Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the US Marine Corps for Future Warfare

Abstract

Reforming a large organization is always difficult. This article considers the attempts made by the United States Marine Corps to introduce change over the last few years. It centres on the influence of the Commandant of the Corps in the late 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, and his attempts to engineer a force that would be both relevant and capable in the years beyond his tenure. He sought to meet the challenge posed by the rise of unconventional forms of warfare, such as counter-insurgency, with a series of radical reforms; however, Krulak's vision and his ability to push change were hampered by internal and external impediments. He was unable to shape the Marine Corps that he wanted to see operating in the 21st century. Examined here are the reasons why Krulak was not successful, and why the corps is still struggling to shape itself as an organization properly geared to dealing with today's asymmetric threats. The corps is not yet all that it should be.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would to extend my sincerest appreciation to General Charles C. Krulak, USMC (ret.), General Carl Mundy, USMC (ret.), Colonel Randy Gangle, USMC (ret.), Major Bruce Gudmundsson, USMC (ret.), Colonel James Lasswell, USMC (ret.), and Colonel Anthony Wood, USMC (ret.) for their time and consideration in not only sharing their experiences with me, but also in helping me to understand the character and culture of the Marine Corps. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman USMCR (ret.) not only for his fulsome support of my research, but also for his being willing to share his own work with me. Many thanks are also due to the staff in the Library and Archives of the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA, for their cheerful help in accessing and locating information, as well as for the hospitality they extended. Finally, but not least, I would like to thank very much the Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom) ‘New Security Challenges’ Programme for providing funding support for my project on military change in the Marine Corps, without which this research could not have been conducted.

Notes

1. Lieutenant General James Mattis, The Future of the United States Marine Corps, American Enterprise Institute Conference, Washington, DC, 18 August 2005, Unedited Transcript from a tape recording, p.132. Also quoted in Joe Fiorill, ‘Marine Corps prepares to take on WMD-armed adversaries’, Global Security Newswire, 22 August 2005, at GovExec.com Daily Briefing, 22 August2005: <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0805/082205gsn1.htm>. Mattis was assigned as the Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force in late spring of 2006.

2. The effectiveness of this was made devastatingly evident by military operations in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 and by the swift toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, to the point that some commentators argued that it represented a ‘new American way of war’. See, for example, Max Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.82, No.4 (July–August 2003), pp.41–58.

3. Jason Sherman, ‘New Defense Strategy Calls for Proficiency Against “Irregular” Threats’, Inside Defense, 16 March 2005.

4. These reviews were: Base Force (1990); Bottom Up Review (1993); Commission on Roles and Missions (1995); Quadrennial Defence Review (1997); and Quadrennial Defense Review (2001). For an overview of these efforts, see Richard A. Lacquement Jr., Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

5. General Mundy, in September 1994, initiated the Vision 21 Project which was designed to ‘help the Marine Corp leaders develop a vision for the 21^st Century by enabling them to understand the possible futures for the country, to realize the implications of those futures, and to identify what the USMC can be and do’. Frederick Thompson (ed.), Vision-21 Source Book: Volume 1: The Process (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, CRM96-10, March 1996), p.1.

6. The Vision 21 Project was a collaborative, interactive effort by 19 Marine Corps generals, including Krulak, who was later chosen to serve as the commandant in March 1995. The Vision 21 project was completed in April 1995. Thompson, Vision-21 Source Book, pp.1–5. General Mundy had assumed that his successor would be one of the 19 generals participating. Interview with General Carl Mundy, 19 April 2005.

7. See ‘The 31^st Commandant's Planning Guidance: A Marine Corps for the 21^st Century’, August 1995. This 21-page guidance document was issued by the new commandant in the very first few minutes of his commandancy. Interview by telephone with General Charles C. Krulak, 10 March 2004.

8. The ‘Ne Cras’ speech was first given by Krulak on 17 November 1997, to the Council on Foreign Relations. See ‘Commandant's Draft Remarks, Council on Foreign Relations, 17 November 1997’; Gen. C.C. Krulak, Papers, 2956, Folder: Council on Foreign Relations Nov 97, Box 99, Archives, General Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.

