Regional Governors under the Dual Power of Medvedev and Putin

Abstract

The over-centralized unitary model of centre–regional relations that was developed under President Vladimir Putin has not substantially changed under the new dual leadership of Dmitrii Medvedev and Putin. Although the provincial governors have now been successfully integrated into the Kremlin's vertical chain of command, the weakening of their institutional and personal powers has made them a weak link, and it has also made the chain itself weaker, especially during a time of economic crisis. By making governors more and more dependent on the centre, the Kremlin may have succeeded in creating power steering for the driving wheel; however, the connection between the driving wheel and the other wheels has become much weaker.

Notes

In fact, there has been a great deal of cross-fertilization in the political development in these countries.

Nikolai Petrov, Maria Lipman and Henry Hale, ‘Overmanaged Democracy in Russia: Governance Implications of Hybrid Regimes’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper, 2010, p.35.

For more on this, see Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider, ‘The Regions Under Putin and After’, in Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (eds.), After Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, 4th edn (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp.59–82.

Putin has long experience of this work, as he supervised Russia's regions for Yeltsin in 1997–98, first as head of the main oversight department that gathered evidence on violations of federal laws and policies in the regions, and then as deputy head of the presidential administration.

<http://premier.gov.ru/visits/ru/7928/events/7932/>, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.

Ibid.

<http://news.kremlin.ru/news/2120>, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.

<http://www.mk.ru/politics/interview/2009/06/04/293874-dissident-respubliki-bashkortostan.html>, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.

89 indicators in total, including 40 describing general education – shares of those who passed state exams by categories of pupils and by subjects, number of schools, of pupils and of teachers, salaries and budgetary expenditures, and the crime rate of teenagers; 49 on primary and secondary professional education.

73 indicators covering levels of mortality by age, physical and financial parameters of the operations of health-care facilities, physical culture and sport.

There was only the list of 20 leaders publicized in late 2008 on 2007 results, and these regions received in total 2 bn roubles of governmental grants.

<http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/reg_ros/reg_pow/governor/d092016>, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.

<http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/reg_ros/reg_pow/governor/d092016>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

<http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/reg_ros/reg_pow/governor/d092016>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

<http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/reg_ros/reg_pow/governor/d092016>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

Decree of the President of Russia, 27 December 2004, No. 1603, ‘O poryadke rassmotreniya kandidatur na dolzhnost’ vysshego dolzhnostnogo litsa (Rukovoditelya vysshevo ispolnitel'nogo organa gosudarstvennoi vlasti) sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On procedure for review of candidatures for the position of high official (Leader of supreme executive organ of state power) of a subject of the Russian Federation], available at <http://www.rg.ru/2004/12/29/gubernatori-dok.html>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

‘The Results of the Year with Dmitry Medvedev’, interview on Channel 1 television conducted on 24 Dec. 2009, available on the Kremlin website at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2009/12/24/1509_type82916_223548.shtml>, accessed 25 Jan. 2010.

It is important to note that when the new system of appointment of governors was proclaimed by the Kremlin in September 2004, it did not provoke massive opposition from the governors and was even welcomed by many of them. This was because (1) many of the governors were coming to the end of their third term in office, which was considered to be their last, and (2) feeling the growing gap between their loyalty to the Kremlin and the need to seek popular support for re-election, they thought it would be easier to seek the Kremlin's support alone.

<http://www.kremlin.ru/news/5494>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

<http://www.levada.ru/press/2009062604.html>, accessed 19 Jan. 2010.

Georgii Deryag'yan, ‘Stabilizatsionnaya politisistema v poiskakh dinamizma?’ [A stabilized political system in search of dynamism?], in Otsenka sostoyaniya i perspektiv politicheskoi sistemy Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2008 godu–nachale 2009 goda [Estimate of the condition and prospects of the political system of the Russian Federation in 2008–beginning 2009] (2 April 2009): see <http://www.inop.ru/page484/>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

‘Samye vliyatel'nye lyudi Rossii – 2003’ [Russia's most influential people, 2003] (Moscow: Institute of Situational Analysis and New Technologies (ISANT), 2004), available at <http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2007/12/rating_politicheskoy_vliyatelnosti/>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2007/12/rating_politicheskoy_vliyatelnosti/>, accessed 20 Jan. 2010.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nikolay Petrov

Nikolay Petrov is head of the Centre for Political-Geographical Studies, Moscow, and Scholar-in-Residence at the Carnegie Moscow Centre.