The role of the Syrian business elite in the Syrian conflict: a class narrative

ABSTRACT

As Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, a new ‘state bourgeoisie’ was created in Syria through means of liberalization and neopatrimonial approaches. In addition to the Alawites who are directly related to al-Assad, this new bourgeoisie included Sunnis and Christians who have proved their utmost loyalty to al-Assad. When the conflict started in 2011, many expected the Sunni businesspeople to join the opposition and distance themselves from al-Assad regime. However, and with the exception of three cases which are discussed in the article; this did not happen. Throughout this article I try to explain how the behavior of the business elite has contributed to the survival of al-Assad regime and the longevity of the conflict. To do so, I discuss the various strategies adopted by the business elite to support the regime while also analyzing the various co-optation and oppression tools that the regime used to subdue and mobilize the business elite. By studying these tools and methods, which rely on a mix of class and neopatrimonial methods, I conclude this article by offering another perspective and a different understanding of authoritarian regimes and their structure while assessing the robustness of these regimes and forecasting their methods in case of uprisings.

With the rise of the socialist Ba’th party and its patron Hafez al-Assad, the political structure in Syria paved the way for the party members and their immediate family to accumulate both wealth and power. This patrimonial approach contributed to the reshaping of the class system and created a new bourgeoisie. The former bourgeoisie, which consisted of landowners and the urban Sunni elite, were sidelined and replaced by a ‘petty bourgeoisie’ that mainly included traditional Ba’athists.

When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in the year 2000, the politico-economic strategy in Syria shifted drastically. Bashar al-Assad deprived Ba’ath party members of their privileges, such as their proximity to the regime and their political and economic advantages, distributing such privileges instead among prominent government officials and members of the country’s upper and upper-middle classes through a series of (neo)patrimonial initiatives. The new (state) bourgeoisie in Syria included not only Alawites who are directly related to Bashar, but also Sunnis and Christians. This new bourgeoisie was given the chance to accumulate wealth by proving its loyalty to and cooperating with al-Assad regime against the opposition, which accuses the regime of practicing sectarianism and privileging Alawites over other sectarian groups, in particular Syrian Sunnis. My goal is to lay out the logic for this apparent paradox, summarized so clearly by Wael al-Khatib, General Coordinator of the Free Officers’ group in Homs, in an interview back in 2013, when he stated: ‘Sunni businessmen with their money and unconditional support for the regime are the reason why the regime is still alive’.¹

In fact, the majority of the businesspeople who formed this new business elite class under Bashar al-Assad are from a Sunni background, with the exception of the inner circle such as the Makhloufs, Shawkats, and Shalishs; who are, in one way or another, related to al-Assad through marriage. Seifan states that from the list of the 100 most important businesspeople in Syria, 23% are the offspring of high government officials or their partners; 48% are new businesspeople, most of whom had close and corrupt relationships with the security services; 22% were part of the traditional bourgeoisie from before the nationalization policies of the sixties, some of whom also had corrupt relationships with the leaders of the state; and seven percent had their primary business activities outside of Syria. If we turn to the religious backgrounds of these businesspeople, we find that 69% were Sunni, 16% Alawite, and 14% were Christians. Although Sunni businesspeople dominate, it is important to note that among the ten wealthiest businesspeople in Syria, the majority are Alawites who are directly related to al-Assad.²

Under Hafez al-Assad, loyalist businesspeople were classified as posing a fundamental threat to the economic and political power of the regime. However, they gradually became a significant component of the regime and were increasingly integrated into its various institutions.³ Although media narratives often show that al-Assad’s support comes primarily from Alawites, today many of the regime’s key supporters are modern-day technocrats, some of whom are Sunnis who found economic prosperity under Bashar’s regime.⁴ In fact, while Bashar al-Assad’s economic reforms—which began in the early 2000s through waves of privatization and other neoliberal measures—have alienated large sections of Syrian society; the kinship between the regime and its business partners is crucial to understanding the longevity of the regime in the current conflict. Despite some defections, most of the business elite in Syria, regardless of their religious background, remain supportive of al-Assad regime.⁵ Just like his father, Bashar al-Assad utilized economic liberalization as a tool via which to strengthen and increase support for the government by safeguarding the allegiance and loyalty of the beneficiaries of such reforms—mainly the urban Sunni upper-middle classes.⁶ As a result of these shifts, and despite the political turmoil that has overtaken Syria since March 2011, one of the most persistent factors in this conflict has been the remarkable coherence and cohesion of the regime elite and their immediate circles.⁷

In light of the above, I argue that the business elite supported a raft of practices that stabilized the regime and, in doing so, prolonged the conflict. The focus of this article will hence be on how the business elite proved their loyalty to al-Assad regime and what they received in return for that loyalty. For example, I will illustrate how businesspeople were involved in funding pro-regime militias and military divisions or using their media platforms to spread the regime’s narrative and propaganda, finally saving the regime economically when many of its members became subject to international sanctions. Moreover, I will provide examples of how the regime penalized those who refused to come to its aid vocally or financially. In order to consolidate our understanding of the state-business relations, I will also reflect on these instances from a classed and (neo)patrimonial perspective.