9. See, for example, General Charles C. Krulak, ‘Ne Cras’ Speech, presented to Center for Naval Analysis Board of Trustees, 17 December 1997: Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Center for Naval Analysis Board of Trustees. Dec. 97, Box 99, p.15; and Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘Commandant's Remarks, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 1998, p.2: General. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. ’98. Box 103, Gray Center.

10. For two detailed accounts of the battle, see Peter S. Wells, The Battle that Stopped Rome: Emperor Augustus, Arminius, and the Slaughter of the Legions in the Teutoburg Forest (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003); and Tony Clunn, The Quest for the Lost Roman Legions: Discovering the Varus Battlefield (Staplehurst: Savas Beatie, 2005).

11. See, for example, Krulak, ‘Ne Cras’ Speech, presented to Center for Naval Analysis Board of Trustees, 17 December 1997, pp.5–6.

12. On the 1997 QDR, see Laquement, Shaping Military Capabilities after the Cold War, pp.111–23.

13. Krulak, ‘Commandant's Remarks’, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 1998, p.2

14. For an articulation of the future, see Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘Preparing for the Future: Address to Luncheon Meeting of the National Strategy Forum’, Chicago, 10 May 1996. Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: National Strategy Forum, May '96, Box 107 A, Gray Center.

15. ‘Ne Cras’ Speech, Board of Trustees: p. 15. This future security environment is embodied in the Corps concept of ‘chaos in the littorals’. See, for example, Krulak, ‘Chaos in the Littorals’, Proceedings, Vol.122, Iss.1 (Nov. 1996).

16. See, for example, Statement of Lt. Gen. Martin R. Steele, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, and Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Wilkerson, Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve, United States Marine Corps, before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, concerning the Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel, 29 January 1998, at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1998_hr/01-29-98steele.htm>.

17. Krulak, ‘Ne Cras’ Speech, to Board of Trustees, p.26.

18. ‘The 31^st Commandant's Planning Guidance’, p.A-3.

19. See, for example, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (ret.), First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), esp. Pt. II, ‘The Innovators’, pp.67–110. Lieutenant General Krulak is General Charles Krulak's father, and an extremely well respected marine in his own right.

20. On this particular point about the difficultly of effecting change, even in the Marine Corps, see Statement of Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee, 15 March 1996, ‘Concerning Battlefield Concepts for the 21st Century’, p.4. Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Senate Armed Services Acquisition and Technology Hearings Mar '96 (1), Box 137, Gray Center.

21. ‘Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG)’, Frag Order, 31 August 1995, p.1.

22. ‘The 31st Commandant’s Planning Guidance, p.A-2.

23. ‘Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG)’, p.1.

24. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, USMC, ‘Innovation, the Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon, and the Fleet Marine’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.80, Iss.12 (Dec. 1996), p.12 ff.

25. Colonel Anthony Woods was picked by Krulak to set up and command the MCWL.

26. Quoted in Roger J. Morris, ‘Reality Has Bitten Hard into the Corps' “Dragon of Change”’, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico, VA, 21 November 2000, p.1.

27. Quoted in Andrew Mays, Christine Grafton and James Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior: A Case Study in Experimentation’; SAIC Document no. SAIC-01-6989&SAC (MacLean, VA: The Strategic Assessment Center, 30 August 2001), pp.8–9.

28. Ibid., p.9.

29. The Marine Corps pioneered this essential concept with its Stingray reconnaissance patrols during the Vietnam War. The Stingray reconnaissance units proved very good at locating enemy forces, but not very good at having these enemy forces destroyed by indirect fires, given poor communications and inadequate means to determine location accurately. See, Bruce H. Norton (ed.), Stingray (New York: Ballantine Books, 2000).

30. Interview with Colonel James Lasswell, USMC (ret.), 25 March 2004. For Krulak's fully fleshed out interpretation of the meaning of the ‘strategic corporal’, see General Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine, January 1999: online at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm>.

31. On the ‘three block war’, see General Charles C. Krulak, ‘Three Block War’, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 (15 December 1997).

32. For some of the lessons and problems that emerged during Urban Warrior, see Joel Garreau, ‘REBOOT CAMP: As War Looms, the Marines Test New Networks of Comrades’, Washington Post, 24 March 1999, p.C01.

