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Abstract
The linkage between political parties and the state in post-communist Europe can be analysed in three different dimensions: the dependence of parties on the state, the management of parties by the state, and the parties' colonization of the state. Empirical analysis of the relationship between parties and the state in these dimensions in all contemporary electoral democracies in Eastern Europe reveals that, in general, parties in post-communist Europe are dependent on the state financially; they are extensively managed by the state; and they do not shy away from the practices of rent-seeking within the state. However, there are also some important regional variations in the predominant type of party–state linkage in the new post-communist democracies.
Acknowledgments
This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at the workshop, ‘Political Parties and the State in Post-Communist Eastern Europe’, Leiden, 4–6 November 2005. In addition to the participants of this workshop, I would like to thank Conor O'Dwyer and Gerardo Scherlis for their comments, and Yvette Peters for her valuable research assistance.
Notes
1. See, for example, Russell J. Dalton, ‘Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.57–77; Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000’, Party Politics, Vol.7, No.1 (2001), pp.5–21; Thomas Poguntke, ‘Parties Without Firm Social Roots?: Party Organisational Linkage', in Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.43–62.
2. See, respectively, Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Jonathan Hopkin and C. Paolucci, ‘New Parties and the Business Firm Model of Party Organization: Cases from Spain and Italy’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.35, No.3 (1999), pp.307–39; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.5–28; Ruud A. Koole, ‘The Vunerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands’, in Richard S Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaption in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1994), pp.278–303.
3. See, for example, Ingrid van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East–Central Europe (London: Palgrave, 2003); Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); Mohamed A. Salih (ed.), Political Parties in Africa (London: Pluto, 2003).
4. See, for example, Mair and van Biezen, ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies’.
5. See, for example, Jack Bielasiak, ‘The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States', Comparative Politics, Vol.34, No.2 (2002), pp.189–210. For an excellent review of party literature on post-communist Europe see Zsolt Enyedi, 'Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition’, in William Crotty and Richard Katz (eds.), Handbook of Political Parties (London: SAGE, 2006), pp.228–38.
6. Richard Rose, ‘Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-communist Societies’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.549–64.
7. See, for example, van Biezen, Political Parties; Karsten Grabow, ‘The Re-emergence of the Cadre Party? Organizational Patterns of Christian and Social Democrats in Unified Germany’, Party Politics, Vol.7, No.1, pp.23–44; Aleks Szczerbiak, Poles Together: Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-communist Poland (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001); Seán Hanley, ‘Are the Exceptions Really the Rule? Questioning the Application of “Electoral–Professional” Type Models of Party Organisation in East Central Europe’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.2, No.3 (2001), pp.453–79; Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, ‘The Party of Power in Russian Politics’, Acta Politica, Vol.35 (Summer 2000), pp.123–45; Petr Kopecký, ‘Developing Party Organization in East–Central Europe: What Type of Party Is Likely to Emerge?’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.515–34;
8. See Arista Maria Cirtautas, ‘The Post-Leninist State: A Conceptual and Empirical Examination’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.28, No.4 (1995), pp.379–92; Venelin I. Ganev, ‘The Separation of Party and State as a Logistical Problem: A Glance at the Causes of State Weakness in Postcommunism’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.15, No.2 (2001), pp.389–420.
9. Conor O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building; How Political Parties Shape States in Postcommunist Eastern Europe’, World Politics, Vol.56, No.4 (2004), pp.520–53.
10. Venelin I. Ganev, ‘Postcommunism as an Episode of State-Building: A Reversed Tillian Perspective’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.38, No.4 (2005), pp.425–45; Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism’, Politics and Society, Vol.30, No.4 (2002), pp.529–54; O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building’.
11. See, for example, Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, ‘Civil Service Reform in Post-Communist Europe: The Bumpy Road to Depoliticisation’, West European Politics, Vol.27, No.1 (2004), pp.71–103.
12. Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký, ‘The State and the Parties: Public Funding, Public Regulation and Party Patronage in Contemporary Democracies’, paper presented at the conference on Political Parties and Development, National Democratic Institute (Washington, DC, 31 August 2005).
13. See Jon Pierre, Lars Svåsand and Anders Widfeldt, ‘State Subsidies to Political Parties: Confronting Rhetoric with Reality’, West European Politics, Vol.23, No.3 (2000), pp.1–24; Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký, ‘On the Predominance of State Money: Reassessing Party Financing in the New Democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe’, Perspectives on European Politics and Societies, Vol.2, No.3 (2001), pp.401–29.
14. Katz and Mair, ‘Changing Models’.
15. Richard S. Katz, ‘The Internal Life of Parties’, in Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Political Challenges in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.87–118; Ingrid van Biezen, (2004). ‘Political Parties as Public Utilities’, Party Politics, Vol.10, No.6 (2004), pp.701–22.
