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Abstract
Constitutionalization – the creation of a formal ‘constitution’ for the European Union – has been seen as a response to the eastern enlargement, on the basis of the three main functions of constitutions: the organizational function, the stabilization function and the legitimating function. However, functional arguments are not sufficient for explaining the constitutionalization of the EU as a response to this enlargement. An alternative explanation refers to the behaviour of the large member states acting in their own self-interest to shift the power relations in the EU in their favour. Using conventions as the method of bringing this about has served both to legitimize and to conceal this motivation. This factor in the evolution of the European Union carries implications for the countries that aspire to become EU members.
Notes
1. Heinz Kleger, Ireneusz P. Karolewski and Matthias Munke, Europäische Verfassung. Zum Stand europäischer Demokratie im Zuge der Osterweiterung (Münster: Lit, 2004), pp. 337ff.
2. The Convention finalized its proceedings by issuing the draft constitutional treaty on 13 June 2003 and 10 July 2003: see European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Brussels, 2003); Heinz Kleger (ed.), Der Konvent als Labor. Texte und Dokumente zum europäischen Verfassungsprozess (Münster: Lit, 2004), pp. 21–179.
3. See Norbert Reich, ‘A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law’, European Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1997), pp. 131–64; Heidrun Abromeit and Tanja Hitzel-Cassagnes, ‘Constitutional Change and Contractual Revision: Principles and Procedures’, European Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1999), pp. 23–44; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2006), pp. 219–41.
4. See Dario Castiglione, From the Charter to the Constitution of Europe? Notes on the Constitutionalization Process in the EU, Queen's Papers on Europeanization, No. 5/2002 (Belfast: Queen's University, 2002); Sergio Fabbrini, ‘Transatlantic Constitutionalism: Comparing the United States and the European Union’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2004), pp. 547–69.
5. Joseph H.H. Weiler represents an alternative position, arguing that there has been a quasi constitutionalization of the EU for the past few decades. He depicts constitutionalization as a cumulative process of signing treaties between member states as well as rulings of the European Court of Justice that treats European Law as superior to the law of member states, thereby establishing a supranational constitutional order: see Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Union: Enlargement, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’, paper presented at the Walter-Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht at the Humboldt-Universität Berlin, 29 Nov. 1999, Forum Constitutionis Europae, Berlin, 1999; Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2002), pp. 563–80.
6. See Neil Walker, ‘The Legacy of Europe's Constitutional Moment’, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 368–92; James Bohman, ‘Constitution Making and Democratic Innovation: The European Union and Transnational Governance’, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2004), pp. 315–37.
7. See Bruno De Witte, ‘Anticipating the Institutional Consequences of Expanded Membership of the European Union’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2002), pp. 235–48; Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalism’, European Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), pp. 365–85; Desmond Dinan, ‘Governance and Institutions: Anticipating the Impact of Enlargement’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, Supplement (2003), pp. 27–43. However, the idea that the EU must not adopt a constitution is gaining ground in legal studies. For the discussion of the N-C (No Constitution) thesis see Antonio Estella, ‘Constitutional Legitimacy and Credible Commitments in the European Union’, European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), pp. 22–42.
8. See Jon Elster, ‘Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory’, in Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio (eds.), Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 87–118.
9. Paul Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’, European Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2001), pp. 125–50; Richard Bellamy (ed.), Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996); Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (eds.), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Joe Shaw, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union’, in Thomas Christiansen, Knud E. Jørgensen and Antje Wiener (eds.), The Social Construction of Europe (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 66–84.
10. However, positions exist which highlight that constitutions drastically lose their configuring functions as a result of the globalization process, which puts constraints upon the effects of constitutions on political decisions: see Dieter Grimm, ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization’, Constellations, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2005), pp. 447–63. Furthermore, constitutions are viewed as not sufficiently flexible to respond to societal changes and are thus unresponsive to changing expectations of the society. In this context Petra Dobner uses the term crisis of constitution: see Petra Dobner, Konstitutionalismus als Politikform. Zu den Effekten staatlicher Transformation auf die Verfassung als Institution (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002). Moreover, there is a thesis on the new constitutionalism which argues that there is a general shift towards ‘juristocracy’ in democratic regimes, since judicial review replaces the parliamentary decision-making process; in this sense, constitutionalism can lead to a crisis of democracy: see Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
11. See Cindy Skach, ‘We, the Peoples? Constitutionalizing the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2005), pp. 149–70.