33. On Project Metropolis, see, for example, Maj. Daniel Schmitt, USMC, ‘Waltzing Matilda’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.189, Iss.1 (Jan. 2005), p.20ff.

34. For more details on CBIRF, both its origins and its innovative organization, see Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers. Folder: ‘Chemical Biological Incident Response Force’; Box 164, Gray Center. This folder contains, among other documents, the original concept paper and email communications between Krulak and Colonel Anthony Wood.

35. See Major Owen O. West, USMR, ‘Who will be the first to fight?’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.87, Iss.5 (May 2003), p.54ff.

36. See William A. Arkin, ‘Spiraling ahead: With the loss of its greatest champion, what's to become of transformation?’, Armed Forces Journal, 4 February 2006, online at <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com>.

37. West, ‘Who will be the first to fight?’

38. For a good argument linking the lessons of the conduct of fighting in Afghanistan to Hunter Warrior and to what has become known as Distributed Operations, see Major Lloyd D. Freeman, USMC, ‘Winning the future battles: Why the infantry must change’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.87, Iss.4 (April 2003), pp.54ff. Distributed operations are defined by the Marine Corps as netted units (ranging from squad- to battalion-sized units) physically dispersed and operating over an extended battlespace. Brigadier General Robert Schmidle, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank G Hoffman, USMC (ret), ‘Commanding the Contested Zones’, Proceedings. Vol.130, Iss. 9 (September 2004) pp. 49ff.

39. Hunter Warrior was not the sole intellectual source for the development of the Distributed Operations Concept. Email communication from Lieutenant. Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (ret.) to author, 3 February 2006.

40. See, for example, Master Sergeant Douglas E. Patton, USMC, ‘Enlisted PME Transformation’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.90, Iss.2 (Feb. 2006), p.14ff.

41. Much of the current use of the Marines was foreseen by some within the Corps. See ‘Colonel says Marines foresaw Iraq-style war’, AZCentral.com, 8 January 2005, online at: <http://www.azcentral.com/community/westvalley/articles/0108lpyumaside08Z1.html>.

42. West, ‘Who will be the first to fight?’

43. Ibid. This particular perception, as West notes, goes all the way back to the Marine assaults in the Pacific campaign of the Second World War.

44. One can argue that this warning was off the mark, given the second Gulf War of 2003. Yet it is well to remember that the assault to Baghdad took three weeks, and outside of that remarkably short period Marines have been operating and fighting in an environment that, in general, bears a striking resemblance to the character of wars Krulak warned were likely (and which, it must be said, many Marines also believed to be the future of warfare).

45. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret.), The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1995), pp.174–5; and Major William S. Ritter, Jr., USMCR, ‘Operation TIGER: Amphibious operations in the northern Persian Gulf revisited’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.80, Iss.7 (July 1996), p.64ff.

46. See, for example, ‘Marine Corps Presentation on Roles and Missions of Armed Forces’ (undated), General Carl Mundy Papers, Box 31, Folder: ‘Marine Corps Presentation on Roles and Missions of Armed Forces’: Gray Research Center. (References to events that occurred in the autumn of 1994 indicate a date of late 1994 or possibly early 1995). This file, containing copies of a slide presentation on roles and missions, indicates that the Marine Corps needed to think beyond conducting large-scale amphibious operations like those engaged in during the Second World War and at Inchon.

47. For an analysis of the influence this perception can have on the choices made by the Marine Corps, see Terry Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die”: Organizational Paranoia and the Origins of the Doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare in the US Marine Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.29, No.3 (June 2006), pp.475–503.

48. This particular concept, broken out from OMFTS, is ‘Ship to Objective Maneuver’ (STOM).

49. Task Force 58 arguably validated the basic OMFTS concept, as the Marine Expeditionary Unit that landed in Afghanistan had to travel some 560 kilometres from its ships to reach the airfield that was its objective. The Marine Corps thus was able to do what the US Army was not able to do – place a battalion-sized force into Afghanistan quickly. However, the MEU had to transship through a Pakistani airfield, where it reorganized before moving into Afghanistan on C-130 heavy lift aircraft. For an account of this movement, from the perspective of a marine lieutenant, see Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), pp.75–110.