Answering such questions on why the majority of businesspeople remained loyal to al-Assad is a two-fold process due to the existence of both co-optation and repressive tools. The first is to look at the advantages and profits bestowed upon those who loyally supported al-Assad, while the other is to look at the ways in which al-Assad chastised those who remained neutral or voiced their support of the uprising. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) argue that dictatorial regimes rely on various methods of repression and co-optation to affect the behaviour of the population.⁸ Although repression is utilized as a socio-political tool to keep the masses at bay, co-optation—for example, by means of patronage—is an equally popular and effective instrument.⁹ While loyal businesspeople enjoy more socio-political and socio-economic privileges in return for their support, those who remain neutral or speak out against the regime face dire consequences. Such consequences vary between the confiscation of their property and that of their family to being indicted with terrorist charges. This rift has enabled new names to come to the forefront and capitalize on the property of those blacklisted by the regime, especially as the latter needed to depend on people who have been exempted from international sanctions. Samer Foz, 46, a Sunni businessman from Latakia currently residing in Dubai, is the best example of both instances, as we will see in the following sections.

In addition to keeping those with proven loyalty in their positions, the regime’s partnership with selected members of the wealthy bourgeoisie—and the Sunni Damascene in particular—gave the latter a vested interest in maintaining the stability of the regime and their relations with it as long as their businesses continued to prosper.¹⁰ The regime’s reliance on its loyal businesspeople has contributed to creating a new social stratum. Due to the length of the conflict, this new stratum has been allowed to accumulate more capital and wealth by attending to the regime’s economic needs that resulted from international sanctions and capital flight.¹¹ Paradoxically, the sanctions put in place by the international community encouraged some businesspeople to become economically more involved with the regime as economic prospects increased during the conflict.¹²

Producing loyalty to the regime

In this article, I reveal the various strategies that were used to reinforce the (economic) ties between al-Assad regime and the business elite. I mainly focus on five strategies: marriage; the financing of (para)military groups and Shabbiha; the financing of trips to vote; providing food during the crisis; and playing the role of middleman for the regime to provide certain necessities.¹³

First, to consolidate this newly established state-business relation, many of al-Assad family members turned to marriage as a means to strengthen their bond with prominent families and prestigious circles to broaden their patronage networks.¹⁴ The marriage between Bashar al-Assad and British-Syrian Asma al-Akhras, daughter of a prominent Sunni diplomat and niece of the famous Homsi Sunni businessman Tarif al-Akhras, is a perfect example of this alliance. Moreover, Bashar’s brother Maher is also married to a Sunni woman and is hence related through marriage to the Syrian tycoon Mohammad Hamsho.¹⁵ As a result of his marriage to the sister of Maher’s wife, Hamsho became a powerful political and economic figure and was elected as a member of the Parliament in 2003 and 2007 while his various businesses flourished even more.¹⁶

The second strategy centred around the financing of Shabbiha militias and (para)military forces or offering logistical help to al-Assad regime to suppress the protests. Al-Assad loyalists spared no expense when helping to maintain and strengthen his grip on the country. For instance, Mohammad Hamsho and Samir Hassan (the latter a former agent for Nestlé in Syria) are both examples of the business elite’s support to al-Assad regime, each funnelling substantial amounts of cash into initiatives intended to suppress protests.¹⁷ Locally speaking, many owners of transport companies have made their buses and vehicles available for troops and Shabbiha movements. Some businesspeople opted for financing military and intelligence units—for example Samer Foz, who funded a paramilitary arm of the Military Intelligence Division, and Ayman Jaber, who financed the Desert Falcons and Sea Commandos that helped the army to recapture Palmyra from Da’esh.¹⁸

Third, when Syria suffered from a severe shortage of wheat in 2013, which seriously affected the government’s ability to provide for its people, loyalists—again such as Samer Foz (who was not subjected to any sanctions at that time) and his company Aman Holding—alleviated the problem as he was granted an exclusive tender to import grain into Syria and handed it over to the government.¹⁹

Fourth, some businesspeople financed trips bringing supporters to Syria to vote for al-Assad. One such individual was Mazen Tarazi who, in 2014, paid for a private jet to fly Syrians from Kuwait so that they could vote for Bashar in the presidential elections.

Finally, when Da’esh came to power, all of the oil wells fell under their control. This not only deprived the Syrian regime of a major source of income, but also of energy. Once again, the Syrian business elite loyalists tried to save the regime by playing the role of intermediary, buying oil from Da’esh. George Haswani, owner of the HESCO company and a close friend of al-Assad, is a very good example here of someone who played the role of middleman. He bought oil from Da’esh and sold it to the regime, which eventually led to him being placed on the European blacklist.²⁰

Resistance to the regime by business people

When the Syrian uprising began in 2011, people expected prominent businesspeople to switch sides and put an end to the regime’s reign by paralysing the economy. Many expatriate businesspeople who are not dependent on the Syrian market or indeed, the continuity of the regime, publicly aligned themselves with the opposition.²¹ However, most of the (Sunni) business elite quickly detached themselves from an opposition movement they believed would prove to be treacherous for the business environment, a fear that was ‘confirmed in summer 2012 when Sunni rebels plundered Aleppo’s industrial zone’.²²

I discuss three cases to show how the business elite actively resisted the regime. First, the participation of business figures in one of the earliest opposition conferences funded by businesspeople of the Damascene Sanqar and Qurabi families was hailed as ‘a significant development’.²³ Haddad argues that it would have been difficult for the regime to hold out in Damascus and Aleppo had business moguls sided with the protesters.²⁴

