Staying the Course in ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’: Persuasion and Perseverance in the Era of the Asymmetric Bargaining War

Abstract

The US brought 20th-century warfare to its apogee in the 1990s, with new techniques and technologies. Contrary to the trend in US planning, however, lower intensity conflicts emerged as the dominant idiom of warfare. In seeking to understand these developments, a number of US strategists suggested that the world was now moving into a ‘fourth generation of warfare’ (4GW). Subsequent theorizing about 4GW highlighted a number of important points. First, the enemy was likely to be dissipated and diffusely organized. Second, amid the Western states' world of law, liberal values, and media transparency, their use of force had to be limited. Third, military operational art has now become less about the decisive physical defeat of the opposing forces and more about persuading the enemy to give up. Now is the era of the asymmetric bargaining war, the parameters of which have been tested in the ‘global war on terrorism’ and in Iraq. While Western states were potentially capable actors, the doctrine and practice of the contemporary bargaining war was far from understood, and serious questions emerged over the effectiveness of the strategies adopted as well as the ability to persevere. The article concludes by suggesting that the development of a multi-lateralized model of intervention might be the best way of meeting the challenges of 4GW.

Notes

1. The development of warfare in the West since Napoleon embodied the three earlier generations. The first reflected the technology of the smoothbore musket: armies were massed to engage in linear and attritional battle. The second generation stemmed from 19th century developments in weapons and transport technologies: battle-lines were still linear but commanders could coordinate direct and indirect firepower as well as manoeuvre their forces across larger areas. The third generation was enabled by developments such as the tank, aircraft, and radio, but stemmed more from ideas than technology. The big ideas were combined arms and deep battle: this approach was non-linear and by striking deep into the enemy it sought to incapacitate rather than simply overwhelm. The focus of the operational art shifted from place to time, with the ability to raise one's own tempo relative to that of the enemy the key factor. The German army inaugurated the third generation with its blitzkrieg, and the US Army brought it to its peak in the 1990s. See William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Capt. John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth-Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, available at <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm>.

2. Lind et al. observed that ‘fourth-generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just physical, entity … Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth-generate will merely accentuate them'. Ibid., p.3.

3. Ibid., p.4.

4. Ibid., pp.4–5.

5. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991); Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004); Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.74, No.3 (May/June 1995); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2005).

6. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, p.114.

7. William S. Lind, Major John F. Schmitt, and Colonel Gary I. Wilson, ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare: Another Look’, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1994, available at <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4GW_another_look.htm>.

8. Thomas X. Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth-Generation’, Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Issue No. 214 (January 2005), available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF214/SF214.pdf>.

9. Luttwak, ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, pp.109–122.

10. Ibid., p.115.

11. According to Avi Kober, ‘Post-heroic warfare has two rules: first, one is not “allowed” to get killed. Second, one is not “allowed” to kill, at least not civilians. The first rule could be attributed to both demography and low stakes, whereas the second rule is affected by the belief that wars result from the evilness of the enemy's political leadership. If one sees the enemy as leadership, rather an armed forces or society – for example, if the enemy is Saddam, Milosevic, Aideed or Arafat – then the centre of gravity should be the enemy's leadership, and killing large numbers of enemy soldiers (as one of the means to achieve battlefield decision), let alone civilians, is not a legitimate act’. Avi Kober, ‘Does the Iraq War Reflect a Phase Change in Warfare?’, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol.21, No.2 (June 2005), p.126.

12. Such a limitation is a marked difference with previous COIN practice. Even the influential British model of COIN operations developed in the 1950s and 1960s, which stressed the rule of law and the use of minimum, targeted force, continued to embody a great deal of violence. In Malaya, many tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly transported into ‘strategic hamlets’. In Kenya, many hundreds of Kikuyu tribesmen were hanged, and hundreds more killed (many beaten to death) in ‘re-education’ camps. Even in the 1950s and 1960s, though, human-rights abuses were sometimes difficult to mask, and domestic political repercussions often interfered with practices in the field.

