimes by providing additional legal and institutional mechanisms. The objective was to enlarge the international consituency interested in missile non-proliferation. For a detailed description of the Russian GCS proposal, see the International Global Control System Experts Meeting at Moscow, 16 March 2000, <www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/GSC_content.htm> providing unofficially translated material; see also Alexander Pikayev, Global Control System: Too Comprehensive? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace April 2001, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa = view&id = 674&prog = zgp&proj = znpp>.

4. Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Department for Information and Press, On results of the meeting of member states of the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, 26 Nov. 2004, <www.ln.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/>.

5. Political system of Russia after Putin's reforms, 27 Jan. 2005, <www.polit.ru/research/2005/01/27/polit_system.html>.

6. Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Sergeyu Ivanovu doverili pochti polovinu rossiiskigo budgeta’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 March 2004, <www.ng.ru/politics/2004-03-11/2_ivanov.html>.

7. The Defence Ministry has steadfastly resisted pressure for an open and transparent military budget. The liberal party Yabloko, and its most outspoken proponent of democratic military reform, Alexei Arbatov, insisted on a new legislation requiring the defence budget to contain about 850 itemized positions, a transparent breakdown of expenditures between strategic areas and forces, a fixed list of classified lines, and provisions for legislative control over the expenditure process. Yabloko failed to gain representation in the Duma in 2003. Alexei Arbatov, ‘Komu nuzhna voennaya taina’, Moskovskiye novosti, No. 37, 2002, <www.mn.ru/issue.php?2002-37-11>; ‘Deputaty Yabloka dobivayutsya prozrachnosti voennogo budgeta’, Yabloko, Press Release, 9 Sept. 2002, <www.yabloko.ru/Press/2002/020919.html>.

8. Press service of the President, Statement of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin, 13 Dec. 2001, <www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yki14-12-2001.html>.

9. Andrei Zaitzev and Dmitri Litovkin, ‘Zrya amerikantzy moderniziruyut svoi radar v Grenlandii’, Izvestia, 9 Aug. 2004, <www.izvestia.ru/army/article254860>.

10. Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the question from the Russian media about publication by the British Independent of an article on plans for the deployment of American MD missiles in Britain. Information and Press Department, Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 19 Oct. 2004 (typescript).

11. Russia's ‘ABM-for-Europe’ Plan: Remarks by Foreign Minister Ivanov (note 2).

12. Joint United States-Russian Statement on a Global Protection System, signed 17 June 1992, <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92061703.html>.

13. Quoted in Andrei Shoumikhin (ed.), Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense: The Emerging Accommodation (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, March 2002), p.2.

14. Zamysel i etapy sozdania obsheevropeiskoi sistemy protivoraketnoi oborony, <www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/evropro.htm>.

15. In November 2004 during a Moscow visit, then-US Permanent Representative to NATO, Nicolas Burns, stressed that the final decision on joint MD had not been made yet for political reasons. According to him, a joint TMD system would be ‘a crucial transition from the atmosphere of Cold War to an organic cooperation … If such a system is built, it would mean that the history of the Cold War has finally come to an end and a return to confrontation is out of the question’. The comment clearly implies that this has not yet been the case. Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Rossiya i NATO po-prezhnemu nesovmestimy’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 19 Nov. 2004, <http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2004-11-19/2_nato.html>.

16. Head of the General Staff Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky quoted in ‘Rossiya i NATO provedut komandno-shtabnoye ucheniye po nestrategicheskoi PRO’, ARMS-TASS, 12 Jan. 2005, <www.pro-pvo.ru/print.asp?pr_sign = presscenter.smi.arms-tass_050112_01>.

17. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov quoted in ‘Russia Offers Japan Common Missile Defence’, Rusnet, 15 Jan. 2003, <www.rusnet.nl/news/2003/01/15/politics03.shtml>. Putin also spoke of the possibility for Russia and the US to cooperate in building an ABM system. ‘Russia Offers to Build Common Missile Defence with the US’, Rusnet, 24 Jan. 2003, <www.rusnet.nl/news/2003/01/24/politics04.shtml>. In September 2003, the Foreign Ministry admitted interest in ‘interaction [with the US] in certain technological directions’. Interview with the Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, Vremya Novostei, 24 Sept. 2003, <www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/0/459E0C94F8EA48BC43256DAB002E57C1?OpenDocument>.

18. See Ivanov Hints at MD Cooperation, 13 Jan. 2005, <www.missilethreat.com/news/200501130038.html>.

19. See Nikolai Sokov, Chronology of Significant Military Maneuvers, Aug. 2004, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/maneuver.htm>.

