Reconsidering Cooperative Threat Reduction: Russian Nuclear Weapons Scientists and Non-Proliferation

Abstract

The collapse of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the fate of its nuclear weapons and led the United States to fund what came to be known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). This includes programs that fight the proliferation of weapons expertise by providing short-term income and eventual re-employment of former Soviet WMD experts in civilian fields. Using case studies, based on archival research and extensive interviews, this article argues that CTR's three main ‘knowledge non-proliferation’ efforts have largely failed at their given task. Although programs have worked with many former Soviet WMD experts, few have been re-employed. Each program has also come to emphasize the number of people engaged rather than re-directed and to have less regard for their WMD skills. Moreover, this shift in goals, and the metrics each program uses to measure progress, led to serious political disputes between Moscow and Washington. Besides being unable to demonstrate success at their original non-proliferation goals, these programs use metrics that threaten to upset the fragile US domestic political consensus for future work in Russia.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. I also thank the US Association of Arts and Sciences, the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and US University for supporting this research, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their comments. The statements and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Notes

For a comparison of country contributions to CTR's objectives see Nuclear Threat Initiative, Russia: International Assistance Programs, www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/intnatl/intnatl.htm#G8 (accessed 21 July 2008).

Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Department for Conversion of Atomic Industry (DCAI), ‘Major Results of Conversion in Defense Complex Enterprises of Minatom, Russia, in 1998–2001’, 2002.

Matthew Bunn, Oleg Bukharin, Jill Cetina, Kenneth N. Luongo, and Frank N. von Hippel, ‘Retooling Russia's Nuclear Cities’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 (September/October 1998), p. 44.

Charles Hecker, ‘Payment Crisis Hits Elite Nuclear Center’, The Moscow Times, 16 June 1995, p. 4; Analytical Center for Non-Proliferation, ‘An Overview of VNIIEF-STL Experiences and Projects’ (Sarov, Russia: 2004), p. 25.

Oleg Bukharin, Downsizing of Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure (Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, May 2000), pp. 17–18.

In 1998 the Russian government promised to invest $500 million on conversion and another $500 million on restructuring its nuclear weapons complex. Eventually, less than $200 million was delivered. A new conversion effort that began in 2002 provided less than $2 million a year in conversion assistance. Initially planned to extend through 2010, the program ended in 2006.

Ministry of Atomic Energy, ‘Major Results of Conversion’ (note 2); and Lev Ryabev, ‘Russia's Down-Sizing and Conversion Programs’, Presentation at the Sam Nunn/Bank of America Policy Forum, Atlanta, Georgia, 26–27 March 2001.

Oleg Bukharin, ‘Downsizing Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 121; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part II, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 13, 20, 22 March 1996, p. 64.

There was widespread agreement that the danger of proliferation was due to economic desperation. For examples, see US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Soviet Crisis and the US Interest: Future of the Soviet Military and Future of the Soviet Economy, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 6, 19 June 1991, p. 246; US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Potential Threats to US Security in the Post-Cold War Era, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 10, 11, 13 December 1991, pp. 4–9, 67. For concern about the effect finances have on the safety of nuclear operations see US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 3, 17, 24 February and 3 March 1993, p. 17.

Other initiatives include a Defense Department program to convert defence industries, the Defense Enterprise Fund, the Civilian Research and Development Foundation, activities at the Department of Commerce and the US Trade and Development Agency, as well as private sector activities involving the Soros Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the National Academies of Science. These initiatives, however, do not focus exclusively on the proliferation of WMD expertise.

Victor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II, ‘Science in the Pursuit of Peace: The Success and Future of the ISTC’, Arms Control Today, June/July 1998, p. 21; Robert Gallucci, ‘Redirecting the Soviet Weapons Establishment’, Arms Control Today, June 1992, p. 3; Glenn Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ: The Story of the International Effort to Convert Russian Weapons (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 108.

For a list of science projects by technical area, see the ISTC database at tech-db.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/istc-projects-database.htm.

Amy F. Woolf, CRS Report for Congress, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: US Programs in the Former Soviet Union, updated 26 June 2006, p. 25.

