Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments of four anonymous reviewers and the editors of Contemporary Security Policy on earlier drafts of this article. They also thank the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland and the European Research Council (Grant No. 203613) for financial support, as well as the EU officials interviewed for this research, on a confidential basis, by one of the authors.

Notes

Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the EU, 2003).

Council of the EU, ‘Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008, on a European Union Military Operation to Contribute to the Deterrence, Prevention and Repression of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery off the Somali Coast’, Official Journal of the European Union, 12 November 2008, L 301, p. 35.

Defined in 1992 by the Western European Union (WEU), these missions are now included in article 17 of the Treaty on the EU (Nice Treaty).

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as UN resolutions provide the legal bases for undertaking counter-piracy operations in the international waters as well as within Somalia's territorial waters. On the legal issues regarding the arrest and the prosecution of pirates, see Assembly of the WEU, ‘The Role of the European Union in Combating Piracy’, Paris, 4 June 2009, Document A/2037, pp. 12–14 and 19–23; and Eugene Kontorovich, ‘International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia’, ASIL Insights, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2009), available at http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm (accessed 11 November 2009).

See, for example, Charles L. Glaser, ‘Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5–50; Robert J. Art, ‘Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1–39; Philip H. Gordon, ‘Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997–98), pp. 74–100; and Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003).

For a more extensive discussion of this trend, see Gerrard Quille, ‘The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security Interests?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 422–38; and Michael E. Smith, ‘The Accidental Strategist: Military Power, Grand Strategy and the EU's Changing Global Role’, Europa Institute Working Paper, University of Edinburgh (January 2008).

Michael E. Smith, ‘The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam’, in Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein and Wayne Sandholtz (eds), The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Rory Keane, ‘The Solana Process in Serbia and Montenegro: Coherence in EU Foreign Policy’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 491–507; Marcela Szymanski and Michael E. Smith, ‘Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU–Mexico Global Agreement’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 171–92; and Marika Lerch and Guido Schwellnus, ‘Normative by Nature? The Role of Coherence in Justifying the EU's External Human Rights Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 304–21.

Personal interviews with EU Military Staff (EUMS) officials, Brussels, November 2007, June 2008, April 2009, and June 2009. Most of the initial 100+ EUMS officials hired by the EU after 1999 have served at NATO, as did several officials interviewed for this article. These individuals are especially well positioned to compare the workings and mindsets of each institution.

For example, see Anne Deighton, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2002), pp. 719–41; Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J.K. Sheperd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Catriona Gourlay, ‘European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 404–21; and Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

Briefly, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement allows for ‘assured access’ to NATO planning capabilities, a ‘presumption of availability’ to the EU of NATO assets, and NATO European command support for EU-led operations. Berlin Plus discussions began in June 1996 but were not completed (and thus made operational) until December 2002.

Council of the EU, ‘Headline Goal 2010’, Brussels, 2004, p. 3, §5; see also the various past years Council Conclusions on ESDP; and Basil Germond, ‘The Naval and Maritime Dimension of the European Union’, in Gérard Bossuat and Anne Deighton (eds), The EC/EU: A World Security Actor? (Paris: Soleb, 2007), pp. 349–52.

Council of the EU, ‘Headline Goal 2010’, Brussels, 2004, p. 3, §5.

A battlegroup is a form of rapid-response capacity-building, each one consisting of around 1,500 troops reinforced with combat support elements, including relevant air and naval capabilities, which can be launched on the ground within ten days after the EU decides to act. See Lt Col. Ron Hamelink, ‘The Battlegroups Concept: Giving the EU a Concrete “Military” Face’, EuroFuture (Winter 2005), pp. 8–11; and Gustav Lindstrom, Enter the EU Battlegroups, Chaillot Paper No. 97 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2007).

Rear Admiral Jan van der Burg, ‘Naval Components within the EU’, Seminar on Europe's maritime frontiers, Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), Lisbon, 18 September 2007, p. 3.

Ibid., pp. 4–5.

Council of the EU, ‘Draft Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities’, Brussels, 28 November 2007, p. 9.

Although anti-piracy missions could well have been envisaged, as the 2003 ESS mentioned piracy as a potential threat. Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World (note 1), p. 5.

See Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World (note 1), pp. 4–5; Assembly of the WEU, ‘Surveillance of the Maritime and Coastal Areas of European States’, Paris, 6 December 2005, Document A/1920, p. 4; Commission of the European Communities, ‘Green Paper: Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European Vision for the Oceans and Seas’, Brussels, 7 June 2006, COM(2006) 275 final, Annex 6, pp. 29–31; and Commission of the European Communities, ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’, Brussels, 10 October 2007, COM(2007) 575 final, p. 5.

Commission of the European Communities, ‘Energy Policy and Maritime Policy: Ensuring a Better Fit’, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, 10 October 2007, SEC(2007) 1283 provisional version, p. 2.