20. Putin Reaffirms Plans for Hypersonic Maneuvarable Warheads, 27 Sept. 2005, <www.missilethreat.com/news/200509.html>.

21. Mark Trevelyan, ‘Russia says close to “unique” new nuclear arms’, Reuters, 13 Feb. 2005.

22. Rossiya gotova asimmetrichno preodolet' lyubuyu PRO mira, 28 March 2004, <http://pda.lenta.ru/russia/2004/03/28/weapon/>.

23. The Concept of Air and Space Defence was first drafted as early as 1994–95 but became newly important only in the beginning of the next decade. In 2002–04, the new draft raised protracted discussions because of the competing interests of various branches. Boris Cheltzov and Sergei Volkov, ‘Rossiya stroit vozdushno-kosmicheskuyu oboronu’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 3 March 2003, <http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2003-02-28/4_oborona.html>.

24. Sergei Novikov, ‘Vozdukh i kosmos podelili na troikh’, 22 Jan. 2004, <www.gazeta.ru/2004/01/22/voennyjkosmo.shtml>.

25. ‘Putin congratulated the Russian Defence Ministry on the successful test of Russia's anti-missile system A-135’, ITAR-TASS, 29 Nov. 2004, <www.scrf.gov.ru/News/Svodka/2004/11/20041130.htm#_Toc89659334>.

26. PZK S-400 Triumph budut prikryvat' krupnye goroda RF, 8 Dec. 2004, <www.aviaport.ru/news/2004/12/08/86218.html>.

27. Dmitry Safonov, ‘Objekt Sistema A-135’, Izvestia, 8 April 2002, <www.izvestia.ru/politic/article16781>.

28. K 2008 Rossiya budet gotova k voine v kosmose, 15 July 2004, <http://lenta.ru/russia/2004/07/15/cosmos/>. Dramatic increases in funding (especially for satellite programmes) enjoyed by the Space Forces since 2001 may also indicate critically low funding levels in previous years.

29. Quoted in Alexander Bogatyryev, ‘Zdravyi smysl plyus technicheskiye vozmozhnosti’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 Jan. 2003, <www.redstar.ru/2003/01/17_01/1_02.html>.

30. Oleg Falichev, ‘Kakaya PRO nuzhna Evrope’, Interview with Yuri Baluevsky, Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 March 2003, <www.redstar.ru/2003/03/20_03/1_02.html>.

31. ‘EvroPRO ne dlya Rossii’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 5 Nov. 2002, <http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2002-11-15/3_korotko.html>.

32. Russia's Officers' Union (1992), led by Stanislav Terekhov; Movement in Support of the Army, Defence Industry and Military Research (1997), led by Viktor Ilyukhin; People's Patriotic Party (2002), led by Igor Rodionov; Strong Power Military Union (2004), led by Leonid Ivashov.

33. Vladimir Temny, Marsh svadebnyh generalov, 29 April 2005, <http://grani.ru/Politics/p.88474.html>.

34. Statement of the All-Russia Officer Convention of 19 Feb. 2005, O pervoocherednyh merah po ukrepleniyu bezopasnosti i territorial'noi tzelostnosti Rossii, <http://censor.ru/09.03.2005/1>. Documents presenting the agenda of the Supreme Officer Council are available in Russian at <www.na-front.narod.ru/>.

35. The party website carries a comprehensive English-language collection of materials relating to Yabloko-driven Russian ABM Initiatives. See <www.eng.yabloko.ru/Hotissues/Politics/Defence/ABM/>.

36. ‘Russia's Arms and Technologies. The XXI Century Encyclopedia’. Vol. 9: ‘Air and Ballistic Missile Defense’ (Moscow: Publishing House ‘Arms & Technologies’, 2004).

37. In 2001, a periodical edition dedicated specifically to VKO was set up. In its third issue, an article noted that publications on this topic had been growing like a snowball rolling downhill. See Sergey Kolganov, ‘Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya oborona – za chto voyuem?’, Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, No. 3, 2001, <http://vko.ru/article.asp?pr_sign = archive. 2001.3.0103_06>.

38. Expression used by Ruslan Pukhov, leading expert of Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Posle Yugoslavii i Iraka ni odna strana ne mozhet schitat' sebya v polnoi bezopasnosti, 18 Aug. 2004, <www.lenta.ru/russia/2004/08/18/pvo/comment.htm_Printed.htm>.

39. Contributions have been published in the most authoritative public arena of military discussions, the bi-weekly Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, and in more specialized outlets like the bi-monthly Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona.

40. Quoted in Viktor Myasnikov and Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Rossiiskiye strategicheskiye rakety perehvatyat nad Plesetzkom’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 22 Oct. 2004, <http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2004-10-22/2_pro.html>.