US Congress, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (note 8), p. 404; US Department of Energy, Industrial Partnering Program, ‘New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program – Reducing the Nuclear Danger’, 7 March 1996, p. 405; US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘Program Strategy’, November 1999, pp. 16–17; US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2001, 30 September 2001; and US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, February 1999), p. 42.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘Program Strategy’, November 1999, p. 1; US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY 2000, Part 6: Department of Energy, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 16, 18 March 1999, p. 359.

US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Program Strategy’, August 1999.

US General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, April 2000), p. 14; US Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2001, p. A68; US Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2002, p. 90; US Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2003, p. 98; National Research Council, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons, The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships (National Academy Press, 2007), pp. 50–1; International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2006, p. 37; Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, 2006 Annual Report, p. 13.

Bukharin, Downsizing of Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure (note 5), pp. 5, 24; Oleg Bukharin, Russia's Nuclear Complex: Surviving the End of the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, May 2004), p. 5. According to Bukharin (Russia's Nuclear Complex, p. 7), about 20 per cent were involved in construction activities.

Bukharin, Russia's Nuclear Complex (note 18), p. 16; Oleg Bukharin, ‘Stewards and Custodians: Tomorrow's Crisis for the Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex?’, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999, p. 131.

Bukharin, ‘Stewards And Custodians’ (note 19), p. 131; and Lev Ryabev, ‘Downsizing of the Nuclear Complex and Defense Conversion Programs’, Presentation at the Conference on Helping Russia Down-Size its Nuclear Weapons Complex, Princeton NJ, 14–15 March 2000.

For estimates of the size of the Soviet biological weapons complex see Amy E. Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1999). Anthony Rimmington, ‘From Military to Industrial Complex? The Conversion of Biological Weapons’ Facilities in the Russian Federation', Contemporary Security Policy 17, No. 1 (April 1996), p. 87, contains a higher estimate of 100,000 total employees. Lower estimates of around 15,000–20,000 can be found in Derek Averre, ‘From Co-Option to Cooperation: Reducing the Threat of Biological Agents and Weapons’, in Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, Volume 1: Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003), p. 42 and footnote 30; and in the testimony of Milton Leitenberg, US Congress, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (note 8), p. 176. According to Smithson, Toxic Archipelago, pp. 11, 49, the chemical weapons complex had approximately 6,000 workers.

Schweitzer, Moscow DMZ (note 11), p. 84; US Congress, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (note 8), p. 53.

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2005), p. 55; Fred Weir and Mark Clayton, ‘US–Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades’, Christian Science Monitor, 20 September 2006.

United States Industry Coalition, Annual Report 2005–2006, p. 6.

See US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts (note 14), pp. 39–43.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘Guidance for Evaluating Weapons Scientists, Engineers, and Technicians’, June 2002, p. 1, www.usic.net (accessed 29 June 2007).

Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to be Reassessed (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, December 2007), p. 5.

US General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 2001), p. 12. According to my interviews at the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, they have their own requirement that Partner Projects involve at least 30 per cent WMD experts.

US General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight (note 28), p. 15.

US Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist (note 27), p. 6.

US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Program Strategy’, August 1999. See also US Congress, Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY 2000, p. 60.

US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Nuclear Cities Initiative Program Plan’, October 2000; US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Program Overview’, June 2001.

US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, May 2001), pp. 3–4, 19–20.

See, for example, US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY 2000, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 9, 11, 18 March, 13 April 13 1999, p. 262.

See 105 H.R.3616, Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Section 3133 (B).

US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts (note 14); and US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist (note 33).

US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Enactment of Provisions of H.R. 5408, the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 October 2000, title XXXI, section 3172.

See for example Mike Allen, ‘Bush Pledges More Aid for Russian Arms Cuts’, The Washington Post, 28 December 2001, p. A1.

US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 3172(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001’, December 2000; US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Nuclear Cities Initiative Program Plan,’ October 2000; US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Program Guide’, October 2002; US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist (note 33), p. 51.

United States Industry Coalition, Annual Report 2005–2006, p. 6.

