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Abstract
The level and scope of state financial support for Polish parties have expanded progressively since 1989, making it the main source of income for a number of them. This becomes even more evident when one considers the allowances paid to party-based parliamentary caucuses and individual parliamentarians. Appointments to state and quasi-state bodies also appear to be an important source of patronage for Polish parties. The Polish party funding regime and state patronage opportunities clearly favour ‘insiders’ and have centralized power in party leaderships. However, the Polish party system remains too unstable to conclude that a ‘cartel’ of privileged insiders is emerging, while increases in state party funding have, at most, simply reinforced existing trends in terms of party leader orientation and popular anti-party sentiment.
Notes
1. Walecki argues that this was due partly to the widespread public anger that greeted the revelations by the new Solidarity government of the existence and amount of the budget subsidies allotted to the communist party and its allies in 1989, a year of severe economic crisis: see Marcin Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2005), p.134.
2. See Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Cartelization in Post-Communist Poland: State Party Funding in Post-1989 Poland’, in Paul Lewis and Paul Webb (eds.), Pan-European Perspectives on Party Politics (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp.127–49 (p.145). Although the surplus from the refund was supposed to be assigned to ‘publicly beneficial purposes’, parties discovered various ways to circumvent this provision. The party could also, of course, earn bank interest on any excess sums, and this could then, quite legally, be spent on strictly party activities. For more on this see Paul G. Lewis and Radzisława Gortat, ‘Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.599–608 (p.606).
3. See P.G. Lewis, ‘Party Funding in Post-communist East–Central Europe’, in P. Burnell and A. Ware, Funding Democratization (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp.137–57 (p.139).
4. See Szczerbiak, ‘Cartelization in Post-Communist Poland’, p.145.
5. See Dominika Wielowiejska, ‘Wypłata za wybory’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29–30 Sept. 2001. As noted above, in the past, election committees could claim a refund in excess of their actual expenditure and therefore make a profit on the election; they could then use this (or the interest accrued on it) to fund future activities.
6. See ‘Miliony za wybory’, Rzeczpospolita, 24 May 2002.
7. The National Party of Retirees and Pensioners received 1.9 million and the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne: SD) and the Peasant–Democratic Party (Partia Ludowo-Demokratyczna: PLD) 540,000 each.
8. See Dominika Wielowiejska, ‘Partyjne pieniądze’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 24–26 Dec. 2001.
9. See Z˙aneta Semprich, ‘Metodą Satine-Lague, bez listy krajowej’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 March 2001. As a further innovation, 5–15 per cent of this subvention was to be earmarked for the party's know-how fund, known as the Party Foundation, to cover the costs of legal, social, political and economic expertise and publishing activities.
10. See Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland, p.138.
11. See Wielowiejska, ‘Partyjne pieniądze’.
12. See Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland, pp.139–40.
13. The Peasant Party ended up losing this subvention because it had been depositing money in the wrong account and, instead of selling its real estate, it passed it over to a foundation whose leadership was almost identical to that of the party; the party had already seen its 2002 subvention reduced owing to irregularities in its 2001 financial statement: see ‘Jak finansują się partie’, Rzeczpospolita, 21 June 2004.
14. See ‘Subwencje dla partii: 22 mln zł dla PiS; 20 dla PO’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 Sept. 2005, at <http://www.wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wybory2005/2029020,67805,2943176.html>, accessed on 30 Sept 2005.
15. However, separate donations could also be made to a party's election fund.
16. Parties that broke the rules or failed to submit accurate annual financial statements or accounts of their election expenses faced reductions in their refunds and donations, as was the case with the Peasant Party, Labour Union and Democratic Party.
17. See ‘Ordynacja wyborcza bez listy krajowej’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 March 2001.
18. See Semprich, ‘Metodą Satine-Lague’.
19. These figures only include income to cover the party's statutory activities that they undertake between elections, and they exclude money paid into the party election funds: see Marek Henzler, ‘Kasa partyjna, pienądze państwowe’, Polityka, 26 April 2003.
20. These were partly from assets that it inherited from the communist-era satellite United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL), of which it was the direct organizational successor, and partly resulted from its use of its 1993 election refund to purchase a large number of buildings.
21. See Marcin Walecki. ‘Kto płaci za wybory’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 Sept. 2005, at <http://www.wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wybory2005/2029020,67805,2925845.html>, accessed on 21 Sept. 2005.
22. See Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland, p.145. Parliamentary parties' specialist and expert reports are largely paid for from these funds, although Sejm deputies and senators who chair parliamentary committees can also obtain additional assistance; this can, of course, be utilized indirectly for party purposes.
23. See ibid., p.143.
24. See Frederyk Frydrykiewicz, Beata Kopyt and Eliza Olczyk. ‘Grunt to dobry adres’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 Jan. 2002.
25. See Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland, p.144.
26. See Marek Henzler, ‘Pan poseł przymuje’, Polityka, 24 April 2004.
27. See Ania van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and Marc van der Muyzenberg, ‘The Positions of Parties in the Polish and Hungarian Parliaments’, paper prepared for the Fourth Workshop on ‘Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe’, The Hague, 1–2 Feb. 1996, p.8.
28. See Janina Paradowska, ‘Lewa Kasa, Prawa Kasa’, Polityka, 22 Jan. 2000. This term is, somewhat confusingly, also used sometimes to simply describe parliamentarians' office expense allowances.
