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Abstract
Since the first genuine multi-party elections in Russia were held in December 1993, party–state relations have followed a path that diverges markedly from the pattern in other post-communist states. As some accounts demonstrate, state capture in these conditions has followed diverse patterns, but the general trend seems to be towards increasing control by parties over the state. In Russia, however, it is the state that is colonizing the parties, rather than vice versa. Especially worthy of attention are the so-called parties of power, which reflect the extent to which, and the mechanisms by which, the state manages party politics and the administrative elites keep politics out of the state in Russia's managed democracy. Recent institutional reforms by the Putin administration point towards more, rather than less, encroachment of the state in party politics, which makes Russia less than a fully-fledged multi-party democracy.
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop ‘Political Parties and the State in Post-Communist Eastern Europe’, Leiden, 4–6 November 2005. The authors would like to thank the participants of this workshop for their comments. They are especially indebted to Petr Kopecký for his assistance in preparing this version.
Notes
1. Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, 3rd edn (Boston, MA: Unwin-Hyman, 1987); Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2nd rev. edn (New York: Random House, 1971).
2. M.S. Voslenskii, Nomenklatura: Gospodstvuyushchii klass Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya/Oktyabr', 1991).
3. Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘The Dynamics of “Democratic Russia”, 1990–1993’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.9, No.2 (1993), pp.141–70.
4. See, for example, Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997). There is, however, some research that indicates that anti-party attitudes among the Russian voters are gradually decreasing: Jon H. Pammett and Joan DeBardeleben, ‘Citizen Orientations to Political Parties in Russia’, Party Politics, Vol.6, No.3 (2000), pp.373–84; Ted Brader and Joshua A. Tucker, ‘The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993–1996’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.45, No.1 (2001), pp.69–83.
5. Anna Grzymała-Busse, ‘Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.36, No.10 (2003), pp.1123–47; Conor O'Dwyer, ‘Runaway State Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Postcommunist Eastern Europe’, World Politics, Vol.56, No.4 (2004), pp.520–23.
6. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.5–28.
7. The ministers referred to are: Aleksandr Zhukov (deputy prime minister, Vpered Rossiya!, Otechestvo–Vsya Rossiya, Yedinaya Rossiya); Aleksei Gordeev (agriculture, Agrarnaya partiya Rossii, Yedinaya Rossiya), Viktor Khrystenko (industry and energy, Nash Dom–Rossiya); Sergei Shoigu (emergencies, Nash Dom–Rossiya, Yedinaya Rossiya), and Vladimir Yakovlev (regional development, Otechestvo–Vsya Rossiya).
8. Allen C. Lynch, How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.161.
9. Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung (eds.), The Dynamics of Russian Politics. Putin's Reform of Federal–Regional Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p.87.
10. Sobranie aktov Prezidenta i Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 41/1993, item 3907.
11. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 26/1995, item 2398.
12. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 26/1999, item 3178.
13. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 51/2002, item 4982.
14. Robert G. Moser, ‘Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics’, Comparative Politics, Vol.31, No.2 (1999), pp.147–65. In the 1993 Duma elections, 141 unaffiliated candidates won in the SMD; in 1995, this number dropped to 77; in 1999, it rose to 106; in 2003, 67 independent deputies were elected.
15. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ‘The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System: Underinstitutionalization in Dual Transitions’, Politics and Society, Vol.29, No.3 (2001), pp.385–414.
16. Grigorii V. Golosov, ‘Party Support or Personal Resources? Factors of Success in the Plurality Portion of the 1999 National Legislative Elections in Russia’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.35, No.1 (2002), pp.23–38 (p.35).
17. John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.24.
18. Richard Rose in this context uses the metaphor of the market: Russian political entrepreneurship is predominantly about ‘supply’, rather than demand: Richard Rose, ‘A Supply-Side View of Russia's Elections’, East European Constitutional Review, Vol.9, No.1/2 (2001), pp.53–7.