50. For a detailed description, see ‘LPD-17 San Antonio-class (formerly LX Class)’, Military Analysis Network: U.S. Navy Ships; online at; <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lpd-17.htm>.

51. Indeed, the corps prides itself for doing more with less. See Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, First to Fight.

52. On this particular point, see William S. Lind, ‘Two Marine Corps’, LewRockwell.com, 5 June 2004, online at: <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind25.html>; and William S. Lind, ‘Corruption in the Corps?’, LewRockwell.com, 6 August 2004, online at: <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind34.html>.

53. Off-the-record conversations with Marine Corps officers, at Conference on ‘Irregular Warfare 2’, USMC Combat Development Command, Quantico, 20–21 July 2005. The perception that a US military service's headquarters staff tend to be focused narrowly, and so are divorced from what the rest of service is engaged in, is seemingly not confined to the Marine Corps. This is suggested by David Von Drehle who has noted ‘the frequent complaints, off the record, by officers home from Iraq, that visiting the Pentagon can be like visiting a distant planet where the war is just a speck in the sky’. David Von Drehle, ‘Rumsfeld's Transformation: There's Been a Small Change in Plan’, Washingtonpost.com, 12 February 2006, at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/11/AR2006021100836&;pf.html>

54. Frank Hoffman has argued that the corps has emphasized ‘deployment’ over ‘employment’. Hoffman, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare’, unpublished draft, 2005. For a shortened version of this piece, in which Hoffman refers to this aspect, see Frank G Hoffman, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs’, Orbis, Vol.50, Iss.3 (Summer 2006), pp.395–411.

55. Thompson (ed.), Vision-21 Source Book.

56. Interview with Bruce Gudmundsson, 21 July 2005.

57. In the Marine Corps Strategy 21 document, published in 2001, the emphasis on preparing for the future is by ‘evolution’, not on revolution. See, US Navy Department, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2001), especially pp.6–8.

58. Interview with General Charles C. Krulak, 10 March 2004.

59. General Charles C. Krulak, with Dr David B. Crist (Interviewer), Oral History Transcript: General Charles C. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), (Washington DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2003), p.173 (access restricted).

60. Any officer dubious of Krulak's efforts, or aware that their superiors were dubious, would be unwilling to commit enthusiastically to a project that they felt would in time fade and vanish, for to embrace his project when others did not could harm their promotion prospects or, in their eyes, waste valuable, scarce resources that could be allocated to more immediate needs.

61. See, for example, General Charles C. Krulak, ‘Preparing the Marine Corps for War’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.81, Iss.9 (Sep. 1997), p.24 ff. Also see, Marine Corps, Sustaining the Transformation, MCRP 6-11D, 28 June 1999. The Crucible is a sustained, 50-hour plus gruelling obstacle course, designed to test individuals physically and mentally, that has been added to the end of both enlisted and officer training. For a detailed description of what the Crucible entails for enlisted personnel, see James B. Woulfe, Into the Crucible: Making Marines for the 21st Century (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998). The Crucible element of officers training is much the same as that for enlisted personnel, though it is several hours longer in duration.

62. Transcript: Chris Bury and Ted Koppel, ‘Three Block War’, ABC Nightline, 12 August 1999, online at: <http://elibrary.bigchalk.com/libweb/elib/do/document?urn = urn%3Abigchalk%3AUS%3BBCLib%3Bdocument%3B29319000&rendition> (access requires account name and password).

63. General Charles C. Krulak, ‘The three block war: Fighting in urban areas’, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol.64, Iss.5 (15 Dec. 1997), pp.139–142. Also, see Sustaining the Transformation, p.18.

64. Krulak touches on this issue in his official oral history. Krulak, Oral History Transcript, p.196.

65. For critical commentaries that contain these concerns, see John F. Schmitt, ‘A critique of the Hunter Warrior concept’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.82, Iss.6 (June 1998), p.13ff; and Captain Michael J. Lindeman, USMC, ‘An opposing force perspective of advanced warfighting experiment Hunter Warrior’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.82, Iss.6 (June 1998), p.20ff.

66. Colonel Gary W. Anderson, USMC, ‘Infestation tactics and operational maneuver from the sea: where do we go from here?’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.81, Iss.9 (September 1997), p.70.