Second, another political initiative by the business elite was made in March 2013 in Jordan, two years after the beginning of the uprisings, called the Syrian Conscience Initiative (mubadarat al-ḍamīr al-Sūri), which proposed that al-Assad should remain in power until 2014 and the current government should not be changed. The only two changes that were destined to occur would have affected the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior. It was obvious that none of the rebels took this initiative seriously, as they regarded it as a ‘desperate attempt to prolong the life of the current authoritarian bourgeois regime’.²⁵

Third, some defections happened among those loyal to the regime, the most significant being that of Firas Tlass, a business tycoon and the son of Mustafa Tlass, who served as the Minister of Defence for years and was a protégé of Hafez al-Assad. Other than the businesspeople residing outside of Syria and Tlass’ defection, no significant changes occurred involving the loyalty of businesspeople close to the regime.

The regime rewards loyalty

The absence of a business arena that is independent from the government in Syria guaranteed the reliance and loyalty of the business elite on the government. The regime’s policy of evading commercial associations with international financial organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, restricted the business class’ relations to al-Assad regime and state officials, which in turn resulted in an alliance that survived the current uprising.²⁶ The regime rewarded loyalty with improved socio-economic and socio-political conditions, mainly through the following four strategies: the awarding of political positions; a monopolistic grip on the smuggling of food into besieged areas; privileged access to businesses and sectors that were left behind by the businesspeople that fled Syria; and access to Syria’s largest (re)construction projects.

In turn, these businesspeople did not shy away from pledging their allegiance to al-Assad regime during the early stages of the uprisings through (social) media platforms, propaganda, and publicity. They also fired employees who wanted to take part in the protests against al-Assad or participate in the national strikes as a means of protest.²⁷ It was not surprising when the European sanctions targeted Syrian individuals who were closest to the regime, such as Rami Makhlouf, Hamsho, and Jaber. However, the sanctions were totally ineffective in inducing a rupture between the elite and the regime, nor did they succeed in encouraging the elite to abandon the regime.²⁸ Reports suggest that well-connected wealthy businesspeople have established themselves as significant players—so-called ‘traders of the crisis’, tujjar al-azmah—in the unfolding civil war economy, taking advantage of, and benefitting from, the business opportunities that resulted from the crisis and the sanctions.²⁹ After a while, it became evident to the Syrian public that the major players who owe their wealth to the regime will not take the side of the opposition, nor will they stop offering financial aid.

Husam Qaterji, a Sunni trader who was not known prior to the uprising, operated as an intermediary for trading oil and cereals between Kurdish held areas, Da’esh, and the Syrian regime. Qaterji, who regularly posted pro-regime propaganda on his social media platforms, was one of the political beneficiaries for his loyalty to the regime as his services secured him a seat in the Parliament in 2016 as a representative of his Governorate, Aleppo.³⁰ Moreover, the Syrian regime has recently approved the building of an oil refinery in Raqqa, which will be partly operated by Qaterji Group’s Arfada Petroleum.³¹ Although Qaterji’s support subjected him to various economic sanctions, he remains actively loyal to al-Assad regime. A further example, Fares Shehabi, a Sunni businessman from Aleppo and nephew of Hikmat Shehabi, who was chief of staff in the Syrian Army, is an outspoken regime supporter on various media platforms. Shehabi’s vocal support resulted in his election to President of the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Industry in June 2012.³²

One of the regime’s strategies in driving opposition forces out of their areas was through the use of siege tactics. The latest, very well-known, and possibly longest, is that of Eastern Ghouta. The inhabitants of the area were forced to deal with merchants collaborating with the regime to smuggle food and other necessities from Damascus to Ghouta at vastly inflated prices. Moheddine al-Manfoush, a regime ally from Mesraba, was the businessman responsible for supplying Eastern Ghouta with food and fuel. Through his relations with regime officials, he succeeded in getting his goods through checkpoints to the besieged areas and selling them for a price that often reached twenty times the goods’ actual value. Simultaneously, al-Manfoush was obtaining cheap products such as milk from Ghouta, then selling them in Damascus for a much higher price and sharing the profits with the regime.³³ The relationship he enjoyed with the regime and the one he built with the people in Ghouta ensured that his businesses remained functional as his facilities kept producing goods that were sold in Ghouta and Damascus.³⁴ Moreover, Mesraba was spared from the regime’s military attacks as part of the arrangement between the two.³⁵ In addition, al-Manfoush signed a contract with the Syrian government in 2019 to remove the rubble from three areas in Eastern Ghouta and sell it to various factories for recycling.³⁶