13. For details of the US campaign in Fallujah, see Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, especially the articles by Lieutenant General John F. Sattler and Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Daniel H. Wilson, ‘Operation Al Fajr: The Battle of Fallujah – Part II’, pp.12–25; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Hayden, ‘Counter-insurgency in Iraq Started with Fallujah’, pp.28–9; F.J. West, ‘The Fall of Fallujah’, pp.52–8.

14. See, Norwitz, Jeffrey H., ‘Defining Success at Guantanamo: By what Measure?’, Military Review, Vol.85, No.4 (July–August 2005), pp.81–2.

15. In his capacity as Professor of Law at the US Naval War College and a Federal Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Norwitz perceived that ‘Success in the struggle against terrorism will be measured in generations. When future strategists look back on the early years of this decade, they will not judge Camp Delta on the relative value of intelligence reports but on humanitarian issues, how detainees were treated, the legitimacy of the trial process, whether laws reflected evolving definitions of “combatants”, and how detainees were ultimately dealt with when America dismantled terrorist groups. As we discover what the law will not allow, serious action to define what is permissible will follow … It has been less than three years since the first detainee walked off the back of a military aircraft onto a runway baking under the hot Cuban sun. Is America achieving its strategic goals by its choice of means? Only by considering how the future measures success can America properly define its strategy at Guantanamo today’. Ibid., p.82.

16. Jack Straw, ‘Global Response to Terrorism’, speech delivered at Royal United Services Institute, 16 January 2006, available at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename = OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c = Page&cid = 1007029391647&a = KArticle&aid = 1136904478281>.

17. See Colonel (ret.) Mark F. Cancian, ‘A Civil War in the Military’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2006, pp.48–52.

18. Major General Peter W. Chiarelli (US Army) and Major Patrick R. Michaelis (US Army), ‘Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations’, Military Review, Vol.85, No.4 (July–August 2005). Chiarelli was US 1st Cavalry Division commander in Baghdad in 2004. For further discussion of full spectrum operations see Major General John R.R. Batiste (US Army) and Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Daniels (US Army), ‘The Fight for Samarra: Full Spectrum Operations in Modern Warfare, Military Review, Vol.85, No.3 (May–June 2005).

19. Chiarelli and Michaelis, ‘Winning the Peace’, p.15.

20. ‘Negotiating with the Iraqi insurgency: dilemmas and doubts’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol.12, Issue 1 (Feb. 2006). Available at <http://www.iiss.org/stratcom>.

21. Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth-Generation’, p.7.

22. See Peter Maass, ‘The Counter-insurgent’, The New York Times Magazine, 11 January 2004.

23. Robert Scales, ‘Culture-centric warfare’, Proceedings (US Naval Institute), October 2004, p.33.

24. See Major John Nagl (US Army), ‘Preface’, Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

25. See Rupert Smith, ‘Bosnia: Using Force Amongst the People’, The Utility of Force, Chapter 9, especially pp.359-68.

26. Contemporary British peacekeeping doctrine was written in the context of war in Bosnia by Colonels Charles Dobbie and Philip Wilkinson at the Army Directorate-General of Doctrine and Development, Upavon, Wiltshire. A more robust peacekeeping approach – the Peace Support Operation (PSO) – emerged in the Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping (JWP 3-01), in 1997. The current British doctrine booklet – The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 (2nd Edition), Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Shrivenham, 2004 – remains the leading account of its kind. Contemporary British philosophy is also succinctly set out in British Military Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01, 2001. JWP 0-01 opens with a concept of fighting power which is a model for the fourth-generation, asserting that, ‘Fighting power can be applied benignly. However, it is an especially powerful and influential instrument of policy when it is used to deter or coerce during a measured process of conflict prevention and confrontation management. This includes the conduct of peace support operations, low intensity law enforcement and other operations aimed at securing humanitarian benefit. While many of these operations will be benign in nature, the effective management of confrontation will often depend on the ability to apply lethal force in a measured and deliberate fashion when necessary. At the very core of this ability is an attitude that is both flexible and endowed with humanity. The combination of war-fighting skills and humanity may seem paradoxical. However, a vitally important part of motivation is the belief in what one is doing: the measured application of force requires discipline and a finely tuned sense of moral purpose. The British approach to the development of fighting power has this vital quality at its core’. JWP 0-01, p.iii.