Maritime Forces and Counter-insurgency

Abstract

The contribution of maritime forces to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations is substantial, but generally overlooked. This article explains the characteristics of maritime forces and how these can prove to be advantages or disadvantages in COIN, both directly and also indirectly, in supporting the efforts of other armed services and agencies. It then explores a number of cases of British COIN campaigns – the Malayan Emergency (1948–1958), Cyprus (1954–1959), East Africa (1964), and the Indonesian Confrontation (1962–1967) – to show the range of roles that have been played by maritime forces. It argues that both operations at sea (such as blockades and patrolling, protecting shipping, intelligence-gathering, and deterring against escalation or involvement by external powers) and also operations from the sea (such as transportation of forces to and within the theatre, providing logistical support, conducting amphibious landings and strike operations, and various tasks relating to ‘hearts and minds’), can make a significant contribution to COIN campaigns. Maritime forces are well suited to contemporary operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict intensity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to express his thanks for the assistance of Captain Chris Page and Kate Tildesley, the Head and Archivist, respectively, of the Naval Historical Branch.

Notes

1. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), p.xi.

2. For an account of the role of maritime forces in this conflict, see Tim Benbow, ‘Maritime Power in the 1990–91 Gulf War and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia’ in Andrew Dorman, Mike Smith & Matthew Uttley (eds) The Changing Face of Maritime Power (London: Macmillan, 1999).

3. John Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). This omission is all the more striking given the importance of the Palestine patrol; see note 21, below.

4. Charles Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber, 1986).

5. Ian F.W. Beckett & John Pimlott (eds), Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985).

6. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp.75–7, 171. Colonel Paget's personal experience of COIN was gained in Kenya, in which there was no maritime contribution, yet also in Palestine and Aden, where it should have been enough to be noticed.

7. The figure of 337 excludes very short pieces such as prefaces and forewords.

8. ‘Gisbourne’ [pseudonym], ‘Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 1964–1966’ in Naval Review, Vol.60, No.1 (January 1967); David Hankinson, ‘Dar-es-Salaam – January 1964’, in Vol.67, No.1 (January 1979). The rules of Naval Review, as a journal for professional debate, permit citation only ten years after publication. Between 1996 and 2005, however, there was only one further article published on this subject.

9. Major C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: HMSO, 1899), pp.22–4.

10. While the explicit emphasis on the joint nature of military operations is relatively recent on both sides of the Atlantic, it is striking how often the term was used in documents as early as the 1950s. See, for example, a 1955 paper entitled ‘Joint Operations against Communist Terrorists in Malaya’. National Archives (NA):ADM 1/26140.

11. Useful accounts of the characteristics of maritime forces can be found in Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004); and James Cable, The Political Influence of Naval Force in History (London: Macmillan, 1998).

12. BR1806 British Maritime Doctrine, Third Edition (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p.271.

13. Ibid., p.264.

14. Ibid., pp.57–8.

15. For the classic account of limited uses of naval force, see James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1991: Third Edition (London: Macmillan, 1994). Some of the examples he lists include actions against bandits or rebels, or during civil wars and civil disturbances.

16. The following list of attributes is taken from BR1806, pp.28–34.

17. Operations at sea by insurgents are covered in Martin Murphy, ‘The blue, green and brown: insurgency and counter-insurgency on the water’, in this volume.

18. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1988), p.16.

19. See, for example, Bernard Estival, ‘The French Navy and the Algerian War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (June 2002).

20. See Frank Uhlig, Vietnam: The Naval Story (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1986); R.L. Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea: The US Navy in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1992).

21. The Royal Navy blockade of Palestine was a largely constabulary activity, although it coincided with a major British COIN campaign ashore. The two were connected, not only in insurgent propaganda, but also when Jewish terrorists mounted attacks on police vessels, Coast Guard radar stations and civil servants, with the aim of hindering the blockade. See Ninian Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol (London: Frank Cass, 2002), especially pp.34, 36–7.

22. Aden, for example, saw security forces supported by Royal Navy helicopters, and by air strikes from carrier-based aircraft. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, Cmnd. 2592, February 1965, para.66.

23. See, for example, the use of the amphibious assault ship HMS Fearless in support of Operation Motorman in 1972. Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969–1984 (London: Book Club Associates, 1985), pp.114, 116.

24. See Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy; Statement of First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates for various years; Peter Hore (ed.), Royal Navy and Royal Marines Operations 1964 to 1996 (London: Maritime Strategic Studies Institute Paper number 1, Naval Historical Branch, 1999).