Another area from which regime loyalists will benefit is the reconstruction work that will take place in Syria. For Bashar al-Assad, his inner circle, and the businesspeople linked to his regime, this reconstruction project is viewed as a means by which they will be able to consolidate the power already acquired and regain political and economic domination over Syria. At the beginning of 2017, the Syrian regime was preparing to enforce Decree 66 on the entire country, which will facilitate the flow of assets to private enterprises and regime cronies free of taxation. Decree 66 permits the government to ‘redesign unauthorized or illegal housing areas’ and replace them with ‘modern’ real estate projects with quality services.³⁷ Moreover, the decree legally and financially makes way for the demolition of housing and the ‘expropriation of families considered dissident, or living in anti-Assad areas who are very often from the working class and then replaces them with higher social classes and new war elites, generally less inclined to challenge the regime’.³⁸ Similarly, in April 2018, the regime issued another directive, Law 10, which allows the government to confiscate the properties of those who cannot prove ownership. This is rather problematic, in that most people targeted by this law do not live in Syria.³⁹ The first tender was won in September 2017 for a value of 150 billion Syrian pounds, 18.9 billion dollars, by Samer Foz .⁴⁰ Mazen Tarazi, whom we discussed earlier, was awarded the tenders to build a mall in addition to six other buildings in a reconstruction project in Damascus called Marota City.⁴¹ Another name that has risen to prominence is that of Wassim Qattan. Qattan was awarded the management contract of the Qassioun Shopping Mall and a forty-five-year contract to manage a major real estate location in Damascus, which included the building of a large five-star hotel and a shopping mall.⁴² All of the businesspeople involved in the Marota City project have since found themselves subject to various European and American sanctions.

In sum, some of the business elite consciously chose to support al-Assad regime due to the symbiotic nature of the relationship they have. This loyalty was motivated by a mix of co-optation and repression, as many businesspeople either enjoyed the various financial benefits their loyalty bestowed upon them, or feared losing their assets like those who remained neutral or embraced the opposition. This has helped al-Assad to avoid otherwise disastrous economic consequences for as long as possible and has also contributed to the financing of militias and paramilitary bodies. All in all, the relationship between the loyalists and al-Assad have proved to be of great mutual benefit.

The price of remaining neutral

Clearly, al-Assad regime deployed various means of repression against those members of the business elite who did not actively support it. Such practices include the seizing of property, the tarnishing of reputations, individuals also found themselves before the newly established counter-terrorism courts facing false charges.⁴³ For instance, Imad Ghrewati—a famous Sunni Damascene businessman who owns a number of car showrooms and various factories in addition to being the head of the Damascus Chamber of Industry—is an good example of a loyalist who chose to remain neutral when the uprising began and henceforth drew the regime’s wrath. Ghrewati’s refusal to support the regime by not agreeing to finance Shabbiha militias led to him being blacklisted by al-Assad regime.⁴⁴ Not only did the regime pursue Ghrewati himself, they also targeted eleven members of the Ghrewati family by confiscating their assets as well. Eventually, Samer Foz took over the businesses owned by Ghrewati under the umbrella of his company Aman Holding. Another example is that of the textile tycoon Sabbagh Charabati. Once one of Aleppo’s top businesspeople, Charabati initially financed some Shabbiha militia. However, in 2016, he refused to continue paying and fled to Egypt, upon which the Syrian regime seized his property.⁴⁵ Firas Tlass, who fled the country after announcing his support for the Syrian opposition and defecting from al-Assad regime, also saw his various assets seized by the Syrian regime. In 2014 his company, MAS, was formally transferred to state ownership.⁴⁶

Law 19, issued in 2012 by al-Assad, regarding anti-terrorism, gave the regime legal grounds to confiscate the property and freeze the assets of those accused of terrorism. The best example of the consequences of this law is that of the UAE-based businessman Muwaffaq al-Gaddah—a leading real estate investor with shares in several projects in the luxurious Ya’afur district on the outskirts of Damascus. Originating from Dara’a, al-Assad personally contacted al-Gaddah at the beginning of the uprisings in the hope of calming things down in Dara’a. However, since his townsmen did not accept his interference, al-Gaddah made little progress. Instead, he gave al-Assad a list of problems that he thought should be fixed—a move that resulted in the ending of his friendship with al-Assad.⁴⁷ Al-Gaddah’s neutrality resulted in his assets being seized in 2014 by the regime under the accusation of ‘funding terrorist organizations’ and of ‘participating in bringing weapons into Dar’a’.⁴⁸ These charges, however, were dropped four years later.⁴⁹

Rethinking class, neopatrimonialism and the Syrian conflict

This article examined the contribution made by the Syrian business elite to the Syrian conflict and the benefits that resulted, both for the elite and the government. This study shows how class differences and the neopatrimonial tendencies of the regime have contributed significantly to the Syrian conflict. That said, how does this Syrian case fit into larger theoretical debates on class and state-business relations, as well as other cases in the Middle East?

Marxian class theory is the most popular among scholars dealing with the subject of social class. While Marx bases his popular theory on social class on the person’s individual position within the society and a given class hierarchy, this position depends on the role that a person plays in the production process.⁵⁰ Marx’s theory is mainly built on the narrative of economic inequality and that the economy plays a vital role in the process of social formation and class stratification.⁵¹ Hanieh, inspired by the Marxian conception of class, explains how class is an expression of the various relations and interactions between the people in a given society that are formed in order to answer to the needs of that society, and that class is always a social relation.⁵² Thus, if we are to apply a Marxian definition of class to the Middle East, we find that political influence, personal relations, ancestry, and education are more important in the shaping of class than the economic aspect alone.⁵³ Daher argues that ‘class is the key social category from which to comprehend the dynamics of any society’.⁵⁴

The bourgeoisie in any given society can take many forms, not least as they tend to change depending on the prevailing political and social situation in which they emerge. The most fitting examples of bourgeoisie, which go hand in hand with this article, are those of the state bourgeoise and the new class/bourgeoisie. Bassam Haddad offers a general definition of the term ‘state bourgeoisie’ in the Syrian context as the⁵⁵

political elite associated with the various institutions of the state as well as its ruling organizations/bodies. Invariably, such elites hold marked positions of power and have accumulated significant wealth as a result of their position within the state apparatuses