29. See ‘Na własny rachunek’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 Dec. 2001.
30. See Henzler, ‘Pan poseł przymuje’.
31. See Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Testing Party Models in East–Central Europe: Local Party Organization in Postcommunist Poland’, Party Politics, Vol.5, No.4 (1999), pp.523–37; and Janina Paradowska, ‘Drogie partie’, Polityka, 3 March 2001. On other occasions, Sejm deputies and Senators rented out rooms for their offices in party-owned buildings, thereby using state money to supplement the party's income, although the 2001 party law should put an end to this practice: see Frydrykiewicz et al., ‘Grunt to dobry adres’.
32. See Paradowska, ‘Drogie partie’.
33. See Stanisław Gebethner, ‘Problem Finansowania Partii Politycznych a System Wyborczy w Polsce w Latach 90’, in Franciszek Ryszka et al. (eds.) Historia–Idee–Polityka (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 1995), pp.425–34 (p.431). Gebethner's calculation included: the financial resources passed on directly to the parliamentary clubs and circles themselves, Sejm deputies and senators' personal expense allowances, and the total amount allocated to parliamentary deputies to maintain their offices. Only the ryczałts (the lump sums paid to ‘professional’ parliamentarians who had given up all paid employment to devote themselves to full-time parliamentary work) was excluded, since this was supposed to replace income forgone. Even these calculations did not include the various services-in-kind enjoyed by Polish deputies and senators (such as free public transport by land or air and the free use of hotel accommodation in Warsaw) of which it was impossible to calculate the exact value.
34. See Szczerbiak, ‘Cartelization in Post-Communist Politics’, p.145.
35. Compare Connor O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Postcommunist Eastern Europe’, World Politics, Vol.56 (2004), pp.520–33.
36. See Dorota Macieja, ‘Rzeczpospolita nomenklaturowa’, Wprost, 5 Aug. 2002.
37. Ibid.
38. See A. Szczerbiak, ‘Polish Parties and the Media: The Politics of Public Broadcasting in Post-communist Poland’, Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne, Vol.1 (2001), pp.47–65.
39. See Macieja, ‘Rzeczpospolita nomenklaturowa’.
40. See Ryszard Kamiński, ‘Paraliz˙ Państwa’, Wprost, 1 April 2001. On the general growth of the public sector in post-1989 Eastern Europe, see O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building’.
41. See Kamiński, ‘Paraliz˙ Państwa’.
42. See ‘Działacze partyjni zamiast urzedników’, Rzeczpospolita, 25 June 2003.
43. See Macieja, ‘Rzeczpospolita nomenklaturowa’.
44. Cited in O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building’, p.539.
45. See ‘Rzeczpospolita nomenklaturowa’.
46. See Mariusz Janicki and Wiesław Władyka, ‘Wielki przeciąg’, Polityka, 11 Oct. 1997.
47. See Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organizations and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.5–28.
48. However, the 2001 figure for gross volatility is considerably lower (28.66 per cent) and the net volatility figure can also be reduced (to 19.25 per cent) if one makes certain assumptions about some of the ‘new’ parties simply being continuations of the old: see Radosław Markowski and Mariusz Cześnik, ‘Polski system partyjny: dekada zmian’, in Radosław Markowski (ed.), System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich Doświadczeń (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2002), pp.17–47 (pp.26–7). For more on Polish electoral volatility, see Mariusz Cześnik and Radosław Markowski, ‘Ewolucja polskiego systemu politycznego’, in Irena Jackiewicz and Krzysztof Murawski (eds.), Rozwój instytucji demokratycznych w Polsce 1989–2001 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2002).
49. The League also comprised some existing parliamentarians elected in 1997 on the Solidarity Electoral Action and Movement for Poland's Reconstruction tickets.
50. Even though it fought the 2001 in coalition with the Labour Union which joined a Democratic Left Alliance breakaway, Polish Social Democracy, which won 3.98 per cent of the vote.
51. See Szczerbiak, ‘Cartelization in Post-communist Politics’.
52. See Aleks Szczerbiak, Poles Together? The Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-communist Poland (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), pp.42–6.
53. See Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen., ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000’, Party Politics, Vol.7, No.1 (2001), pp.5–21 (p.9).
54. See Loek C.J.M. Halman, The European Values Study: A Third Wave, source book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study Surveys (Tilburg: EVS, WORC, Tilburg University, 2001); available at <http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/fsw/evs/documents/Publications/Sourcebook/EVS_SourceBook.pdf>, accessed 15 May 2006.
55. See Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘The New Polish Parties as Membership Organizations’, Contemporary Politics, Vol.7, No.1 (2001), pp.57–69.
56. See European Commission, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004.1, Feb.–March 2004 (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), p.21.
57. See CBOS, Opinie o polskiej klasie politycznej (Warsaw: CBOS, June 2003); data for April 2003.
58. See Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders, ‘Parties and Party Systems in Post-Communist EU Member States: Comparative Aspects’, in Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.14.
59. Author's calculations.
60. See CBOS, Finansowanie partii politycznych (Warsaw: CBOS, March 2001); data for March 2001.
61. See, for example, ‘Z czego pozyją partie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 March 2001.
62. This centred on allegations that individuals linked to the Democratic Left Alliance, including the media mogul and film producer Lew Rywin, demanded payment from the newspaper publisher Agora in return for favourable changes to the government's media regulation law.
63. See, for example, Ludwik Dorn, ‘Finansowanie działalności politycznej w Polsce. Obecna praktyka i jej reforma’, in Marcin Walecki (ed.), Finansowanie polityki. Wybory, pienądze, partie polityczne (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2000), pp.141–78.