16. Allan Sikk, ‘Party Financing Regimes and Emergence of New Parties in Latvia and Estonia’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops (Uppsala, April 2004); Ingrid van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East–Central Europe; Steven D. Roper, ‘The Influence of Romanian Campaign Finance Laws on Party System Development and Corruption’, Party Politics, Vol.8, No.2 (2002), pp.175–92; Paul G. Lewis, ‘Party Funding in Post-Communist East–Central Europe’, in Peter Burnell and Alan Ware (eds.), Funding Democratization (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp.137–57.
17. Katz, ‘The Internal Life’, p.90.
18. See, for example, Jan Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 1: Institutional Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
19. See Wolfgang C. Müller, ‘Patronage by National Governments’, in Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (eds.), The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp.141–60; Simona Piattoni (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Luis Roninger, ‘Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy’, Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.3 (2004), pp.353–75.
20. See Panebianco, Political Parties.
21. See, for example, Simona Piattoni, ‘Clientelism, Patronage (and Corruption) in Modern Democracies: Reflections on Current Trends and Ways of Analysing Them’, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Budapest, September 2005; see also Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.33 (2000), pp.845–79.
22. See Paul Heywood, ‘Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives’, Political Studies, Vol.45, No.3 (1997), pp.417–35; Piattoni (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation.
23. For example, Jordan inserts ‘patronage’ into the title of his article, but the otherwise very interesting piece focuses almost solely on corruption scandals: see Jeffrey M. Jordan, ‘Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic’, SAIS Review, Vol.22, No.2 (2002), pp.19–52.
24. Ganev, ‘Postcommunism as an Episode’.
25. IDEA, Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: Handbook Series (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003).
26. See van Biezen and Kopecky ‘The State and the Parties’; Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Financing Politics: A Global View’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.4 (2002), pp.69–86.
27. Daniel Smilov, ‘Comparative Party Funding and Corruption in Eastern Europe’, in Political Party and Election Campaign Financing in Southeastern Europe: Avoiding Corruption and Strengthening Financial Control (Transparency International, 2002–2003), pp.22–30.
28. See also Janis Ikstens, Daniel Smilov and Marcin Walecki, ‘Party and Campaign Funding in Eastern Europe: A Study of 18 Member Countries of the ACEEEO’, paper presented at the ACEEEO annual conference on Transparent Election Campaign Financing in the 21st Century (Brijuni, 2001).
29. Jurij Toplak, ‘Party Funding and Corruption in Balkan Countries – the Cases of Slovenia and Croatia’, in Political Party and Election Campaign, pp.43–55.
30. See van Biezen and Kopecký, ‘On the Predominance of State Money’.
31. See also Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Cartelisation in Post-Communist Politics: State Party Funding in Post-1989 Poland’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.2, No.3 (2001), pp.431–51.
32. See also Marcin Walecki, ‘Money and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe’, in IDEA, Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, pp.71–93.
33. See also Sikk, ‘Party Financing Regimes’.
34. See Sikk in this collection, and ‘Party Financing Regimes’.
35. Lewis, ‘Party Funding’.
36. See van Biezen and Kopecký, ‘On the Predominance of State Money’; Walecki, ‘Money and Politics’.
37. See Ikstens, Smilov and Walecki, ‘Party and Campaign Funding’.
38. See van Biezen and Kopecký ‘The State and the Parties’.
39. Kenneth Janda, ‘Party Law and the Goldilocks Problem: How Much is Just Right?’, paper presented at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (Washington, DC, 31 August 2005).
40. See also Sikk in this collection.
41. Jorge P. Gordin, ‘The Political and Partisan Determinants of Patronage in Latin America 1960–1994: A Comparative Perspective’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.41, No.4 (2002), pp.513–50.
42. Anna Grzymala-Busse, ‘Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.36, No.10 (2003), pp.1123–47; O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building’.
43. See, for example, Philip Manow, ‘Was erklärt Politische Patronage in den Ländern Westeuropas?’, Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift, Vol.43, No.1 (2003), pp.20–45.
44. However, Manow argues that the general Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International, which reflects the perceptions (of business people and country analysts) of a wide variety of different types of corruption (including administrative and economic), constitutes a good proxy for party patronage. This is because the index actually taps into and measures aspects of patronage and it is likely that respondents in some of their answers had practices of party patronage in mind. In addition, Manow shows that the CPI correlates highly with various expert judgments and qualitative country rank orderings of patronage.
45. The figure for each country represents an average of scores in two consecutive years, 2004 and 2005. However, for Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Serbia and Montenegro, data were available for only one year.
46. The STD for older democracies is 0.60: see van Biezen and Kopecký ‘The State and the Parties’.
47. The data come from the 1999–2000 survey; the World Bank repeated the survey in 2002, but unfortunately the question concerning patronage and its impact was not asked in the 2002 survey.
48. See van Biezen and Petr Kopecký ‘The State and the Parties’.