John Waterbury has argued that the state bourgeoisie does not constitute a class in the traditional sense.⁵⁶ Waterbury’s argument revolves around that fact that this state bourgeoisie does not pursue any reproduction or rebranding of itself as it controls the means of production. Haddad explains how other scholars have not challenged Waterbury’s notion regarding the lack of clarity of whether members of the state bourgeoisie are primarily members of any single class.⁵⁷

According to Perthes, we can define the ‘new class’ via three main characteristics. First, the main activities of the ‘new class’ are, in one way or another, related to the state. Second, this class always asks to be granted exemptions and special treatment when it comes to disobeying the rules in order to advance, especially when it comes to the legalizing of otherwise illegal activities. Third, they rely largely on monopolies in certain sectors of the economy.⁵⁸ These characteristics are very evident under Bashar’s rule, especially since the beginning of the conflict as members of this ‘new class’ were on many occasions the saviours of the regime, either by financing (para)military groups to help suppress the uprising, saving the regime from the aftermath of economic sanctions, or assuming the role of middleman in order to provide the regime with cereals and oil. Raymond Hinnebusch (2004: 87) also talks about how the different alliances and relationships that were made between the state elites and businesspeople have contributed to the making of a ‘new bourgeoisie’, which is semi-official and whose influence extends to both the public and private sectors.⁵⁹ Shamel Azmeh argues that these newly made partnerships remained ‘strongly antagonistic’, as the members of the state-bourgeoisie and the state-elite had the upper hand when it comes to dictating the terms of these alliances.⁶⁰

When talking about the different kinds of bourgeoisie that are created by the state as a way for the ruler to remain in power and keep a hold on all the different monopolies at play, one cannot shy away from mentioning the concept, or rather the behaviour, of (neo)patrimonialism. Class alone cannot explain the nature of the relationship between the regime and its cronies, and the way they responded to the Syrian conflict. (Neo)patrimonialism in this case offers the missing link. Oliver Schlumberger defines the key feature of neopatrimonialism as the freedom that the political ruler has when it comes to the legality of their actions.⁶¹ Thus, this lack of restriction is nothing but an

informal exercise of power in a personalized system in which the ruler entertains close informal networks with various ‘circles’ of elite members […] who are personally loyal to the ruler who acts as a referee between competing for elite interests and balances them⁶²

According to Erdmann and Engel, neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two partially entangled modes of domination that coexist: ‘Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm.’⁶³ Eva Bellin argues: If the coercive apparatus is patrimonially organized rather than institutionalized, it is likely to be less receptive to the idea of regime change because it is more likely to be ruined by reform.⁶⁴ In his book The People Want, Gilbert Achcar bases his understanding of the notion of patrimonialism on Marx’s work as he defines patrimonialism as ‘an absolute, hereditary type of autocratic power, which is, however, capable of functioning with an entourage of “kith and kin”’.⁶⁵ Schlumberger and Achcar both argue that all Arab countries exhibit social patrimonial or neopatrimonial forms of organization to an extent that is unmatched anywhere else in the world.⁶⁶ Neopatrimonialism can especially be seen in kingdoms and sheikhdoms across the Middle East, however, it is not only confined to such countries.

Jason Brownlee (2002) recognizes four non-monarchical countries in the Middle East that have distinct (neo)patrimonial characteristics: al-Assad’s Syria; Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; Ghaddafi’s Libya; and Bourguiba’s Tunisia.⁶⁷ Adib Nehme believes that the protesters who chanted ‘The people want to overthrow the regime’ were mainly talking about the despotic, patriarchal, corrupt, or rentier characteristics of these regimes which, taken together, define what he refers to as a ‘neopatrimonial state’.⁶⁸ Achcar also explains how in (neo)patrimonial states, members of the ruling elites and circles with an understanding of business take advantage of the power given to them by the authorities and they abuse this power in order to accrue wealth.⁶⁹ This level of patrimonialism in Syria was constructed and consolidated through the centralization of power in al-Assad and those loyal to him; the construction of Assad’s personality cult Suriyet al-Assad—al-Assad’s Syria, and the formation of state-business relations and networks.⁷⁰ Syrian authoritarian rule simply became a ‘cold, paternal authoritarianism, disinterested in any form of peoplehood, and governed openly by an avowed marriage of business and state elites’.⁷¹

This is clearly reflected in the five strategies, including matrimonial, financial, or intermediary tactics; that the regime followed in order to solidify its state-business relations. When the uprising began, many Syrians assumed that the Sunni businesspeople would support the opposition and contribute to toppling the regime by paralysing the Syrian economy. However, the reverse happened as the majority did the exact opposite and contributed to the longevity of the conflict and al-Assad’s rule. However, this does not mean that all businesspeople sided with al-Assad and there are examples of people who were actively against him. The article discussed three cases. First, the participation of business figures in one of the earliest opposition conferences funded by businesspeople of the Damascene Sanqar and Qurabi families who had already fallen out with al-Assad regime. Second, another political initiative by the business elite was made in March 2013 in Jordan, two years after the beginning of the uprisings, called the Syrian Conscience Initiative (mubadarat al-ḍamīr al-Sūri). However, this initiative was not adopted by the Syrian opposition. Third, some defections happened among the loyalists of the regimes, the most significant being that of Firas Tlass. Other than those businesspeople residing outside of Syria and Tlass’ defection, no significant changes occurred involving the loyalty of the businesspeople close to the regime.

