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ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been increased scholarly attention devoted to the politics behind decision-making processes in multilateral organisations like the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). For heritage studies, this trend has been particularly important, as it has expanded interest in the networks of power created by UNESCO conventions and their often-unpredictable global impacts. In this article, I examine the role of NGO representatives as governing bodies of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) in order to show how, despite their limited power, these delegates are increasing the relevance of the ICH Convention albeit in paradoxical ways. While fighting to secure their own position within the 2003 Convention, NGOs are entrenching an exclusionary canon of heritage expertise and reinstating the significance of geo-political borders between the Global North and South. I highlight how these new configurations of power based on private know-how end up restructuring the arena of political debate, steering the conversation away from local communities’ cultural rights and their effective control over the resources needed for those rights to be exercised.
Acknowledgments
Some of the arguments I present in this article were first elaborated as part of my doctoral dissertation, and I am deeply grateful to Lynn Meskell, whose critical insight on my work greatly improved this essay. I am particularly indebted to Erin Martineau, Clara Seligman Lewis, and Lauren Yapp, who reviewed earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to Barbara Voss and Ian Hodder, who read and commented on preliminary versions of this work. Special thanks to the many NGO members with whom I spoke during my research, particularly to the Fundación Erigaie staff, who allowed me to represent them at the UNESCO meetings and have provided ongoing support and advice. I am extremely thankful to Nicholas Brown for his help collecting, organizing, and interpreting UNESCO data. Many thanks to all the interviewees who patiently answered my many questions and held long conversations with me. I am also indebted to Anne Laura Kraak and Bahar Aykan who revised the manuscript and provided useful feedback and suggestions. I am deeply grateful to the journal’s editor and anonymous reviewers whose careful reading and insightful observations greatly improved this article. This research was supported by numerous centres, programs, and institutions at Stanford University, which helped complete initial field research and writing phases of my work. The bulk of field research phase was supported by an International Dissertation Research Fellowship from the Social Sciences Research Council. The writing phases were mostly supported by a Mellon Foundation Dissertation Fellowship from Stanford’s Humanities Center and a Dissertation Fellowship from the Department of Black Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. I conducted ethnographic research during UNESCO's 7th Session of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, the 3rd NGO Forum, and the 6th Ordinary Session of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. I was an official delegate of the Colombian NGO Fundación Erigaie.
2. I conducted participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and informal conversations with members from accredited NGOs that have participated in ICH Committee meetings and/or attended the NGO Forums. Including state-party representatives, diplomats, researchers, and NGO members, I conducted close to 30 interviews, though given the long-term nature of my work and repeated communication with individuals, interactions are hard to quantify.
3. State Parties are divided into six electoral groups: Group I Western European and North American states, Group II Eastern European states, Group III Latin American and Caribbean states, Group IV Asian and Pacific states, Group V-a African states, and Group V-b Arab states.
4. For a history of the ICH Convention and transition period from the Masterpieces programme, see Aikawa-Faure (Citation2009) and Adell et al. (Citation2015).
5. I use the term Committee and Intergovernmental Committee interchangeably.
6. On average, between 2009 and 2014, 81% of State Parties were simultaneously represented in the Committee and the Subsidiary Body. Though members of the Subsidiary Body were meant to abstain from evaluating dossiers presented by their home countries, the fact that nominating countries could be part of the evaluating group, raised concern among some of the Convention’s governing bodies. In 2013, the Internal Oversight Service (IOS) noted that a number of stakeholders questioned the evaluation methods used for file assessments (see document IOS/EVS/PI/129). As stated by the IOS, ‘the absence of clear rules regarding the participation of Subsidiary Body members in ICH Committee meetings raises further questions, given that some Body members also represent their Governments to the Committee and take the floor during the sessions to support certain nominations. As a result of this many stakeholders question the integrity of the evaluation process to the Representative List’ (ITH/13/8.COM/13.d, page 2, paragraph 3.)
7. See the Operational Directives for the Implementation of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2018.
9. Working document LHE/19/NGO/2. Reflection on the Role of Accredited Non-Governmental Organisations within the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. Paris, 21 March 2019.
10. This situation is not unique to the 2003 Convention. As explained by Ahmed (Citation2011, 839), NGOs have a voice within the UN and other international organisations when the ‘deliberation processes are open in the early stages of the discussion and preparations [but] NGOs are shut out at later stages when states bargain over the final decision.’
11. Historically, there have only been 28 candidacy withdrawals from the Representative List; a decision a State Party is allowed to make after receiving the advisers’ recommendations and before being evaluated by the Committee. State Parties withdraw their nominations for different reasons. While some delegations withdraw after realising the weaknesses in their proposals based on the advisers’ recommendations, others strongly disagree with the recommendations, but recognise they do not have enough political leverage to lobby for their element’s inscription that year. It is important to note however, that regardless of how withdrawals are interpreted, it is uncommon to withdraw a nomination, and State Parties have only withdrawn 6.5% of all candidacies ever presented.
12. See Bortolotto’s (Citation2015) analysis of the inscription of the ‘Eshuva Harákmbut sung prayers of Peru’s Huachipaire People.’
14. NGO Statement ICH-7.COM, 2012.
16. For more on international bureaucracies and elites see: Bjerregaard and Nielsen (Citation2014); Robinson and Harris (Citation2000).
17. Though it is not always accurate to equate the behaviour of individual NGO representatives with that of NGOs as organisations, in this type of venues, these individuals are acting in official capacity as delegates from their organisations. Though their personal interests may not always coincide with those of their institutions, these delegates’ personal expertise and to an extent, their prestige and influence, are intimately connected to the organisations they represent and their own positions within them. Conversely, my ethnographic observations confirm that often, the NGOs’ power and influence also depends on who is acting as their representatives in such venues. In sum, though it is important to analytically distinguish between the power of institutions and that of individual representatives, in practice one heavily relies on the other.
18. This individual mentioned that the criteria for selecting experts are intentionally opaque and largely dependent on connections and reputation. Jokingly, he added that being considered for this group was like being selected as a member of Tubby’s boy club, from the Little Lulu cartoon.
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Maria Fernanda Escallón
Maria Fernanda Escallón, Assistant Professor, Anthropology Department, University of Oregon. She is a socio-cultural anthropologist and archaeologist interested in cultural heritage, race, diversity politics, ethnicity, and inequality in Latin America.