Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space Weaponization and Conflict

Abstract

Is armed conflict in and from space inevitable? In recent years a consensus has emerged that space has become increasingly militarized – in the sense that technologies placed in outer space are increasingly used to facilitate and augment traditional military activities. But actual use of weapons in or from outer space remains highly controversial. The aim of this article is to assess the attitudes of major space-faring powers towards space weaponization. Central here, the article argues, is the question of whether the weaponization of space and/or conflict in space (taken here to mean the occurrence of military conflict in outer space itself, or from the Earth directed at any systems deployed in outer space) is inevitable, and the extent to which the major space powers espouse this proposition. This article shows that the idea of inevitability retains a prominent place (although for subtly differing reasons) in American, Chinese, and Russian perspectives on space weaponization. What it is that is inevitable frequently varies, based on assumed but underspecified technological developments. This risks creating a discursively constructed security dilemma that increases the likelihood of actual space weaponization. It leads to the conclusion that renewed negotiations between the major space powers and international cooperative agreements are essential to combat the fatalism of the inevitability thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Mike Sheehan, Alan Collins, and Julie MacLeavy for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. He would also like to pay particular thanks to Nancy Gallagher, Aaron Karp, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on the article. Any errors and omissions that remain are the sole responsibility of the author.

Notes

For a more detailed overview see Rip Bulkeley and Graham Spinardi, Space Weapons: Deterrence or Delusion? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986).

The US National Reconnaissance Office operates several radar imaging satellites for the purposes of battlefield reconnaissance; systems such as Milstar (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) are used by US forces for providing secure communications; and the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) has been used for targeting and guidance of strike capabilities.

General John Shalikashvili as quoted in Alasdair McLean, ‘A New Era? Military Space Policy Enters the Mainstream’, Space Policy, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2000), pp. 243–7, p. 244.

Ibid.

Although the idea was flirted with recurrently during the Cold War by both the US and Soviet Union, both of whom also tested various forms of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons; see Bulkeley and Spinardi, Space Weapons (note 1).

‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’, available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ost/text/space1.htm (accessed 30 July 2007).

Taboo is used here in the sense of a ‘normative prohibition’ though, as Nina Tannewald argues with relation to nuclear non-use, the space weapons taboo is only one, albeit important, reason for the non-use of space weapons in a conflict situation to date. See Tannewald, ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United State and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use’, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999), pp. 433–68. See also Karl P. Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate’, Astropolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003), pp. 4–28

See Bruce M. Deblois, ‘The Advent of Space Weapons’, Astropolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003) pp. 29–53, p. 30. Here, most obviously, the Chinese and US demonstration of ASAT capability, albeit against their own satellites, raises significant questions as to whether space is in fact already weaponized.

See Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

See, in particular, Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).

DeBlois, ‘The Advent of Space Weapons’ (note 8), p. 32.

See Gerard DeGroot, Dark Side of the Moon: The Magnificent Madness of the American Lunar Quest (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007) pp. 12–29; Bulkeley and Spinardi, Space Weapons (note 1), pp. 10–24.

DeBlois, ‘The Advent of Space Weapons’, (note 8), pp. 38–9. DeBlois, it should be noted, does himself accept the strong version of the inevitability thesis that he caricatures here.

Karl P. Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7); see also Karl P. Mueller, ‘Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?’, paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA, 27 March 2002, available from http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html (accessed 25 July 2007).

See Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7), p. 17. For an example of the airpower analogy in weaponization advocacy, see Franz J. Gayl, ‘The Military Space Service: Why Its Time Has Come’, Space Daily (November 2003) available from http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html (accessed 27 July 2007). Mueller is highly sceptical of this argument's claims to veracity: ‘Naturally, it would be foolish to conclude from the history of the last fifty years that space will definitely not be weaponized during the next fifty, but it would also be reckless to deduce the opposite from the history of flight between 1903 and 1915.’ ‘Totem and Taboo’, p. 19.

See Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7) pp. 17–18. As Mueller notes, this position is not necessarily limited to hawks or war-mongers; there can be those who, whilst accepting the desirability of space as a ‘sanctuary’ from conflict in the abstract, are nevertheless resigned to the belief that ‘space weaponization is inevitable, and that this makes it imperative for the United States to lead the way in the development and deployment of space weapons’. Ibid., p. 13.