The Syrian regime has employed various tools of repression and co-optation in order to solidify the relations it has with the business elite. Businesspeople who actively pledged their allegiance to al-Assad regime during the early stages of the uprising through (social) media platforms, propaganda, and publicity were rewarded with various benefits. These benefits are best split into four strategies: political positions; monopolistic grip on the smuggling of food into besieged areas; privileged access to the businesses and business sectors left behind by those who fled Syria; and access to Syria’s largest (re)construction projects. Although their support of the regime landed many businesspeople on various sanctions lists, these sanctions failed to undermine state-business relations, nor did they succeed in stimulating more businesspeople to defect.

As an authoritarian regime, al-Assad’s rule not only utilized methods of co-optation to direct the behaviour of the business elite; it also employed repression. The punitive measures that the regime undertook included the seizing of properties, the freezing of assets, and the tarnishing of reputations. Law 19 issued in 2012 provided the legal justification for such measures and businesspeople were summoned to the counter-terrorism courts on false charges. Moreover, seized properties were then distributed among loyalists who had proven themselves worthy to the regime.

The benefits provided by the regime were not restricted to Alawites as most of the personalities discussed throughout the article come from the Sunni community. This demonstrates that the regime’s multiple co-optation strategies are not solely based on sect. Rather, these tools and strategies rely on a mix of class and (neo)patrimonial methods that were effective in prolonging the conflict and the regime’s rule. In sum, looking at the current conflict from class and neopatrimonial perspectives provides a different understanding of authoritarian regimes and their structure while assessing the robustness of these regimes and forecasting their methods in case of uprisings.

Having worked on nurturing the symbiotic nature of its relationship with the business elite, al-Assad regime successfully deployed its neopatrimonial characteristics to mobilize its cronies, deterring any further political change in the country. Thus, looking at the examples provided earlier, al-Assad’s repression and co-optation approaches in subduing and mobilizing members of the new class is a clear demonstration of the importance of class and neopatrimonialism in the Syrian state in general and the Syrian conflict in particular.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Michael Pizzi and Nuha Shabaan, ‘Under Sectarian Surface, Sunni Backing Props up Assad Regime’, Syria Direct, June 20, 2013, https://syriadirect.org/under-sectarian-surface-sunni-backing-props-up-assad-regime/.

² Samir Seifan, ‘“Siyasat tawzi” ad-dakhl wa dawruha fil-infijar al-ijtima’I fi Suriya’, in: Khalfiyyat ath-thawrah’, Dirasaat Suriya (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013).

³ Volker Perthes, ‘The Syrian Private Industrial and Commercial Sectors and the State’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 86, no 2 (1992): 207–30.

⁴ Zoe Hu, ‘Why Bashar al-Assad is still in power’, Al-Jazeera, October 4, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/4/why-bashar-al-assad-is-still-in-power.

⁵ Shamel Azmeh, ‘Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule’, Politics & Society 44, no 4 (2016): 499–523.

⁶ Benedetta Berti and Jonathan Paris, ‘Beyond Sectarianism: Geopolitics, Fragmentation, and the Syrian Civil War’, Strategic Assessment 16, no 4 (2014): 21–34; Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resistance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁷ Bassam Haddad, ‘Syria’s State Bourgeoisie: An Organic Backbone for the Regime. Middle East Critique 21, no 3 (2012): 231–57. This is now changing as the rather public fight between al-Assad and his cousin Makhlouf, which began in the summer of 2019, unfolds. In the past few months, the Syrian authorities have frozen some of Makhlouf’s assets and arrested people close to him to pressure him. The explanation provided by the regime was that Makhlouf has a minimum of 130 billion SYP, 180 million dollars, of unpaid taxes for his telecommunication empire. See Joseph Daher, ‘The Syrian Presidential Palace Strengthens its Concentration of Power: The Rift Makhlouf-Assad’, European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, May 13, 2020, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/67027/PB_2020_21_MED.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁸ Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, ‘A dictator’s toolkit: Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies’, Journal of Peace Research 51, no 3 (2014): 332–46.

⁹ Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, ‘A dictator’s toolkit’, 332–33.

¹⁰ Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba’th Party (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

¹¹ John Cuddington, Capital flight: Estimates, issues and explanations (Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1986). Cuddington defines capital flight as the ‘short-term speculative capital outflows [which involves] hot money that responds to political or financial crises, heavier taxes, a prospective tightening of capital controls or major devaluation of the domestic currency, or actual or incipient hyperinflation’.

¹² Samer Abboud, ‘Syria’s Business Elite: Between Political Alignment and Hedging Their Bets’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comments August 22, 2013, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C22_abo.pdf.

¹³ Uğur Ümit Üngör, ‘Shabbiha: Paramilitary Groups, Mass Violence and Social Polarization in Homs’, Violence: An International Journal 1, no 1 (2020): 59–79. Üngör defines Shabbiha as ‘irregular armed groups dressed in civilian gear and committing a broad spectrum of violence against civilians’.