According to International Science and Technology Center, ‘ISTC Fact Sheet’, www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/public-info-fact-sheet.htm (accessed 21 January 2008), from 1994 through 2006 ISTC projects involved 67,684 participants from 922 institutes in the former Soviet Union. From 1996 through 2006, STCU projects have involved approximately 17,300 participants. See Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, ‘overhead slides’, Nanophotonics (CD-ROM), September 2005; and Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, 2006 Annual Report, p. 13.

This estimate is probably high. At the Science Centers an increasing number of projects are with commercial partners for which there are different requirements for WMD expert participation. At the Science Center in Moscow there is no minimum requirement while the center in Ukraine prefers to fund projects where at least 30 per cent of participants have WMD credentials. Since 2000 these commercial projects have represented a third to over half of project funding at the Moscow center. The same is true since 2002 for the center in Ukraine.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program – Reducing the Nuclear Danger’, 7 March 1996, submitted as part of US Congress, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (note 8), p. 404.

US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, FY 1995: US Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, April 1996, p. 113.

Ibid.

National Research Council, Office of International Affairs, An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center: Redirecting Expertise in Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union, (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), p. 11; Oleg Bukharin, Frank N. von Hippel, and Sharon K. Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia's Closed Nuclear Cities (Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, November 2000), p. 13.

National Research Council, An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center (note 46), p. 11.

Anonymous interview by author, Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, 9 July 2007.

National Research Council, An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center (note 46), p. 11; Averre, ‘From Co-Option to Cooperation’ (note 21), p. 34; Amy Smithson offers specifics about the importance of Science Center grants at key former biological weapons institutes in Toxic Archipelago (note 21), pp. 48–50.

Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, ‘Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), p. 67.

US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts (note 14), p. 3.

Ibid.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘Program Strategy’, November 1999, p. 1; US Congress, Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY 2000 (note 15), p. 359.

Woolf, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance (note 13), p. 25.

Based on information provided in International Science and Technology Center, Annual Reports, 1994–2005 and author's email communications with ISTC on 15 June 2007 and 20 June 2007.

Based on information provided in Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, Annual Reports, 2000–2005, and Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, Governing Board Minutes, 1995–2005.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘Program Strategy’, November 1999, pp. 17–18; US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, ‘Overhead Slides’, 11 December 1997; US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts (note 14), p. 35.

United States Industry Coalition, Commercial Partnerships in the Former Soviet Union, Spring 2007, p. 1; US Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, FY 2008 Congressional Budget Request, February 2007, p. 458.

Frederick P. Kellett, USIC and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention: A Survey of Companies Doing Business in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2007), p. 20, footnote 2.

Ibid., p. 29.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2000, 30 September 2000, pp. 1–2.

US Department of Energy, Internal Report on Programs in Russia, 2001.

US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, August 2005), pp. 6, 20.

US Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist (note 27), pp. 5–8.

International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2006, p. 4.

International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2005, p. 14; International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report 2006, p. 4.

Based on information provided by ISTC, email communication with author, 22 July 2007.

Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, Annual Report, 2005, p. 12; US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, FY 2000 US Assistance to the NIS: Annual Report on US Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, January 2001, p. 243.

See, for example, US Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress for FY 2006, p. 53; US Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, ‘Bioindustry Initiative Factsheet’, September 2003; US General Accounting Office, Department of State: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities need Reassessment (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, April 2004), p. 30.

William H. Tobey, Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, ‘Letter to the Editor: Nuclear Scientists’, New York Times, 31 January 2008.

Aspin as quoted in Adam Clymer, ‘Soviet Turmoil; US Swords into Plowshares for Soviets?’ New York Times, 29 August 1991, p. A22.

For examples of this argument see R.W. Apple, Jr., ‘Soviet Turmoil; Even as Bush Counsels Prudence, West Seems Eager to Aid Soviets’, New York Times, 29 August 1991, p. A1; Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, ‘The Nunn-Lugar Initiative: Cooperative Demilitarization of the Former Soviet Union’, in Allan E. Goodman (ed.), The Diplomatic Record 1991–1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 141–2; Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); and Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller, and Charles Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991).

