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Abstract
In the period since independence, Ukrainian electoral laws and constitutional provisions have been amended on several occasions, sometimes involving reversals of positions by individual politicians and political parties. A number of approaches have been employed in order to explain such changes in political systems. In the Ukrainian case, where electoral reform took place in a context of broader institutional design, the shifts in behaviour by both pro-government and opposition politicians seem to have been prompted by short-term calculations of self-interest in a fluid political context dominated by the debate over constitutional reform.
Notes
1. See, for example, Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2. Or semi-authoritarian.
3. See Paul D'Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), which assesses Ukrainian politics since independence, noting its semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian features.
4. Marko Bojcun, ‘The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of March–April 1994’, Europe–Asia Studies, Vol.47, No.2 (1995), pp.229–49.
5. Natalya Bogasheva and Yuriy Klyuchkovskiy, ‘Evolyutsiya vyborchoi systemy Ukrainy’, published online (1 July 2006) at the Election Law Institute < http://www.eli.org.ua>, accessed 9 Aug. 2006.
6. However, there is no real enforcement mechanism.
7. Sergey Rakhmanin, ‘Proportsii i portsii’, Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 28 Feb. 2004.
8. Taras Kuzio, ‘The 1994 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.11, No.4 (1995), pp.335–61.
9. For a detailed discussion of how mixed electoral systems produce outcomes that differ from pure SMD and PR systems, see Federico Ferrara, Erik S. Herron and Misa Nishikawa, Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and its Consequences (New York: Palgrave, 2005).
10. Oleg Kravchenko, ‘Osobennosti natsiolnal'noi politicheskoi kukhni. Polubol'shinstvo, poluoppozitsiya, poluvlast’', Delovaya Ukraina, 23 March 2001.
11. Elections in three districts were deemed invalid; by-elections were held to fill the seats.
12. However, many independent candidates affiliated themselves with pro-presidential factions after the parliament was seated, increasing the pro-government contingent.
13. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Individuals may attempt to create advantages for themselves when designing society's rules and norms; under the ‘veil of ignorance’, institutional designers choose rules that are just for the most and the least disadvantaged.
14. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).
15. Michael McFaul, ‘Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependence during Transitions: Cases from Russia’, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol.10, No.1 (1999), pp.27–52; and Michael McFaul, ‘Explaining Party Formation and Nonformation in Russia’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.34, No.10 (2001), pp.1159–87.
16. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.
17. Kathleen Bawn, ‘The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.37, No.4 (1993), pp.965–89; Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden, ‘Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland's Electoral System, 1989–2001’, Journal of Politics, Vol.66, No.2 (2004), pp.396–427.
18. Carles Boix, ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies’, American Political Science Review, Vol.93, No.3 (1999), pp.609–24.
19. Kenneth Benoit, ‘Models of Electoral System Change’, Electoral Studies, Vol.23, No.3 (2004), pp.363–89.
20. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
21. Josephine T. Andrews and Robert W. Jackman, ‘Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice Under Extreme Uncertainty’, Electoral Studies, Vol.24, No.1 (2005), pp.65–84.
22. Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Karen Dawisha, ‘The Unintended Consequences of Electoral Reform’, Working Paper, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2000.
23. Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
24. Such as Jones Luong's approach. Ibid.
25. Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, ‘Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections’, Europe–Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.6 (1999), pp.1039–68; and Erik S. Herron, ‘Causes and Consequences of Fluid Faction Membership in Ukraine’, Europe–Asia Studies, Vol.54, No.4 (2002), pp.625–39.
26. Volodymyr Zviglianich, ‘The Referendum and Prospects for Democracy in Ukraine’, Jamestown Foundation Prism, Vol.6, No.6 (30 June 2000), available at < http://www.jamestown.org/publications_archives.php?publication_id=7>, accessed 9 Aug. 2006.
27. For a detailed discussion of this and other key events in Ukrainian politics during the 1990s and 2000s, see D'Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics, Ch.4.
28. Taras Kuzio, ‘Did Ukrainian Death Squads Commit Political Murders?, RFE/RL Newsline, 22 Aug. 2002.
29. Speech by Gyorgiy Ponamarenko, in Verkhovna Rada, ‘Zasidannya dvadtsyat’ pershe: Sesiyniy zal Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 22 bereznya 2001 roku', available at < http://www.rada.gov.ua>, accessed 25 July 2006.
30. Ibid.
31. This calculation includes only those deputies elected to SMD or PR seats; deputies who replaced members of parliament who left the Verkhovna Rada are not included because they probably face different incentives.
32. See ‘Ukrainian President Vetoes Proportional Parliamentary Election Law…’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 21 Feb. 2001.
33. The source for comparisons of the draft laws was a document prepared by the Elections and Political Processes Project in Kyiv, Ukraine.
34. Verkhovna Rada, ‘Zasidannya dvadtsyat’ pershe: Sesiyniy zal Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 22 bereznya 2001 roku'.
35. As noted above, the calculation includes only those deputies elected to SMD or PR seats.
36. Taras Kuzio, ‘Is Kuchma Genuine in his Political Reform?’, RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol.3, No.33 (3 Sept. 2002), available at < http://www.rferl.org>, accessed 15 June 2006.
37. Askold Krushelnycky, ‘Anti-Kuchma Demonstrations Continue in Kyiv and Elsewhere’, RFE/RL Weekly Digest, 24 Sept. 2002, available at < http://www.rferl.org>, accessed 15 June 2006.
38. Quotations from Olga Dmitricheva, ‘Strana pobedivshei nepredskazuemosti’, Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 14 Sept. 2002.
39. Viktor Desyantnikov, ‘Prizrachnost’ izbiratel'nykh zakonov', Pravda Ukrainy, 17 Dec. 2002.
40. Quotation from Dmitricheva, ‘Strana pobedivshei nepredskazuemosti’.
41. Tom Warner, ‘Kuchma May Cancel Election’, Financial Times, 23 Aug. 2003.
42. Taras Kuzio, ‘Ukrainian President Backs Down in Wake of Harsh PACE Resolution’, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.8, No.27 (11 Feb. 2004), available at < http://www.rferl.org>, accessed 15 June 2006.
43. Jeremy Bransten, ‘Parliament Votes Down Pro-Kuchma Proposal’, RFE/RL Feature Articles, 3 Feb. 2004.
44. Fatherland, associated with Yulia Tymoshenko, was characterized at this time as a more ‘pragmatic’, oligarch-driven faction; beginning in 2001, it ‘developed into one of Kuchma's most ardent opponents’. Consequently, it is not listed among the opposition factions here: see Sarah Whitmore, State-building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990–2003 (New York: Routledge, 2004); quotation from p.96.
45. For a detailed discussion of factions and their positions, see Whitmore, State-building in Ukraine.
46. Communist Party, Regions, Labour Ukraine, SDPU(o), People's Power, Democratic Initiative, Agrarian Party, People's Choice, People's Democratic Party.
47. Erik S. Herron and Paul E. Johnson, ‘Fraud Before the “Revolution”: Special Precincts in Ukraine's 2002 Parliamentary Election’, in Ingmar Bredies, Valentin Yakushik and Andreas Umland (eds.), Aspects of the Orange Revolution III: Elections in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007), forthcoming.
48. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
49. Natalya Bogasheva and Yuriy Klyuchkovskiy, ‘Evolyutsiya vyborchoi systemy Ukrainy’, published online (1 July 2006) by the Election Law Institute at < http://www.eli.org.ua>, accessed 9 Aug. 2006.