¹⁴ Shmuel Bar, ‘Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview’, Comparative Strategy 25, no 5 (2006): 353–445.

¹⁵ Bar, ‘Bashar’s Syria: The Regime’. Hamsho is active in different sectors such as politics, trade, metal manufacturing, and TV production.

¹⁶ Caroline Donati, ‘The Economics of Authoritarian Upgrading in Syria’, in Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran, ed Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 35–60.

¹⁷ Jihad Yazigi, ‘Syria’s War Economy’, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2014, https://ecfr.eu/publication/syrias_war_economy/. For more information on Samir Hassan see https://businessmen.pro-justice.org/en/samir-anis-hasan/.

¹⁸ Younes Ahmed, ‘Syria’s businessmen invest in postwar reconstruction’, The Arab Weekly, June 5, 2016, https://thearabweekly.com/syrias-businessmen-invest-postwar-reconstruction; Sasapost, ‘Nukhbat al-Assad al-Maliyyah. Bashar Yastad’i Rijal al-Mal fi Ma’arakat al-Baqa’ [The financial elite of Assad: Bashar summons the men of money in the battle for survival], Sasapost, March 30, 2018, https://www.sasapost.com/al-assads-businessmen/.

¹⁹ Sasapost, ‘The financial elite of Assad’.

²⁰ David Blair, Oil middleman between Syria and Isil is new target for EU sanctions, The Telegraph, March 7, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11455602/Oil-middleman-between-Syria-and-Isil-is-new-target-for-EU-sanctions.html; Ahed Fadel, ‘George Haswani- Waseet Fawq al-’ada li Nift Daesh’ [George Haswani: an extraordinary broker of ISIS oil], Al-Arabiya, December 4, 2015, https://bit.ly/2PmPKW5; Omar Al-Khatib, ‘George Haswani: Lo’bat al-Assad wa Safiruhu lida Daesh’ [George Haswani: Assad’s game and his ambassador to ISIS], Orient News Network, March 8, 2015, https://bit.ly/318q3Lo.

²¹ Aurora Sottimano, ‘The Syrian Business Elite: Patronage Networks and War Economy’, Syria Untold, September 24, 2016, https://syriauntold.com/2016/09/24/the-syrian-business-elite-patronage-networks-and-war-economy/.

²² Fabrice Balanche, ‘Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War: A Geopolitical Study’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sectarianism-syrias-civil-war-geopolitical-study.

²³ Lauren Williams, ‘Syrian businessmen back opposition conference’, The Guardian, May 30, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/30/syrian-businessmen-back-opposition-conference.

²⁴ Bassam Haddad, ‘The Syrian Regime’s Business Backbone’, Middle East Report 262 (2012), https://merip.org/2012/03/the-syrian-regimes-business-backbone/.

²⁵ Ghayath Na’issah, ‘Al-Tabaqa Al-Bourjoisiyyah Al-Souriyyah Wal Thawra Al-Sha’biyyah’ [The Syrian bourgeois class and the popular revolution], Ahewar, June 1, 2014, https://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=394623.

²⁶ Housam Darwisheh, ‘Syria and the Arab Spring: Unravelling the Road to Syria’s Protracted Conflict’, The Asian Institute for Policy Studies Brief 44 (2013): 1−12.

²⁷ Na’issah, ‘The Syrian Bourgeois’.

²⁸ Abboud, ‘Syria’s Business Elite’, 4.

²⁹ Rune F. Lyme, ‘Sanctioning Assad’s Syria: Mapping the Economic, Socioeconomic and Political Repercussions of the International Sanctions Imposed on Syria since March 2011ʹ, Danish Institute for International Studies, no 13 (2012): 7.

³⁰ Joseph Daher, ‘Assad Regime Still Reliant on Fractions of the Sunni Bourgeoisie’, Syria Untold, December 21, 2017, https://syriauntold.com/2017/12/21/assad-regime-still-reliant-on-fractions-of-the-sunni-bourgeoisie/.

³¹ Karam Shaar, ‘Investing in Syria: ”Photo ops” outweigh real change’, Middle East Institute, July 9, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/blog/investing-syria-photo-ops-outweigh-real-change.

³² Abboud, ‘Syria’s Business Elite’, 6.

³³ The Economist, ‘Dairy godfathers: Syria’s new war millionaires’, The Economist, June 1, 2017, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/06/01/syrias-new-war-millionaires.

³⁴ Youssef Sadaki, ‘The Siege Economy of Eastern Ghouta’, Atlantic Council, March 23, 2016, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-siege-economy-of-eastern-ghouta/.

³⁵ Joseph Daher, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Syria: Origins and Developments’ (PhD diss., University of Lausanne, 2018): 409.

³⁶ Enab Baladi, ‘al-Manfoush yuzil anqad thalath baldat fi al-Ghouta’ [Al-Manfoush removes the rubble of three towns in Ghouta, with a contract with the military housing unit], Enab Baladi, May 19, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/301800.

³⁷ The Syria Report, ‘No Alternative Accommodation for Mazzeh District Residents—Government Outlet’, The Syria Report, October 17, 2017, https://www.syria-report.com/news/91?page=6.

³⁸ Joseph Daher, ‘The Syrian Reconstruction Question, Issues and Dynamics’, Observatoire du monde arabo-musulman et du Sahel, April 2018, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/22.pdf.