DeBlois, ‘The Advent of Space Weapons’, (note 8), p. 32; Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7), pp. 20–1.

Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’(note 7), p. 21.

Deblois, ‘The Advent of Space Weapons’ (note 8), p. 35.

Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7), p. 22.

For a further discussion, see Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 82–140.

David Grahame, ‘A Question of Intent: Missile Defense and the Weaponization of Space’, Basic Notes (May 2002), available from http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002NMDspace.htm (accessed 27 July 2007).

Gayl, ‘The Military Space Service: Why Its Time Has Come’ (note 15).

Col. John E. Hyten, USAF, ‘A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War? Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space’, Air & Space Power Journal (Fall 2002) available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html (accessed 2 August 2007).

USSPACECOM, ‘Vision for 2020’ (1997), p. 11, available from http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf (accessed 12 September 2008).

USSPACECOM, ‘Long Range Plan’ (1998), Chapter 2, p. 6, available from http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm (accessed 12 September 2008).

USSPACECOM, ‘Vision for 2020’, (note 25), p. 11.

See, for example, Thomas D. Bell, ‘Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological Inevitabilities’ (January 1999) available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat6.pdf (accessed 27 July 2007).

Lt. Col Bruce M. Deblois, USAF, ‘Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy’, Aerospace Power Journal (Winter 1998) available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html (accessed 26 July 2007); USAF, ‘Counterspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1’ (August 2004) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf (accessed 30 July 2007).

Statement by Undersecretary of the Air Force Director, National Reconnaissance Office Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space The Honorable Peter B. Teets Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee On Space Policy, 16 March 2005, reprinted in Astropolitics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), pp. 185–98, p. 916; latter quote cited in David Grahame, ‘A Question of Intent: Missile Defense and the Weaponization of Space’, Basic Notes (May 2002) available from http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002NMDspace.htm (accessed 27 July 2007).

General Lance W. Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command, ‘The Impact of Space on Security and Stability in International Affairs’, remarks prepared for the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, 2 March 2004.

See Theresa Hitchens and Victoria Samson, ‘Space Weapons Spending in the FY 2009 Defense Budget’ (March 2008) available from http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/SpaceWeaponsFY09.pdf (accessed 10 April 2008) for an overview. For a more detailed account see Bruce M. De Blois, Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell, ‘Space Weapons: Crossing the US Rubicon’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2004), pp. 50–84; and also Michael Krepon, ‘Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option’, Arms Control Today (November 2004) available from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon.asp (accessed 27 July 2007). Others argue that defensive methods to protect US satellites need not necessarily be offensive in nature – such as the proposed ANGELS (Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space) which would simply move satellites to safer locations should they be attacked. See John Arquilla as cited in Brittany Sauser, ‘A Dangerous Step toward Space Warfare’, Technology Review, 27 October 2006, available from http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/17668/page2/ (accessed 26 July 2007).

DuBlois et al., ‘Space Weapons’ (note 32); see also the Air Force's ‘Transformation Flight Plan’ (November 2003) available from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_340_AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN_2003_FINAL_PUBLICLY_RELEASABLE_VERSION.pdf (accessed 10 April 2008), p. 86, which lists Hypervelocity Rod Bundles as a key future programme, but not expected to be operable until after 2015; for more on the potential and limitations of such concepts, see Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J. A. Edwards, Michael D. Miller, and Calvin Shipbaugh, Space Weapons, Earth Wars (RAND: Santa Monica, 2002), Appendix a and Appendix b.

Available from http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf (accessed 30 July 2007).

Ibid., pp. viii, xiv.

Ibid., p. x.

As reported on the front page of the UK national newspaper The Independent, 19 October 2006.

US National Space Policy, 31 August 2006. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/national/us-space-policy_060831.pdf (accessed 4 November 2008).

Theresa Hitchens, ‘The Bush National Space Policy: Contrasts and Contradictions’, Center for Defense Information, 13 October 2006, available from http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3692 [(accessed 26 July 2007).

McLean, ‘A New Era? Military Space Policy Enters the Mainstream’ (note 3).

Simon Worden, ‘High Anxiety’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 2006), pp. 21–3; for a contrary viewpoint see DuBlois et al., ‘Space Weapons’ (note 32).

Worden, ‘High Anxiety’ (note 41).

Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7), p. 24.

Crude ASAT capabilities were under development and available to the US, though not used, from the early 1960s and then tested under Reagan in 1985. See Bulkeley and Spinardi, Space Weapons, (note 1) pp. 49–51.

See Pavel Podvig, ‘The US Satellite Shootdown: An Unnecessary Action’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 2008) available from http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/the-us-satellite-shootdown-an-unnecessary-action (accessed 12 September 2008).

Robert Lawson, ‘The Space Security Index’, Astropolitics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004), pp. 175–99, p. 192.

Joan Johnson-Freese, ‘A New US-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation’, Astropolitics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), pp. 131–58, p. 132.

On the prominence of this presumption see Zhang Hui, ‘Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective’, Security in Space, p. 24, available from http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf (accessed 31 July 2007).

Kevin Pollpeter, ‘The Chinese Vision of Military Space Operations’, in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (eds), China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (RAND, 2005), as cited in Johnson-Freese, ‘A New US-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation’ (note 47), p. 132.

Professor Du Xiangwan, Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, speaking in 2004, as quoted in Hui, ‘Space Weaponization and Space Security’ (note 48), p. 26. Emphasis added.

Chinese Foreign Ministry Official Tang Guoqiang, speaking at a UN conference on space in 2006, as quoted in Jeff Kueter, ‘China's Space Ambitions – And Ours’, The New Atlantis (Spring 2007), p. 16, available from http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/16/TNA16-Kueter.pdf (accessed 27 July 2007). Emphasis added.

Zhang Hui, ‘Chinese Perspective on Space Weapons’, in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, Russian and Chinese Responses to US Military Plans in Space (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), p. 31.

See Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, ‘Understanding China's Antisatellite Test’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2008), pp. 335–47, pp. 339–40.

Joan Johnson-Freese and Andrew S. Erickson, ‘The Emerging China–EU Space Partnership: A Geotechnological Balancer’, Space Policy, No. 22 (2006), pp. 12–22, p. 13. This sense of Chinese national autonomy is somewhat artificial given the Chinese tendency to ‘borrow’ ideas and technologies from others; the Shenzou 5 was, for example, essentially a modified version of a Russian craft.

William S. Murray III and Robert Antonellis, ‘China's Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon (and Us)’, Orbis, Fall, 2003, pp. 645–52, p. 645.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, ‘White Paper: China's Space Activities’ (November 2000), available from http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/ChinaSpace.pdf (accessed 27 July 2007). See also Brian Harvey, China's Space Program: From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (Chichester: Springer Praxis, 2004), pp. 15–17.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, ‘White Paper: China's Space Activities in 2006’ (October 2006), available from http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp2006.pdf (accessed 27 July 2007).

Kulacki and Lewis, ‘Understanding China's Antisatellite Test’ (note 53), p. 336.

Johnson-Freese and Erickson, ‘The Emerging China–EU Space Partnership’ (note 54), p. 14.

European Space Policy Institute, ‘China's Posture in Space: Implications for Europe’ (June, 2007), available from www.espi.or.at/home/index.php?download=ESPI_China_Report_rev4-1_WF.pdf (accessed 27 July 2007).

Murray and Antonellis, ‘China's Space Program’ (note 53), p. 651.

Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes, ‘China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications’, Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2007), pp. 39–45.

Shu-Hsian Liao, ‘Will China Become a Military Space Superpower?’, Space Policy, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2005), pp. 205–12, p. 209; Saunders and Lutes, ‘China's ASAT Test’, (note 62), p. 40.

Ashley J. Tellis, ‘China's Military Space Strategy’, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2007), pp. 41–72, p. 45.

Kulacki and Lewis, ‘Understanding China's Antisatellite Test’ (note 53), p. 341, emphasis in original. See also Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (note 21), pp. 216–17.

See Liao, ‘Will China Become a Military Space Power?’ (note 63), p. 17; Kueter, ‘China's Space Ambitions’ (note 51), p. 8.

Space debris, around 900 pieces of which were created in the destruction of the Chinese weather satellite, can result in severe collisions with satellites as the result of the velocity such debris gains while in orbit.

See Tellis, ‘China's Military Space Strategy’ (note 64); Saunders and Lutes, ‘China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications’ (note 62); Kulacki and Lewis, ‘Understanding China's Antisatellite Test’ (note 53).