41. For the technical take, see for example, Vladimir Belous, ‘Sostyazaniye yadernyh mechei i schitov’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 21 May 2004, <http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2004-05-21/4_oborona.html>. See also the contribution of Rafał Domisiewicz and Sławomir Kamiński in this issue.

42. ‘Experty predlagayut complex mer doveriya po strategicheskim vooruzheniyam’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 2 July 2004, <http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/concepts/2004-07-02/4_doklad.html>.

43. This line of thinking follows early hopes in 1992–93 for Russian-US (and Russian-Western, in a broad sense) strategic partnership. In a more realistic vein, Alexei Arbatov throughout the 1990s and early 2000s has argued for the need for critical reassessment of assumptions underlying Russia's security and defence policy. The 2004 paper is authored by Sergey Rogov, director of ISKRAN, and retired generals Viktor Yesin and Pavel Zolotarev.

44. Quoted in Safonov, ‘Objekt Sistema A-135’ (note 27).

45. Oleg Klochkov, ‘Sekrety novogo “Iskandera”’, Interview with Oleg Mamalyga, chief constructor of KBM Engineering, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 5 Nov. 2004, <http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2004-11-05/1_iskander.html>.

46. Michail Khodaryenok, ‘Spros na S-300 budet rasti’, Interview with Alexander Lemansky, general constructor of NPO Almaz, Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2002).

47. Quoted in Myasnikov, ‘Vladimir Ivanov’ (note 40).

48. To illustrate an earlier point, Yavlinsky's key argument ran: ‘We already have S-300 missiles and technical systems that are far ahead of anything produced in Europe. Russian missiles are far better than the US-produced Patriots. In other words, we have all the grounds to insist that the European defence system be built with our equipment.’ Grigory Yavlinsky, ‘Strategiya oboronnoi initziativy’, Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda, 24 Feb. 1999, <www.yabloko.ru/Publ/Articles/yavl-73.html>.

49. Quoted in Vladimir Dvorkin, ‘Sozdat’ PRO Rossii segodnya neposil'no', Izvestia, 23 Nov. 2003, <www.izvestia.ru/army/article41370>; Vladimir Dvorkin, ‘PRO SShA ne budet ugrozhat’ Rossii', Strana.ru, 13 June 2002, <www.strana.ru/stories/01/12/13/2204/148480.html>.

50. The first type is best exemplified by Said Aminov's <www.pvo-guns.ru>and its several affiliates; the second by Pavel Podvig's <www.russianforces.org/>featuring news subscription, archives and blog.

51. Boris Alyoshin, ‘Vsye ecshe budet!’, Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Courier, 19–25 Aug. 2003, <www.vpk-news.ru/oldversion/article.asp?pr_sign = archive.2003.01.0301_01_03>.

52. For example <www.vko.ru>; <www.raspletin.ru/>; <www.pro-pvo.ru/>.

53. Alexei Arbatov, ‘Seichas dazhe spor ne s kem vesti’, Index, No. 19 (2003), <www.index. org.ru/journal/19/arbatov19.html>;.

54. As an extreme instance, much publicity surrounded the assassinations in June 2003 of the top managers of the Almaz-Antei group producing air defence systems.

55. The previous instance of taking up the subject of the Moscow ABM system by a national newspaper (Izvestia) dates back to 1997 that does not make the case for the high public profile of the issue.

56. Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Minoborony reanimiruyet antiraketnyh dinosavrov’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 10 Dec. 2004, <http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2004-12-10/6_minoborony.html>;.

57. Ilya Klabukov's <http://pro-pko.narod.ru>: YaBTc PR 52T6, <http://pro-pko.narod.ru/a135/pr-51t6-ydch.htm>.

58. In June 2000, 66 per cent said they knew of the US plans to deploy MD system; 34 per cent felt negatively about it. Foreign Threat. Population poll, 14 June 2000, <http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/army_war/nuclear_weapons_/pro_snv2/ed00081>. In December 2001, an equal 66 per cent of Russians said they knew about the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This news was taken by 43 per cent of respondents negatively, and 31 per cent were indifferent. Only 8 per cent of respondents felt positive about it. Almost every second respondent (42 per cent) was convinced that Russia should take reciprocal actions in response to US plans. See A. Petrova, The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as seen by Russians, 27 Dec. 2001, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/ international_relations/army_war/nuclear_weapons_/pro_snv2/eof014901>;.

59. A. Petrova, Russians Indifferent Towards an Unfriendly America, 25 Oct. 2004, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/truck_West/Russia_USA/eof044103>.

60. A. Petrova, Contradictory feelings about NATO, 17 May 2002, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/army_war/eof021705>.