³⁹ Arwa Ibrahim, ‘Syria: “Absentees law” could see million of refugees lose lands’, Al-Jazeera, April 7, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/7/syria-absentees-law-could-see-millions-of-refugees-lose-lands.

⁴⁰ Daher, ‘The Syrian Reconstruction Question’, 3–6.

⁴¹ Murad Abdul Jalil, ‘Asmaa Jadida li Rijal A’mal fi Souria- Man Waraahom?’ [Merchants disappeared, and others shone their star: New names of businessmen in Syria … Who is behind them?], Enab Baladi, July 1, 2018, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/196755.

⁴² Daher, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution’, 427.

⁴³ Sottimano, ‘The Syrian Business Elite’.

⁴⁴ Zaman al-Wsl, ‘Annizam yulaheq Imad Ghrewati ila Dubai lilhajez ala amwaleh’ [The regime pursues Imad Ghariwati to Dubai to seize his money], Zaman al-Wsl, October 12, 2017, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/82061/.

⁴⁵ Paul Halabi, ‘The new masters of the Syrian economy: A special investigative report into the rise and fall of Syrian tycoons and their links to the regime’, L’Orient Today, October 9, 2019, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1190056/the-new-masters-of-the-syrian-economy.

⁴⁶ Daher, ‘Assad Regime Still Reliant’; Renaud Lecadre, ‘Firas Tlass: “Partenaire local” de Lafarge en Syrie’ [Firas Tlass: ‘Local Partner’ to Lafarge in Syria], Liberation, December 14, 2017, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/12/14/firas-tlass-partenaire-local-de-lafarge-en-syrie_1616777/.

⁴⁷ Fouad Abdel Aziz, ‘Mwaffaq al-Gaddah- rajol al-a’amal allazi arad an yakon tha shan inda Bashar al-Assad’ [Muwaffaq al-Qaddah: The businessman who wanted to be important to Bashar al-Assad], Eqtsad, June 30, 2016, https://www.eqtsad.net/news/article/14314.

⁴⁸ al-Iqtisadi, ‘Suriya: al-hajz ‘ala amwal rajul al-a’mal Mwaffaq Al-Gaddah’ [Syria: The seizure of the money of businessman Muwaffaq al-Qaddah], al-Iqtisadi, June 8, 2014, https://bit.ly/31bJJy1.

⁴⁹ Editorial Team, ‘Sultat al-Assad tufrej an amwal mohtajaza li rijal al-’amal al-Souriyeen’ [Assad authorities release funds withheld from Syrian businessmen], Horrya, May 11, 2018, https://horrya.net/archives/61708.

⁵⁰ David Sills, International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), 297.

⁵¹ Hanna Batatu, ‘Class Analysis and Iraqi Society’, Arab Studies Quarterly 1, no 3 (1979): 229–244.

⁵² Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2013),6.

⁵³ James A. Bill, ‘Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no 4 (1972): 417–434.

⁵⁴ Daher, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution’, 57.

⁵⁵ Haddad, ‘Syria’s State Bourgeoisie’, 232.

⁵⁶ John Waterbury, ‘Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie?’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, no 1 (1991): 1–17.

⁵⁷ Haddad, ‘Syria’s State Bourgeoisie’, 234.

⁵⁸ Volker Perthes, ‘A Look at Syria’s Upper Class: The Bourgeoisie and the Ba’th’, Middle East Report 170 (1992): 31–37.

⁵⁹ Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 2002), 87.

⁶⁰ Azmeh, ‘Syria’s Passage to Conflict’, 501.

⁶¹ Oliver Schlumberger, ‘Patrimonial Capitalism: Economic Reform and Economic Order in the Arab World’ (PhD diss., Eberhard-Karls University of Tubingen Institute for Political Science, 2004), 36.

⁶² Schlumberger, ‘Patrimonial Capitalism: Economic Reform’, 37.

⁶³ Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept’, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Paper 16, 1 February 2006, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909183.

⁶⁴ Eva Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East’, Comparative Politics 44, no 2 (2012): 127–49.

⁶⁵ Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (California: University of California Press, 2013), 58.

⁶⁶ Achcar, The People Want, 59.; Schlumberger, ‘Patrimonial Capitalism: Economic Reform’, 1.

⁶⁷ Jason Brownlee, ‘And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonialism Regimes’, Studies in Comparative International Development 37, no 3 (2002): 35–63.

⁶⁸ Adib Nehme, The Neopatrimonial State and the Arab Spring (Beirut: Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, 2016), 25.

⁶⁹ Achcar, The People Want, 62.

⁷⁰ Azmeh, ‘Syria’s Passage to Conflict’; Azmeh, Business Networks in Syria. This is a popular term among al-Assad supporters and is highly utilized by the loyal media for propaganda purposes. This term bonds Syria to al-Assad family, with Hafez as the immortal father of the country, exhibiting the patrimonial and despotic nature of the country under al-Assad regime. Other popular idioms, especially during the conflict, are ‘al-Assad or no one’, ‘al-Assad or we burn the country’—both of which strengthen this bond between Syria and al-Assad rule.

⁷¹ Mohammed Bamyeh, ‘Anarchist, Liberal, and Authoritarian Enlightenments: Notes From the Arab Spring’, Jadaliyya, July 30, 2011, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24260/Anarchist,-Liberal,-and-Authoritarian-Enlightenments-Notes-From-the-Arab-Spring.