67. Ibid. Anderson exposes this concern in arguing that the concept of dispersed operations is not a replacement of traditional amphibious doctrine.

68. ‘Letters’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.81, Iss.5 (May 1997), p.10ff. This particular letter is in response to an article by Andrew Krepinevich that argued the need for the Marine Corps to innovate new operational and tactical concepts to adapt to the promise of the RMA, with a particular focus on the impact of long-range precision strikes. The Hunter Warrior experiment was in effect such an effort and elicited the same concerns, hence the comments do reflect a general concern that was perceived with respect to the Hunter Warrior experiment. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Competing for the future: Searching for Major Ellis’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.80, Iss.11 (Nov. 1996), p.28 ff. For a critical commentary on Krepinevich's argument, particularly with respect to long range precision strikes, see Robert A. Wehrle, ‘Unexamined assumptions’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.81, Iss.2 (February 1997), p.47ff.

69. Schmitt, ‘A critique of the Hunter Warrior concept’.

70. Some in the Marine Corps were concerned that concepts experimented with in AWEs would be used to structure the corps in the future, and that should this happen it would move the corps away from its traditional force structures. See Krulak, Oral History Transcript, p.173. Krulak notes that the AWEs were not at all about force structure; that this was a misplaced perception. Krulak, in his official oral history, acknowledges that his efforts to transform the corps caught many Marines by ‘surprise’ and that he ran into resistance stemming from concern that he was moving the corps away from its ‘touchstones’. Ibid., p.138.

71. General Charles C. Krulak, email message to Colonel Anthony Woods; Subject: ‘Thoughts’, 17 January 1998, 21:04:26 EST: General C.C. Krulak, Papers: Folder: Warfighting Lab, 1 June 98 to 30 June 98: Box 164, Gray Center.

72. See General James L. Jones, ‘Commandant's Guidance’, Marines Magazine, Vol.27, Iss.7 (July 1999), p.12ff.

73. Interview with Colonel Randy Gangle, USMC (ret.), 21 April 2005.

74. On the need to train NCOs to become ‘strategic corporals’, see 1st Lieutenant Christopher Tsirlis, ‘Marines Must Train for Threats with No Boundaries’, Proceedings, Vol.130, Iss.8 (August 2004), p.70 ff; and Charles K. Curcio, ‘Are NCOs Prepared for Today's Small-Unit Leadership?’, Leatherneck, July 2005, pp.32–3.

75. On the fulsome embracing of the Distributed Operations concept by the Marine Corps, see General Michael Hagee, USMC, ‘Creating Instability in an Unstable World’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.89, Iss.6 (June 2005); Brig. Gen. Robert Schmidle, USMC, ‘Distributed Operations: From the Sea’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.88, Iss.7 (July 2004), p.37ff; and Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Jr., USMC, ‘Distributed Operations: The Time Is Now’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.88, Iss.7 (July 2004), p.36ff.

76. For example, a very public, high profile initiative is the new joint US Marine Corps–Army doctrine on counterinsurgency, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006. This manual was inspired and driven by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, US Army, and Lieutenant General James Mattis, USMC. On changes being made to the USMC education, see Colonel John A. Toolan, USMC and Charles D. McKenna, ‘Educating for the Future’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.90, Iss.2 (February 2006), pp.12ff.

77. See Lt. Gen. James Mattis, USMC and Frank Hoffman, ‘Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars’, Proceedings, Vol.131, Iss.11 (Nov. 2005), p.18ff.

78. See Joshua Kucera, ‘USMC refines small unit plan’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 February 2006.

79. For an analysis of some of lessons learned during Urban Warrior and follow-on efforts to explore and develop new techniques for urban warfare being applied successfully in the marine assault on Fallujah, and of the need to further develop new techniques, procedures, and concepts, see Colonel Gary W. Anderson, USMC (ret.), ‘Fallujah and the Future of Urban Operations’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.88, Iss.11 (Nov. 2004), p.52ff.

80. Thomas A. Mahnken, ‘Marine Attitudes Towards Transformation’, presentation at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 2 December 2004. I would like to thank sincerely Tom Mahnken for sharing his and James R. FitzSimonds' findings with me.

81. Marine Corps Strategy 21, p.5.