12. An alternative approach would include a catalogue of normative expectations towards constitutions: see, for example, the new normative triad of security, diversity and solidarity, as set out in Erhard Denninger, ‘“Security, Diversity, Solidarity” Instead of “Freedom, Equality, Fraternity”‘, Constellations, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2000), pp. 507–21; also Nicholas Buttle, ‘Republican Constitutionalism: A Roman Ideal’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2001), pp. 331–49.
13. Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Reinbeck, 1999); Peter Häberle, ‘The Constitutional State and its Reform Requirements’, Ratio Juris, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2000), pp. 77–94.
14. Duncan Ivison, ‘Pluralism and the Hobbesian Logic of Negative Constitutionalism’, Political Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1999), pp. 83–99; Kleger et al., Europäische Verfassung, p. 33.
15. See Erik Oddavar Eriksen, ‘Why a Constitutionalized Bill of Rights’, in Erik O. Eriksen, John Fossum and Augustín José Menéndez (eds.), The Chartering of Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), pp. 48–70; Augustín José Menéndez, ‘Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002), pp. 471–90.
16. Kleger et al., Europäische Verfassung, pp. 293–300.
17. The major issue in this regard was the ‘legal bite’ of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: see Augustín José Menéndez, ‘Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002), pp. 471–90; R. Alonso García, ‘The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, European Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2002), pp. 492–514.
18. For example Dieter Grimm, ‘Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?’, paper presented at the Siemens Foundation, Munich, 19 Jan.1994; Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1995), pp. 219–58.
19. Joschka Fischer, ‘Vom Staatenbund zur Föderationen. Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Union’, speech delivered at the Walter-Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, Forum Constitutionis Europae.
20. Edgar Grande, ‘Multi-Level Governance: Institutionelle Besonderheiten und Funktionsbedingungen des europäischen Mehrebenensystems’, in Edgar Grande and Markus Jachtenfuchs (eds.), Wie problemlösungsfähig ist die EU? Regieren im europäischen Mehrebenensystem (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), pp. 11–30.
21. For instance, Uwe Leonardy, ‘Kompetenzabgrenzung in der Europäischen Union: Eine Marotte der deutschen Länder?’, Jahrbuch des Föderalismus (2001), pp. 454–70; also Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 41–77.
22. Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration’, Public Administration, Vol. 66, No. 3 (1988), pp. 239–78; Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2006), pp. 845–64.
23. Karen J. Alter, ‘Who are Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 1 (1998), pp. 121–48.
24. Europäisches Parlament, Bericht über die Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeiten zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mitgliedstaaten, Ausschuss für konstitutionelle Fragen, Sitzungsdokument A5-0133/2002, 2001/2024(INI), Berichterstatter Alain Lamassoure (Brussels: European Parliament, 2002).
25. However, some scholars pointed to the possible strengthening of the Council and European judiciary as a result of the enlargement-induced changes in the EU decision-making system: see, for example, George Tsebelis and Xenophon Yataganas, ‘Veto Players and Decision-making in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002), pp. 283–307.
26. Anand Menon, ‘Britain and the Convention on the Future of Europe’, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 5 (2003), pp. 963–78.
27. Jan Zielonka, Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration, Harvard Jean Monnet Paper 7 (Boston, MA: Harvard Law School, 2002).
28. Ireneusz P. Karolewski, ‘Constitutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Implications of the Constitutional Treaty’, German Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 11 (2005), pp. 1649–66.
29. Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’, p.126; Dieter Grimm, Die Verfassung und die Politik. Einsprüche in Störfällen (München: Beck, 2001); Andreas Føllesdal, Achieving Stability? Forms and Arenas of Institutional and National Balances in the Draft Constitutional Treaty (Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies 2004), Online Paper 06/04.
30. Rainer Bauböck, ‘Why Stay Together? A Pluralist Approach to Secession and Federation’, in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 366–94; Ferran Requejo, ‘Value Pluralism and Multinational Federalism’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2004), pp. 23–40; Iain McLean, ‘Fiscal Federalism in Australia’, Public Administration, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2004), pp. 21–38.