See, for example, Richard Wolf and Jessica Lee, ‘Lawmakers: Use Military Funds for Aid’, USA Today, 29 August 29 1991, p. 4A.

See, for example, US Congress, Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 137, No. 177, Part 3, H11496; Congressional Research Service, The Future of Arms Control: New Opportunities, Report prepared for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., April 1992, p. 65; and, US Congress, Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 137, No. 90, H4356-H4357.

For example, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney favoured waiting until the Soviet Union reduced its nuclear arsenal and defence spending before providing aid. See US Congress, Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 137, No. 123, S12591. See also US Congress, Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 137, No. 124, E2972; US Congress, Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 137, No. 176, S18001.

US Congress, Potential Threats to US Security (note 9), p. 92.

US Congress, Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 137, No. 90, H4356; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Soviet Crisis and the US Interest: Future of the Soviet Military and Future of the Soviet Economy, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 6, 19 June 1991, p. 100.

In 2002 for the first time the US president failed to make this certification. The Bush administration claimed that Russia had not supplied the necessary information; a particular issue was sharing data about a strain of anthrax that had been developed by Russian scientists. Without certification about one-third of cooperative threat reduction-related assistance to Russia was stalled. Eventually, the Bush administration asked Congress to permanently waive the requirement for certification, which Congress eventually did. Today the president must still certify certain Russian behaviours but may also waive the need for certification due to national security concerns.

These six conditions specified that Russia had to invest its own money in WMD destruction, forego excessive military modernization, destroy fissile materials from its dismantled nuclear weapons, help the United States verify the destruction of such weapons, and comply with arms control agreements and international standards of human rights.

United States Department of State, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1999.

Included were US programs aimed at promoting democratic and market reforms in Russia. For example, many of the technical assistance programs funded by USAID involved contracts to US companies and non-governmental organizations. See James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 95.

United States Industry Coalition, Annual Report 2005–2006, p. 10.

See 105 H.R.3616, Section 3133 (B).

US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts (note 14), pp. 50–9; and US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist (note 33), p. 4.

Based upon Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Interactive Budget Database’, www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/charts/cnm_funding_interactive.asp (accessed 11 August 2008).

See, for example, US Congress, Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY 2000, p. 262.

US Congress, Enactment of Provisions of H.R. 5408, title XXXI, section 3172.

US Congress, House, Committee on National Security, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 16 June 1997, p. 420.

US Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist (note 27), p. 15.

For the persistence of such concerns see US Congress, Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 13 June 1995, H5865, H5867, H5871; Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 23 June 1997, H4199; US General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight (note 28) p. 2; and US Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist (note 27), p. 6. With respect to the Science Centers, one persistent concern is that doing cooperative research with former biological weapons experts may help Russia develop offensive biological weapons capabilities. See US General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat (note 17), p. 6.

US House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, ‘New Release: Department of Energy Program Funds Russian Nuclear Work in Iran’, 6 February 2008.

Based on budget information provided in US Department of State, ‘Science Centers Program’, briefing slides; US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report on the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, Message from the President, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 June 2000, p. 5; William Hoehn, ‘Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Requests for US-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation Programs’, Russian US Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), April 2002; William Hoehn, Preliminary Analysis of the US State Department's Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request for Nonproliferation Programs in Russia and the FSU, RANSAC, 11 March 2004; Woolf, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance (note 13), p. 24; US Department of State, Annual Report on Assistance to the Former Soviet Union, Fiscal Years 1994–2006 but especially 2000 and 2005; Isabelle Williams, ‘Preliminary Analysis of the US State Department's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request for Global WMD Threat Reduction Programs’, Partnership for Global Security Policy Update, April 2007.

US Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors FY 2008 Congressional Budget Request, Vol. 1, February 2007, DOE/CF-014, p. 458; US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts, (note 14), p. 33; Amy F. Woolf, Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, Congressional Research Service, 21 November 2000), p. 11; RANSAC, ‘Russian Nuclear Security and the Clinton Administration's Fiscal Year 2000 Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. A Summary of Congressional Action’, February 2000; William Hoehn, Russian US Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Update on Congressional Activity Affecting US–Russian Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs, July 26, 2002, p. 34; Russian-US Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Preliminary Report: Anticipated FY2003 Budget Request for Department of Energy Cooperative Nuclear Security Programs in Russia January 9, 2002, p. 2; William Hoehn, RANSAC, Policy Update, Preliminary Analysis of the US Department of Energy's Fiscal Year 2006 Nonproliferation Budget Request, Feb. 2005, p. 4; United States Industry Coalition, E-Notes, Vol. 8, No. 4, 4 May 2007, p. 2.

Federal of US Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council, ‘Report on the Fourth International Workshop on Nuclear Warhead Elimination and Nonproliferation’, (Washington, DC: 26–27 February 1992), p. 12; US Congress, House, Defense Policy Panel and the Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, Regional Threats and Defense Options for the 1990s, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 11, 17, 19, 24, 26, 27, 31, April 2, 8, 9, and May 5, 1992, p. 326; and US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Assisting the Build-Down of the Former Soviet Military Establishment, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 5, 6 February 1992, pp. 50, 58.

National Research Council, An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center (note 46), p. 19.

US Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist (note 27), p. 24.

US Department of Energy, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2001, 30 September 2001.

US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1999, Part 6: Department of Energy, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 12, 17, 18 March 1998; US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation. Concerns with DOE's Efforts (note 14), p. 27. According to one source, this timeline depended on budgets of $50 million in later years. According to another, the total projected cost of IPP was $370 million, which is approximately equal to program budgets from 1994–2008.

US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 2002. Part 6: Department of Energy, September 2001, pp. 156–7, 159; US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 2001. Part 6: Department of Energy, 21, 23 March 2000, p. 553.

US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) Status Report and Program Plans; US Department of Energy, Nuclear Cities Initiative, ‘Nuclear Cities Initiative Program Status’, 15 August 2000.

Valentin Tikhonov, Russia's Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation, (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), p. 15.

See for example, US General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat (note 17), p. 14; Roger Roffey, Wilhelm Unge, Jenny Clevström, and Kristina S Westerdahl, Support to Threat Reduction of the Russian Biological Weapons Legacy – Conversion, Biodefence and the Role of Biopreparat, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—0841—SE, April 2003, p. 69; and Marilyn Chase, David S. Cloud, and John J. Fialka, ‘Soviet Germ Program is a Worry Once Again Amidst Anthrax Scare’, Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2001, p. A1.

About 40 per cent of the Russia federal budget is linked to oil and gas revenues. See US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, ‘Major, Non-OPEC Countries’ Oil Revenues', June 2005.

Stuart D. Goldman, ‘Russia’, Congressional Research Service, 9 April 2004, p. 6; World Bank, Russian Economic Report #15, November 2007, p. 2.

Based upon a comparison of the growth in Russian GDP and defence spending as found in US Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, various years; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database, at www.sipri.org; and Petter Stalenheim, Damien Fruchart, Wuyi Omitoogun, and Catlina Perdomo, ‘Appendix 8A. Tables of Military Expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 341.

Peter Romashkin, ‘Analysis of Federal Budgets of the Russian Federation in the National Defense Section of Spending, Subsection of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, Institute for World Economy and International Relations’ (IMEMO), 25 May 2006, p. 2.

John V. Parachini, David E. Moser, John Baker, Keith Crane, Michael Chase, and Michael Daugherty, Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem, RAND, National Security Research Division, 2005, p. 10; Analytical Center for Non-Proliferation, Quarterly Information Bulletins (Sarov, Russia), Issue 26, June 2006.

Recently the Council on Foreign Relations, for example, urged President Bush to view Russia as an authoritarian adversary rather than a strategic partner. See Peter Baker, ‘Task Force Urges Bush to be Tougher With Russia’, Washington Post, 5 March 2006, p. 16.

Under the agreement that established the Moscow Science Center, equipment for projects is allowed to enter Russia duty-free. Russia is concerned that businesses use Partner Projects to circumvent the taxes that would otherwise be levied on imported equipment and supplies.

See, for example, Sharon K. Weiner, ‘Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia's Nuclear Cities’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002).