The European agency responsible for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states. Among other tasks, FRONTEX coordinates EU member states’ police operations to monitor and combat illegal immigration at sea.

Commission of the European Communities, ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’ (note 18), p. 2.

Ibid.

See notably the comments of the CHENS (Chiefs of European Navies) on the EU maritime Green Paper, 29 May 2007, Annex to Personal letter 42/07, available at http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/contributions_post/237chens.pdf

Commission of the European Communities, ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’ (note 18), p. 5; see also European Commission, ‘Integrated Maritime Policy for the EU Working Document III on Maritime Surveillance Systems’, European Commission/Joint Research Centre Ispra, Italy, 8 January 2008, p. 6.

On the concept of maritime frontier, see Basil Germond, ‘From Frontier to Boundary and back Again: The European Union's Maritime Margin's’, European Foreign Affairs Review, forthcoming, 2010.

Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World (note 1), p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

Philip H. Colomb (Admiral), Naval Warfare, 2nd revised ed. (London: W.H. Allen, 1895).

Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun (eds), Governing Europe's Neighborhood: Partners or Periphery? (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2007).

Legally speaking, ‘piracy’ refers to actions performed on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of any state; actions performed within territorial waters are termed ‘armed robbery at sea’. UNCLOS, 10 December 1982, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (London: C. Hurst, 2009).

Roger Middleton, ‘Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars’, Briefing paper, Chatham House, October 2008, AFP BP 08/02, p. 4.

International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Service, IMB, available at http://www.icc-ccs.org. Other risky zones listed by the IMB are located in the waters near China, Indonesia, the Gulf of Guinea, and in the vicinity of some Brazilian ports.

Rob Crilly, ‘Only Guns Can Get Aid Past the Pirates into the Gates of Hell’, The Times, 20 September 2008, pp. 54–5.

‘No Ransom for Pirates, UK Insists’, BBC News, 20 November 2008.

Julian Borger and Xan Rice, ‘Big Rise in Piracy Could Close Suez Canal Trade’, The Guardian, 2 October 2008, p. 24; Crilly, ‘Only Guns’ (note 34), p. 54.

Costs include ransom payments (estimated at US$20–30 million in 2008), extra fuel to avoid attacks (estimated at US$1–2 million), higher insurance premiums, and the hiring of private security escorts (estimated at up to US$100,000). See Miles Costello, ‘Shipping Insurance Cost Soars with Piracy Surge Off Somalia’, The Times, 11 September 2008; and Catherine Holahan, ‘The Real Cost of Piracy’, MSN Money, 14 April 2009, available at http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Extra/the-real-cost-of-piracy.aspx

Xan Rice and David Gow, ‘Shipping Industry Urges EU Governments to Take Up Arms Against Somali Pirates’, The Guardian, 22 November 2008, p. 37.

Carl Mortished, ‘Security Firms Spy New Jobs on High Seas’, The Times, 22 November 2008, p. 58.

On the link between piracy and terrorism, see Martin N. Murphy, ‘Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security’, Adelphi Paper, No. 388 (2007).

Concerning the alleged link between pirates and terrorists in the Strait of Malacca, see Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security (RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 2008).

Xan Rice, ‘Somali Pirates Capture Ukrainian Cargo Ship Loaded with Military Hardware’, The Guardian, 27 September 2008, p. 29.

Middleton, ‘Piracy in Somalia’ (note 32), p. 5.

As one observer notes, ‘Pirates cannot function, and piracy could never have survived unless there were sympathizers, protectors and customers on the shore ready, willing and able to provide sanctuary’. Donald J. Puchala, ‘Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 6–7.

Middleton, ‘Piracy in Somalia’ (note 32), p. 3. Interestingly, this is also the position defended by the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland that affirms that its ‘well-trained’ armed forces could efficiently fight pirates at sea and ‘blow up their bases inside Somalia including Puntland’ if only it gains diplomatic recognition. Abdulaziz Al-Mutairi, ‘Somaliland Navy: The Only Way to Stop Somali Piracy’, 26 November 2008, available at http://www.somalilandembssy.com

UN Security Council, Resolution 1816 (2008). Adopted by the Security Council at its 5902nd meeting on 2 June 2008, S/RES/1816 (2008), p. 3.

UN Security Council, Resolution 1846 (2008). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6026th meeting on 2 December 2008, S/RES/1846 (2008).

Council of the EU, ‘Council Adopts Joint Action on a European Union Military Operation against Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery off the Somali Coast’, Brussels, 10 November 2008, 15478/08 (Press 321), p. 4.

European Parliament, ‘Sea Piracy (Debate)’, 23 September 2008, Brussels. Transcript of the debate, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu

Anthony King, ‘The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 46–8.