25. On the Malayan Emergency, see Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948–1960 (London: Cassell, 1966); Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), Part III; John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency 1948–1954 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). On the ‘British approach’ deriving from Malaya, see Thomas R. Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

26. Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency, p.55.

27. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp.75–6.

28. E.D. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations: 1 Malaya and Borneo (London: Ian Allan, 1985), p.35.

29. Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1975), p.372.

30. NA: ADM 1/23646.

31. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, p.170.

32. Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Naval Estimates 1953–54, Cmd 8769 (1953), para.3.

33. Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgency War, 1948–1960 (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p.135.

34. NA: ADM 1/25556.

35. Flag Officer Malayan Area to CINC Far East Station, 3 November 1955, NA: ADM 1/26140.

36. Flag Officer Malayan Area to CINC Far East Station, 17 November 1955, NA: ADM 1/26140.

37. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, pp.35–7.

38. See Kitson, Bunch of Five, Part IV; Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978); Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency, pp.84–107.

39. Major-General K.T. Darling, ‘Report on the Cyprus Emergency’, 31 July 1959, para.80, in Naval Historical Branch: Reports of Proceedings Volume 53A: The Cyprus Emergency.

40. Report by Brigadier G.H. Baker, March 1958, quotation para.63, also Darling report, both in ibid. Baker was chief of staff to the governor, and CINC Cyprus, November 1955 to January 1957.

41. Paget mentions the capture of this ship but makes no reference at all to maritime forces in his account of this campaign. In his conclusion, however, he noted the need for naval anti-smuggling patrols when, as in Cyprus, the enemy are being supplied from overseas. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp.120, 171.

42. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p.174; she also describes the Royal Navy as ‘the one branch of the security forces which was not vulnerable to penetration’.

43. Darling report, para.88.

44. This account is based largely on Hankinson, ‘Dar-es-Salaam – January 1964’. See also Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, Cmnd. 2592, February 1965, para.74.

45. Hankinson, ‘Dar-es-Salaam – January 1964’, pp.17–18.

46. For general accounts of the Confrontation, see David Easter, Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1960-66 (London: IB Tauris, 2004); Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations; Chris Tuck, ‘Borneo 1963–66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War Termination’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.15, No.3 (Winter 2004).

47. Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency, pp.16, 38.

48. For accounts of these disputes, see Easter, Britain and the Confrontation, especially pp.99–103.

49. The report on the operation describes it as ‘completely joint’ from the start, and notes the ‘excellent inter-Service co-operation’ that it involved. HQ Far East Command, ‘Report on Operations in Borneo December 1962 to January 1963’, NA: ADM 1/28626.

50. Ibid., paras.4–19.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., paras.17–19.

54. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1964, Cmnd. 2270, February 1964, para.89.

55. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p.54.

56. Ibid., p.72.

57. Ibid., pp.85–6.

58. ‘Gisbourne’, ‘Naval Operations’, p.43.

59. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p.92.

60. ‘Gisbourne’ suggests that, due to good intelligence, ‘over 80 per cent of all attempted incursions were intercepted’, ‘Naval Operations’, pp. 44–5; Smith cites a figure of 90 per cent, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p.92.

61. Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency, pp.14–15.

62. Chris Tuck, ‘The Royal Navy and Confrontation, 1963–66’, in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000: Influences and Actions (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp.213–16; also Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, pp.92–3.

63. NA: ADM 1/28626; also ‘Gisbourne’, ‘Naval Operations’, pp.44–5.

64. According to Grey, there were some Malaysian commando and Special Boat Service operations against Indonesian islands in the Malacca Strait. Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955–1972 (St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p.58.

65. Indeed, the official history of the Royal Australian Navy in the conflict suggests that one of its most significant contributions was in direct assistance to the Royal Malaysian Navy; Grey, Up Top, pp.34–41.

66. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, pp.54, 92; also Tuck, ‘The Royal Navy and Confrontation, 1963–66’, p.207. ‘Gisbourne’ also notes their potential vulnerability to the sort of small arms and rocket launchers that could easily have been carried in sampans; ‘Naval Operations’, p.44.

67. Callwell, Small Wars, p.22.

68. Ibid., p.23.

69. It is striking that under one of his key lessons for COIN, mobility, Paget refers to ‘good communications by land and air’, especially helicopters, but does not mention the sea! Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp.164–5.

70. ‘Gisbourne’, ‘Naval Operations’, p.46.

71. Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper 2003, Cm 6041-I, December 2003, especially paras.4.3-4.7; Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm 6269, July 2004, para.1.2.