NATO and Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?

Abstract

This article examines NATO as a tool for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The authors show how its multinational character, reliance on consensus, and limited resources make NATO an unlikely contributor to effective COIN. Its role in the 1995 intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is used to show that, in a suitably permissive environment, NATO can help to alleviate the conditions that can lead to insurgency movements. However, NATO's role in Afghanistan shows that the organization has serious limitations in the more challenging circumstances that tend to characterize contemporary COIN. It engaged there in such a way that it was difficult for it to play an effective tactical role, and its strategic liabilities were increasingly exposed. The article puts forward ways in which NATO might be reformed to take a more positive role in COIN and concludes that if it cannot make such a transition, its decline as a relevant tool for international security management will accelerate.

Notes

1. Colonel William J. Lucas, USAF, JCS pub.1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p.93.

2. On the nature of modern insurgency and counter-insurgency requirements, see Robert R. Tomes, ‘Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp.16–28. Also see Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington DC: CIA Publications, n.d.).

3. A NATO counter-insurgency plan designed for maintaining public order was used by the Greek military in a 1967 coup that disrupted democracy there for seven years. Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983), p.51.

4. Rob de Wijk, ‘The Limits of Military Power,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.1 (Winter 2002), p. 81.

5. Sean Kay, ‘What Went Wrong with NATO?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.18, No.1 (April 2005), pp.69–83.

6. On the unique vulnerability of democracies to suicide terrorism, see Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).

7. Joseph Lepgold, ‘NATO's Collective Action Problem,’ International Security, Vol.13, No.1 (Summer 1998).

8. Philip H. Gordon, ‘Back Up NATO's Afghanistan Force,’ International Herald Tribune, 8 January 2006. Gordon notes that while in Afghanistan, a group with which he travelled had to remain an extra day in Herat because there were only two transport planes for the NATO mission; one of them was broken and the other was under national caveats not to fly at night.

9. Lisa Burgess, ‘Jones: Failure of Some NATO Nations to Join Iraq Training Effort is “Disturbing”’, Stars and Stripes, 24 November 2004.

10. ‘NATO States Ignore Afghan Call,’ BBC News, 12 September 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

11. At the time, NATO officials hoped that a meeting of defence ministers later in the year would resolve the discrepancy between military requests and political commitment among members. Nonetheless, among the allies, only Poland appeared to indicate an interest in sending more troops to Afghanistan, commensurate to its disengagement from Iraq. Poland indicated a willingness to boost its numbers in Afghanistan from 100 to 900, though its own rules of engagement were still at the time to be determined and deployment was not likely until February 2007 – too late for the crisis immediately affecting NATO. See David Dombey et al., ‘Poland is Best Hope for Afghan Force,’ Financial Times, 13 September 2006.

12. As Thomas X. Hammes notes, insurgency and terrorism are the only modern war tactics that have defeated superpowers. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (New York: Zenith, 2006).

13. Thomas X. Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation,’ Strategic Forum, no. 214 (January 2005), pp.1–6.

14. Sean Kay, Global Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), p.239.

15. Philippe Sauvagnargues, ‘NATO Issues Stern Warning to Afghanistan's Taliban’, Agence France Presse, 16 June 2006.

16. See Michael D. Shafer, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.103, No.1 (Spring 1988).

17. Bryan Bender, ‘Dutch Debate May Hold Key to NATO Role in Afghanistan’, Boston Globe, 23 January 2006.

18. Interview with former senior NATO official, 2001. Interestingly, in Kosovo, the NATO allies went to war against Yugoslavia to prevent it from escalating its own counter-insurgency campaign against the Kosovo Liberation Army.

19. Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Shaping the Future of Counter-insurgency Warfare’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 November 2005, available at <http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0511cordesman.pdf>.

20. Gregg Zoroya, ‘Afghanistan Insurgence Growing Stronger’, USA Today, 16 November 2005.

21. On the evolution of insurgency in its early stages, see Bruce Hoffman, ‘Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq’, RAND Occasional Paper, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP, June 2004, pp.16–17.