31. For example, Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel, ‘Who is Afraid of European Federation? How to Constitutionalize a Multi-Level Governance System’, in Christian Joerges, Yves Meny and Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.), What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (Florence: European University Institute, 2000), pp. 45–59.
32. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad regard the congealing effects of constitutions as unjust vis-à-vis future generations, since societies change and the future generations do not have any influence on the constitution-making process but are bound by it: Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
33. In the mid-1990s, a similar argument was advanced by Joseph Grieco, who labelled it the voice–opportunity thesis. Grieco argued that European integration can be best explained by analysing the tendencies of EU member states to control potentially hegemonic states such as Germany through common institutions. In this context Grieco explained French policy to establish a common European currency, since it gave France an opportunity to control German monetary policy through the European Central Bank: Joseph Grieco, ‘The Maastricht Treaty: Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1995), pp. 21–40.
34. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, rev. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
35. See Jan-Erik Lane and Reinert Mæland, ‘Constitutional Analysis: The Power Index Approach’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2000), pp. 31–56.
36. Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.92.
37. See Aaron Keck, ‘Paine and the Right to Revolution’, paper prepared for presentation at the ‘Thomas Paine: Common Sense for Modern Era’ Symposium, San Diego, 21–22 Oct. 2005.
38. See Skach, ‘We, the Peoples?’, p.153.
39. See Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Constitutional Treaty of Europe’, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2006), pp. 61–80; Andreas Føllesdal, Legitimacy Theories of the European Union, Working Paper WP 04/15 (Oslo: ARENA, 2004)
40. Ran Hirschl, ‘Preserving Hegemony? Assessing the Political Origins of the EU Constitution’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), pp. 269–92.
41. Tito Boeri and Herbert Brücker, ‘Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities’, World Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), pp. 49–67; Hans-Werner Sinn, ‘EU Enlargement and the Future of the Welfare State’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2002), pp. 104–15.
42. Christian Keuschnigg and Wilhelm Kohler, ‘Eastern Enlargement of the EU: How Much is it Worth for Austria?’, Review of International Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2002), pp. 324–42; Christian Keuschnigg, Mirela Keuschnigg and Wilhelm Kohler, ‘The German Perspective on Eastern EU Enlargement’, The World Economy, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2001), pp. 513–42.
43. Sinn, ‘EU Enlargement and the Future of the Welfare State’, p.107.
44. Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2001), pp. 47–80; Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
45. The reasons given for the EU's membership policy vary. Some authors highlight that it stems from the identity of the EU as a benevolent hegemon in Europe: see Emilian Kavalski, ‘Identity of Peace: Framing the European Security Identity of the EU’, in Ireneusz P. Karolewski and Viktoria Kaina (eds.), European Identity. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights (Münster: Lit, 2006), pp. 92–112.
46. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, pp. 55–62.
47. Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, ‘Legitimizing the Euro-“Polity” and its “Regime”: The Normative Turn in EU Studies’, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003), pp. 7–34; Erik Oddavar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, ‘Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimacy Assessed’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004), pp. 435–59.
48. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp. 42ff; Augustín José Menéndez, Neither Constitution, Nor Treaty: A Deliberative-democratic Analysis of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU, Working Paper 8/05 (Oslo: ARENA, 2005); Vito Breda, ‘A European Constitution in a Multinational Europe or a Multinational Constitution for Europe?’, European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), pp. 330–44; Simone Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy’, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004), pp. 153–73; Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power’, Constellations, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005), pp. 223–44.
49. Richard Bellamy and Justus Schönlau, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: The Need for Constitutional Compromise and the Drafting of the EU Constitution, The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2003, Online paper 33/03.
50. Ireneusz P. Karolewski, ‘Citizenship and Collective Identity in Europe’, in Karolewski and Kaina (eds.), European Identity, pp. 23–58.
51. See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch? (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1999).
52. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, ‘Integration und Demokratie’, in Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996), pp. 47–71.
53. See Frans Stokman and Robert Thomson, ‘Winners and Losers in the European Union’, European Union Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2004), pp. 5–23; Christina Zimmer, Gerald Schneider and Michael Dobbins, ‘The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution’, Political Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2005), pp. 403–22.