19. Anatolii Kostyukov, ‘Restavratsiya: Prezident obnarodoval plan gosudarstvennogo pereustroistva’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Sept. 2004, p.1.
20. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 21/2005, item 1919.
21. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 15/2005, item 1277.
22. Some names circulating for leading positions in the public chamber suggest an emphasis on ‘celebrity’ rather than democratic credentials: oligarchs Mikhail Potanin and Mikhail Fridman and the former chess world champion Anatolii Karpov: see Sergei Varshavik, ‘Antitsenzor’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 Nov. 2005, p.2.
23. Vedomosti S”ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR, 42/1990, item 839; see also S.A. Avak'yan, Politicheskii plyuralizm i obshchestvennye ob'edineniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: konstitutsionno-pravovye osnovy (Moscow: Rossiiskii yuridicheskii izdatel'skii dom, 1996).
24. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 29/2001, item 2950. For a detailed analysis of the Law, see Ruben Verheul, ‘Planned Politics: The Russian Law on Political Parties’, in William B. Simons and Ferdinand Feldbrugge (eds.), Human Rights in Russia and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Ger P. van den Berg (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), pp.223–39; and V.V. Lapaeva (ed.), Kommentarii k Federal'nomu zakonu O politicheskikh partiyakh (Moscow: Institut zakonodatel'stva i sravnitel'nogo pravovedeniya pri Pravitel'stve Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2002).
25. This amounts to 0.046 per cent of the 2003 electorate; citizens may be members of only one party. The criteria mentioned here are set forth by a 2004 amendment of the law: Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 52/2004, item 5272. The requirements in the original version were less strict: regional chapters were to number 100 members (50 for other chapters), and minimum membership was set at 10,000.
26. It must nominate candidates in one of the following elections: State Duma (as a ‘list’ in the proportional elections or in at least five per cent of single-member districts); presidency; highest executive office in at least ten per cent of the federal subjects; legislatures of at least 20 per cent of the federal subjects; or organs of self-government in more than half of the federal subjects.
27. The website <http://www.cityline.ru:8081/politika> lists 21 rather obscure parties that were ‘outlawed’ for failing to meet the criteria of the law on political parties. Most of these bans are related to insufficient regional chapters.
28. Yelena Rudneva, ‘100.000 chlenov–potolok dlya partii’, Vedomosti, 21 Sept. 2005; website of the Federal Registration Service, <http://www.rosregistr.ru/>.
29. The Central Electoral Commission, considering its draft version of the party law, originally intended to impose ‘impartiality’ upon the president by default. Yet the chairman, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, and other CEC members have on various occasions stated that they do not in principle oppose a partisan presidency: see, for example, Denis Babichenko, ‘Prezident ostanetsya bespartiinym’, Segodnya, 5 Jan. 2001; Ol'ga Tropkina, ‘Veshnyakov podyskivaet nachal'nika dlya Putina’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 Aug. 2001, p.3.
30. See Ye. Sidorenko, ‘Pravovoe polozhenie politicheskikh partii’, Rossiiskaya yustitsiya, 2001, No.10, pp.53–5. The author, a deputy minister of justice, points out that, while the law considerably extends the control over party activities, at the same time it leaves the registering organs few possibilities to verify whether aspiring associations actually qualify for party status. Sidorenko's plea for the possibility of demanding additional documentation has been heard, in that the 2004 amendments to the party law require party chapters to present membership lists to the ministry.
31. Politicians who are opposed in principle to receiving taxpayers' means can opt out and refuse state subsidies.
32. The ministry of justice has published financial reports of some parties for 2003 at <http://party.scli.ru/finansy.htm>. The figures available are, for dues and donations respectively: KPRF – ca. $77,430 and $118,300; SPS – $44,130 and $6,360,000, UR – $405,000 and $33,262,000; Agrarian Party – $10,800 and $1,000,400.
33. Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2005), p.85.
34. Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 1999), p.191; see also Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2002).
35. See, for example, Vladimir Gel'man, ‘Blurry Boundaries, Biased Contests: Public Offices, Private Money, and Russia's Party Politics’, paper presented at the workshop ‘The Effect of Party and Campaign Finance on Post-Communist Party Development’, Riga, 20–23 Oct. 2005.
36. Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); Luke March, The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
37. In the 1995 Duma elections, about half the party list votes were cast for parties that did not manage (and in many cases did not intend) to cross the five per cent threshold; thus, one might say, a significant share of the ‘protest vote’ was effectively neutralized.
38. Valentin Poluektov, Polevye i manipulyativnye tekhnologii: nastol'naya kniga menedzhera izbiratel'nykh kampanii (Moscow: Russkaya panorama, 2003).
39. Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, ‘The Party of Power in Russian Politics’, Acta Politica, Vol.35, No.2 (2000), pp.123–45.
40. This is in obvious contrast with parties we are familiar with in many western countries, where a party can be truly a party, and can be truly governing or not. If the SPD in Germany does not supply the chancellor and the ministers, it is not the governing party, but it may become the governing party. If the Conservative Party in England has the majority in the House of Commons, the Labour Party is not thereby less of a party: it is still a party, although much less powerful. A Republican president in the USA, plus perhaps a Republican majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, does not thereby eradicate the Democratic Party; the Democratic Party does not lose its past and future because of the temporary domination of the Republicans.
41. Timothy J. Colton, ‘Russia's Choice: The Perils of Revolutionary Democracy’, in Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough (eds.), Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993 (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998), pp.115–39.
42. After a change of the Federal law, President Putin began in 2005 to appoint the heads of the executive branches in the RF's subjects. The heads of the executive branch of the subjects (called governors, presidents, mayor [of Moscow], head [of Karelia] or some other term, but often referred to as ‘governors’ as their generic name) no longer hold a seat ex officio in the Federation Council (upper house): for the original law see Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 42/1999, item 5005; and for Putin's amendments, Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 50/2004, item 4950.
43. B. Makarenko, ‘Otechestvo–Vsya Rossiya’, in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Riabov (eds.), Rossiya v izbiratel'nom tsikle 1999–2000 godov (Moscow: Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, 2000), pp.155–66.
44. Ivan Otdel'nov, ‘Ocherednoi gubernatorskii blok fakticheski sozdan’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 Sept. 1999, p.1.
45. Yekatarina Grigor'eva, ‘Ideologiya “Yedinstva”–v otsutstvie ideologii’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sept. 1999, p.3; Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, ‘Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: “Unity” and the 1999 Duma Election’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.16, No.3 (2000), pp.201–24.
46. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata (Moscow: Interbuk, 1997).
47. Compare the websites of the Russian ministry of justice on political parties, <http://party.scli.ru>, and of the Federal Registration Service, <http://www.rosregistr.ru/>.
48. Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 21/2005, item 1919.
49. For example, Roman Abramovich is the one dominating figure in Chukotka, where virtually nothing, it appears, is beyond his political and economic reach; there is no semblance of multi-party politics in Chukotka – in fact, nothing akin to politics tout court. Yurii Luzhkov, to mention one other example, has dominated the political scene in the city of Moscow almost since the moment in June 1992 when Gavriil Popov stepped down as the first elected mayor of the city before the expiry of his term and Luzhkov, his unelected deputy mayor, took charge. After that Luzhkov has been directly elected mayor repeatedly, with impressive, overwhelming majorities. Luzhkov is not the ‘product’ of his party-political organization: Luzhkov had produced his party-political organization, re-creating and re-aligning it as he saw fit, also with an eye to his ambitions on the federal scene. Less appealing examples of local political and political ‘big men’ are to be found in Tatarstan, Kalmykia, and Bashkortostan.