The influence of party patronage and state finance on electoral outcomes: Evidence from Romania

Abstract

Party patronage and party and campaign finance have had a substantial impact on the evolving relationship between Romanian parties and the state. Given that patronage can create clientelistic networks that promote corruption, it is important to understand how patronage is used by parties to control state resources which can be explored through the civil service appointment process, use of local government patronage, the state control of the media and the influence of external monitoring on civil service reform. Party campaign financing (PCF) is a critical example of the party–state relationship, which is often viewed as a means to limit the influence of economic interests and create a more level playing-field among parties. While parties use state resources for electoral gains and as a form of party income, patronage and PCF actually have a modest influence on election outcomes.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Bogdan Stanciu for his assistance.

Notes

1. For a broad-ranging discussion of the relative weakness of post-communist civil societies see Aleksander Smolar, ‘Civil Society After Communism: From Opposition to Atomization’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.7 (1996), pp.24–38; Bill Lomax, ‘The Strange Death of Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.13 (1997), pp.41–63; Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999); and Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

2. Venelin I. Ganev, ‘The Separation of Party and State as a Logistical Problem: A Glance at the Causes of State Weakness in Postcommunism’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.15 (2001), p.389.

3. For an interesting account of state capture due to the communist legacy see Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a functionalist account of state politicization see M. Steven Fish, ‘The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.4 (1998), pp.31–78; and for the structure of state incentives, László Bruszt and David Stark, Pathways from State Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For an account of state capture based on the distribution of party power in parliament see Anna Grzymala-Busse, ‘Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.36 (2003), pp.1123–47.

4. Ben Schneider, Politics within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

5. Katja Michalak, ‘Patterns of Civil Service Reform in Romania: A Multi-Dimensional State Analysis’ (unpublished manuscript, 2005).

6. Although Katz and Mair develop the concept of the cartel party, they do not see the interpenetration of the state and the party as a necessary condition for corruption: see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy’, Party Politics, Vol.1 (1995), pp.5–28.

7. Ingrid van Biezen, ‘Party Financing in New Democracies: Spain and Portugal’, Party Politics, Vol.6 (2000), p.329.

8. Huntington was one of the first scholars to argue for the benefits of party patronage: see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

9. Wolfgang C. Müller, ‘Patronage by National Governments’, in Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta (eds.), The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp.142–3.

10. Jean Blondel, ‘Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe’, in Richard Gunther, José Ramon-Montero and Juan J. Linz (eds.), Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.241.

11. By the time the law was to be promulgated, Vasile had been removed as prime minister and replaced by Mugur Isarărescu.

12. ‘Best Practices in the European Countries: The Republic of Romania’, Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (Naples, Italy, 2004), p.11.

13. Sandra Pralong, ‘Romania’, Nations in Transition (New York: Facts on File, 2003), p.489.

14. While the law clarifies situations of conflict of interest by defining public interest and personal interest, the code applies only to civil servants and not to elected and appointed officials: see Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Nations in Transit 2005’ (2005), p.11.

15. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Nations in Transit 2004’ (2004), p.17.

16. Adrian Moraru and Elena Iorga, ‘Romanian Civil Service Barometer, 2004’, Institute for Public Policy (Bucharest, Romania, October 2004), p.4.

17. An interesting question rarely addressed in the literature is the influence of the system of government on the use of patronage. One could argue that, while a federal system may exhibit the same level of patronage, the election of local government and separation of powers between national and sub-national levels provides a check on the use of party patronage by other parties.

18. Moraru and Iorga, ‘Romanian Civil Service Barometer, 2004’, p.5.

19. Giorgio De Sabbata, ‘Part II Report on Local and Regional Democracy in Romania’, Monitoring Report 1995 CG (2) 5 (Bucharest, Romania, 1995).

20. Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Nations in Transit 2005’, p.3.

21. Peter T. Leeson and Christopher J. Coyne, ‘Manipulating the Media’ (unpublished manuscript, 2005), p.18.

22. Ibid, p.14.

23. ‘Press Freedom in Romania: Report on 2003’, Media Monitoring Agency (Bucharest, Romania, 2004), p.5.

24. In its latest report, the EU emphasized the need for the Romanian ministry of finance to be more involved in policy formation at all levels, including local government.

25. ‘2004 Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession’, Commission of the European Communities SEC (2004) 1200, 657 (6 October 2004), p.32.

26. Michalak, ‘Patterns of Civil Service Reform’, p.15.

27. Pralong, ‘Romania’, p.489.

28. Michalak reports that 597 employees work at the ministry of foreign affairs while 350 work at the ministry of education, research and youth (both figures based on civil servants in the Bucharest office); in addition, the budget of the ministry of foreign affairs is ten times that of the ministry of education, research and youth: see Michalak, ‘Patterns of Civil Service Reform’, p.21.

29. Monitorul Oficial al României, 18 March 1990.

30. Carothers argues that few, if any, opposition parties actually received the state subsidy: see Thomas Carothers, ‘Romania’, in Larry Garber and Eric Bjorn (eds.), The New Democratic Frontier (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992), p.86.

31. This prohibition was supposedly amended to allow for foreign contributions if they were documented. Carothers reports that opposition parties had to wait an inordinate amount of time for their currency transfers to be approved: ibid, p.83.

32. Ibid.

33. Katz and Mair, ‘Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Rejoinder’, pp.529–30.

34. Monitorul Oficial al României, 30 Dec. 1989.

35. This number does not include ethnic minority parties, which were guaranteed a seat in the lower house. Of the ethnic-based parties, only the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania and the German Democratic Forum received enough votes to win a seat outright.

36. Significantly, there was no change to the party registration requirement of 251 members.

37. Monitorul Oficial al României, 5 July 1992.

38. However, governments such as the United States were very active during the 1992 national elections. As Carothers points out, the United States through organizations such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the United States Information Agency was very active in supporting opposition parties: see Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).

39. Each party had to designate a specific fiscal agent that registered with the ministry of economics and finance.

40. Monitorul Oficial al României, 11 April 1996.

41. The court of audit is the government body responsible for supervising the financing of parties. Interestingly, the law specifically states that the court of audit may check only the general bank account of a party. The paragraph that outlines the forms of party financing is specifically excluded from the supervisory jurisdiction of the court. Neither the 1996 election law nor the law on parties specifies that parties must submit reports to the court of audit; rather, the court has the right to investigate party bank accounts: see Monitorul Oficial al României, 15 Feb. 2005, and ‘Alegeri la limita democraţiei: Analiza procesului electoral din România, Octombrie – Decembrie 2004’ (Bucharest: Pro-Democracy Association, 2005).

42. Katz and Mair, ‘Changing Models’, p.20.

43. Grzymala-Busse, ‘Political Competition and the Politicization of the State’, pp.1123–47.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Steven D. Roper

His research focuses on institutional design, human rights and international law. He is the author of Romania: The Unfinished Revolution (2000) and co-author (with Lilian A. Barria) of Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights (2006).