54. Dieter Grimm, ‘Vertrag oder Verfassung. Die Rechtsgrundlage der Europäischen Union im Reformprozess Maastricht II’, in Dieter Grimm, Joachim Jens Hesse, Reimut Jochimsen and Fritz W. Scharpf (eds.), Zur Neuordnung der Europäischen Union. Die Regierungskonferenz 1996/1997 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), pp. 9–31 (p.18).
55. Weiler, ‘The European Union: Enlargement, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’.
56. See Wolfgang Wessels, ‘The Constitutional Treaty: Three Readings from a Fusion Perspective’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, Annual Review, pp. 11–36; Jiri Pribán, ‘European Union Constitution-Making, Political Identity and Central European Reflections’, European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2005), pp. 135–53; Franz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowski, ‘European Identities and the EU: The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2004), pp. 573–98.
57. André Brodocz, Die Symbolische Dimension der Verfassung. Ein Beitrag zur Institutionentheorie (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), p.26.
58. Of course, other institutions can also fulfil the symbolic function, since a similar system of reference can be delivered, for example, by the national myth which dominates in France, in contrast to Germany, where the constitution has a much stronger political meaning. The difference in endowment with symbolic institutions was the source of diverging positions vis-à-vis the European constitution in the debate between Joschka Fischer and Jean-Pierre Chevènement; the latter argued that the German elite overstresses the meaning of the constitution because the idea of the nation became unpopular in Germany owing to its historical experiences: see Die Zeit, 21 June 2000.
59. Brodocz, Die Symbolische Dimension der Verfassung, p.27.
60. Jutta Limbach argues with regard to Germany that the Federal Constitutional Court fulfils an educational function vis-à-vis German society, socializing it to democracy: Jutta Limbach, ‘Die Integrationskraft des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, in Hanns Vorländer (ed.), Integration durch Verfassung (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), pp. 315–28 (p.316); Jutta Limbach, ‘The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution’, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2001), pp. 1–10.
61. See Jürgen Habermas, Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen Ausdruck (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2001); Dolf Sternberger, Verfassungspatriotismus. Schriften (Frankfurt/Main: Insel, 1990), Vol. 10.
62. Gary Schaal, Vertrauen, Verfassung und Demokratie. Über den Einfluss konstitutioneller Prozesse und Prozeduren auf die Genese von Vertrauensbeziehungen in modernen Demokratien (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), pp. 11–15.
63. Hanns Vorländer, ‘Integration durch Verfassung? Die symbolische Bedeutung der Verfassung im politischen Integrationsprozess’, in Hanns Vorländer (ed.), Integration durch Verfassung (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), pp. 9–40 (p.26); Dieter Grimm, ‘Integration by Constitution’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 3, Nos. 2–3 (2005), pp. 193–208.
64. André Brodocz, ‘Chancen konstitutioneller Identitätsstiftung. Zur symbolischen Integration durch eine deutungsoffene Verfassung’, in Vorländer (ed.), Integration durch Verfassung, pp. 101–20. Gary Schaal differentiates in turn four modes of integration by means of a constitution, including integration by neutrality, integration by value consensus, integration by discourse, and integration by conflict: see Gary S. Schaal, ‘Vier normative Konzepte von Integration qua Verfassung’, in Vorländer (ed.), Integration durch Verfassung, pp. 71–100.
65. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? Eine Bemerkung zu Dieter Grimm’, in Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), pp. 185–9 (p.189).
66. See Cathleen Kantner, Kein modernes Babel. Kommunikative Voraussetzungen europäischer Öffentlichkeit (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004); Hans-Jörg Trenz and Klaus Eder, ‘The Democratizing Dynamics of European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism’, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2004), pp. 5–25. However, there are authors who highlight the segmentation of European publics instead of identifying an integrated Pan-European public: see Erik Oddvar Eriksen, ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere’, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2005), pp. 341–63.