Created in 1995 with France, Italy and Spain (and since 1998 Portugal as well), EUROMARFOR is a multinational on-call naval force. It consists of pre-designated units that could be activated within a few days, particularly for crisis management missions as defined by the Petersberg declaration. Its perimeter of action seems to correspond, for the moment, to the Mediterranean region (enlarged to the Horn of Africa) even if this does not constitute the official position. The FNFA works in a similar way.

Bruno Waterfield, ‘UK to Lead EU Anti-Piracy Force off Somalia’, Telegraph.co.uk, 19 November 2008.

Bundesmarine, Inspekteur der Marine, ‘Zielvereinbarung für die Deutsche Marine’, Bonn, 8 July 2003.

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, ‘Transformation – Marine Auf Kurs’, Bonn, 28 June 2004, p. 2. Translation by the authors; ‘Escort Navy’ and ‘Expeditionary Navy’ are in English in the German document.

Michael E. Smith, ‘Sending the Bundeswehr to the Balkans: The Domestic Politics of Reflexive Multilateralism’, German Politics and Society, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 49–67.

EUMS officials, even those who have served in both NATO and EU institutions, also attest to a common perception that NATO is basically a tool of US interests, and thus may not be accepted in certain parts of the world (particularly the Middle East). As one such official put it, the EU, not NATO, is ‘the acceptable face of Europe’. Personal interviews with EUMS officials, Brussels, November 2007, June 2008, April 2009, and June 2009.

It is also arguable that other states might prefer an EU-led operation to a NATO-led one, particularly as all EU operations are typically endorsed by the UN. India, for example, supports the idea of UN-authorized naval missions, as it traditionally avoids participation in coalition operations (except within the UN), and especially not a coalition dominated by the US (through NATO or otherwise), as it would create problems in India's internal politics. China and Russia have the same attitude. See Atul Aneja, ‘India Weighs Counter-Piracy Options in Somalia’, The Hindu, 21 November 2008.

Personal interviews with EUMS officials, Brussels, November 2007, June 2008, April 2009, and June 2009.

Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO standing maritime groups have been often and efficiently engaged in various operations ranging from embargos to counter-terrorism.

NATO, ‘Operation Allied Provider’, Press Release, 21 November 2008, available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/allied_provider/background.html

Quoted by Waterfield, ‘UK to Lead EU Anti-Piracy Force’ (note 52). However, NATO did consider an operation in Somalia (as well as an intervention in the 2006 Israeli–Lebanon war) but abandoned both efforts because it was felt that NATO forces would not be accepted. Personal interview with an EUMS official, Brussels, November 2007.

BBC News, ‘Miliband Warns of Piracy Danger’, 18 November 2008.

Bjoern H. Seibert, ‘EU NAVFOR: Countering Piracy in Somali Waters’, RUSI Commentary, available at http://www.rusi.org/research/militaryscience/maritime/commentary/. TF 151 is, however, involved in anti-piracy operations since January 2009, as decided by the US in light of China's, India's and Russia's decisions to deploy warships in the region.

As decided by the NATO ministerial committee on 3 December 2008. ‘EU to Begin Anti-Piracy Mission Next Week’, International Herald Tribune, 3 December 2008. See also the Associated Press, ‘NATO Plans New Anti-Piracy Mission off Somalia’, 19 February 2009.

Assembly of the WEU, ‘The Role of the European Union in Combating Piracy’, Paris, 4 June 2009, Document A/2037, p. 17.

Ibid., p. 9.

On the structural and political challenges facing multilateral naval cooperation, see Basil Germond, ‘Multinational Military Cooperation and its Challenges: The Case of European Naval Operations in the Wider Mediterranean Area’, International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2008), pp. 173–91.

This conclusion would seem to satisfy the basic conditions posited by Anthony King regarding the minimal requirements for a more robust ESDP policy. However, where King also argues that the ‘future of European security’ may lie in a ‘transformed NATO’, we argue precisely the opposite: the future of the ESDP lies in its independence from NATO, owing not only to the underlying rationales and institutional histories of each organization but also to the perceptions of outsiders who interact with those organizations, as noted in this article. See King, ‘The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy’ (note 50), pp. 52–3.

Michael E. Smith, ‘Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 79–104.

James Rogers, ‘From Suez to Shanghai: The European Union and Eurasian Maritime Security’, EU-ISS Occasional Paper, No. 77, March 2009.

In fact, China's decision to contribute to the fight was the first time in five centuries that Chinese naval forces were sent beyond its territorial waters to defend Chinese interests; China also admitted for the first time that it was seriously considering building its first aircraft carrier. Leo Lewis, ‘Beijing Ends 500 Years of Tradition as it Sends the Navy out to Attack Pirates’, The Times, 27 December 2008, p. 43.