A Tipping Point Realized? Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and Middle East

Abstract

The Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East are precariously perched on an uncertain nuclear threshold. Several regional states may be reconsidering their non-nuclear status. Iran's confrontation with the international community over its refusal to honour its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the overriding component states are viewing. Another element is Israel's nuclear program and its policy of preventing any regional state from threatening the Jewish state with nuclear weapons. Another complicating element in the strategic framework is a resurgent interest in nuclear energy.

What is the security policy community to make of these dynamics in which proliferation, deterrence, extended deterrence, and conflict escalation are all interacting in a complex interstate bargaining framework? This article applies a series of competing theoretical explanations for nuclear proliferation and assesses the implications they offer for policy prescriptions. Stressing neo-realist insights, it is shown here that control of proliferation requires recognition that the Middle East security dilemma has been altered – probably permanently – by the American invasion of Iraq, the increased political influence of Iran, and the continued violent spiral in the Arab–Israeli dispute. These three factors have combined to create new internal political pressures on regional regimes while at the same time creating a new and disturbing regional distribution of power that is shaping the region's approach to nuclear issues. Dealing with these factors is crucial in developing policies that can mitigate the further spread of nuclear weapons in the region.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author expresses his profound appreciation to CSP reviewers and the CSP editor for all their helpful suggestions in helping to improve the final product.

Notes

Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 110-34, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, February 2008, p. viii.

As argued in Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ‘A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors’, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 2 (June 2007) pp. 111–28.

As noted in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: IISS, 2008), p. 7.

As asserted by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal in Mariam Hakeem, ‘GCC's Nuclear Programme Will be a Role Model’, Gulf News, 14 January 2007 at http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/01/14/10096775.html.

Joby Warrick, ‘Spread of Nuclear Capability is Feared’, Washington Post, 12 May 2008, p. A1.

Perhaps the best summary of the competing arguments is Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Is There A Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate’, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 2006, pp. 43–60.

As forcefully stated by Mitchell Reiss, ‘The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States’, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 3–18.

As argued by Shibley Telhami, ‘America in Arab Eyes’, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 107–22.

Perhaps the best summary and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks is contained in Ogilvie-White, ‘Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?’ (note 6). Also see, Scott Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1997) pp. 54–86; Zachary Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds), The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point (note 7); John Deutch, ‘The New Nuclear Threat’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992); Steven M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).

Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Why More May Be Better’, Adelphi Paper No. 171, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993).

Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’ (note 9), p. 57.

Kurt M. Campbell, ‘Reconsidering a Nuclear Future’, in Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point (note 7), pp. 20–1.

Problematic application of the reconfigured US strategic deterrent in the Middle East is covered in James A. Russell, ‘Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 98–117. Also see Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 169–86.

Campbell, ‘Reconsidering a Nuclear Future’ (note 14), p. 29.

Benjamen Frankel, ‘The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, in Davis and Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle (note 9), pp. 37–78.

Ibid., pp. 37, 60–1. A similar conclusion is by John Mearsheimer in predicting nuclear proliferation in Europe in ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56.

Ogilvie-White also notes theoretical weaknesses stemming form the assumptions that he state is a unitary actor and that the state is a rational actor. Ogilvie-White, ‘Is There A Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?’ (note 9), p. 45.

Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’ (note 9), p. 55.

Ibid., pp. 63–4; For explanations of the impact of bureaucracy on state behaviour, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 1974); Graham Allison and Mort Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, World Politics, Spring 1972.

Sagan forcefully argues this point in ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66–107.

Sagan, ‘Why Do States Develop Nuclear Weapons?’ (note 9).

A distinction covered by Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425. Robert Jervis challenged an underlying premise of the neo-realists with his argument that the dynamics of the security dilemma need not inevitably lead to conflict in ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214. For more on the realist-neoliberal divide, see Robert Powell, ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neoliberal–Neorealist Debate’, International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313–44; Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42–63.

Glenn Chafetz, ‘The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective’, in Davis and Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle (note 9), p. 128.

Ibid., p. 138.

Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’ (note 9), pp. 73–4.

Ibid.

Peter Lavoy, ‘Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation’, Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3–4 (September 1993) pp. 192–212.

Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1998–2003, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 23 October 2006, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. For reporting purposes, the Near East region is comprised of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

I am not arguing that regional substate actors have not developed credible military capacities – a variety of groups have demonstrated credible capabilities in asymmetric warfare. Hizbollah, for example, demonstrated credible semi-conventional military capabilities during Israel's August 2006 invasion of Lebanon. Arguments that regional militaries have not developed credible conventional military forces are summarized in Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

As noted by Barry Rubin, ‘The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2001) at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a4.html.

Greg Gause, ‘Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf’, Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 273–305. Gause argues that ‘[Gulf] states overwhelmingly identified ideological and political threats emanating from abroad to the domestic stability of their ruling regimes as more salient than threats based upon aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities’ (p. 274). Also see Darryl Priess, ‘Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council’, Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 143–71.

James A. Russell, ‘Saudi Arabia in the 21^st Century: A New Security Dilemma’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 64–78.

See Kevin W. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, 2008), pp. 25–33, online at http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf

Comprehensive treatment of Libya's program in Wyn Bowen, ‘Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink’, Adelphi Papers No. 380 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006).

For background see Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997).

Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press 1998).

Application of the US nuclear deterrent in the Middle is explored further in Russell, ‘Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East’ (note 15).

On 14 May 2007, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found that Iraq was enriching uranium on a far wider scale than had previously been realized. Details in David Sanger, ‘Inspectors Cite Big Gain by Iran on Nuclear Fuel’, New York Times, 15 May 2007 at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/world/middleeast/15iran.html.

The history and motivations of regional states' involvement in development of chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles is covered in James A. Russell (ed.), WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2006). Also see Sami Hajjar, ‘Regional Perspectives on the Causes of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 1 (January/March 2000), pp. 35–56; Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 25–43.

History and recent developments summarized in Claudi Baumgart and Harald Muller, ‘A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East: Pie in the Sky?’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004–2005), pp. 45–58.

Endemic problems in the NWFZ proposals in the Middle East are discussed in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (note 3), p. 158.

Sammy Salama and Khalid Hilal, ‘Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons’, WMD Insights, November 2006.

As argued by Frankel, ‘The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, in The Proliferation Puzzle (note 9).

A perception not just shared in the region, but within the US intelligence community. See Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, ‘Reduced Dominance Is Predicted for US: Analyst Previews Report for Next President’, Washington Post, 10 September 2008, p. A2. The article reports on the findings of the National Intelligence Council's forthcoming report, entitled Global Trends 2025.

A representative sample is polling done under the Pew Global Attitudes Project, see http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=801.

Zogby International Annual Arab 2006 Public Opinion Survey, available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2006Lebanon.pdf.

Ibid.

For background on the main elements of the system of regional security and a summary of alternative frameworks, see Michael Kraig, ‘Forging a New Security Order for the Persian Gulf’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2006); James A. Russell, ‘Searching for a Post Saddam Regional Security Architecture’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2004); Richard Russell, ‘The Collective Security Mirage’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2005); Kenneth Pollack, ‘Securing the Gulf’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4 (2003).

Summarized by Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sales Proposals’, Congressional Research Service, Report 17 January 2008, posted at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34322.pdf.

This and a variety of initiatives to strengthen the NPT are detailed in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (note 3), pp. 151–62.

As quoted in Salama and Hilal, ‘Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons’ (note 44).

As generally argued in George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirrincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and John B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), online at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/univ_comp_rpt07_final1.pdf