67. Kleger (ed.), Der Konvent als Labor.
68. Moravcsik, ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?’, p.220.
69. Heinz Kleger, ‘EU-Verfassung im Härtertest’, WeltTrends, Vol. 48 (2005), pp. 93–107.
70. Ireneusz P. Karolewski, ‘Zwischen Machtstreben und Toleranz – Verfassungsdiskurs in Polen’, WeltTrends, Vol. 48 (2005), pp. 115–20.
71. See Andreas Maurer, Parlamentarische Demokratie in der Europäischen Union. Der Beitrag des Europäischen Parlaments und der nationalen Parlamente (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), p.51.
72. For legitimacy strategies of the European Convention see John E. Fossum, Contemporary European Constitution-making: Constrained or Reflexive?, ARENA Working Paper 05/04 (Oslo: ARENA, 2004).
73. Astrid Lorenz, ‘How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2005), pp. 339–61.
74. See Richard Bellamy, ‘The Constitution of Europe: Rights or Democracy?’, in Richard Bellamy, Vittorio Buffacchi and Dario Castiglione (eds.), Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995), pp. 153–75.
75. See Andreas Maurer, ‘Less Bargaining – More Deliberation: The Convention Method for Enhancing the EU Democracy’, International Politics and Society, No. 1 (2003), pp. 167–90; Carlos Closa, ‘Improving EU Constitutional Politics? A Preliminary Assessment of the Convention’, University of Manchester, Constitutionalism Web-Paper, No. 1, 2003; Paul Magnette, ‘Deliberation versus Negotiation: A First Analysis of the Convention on the Future of the Union’, paper presented at the first Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26–8 Sept. 2002.
76. See Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine, ‘Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2007), pp. 69–80. However, there are also sceptical voices: see John Erik Fossum and Augustín José Menéndez, ‘The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union’, European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), pp. 380–410.
77. Frank Schimmelfennig calls one of the negative effects rhetorical action: see Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap’, p. 65.
78. George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch, ‘The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2007), pp. 157–86.
79. Ben Crum, ‘Politics and Power in the European Convention’, Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1–11.
80. See David R. Cameron, ‘The Stalemate in the Constitutional IGC Over the Definition of a Qualified Majority’, European Union Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004), pp. 373–91.
81. See Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘The European Convention: Bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric’, West European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), pp. 381–404.
82. See Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘Coping with the Lilliput Syndrome: Large vs. Small Member States in the European Convention’, European Public Law, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), pp. 83–102.
83. Berhard Felderer, Iain Paterson and Peter Silrászky, Draft Constitution: The Double Majority Implies a Massive Transfer of Power to the Large Member States ‐ Is this Intended? (Vienna: Institute of Advanced Studies, 2003).
84. See Iain Paterson, ‘A Lesser Known Probabilistic Approach to the Shapley–Shubik Index and Useful Related Voting Measures’, paper presented at the European Public Choice Society, University of Durham, 31 March–3 April 2005; Wojciech Slomczynski and Karol Zyczkowski, ‘Penrose Voting System and Optimal Quota’, Acta Physica Polonica, Vol. 37, No. 11 (2006), pp. 3133–43; Claus Beisbart, Luc Bovens and Stephen Hartmann, ‘A Utilitarian Assessment of Alternative Decision Rules in the Council of Ministers’, European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2005), pp. 395–418.
85. Claus Offe, ‘Micro-aspects of Democratic Theory: What Makes for the Deliberative Competence of Citizens?’, in Claus Offe, Herausforderungen der Demokratie. Zur Integrations- und Leistungsfähigkeit politischer Institutionen (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2003), pp. 297–334.
86. Adam Przeworski, ‘Deliberation and Ideological Domination’, in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 140–60.
87. Solomon E. Asch, ‘Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority’, Psychological Monographs, Vol. 70, No. 9 (1956), pp. 1–70.
88. Identified as CONV773/03.
89. On the concept of ‘differentiated membership’ see Christina. J. Schneider, ‘Differenzierte Mitgliedschaft und die EU-Osterweiterung. Das Beispiel der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit’, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2006), pp. 67–94.
90. See Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schmmelfennig, ‘Relations with the Wider Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, Annual Review (2006), pp. 137–54; Mustafa Türkes and Göksu Gökgöz, ‘The European Union's Strategy Towards the Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2006), pp. 659–90; Judith Kelley, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms Through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2006), pp. 29–55.