22. William L. Nash, ‘Post Conflict Operations: Preparing our Military for the Future’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 November 2005, available at <www.cfr.org>.

23. IFOR Fact Sheet, June 1996, NATO Office of Information and Press.

24. Christine Wallich, ‘Policy Forum: Bosnia – After the Troops Leave,’ Washington Quarterly, Vol.19, No.3 (Summer 1996), pp.82–3.

25. IFOR Fact Sheet: Civil-Military Cooperation, NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1996.

26. Joint Press Conference of Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe at NATO Headquarters, 18 March 1996, NATO Office of Information and Press.

27. P.A. Grootendorst (Royal Netherlands Marine Corps), ‘Peace Operations in an Insurgency Environment’, available at <www.globalsecurity.org>.

28. John Mackinlay, ‘NATO and Bin Laden’, RUSI Journal, Vol.146, No.6 (December 2001).

29. Reyko Huang, ‘Fact Sheet: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan’, Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, 14 February 2002, available at <www.cdi.org>.

30. ‘NATO in Afghanistan: Fact Sheet’, available at <www.nato.int>.

31. Ibid.

32. ‘ISAF Provisional Reconstruction Teams’, <www.jfcbs.nato.int>.

33. ‘NATO: Keeping the Peace in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, at <www.cfr.org>.

34. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘NATO Far from Relieving US Forces in Afghanistan’, Christian Science Monitor, 9 December 2003, available at <www.csmonitor.com>.

35. ‘NATO Discusses Taking the Lead in Afghanistan’, USA Today, 1 December 2003.

36. ‘NATO: Keeping the Peace in Afghanistan’.

37. Nick Fiorenza, ‘A Greater NATO Role in the Greater Middle East?’ ISIS Europe, Vol.6, No.1 (February 2004), available at <www.isis-europe.org>.

38. ‘NATO in Afghanistan – Fact Sheet’.

39. NATO Topics: Afghanistan, available at <www.nato.int>.

40. Ron Synovitz, ‘Afghanistan: NATO Troops Apply “Robust” New Rules of Engagement’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 February 2006.

41. Mark John, ‘NATO Military Backs Command Deal for Afghanistan’, Reuters, 14 November 2005.

42. ‘Afghan Role Vexes NATO Ministers,’ BBC News, 14 September 2005, available at <www.BBC.com>.

43. This architecture would be facilitated by creating a single chain of command for all operations under an ISAF commander with an assigned deputy officer answering to the counter-insurgency operations. John, ‘NATO Military Backs Command Deal’.

44. Ron Synovitz, ‘Afghanistan: France Wants to Keep Separate Commands for ISAF and Combat Forces,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 October 2005, available at <www.rferl.org>.

45. Francis Rheinheimer, ‘Afghanistan Stage III: NATO's Most Ambitious Operation?’ Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, 15 May 2006, available at <www.cdi.org>.

46. Rheinheimer, ‘Afghanistan Stage III’.

47. ‘NATO Forces Will Not Chase Taliban in Afghanistan's South’, Agence France-Presse, 12 December 2005.

48. Ahmed Rashid, ‘NATO's Afghanistan Troop Dilemma’, BBC News, 26 December 2005, available at <www.BBC.com>.

49. Pamela Constable, ‘Helicopter Force Takes Measure of Two Wars’, Washington Post, 29 May 2006, p.A1.

50. Paul Ames, ‘US Offers to Command NATO in Afghanistan’, Associated Press, 6 June 2006.

51. Griff Witte, ‘US Cedes Duties in Rebuilding Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 3 January 2006, p.A1.

52. Sayed Salahuddin, ‘Taliban Battered Ahead of NATO talks on Afghanistan’, Reuters, 7 June 2006.

53. ‘Big Anti-Taliban Operation in South’, Dawn, 15 June 2006, available at <http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/15/int3.htm>.