See Gene V. Milowicki and Joan Johnson-Freese, ‘Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test’, Astropolitics, Vol. 6, No.1 (2008), p. 5.

Johnson-Freese, ‘A New US-Sino Relationship’ (note 47), p. 153.

For an extended version of this argument, see Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (note 21).

Such as the so-called ‘Fractional Orbit Bombardment System’ (FOBS) – launching a warhead into orbit from an ICBM, then using retro-rockets to redirect it towards its target. The programme was discontinued in 1971. See Bulkeley and Spinardi, Space Weapons (note 1), p. 19.

Victor Mizin, ‘Russian Perspectives on Space Security’, in John M. Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, and Emma S. Hinds (eds), Collective Security in Space, available from http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/Collective%20Security%20in%20Space%20-%20European%20Perspectives.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007), pp. 79–80.

Mizin, ‘Russian Perspectives on Space Security’ (note 73), p. 85.

Ibid. Though Ivanov uses the term ‘militarization’ here, suggestive of an expansive opposition to the military uses of outer space, Russian concern and subsequent proposals for arms control in space have consistently been limited to the issue of placing weapons in space and the use of weapons against space assets; this does not include other military uses of space, such as military support.

Vladimir Putin, 8 November 2006, as quoted in James Oberg, ‘Space Weapons: Hardware, Paperware, Beware?’, The Space Review (November 2006), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/744/1

Andrei Shoumikhin, ‘Russian Perspectives on the Military Uses of Outer Space’, Vol. 1, No. 3, Astropolitics (2003), pp. 95–112, p. 99.

Mizin, ‘Russian Perspectives on Space Security’ (note 73), p. 94.

Vladimir Frolov as quoted in Shoumikhin, ‘Russian Perspectives on the Military Uses of Outer Space’ (note 77), p. 110, fn. 20.

Mizin, ‘Russian Perspectives on Space Security’ (note 73), p. 92.

Ibid., pp. 94, 98.

Statement at the International Conference on Space Without Weapons – Arena for Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century, 11 April 2001.

Shoumikhin, ‘Russian Perspectives on the Military Uses of Outer Space’ (note 77), p. 109.

Pavel Podvig, ‘Russia and Military Uses of Space’, in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, Russian and Chinese Responses to US Military Plans in Space (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), p. 28.

See Mizin, ‘Russian Perspectives on Space Security’ (note 73), p. 98.

Podvig, ‘Russia and Military Uses of Space’ (note 84), p. 26.

As cited by BBC News, ‘Russia Proposes Space Arms Treaty’, February 2008, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7240796.stm (accessed 11 April 2008).

Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167–214, p. 169; John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1950), pp. 157–80, p. 157.

Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’, (note 7), pp. 10–11. See also IISS, ‘Space Security: Growing Dependence Brings Vulnerability’, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2008).

Raymond Aron, Peace & War: A Theory of International Relations (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions, 2003), p. 664.

Cf. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Beyond the Security Dilemma: Technology, Strategy and International Security’, in Carl G, Jacobsen (ed.) The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies and Mindsets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) and more recently Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). There are of course major debates here about whether or not the ‘Security Dilemma’ is an inescapable, albeit tragic, fact of international life – see Alan Collins, ‘State-Induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2004), pp. 27–44; and, as Jennifer Mitzen has recently suggested, whether states actually in some ways grow ‘attached’ to the routines and roles that accrue from a dilemmatic relationship; see Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), pp. 341–70.

See Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), pp. 78–9.

Indeed, the Bush administration effectively embellished this position in 2005 by voting against the UN General Assembly Resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), an initiative which the US had also previously abstained from supporting. See Gallagher and Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space (note 92), p. 41.

James Clay Moltz, ‘Preventing Conflict in Space: Cooperative Engagement as a possible US Strategy’, Astropolitics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), pp. 121–9, pp. 127, 128.

Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7); see also Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (note 21) and Moltz, ‘Preventing Conflict in Space’ (note 94).

Mueller, ‘Totem and Taboo’ (note 7), p. 13.

James Clay Moltz, Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 5.

For a more detailed discussion of such options, see Gallagher and Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security (note 92), pp. 75–86; Moltz, ‘Preventing Conflict in Space’ (note 94).