54. Hans de Vreij, ‘Major US-led Operation in Southern Afghanistan’, available at <www.radionetherlands.nl>.

55. Sayed Salahuddin, ‘Afghans Welcome NATO Expansion, Taliban Threaten’, Reuters, 9 December 2005.

56. Ismail Khan, ‘Taliban Ready to Face NATO Troops’, Dawn, 11 June 2006.

57. ‘NATO Expansion into Southern Afghanistan “Will be Tough”’, Agence France-Presse, 8 May 2006.

58. Jonathan Marcus, ‘NATO's Afghan Mission Under Pressure’, BBC News, 9 September 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

59. Witte, ‘US Cedes Duties’.

60. ‘NATO Expansion into Southern Afghanistan’.

61. Christopher Swift, ‘Riots, Renewed Attacks Underscore Taliban Resilience’, Terrorism Focus, Vol.3, No.21 (31 May 2006), pp.4–5.

62. Paul Wood, ‘UK Soldiers face Difficult Battle’, BBC News, 7 September 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

63. ‘Kabul Suicide Bomb Hits US Convoy’, BBC News, 8 September 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

64. ‘NATO Kills 94 “Taleban Fighters”’, BBC News, 10 September 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

65. Carlotta Gall, ‘Opium Harvest at Record Level in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 3 September 2006.

66. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Afghanistan: Taleban's Second Coming’, BBC News, 2 June 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

67. Declan Walsh, ‘Afghan Province to Provide 1/3 of World's Heroin’, Dawn, 15 June 2006.

68. Rashid, ‘Afghanistan: Taleban's Second Coming’.

69. Mihai Carp, ‘Building Stability in Afghanistan’, NATO Review (Spring 2006), available at <www.nato.int>.

70. Gall, ‘Opium Harvest’.

71. Rachel Morarjee, ‘Doubts Intensify Over Afghanistan's Future’, Christian Science Monitor, 11 September 2006.

72. Comments at joint news conference, Brussels, reported in David Brunnstrom and Mark John, ‘NATO Vows to Boost Afghan and Mission Despite Violence’, Reuters, 8 June 2006.

73. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘NATO will be in Afghanistan for Years, Says Military Chief’, Guardian, 23 February 2006.

74. Brad Wright, ‘NATO to Ramp Up Afghanistan Forces’, www.CNN.com, 27 January 2004.

75. ‘Karzai Criticises Foreign Tactics’, BBC News, 22 June 2006, available at <www.BBC.com>.

76. Pamela Constable, ‘Afghan Leader Losing Support’, Washington Post, 26 June 2006, p.A1.

77. Peter Graff, ‘Taliban Tests British Troops in Afghan Battle’, Reuters, 19 June 2006.

78. Richards' comments and the American quotation are reported in ‘NATO to Try New Tactic in Afghanistan’, Knight Ridder Newspapers, 18 June 2006.

79. Joseph Giordono, ‘Commander to Draw on Lessons of the Past for Afghanistan Mission’, Stars and Stripes, 11 March 2006.

80. Al Pessin, ‘NATO General Has Plan for Afghan Security, Development’, Voice of America, 15 June 2006, available at <http://voanews.com/english/archive/2006-06-15-Voa57.cfm?CFID = 106190086&CFTOKEN = 36634824>.

81. NATO has had to expend considerable effort in outreach to the Afghan population simply to explain the nature of the mission and stress its non-combat support functions. Only 31 per cent of Afghans can read and write, and while there are 250 newspapers in Afghanistan, most are located in the capital and major cities. The US hoped to address this issue with the distribution of 200,000 wind-up radios but their signals often do not reach the most remote areas. ISAF also has engaged in regular public opinion surveys, though gaining a good sense of the mood outside the major population centres is difficult. ‘Interview: General Gotz Gliemeroth, ISAF Commander’, NATO Review, Winter 2003, available at <www.nato.int>.

82. de Vreij, ‘Major US-led Operation’.

83. Ibid.

84. Jim Garamone, ‘Former US Chief in Afghanistan Talks of Term’, American Forces Press Service, 19 May 2005.

85. Pessin, ‘NATO General Has Plan’.

86. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Imperial Grunts’, The Atlantic, October 2005, available at <www.theatlantic.com>.