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ABSTRACT
Most autocratic leaders have confidence they can control election results by holding unfair and unfree competitive elections. They have many tools at their disposal to ensure they do not lose elections. Although electoral fraud and ballot box stuffing can secure an easy win, such tools may trigger mass protests and jeopardize the existence of the nondemocratic state. Nondemocratic leaders abuse the electoral system to prevent coordination among opponents and the masses. From changing election rules and banning political parties to eliminating effective candidates, the ‘menu of manipulation’ that nondemocratic leaders employ blocks creation of a focal point for collective action among the opposition. Moreover, the opposition rarely has an opportunity to solve collective action problems and deliver a unified message for change. When the opposition does capitalize on this opportunity, a segment of the electorate that opposes the nondemocratic leader responds to the opposition’s mobilization efforts. Based on original data gathered at the district level between 2000 and 2016, this study offers an original investigation into Iranian legislative elections. I argue that when opponents of an autocratic leader provide a unified request for change in the status quo, there is a surge in voter turnout.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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2 S. T. Stokes, T. Dunning, M. Nazareno, and V. Brusco, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and H. Larreguy, J. Marshall, and P. Querubin, ‘Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers’, American Political Science Review 110, no. 1 (2016): 160–79.
3 Ashlea Rundlett and Milan W. Svolik, ‘Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud’, American Political Science Review 110, no. 1 (2016): 180–97; and Z. Luo and A. Rozenas, ‘The Election Monitor’s Curse’, American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 1 (2018): 148–60.
4 Erik S. Herron, ‘Measuring Dissent in Electoral Authoritarian Societies: Lessons from Azerbaijan’s 2008 Presidential Election and 2009 Referendum’, Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 11 (2011): 1557–83; and E. Frantz, ‘Voter Turnout and Opposition Performance in Competitive Authoritarian Elections’, Electoral Studies 54 (2018): 218–25.
5 Carles Boix and Milan W. Svolik, ‘The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships’, The Journal of Politics 75, no. 2 (2013): 300–16.
6 Jennifer Gandhi and A. Przeworski, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats’, Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279–1301; and Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
7 Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6.
8 Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi, Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016).
9 Sarah Birch, ‘The Electoral Tango: The Evolution of Electoral Integrity in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’ (Max Weber Lecture No. 2016/02, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 17 February 2016), http://hdl.handle.net/1814/40331.
10 P. Rivetti, ‘Islam and Factional Politics in Iran’, in The Routledge Handbook to Religion and Political Parties, edited by Jeff Haynes (London: Routledge, 2019), 346–57; and M. A. Kadivar and V. Abedini, ‘Electoral Activism in Iran: A Mechanism for Political Change’, Comparative Politics 52, no. 3 (2020): 493–514.
11 Aghil Daghagheleh, ‘Ambivalent Voting Behavior: Ideology, Efficacy, and the Socioeconomic Dynamic of Voter Turnout in Iran, 1997–2005’, Sociological Forum 33, no. 4 (2018): 1023–44; and D. Conduit and S. Akbarzadeh, ‘Pre-election Polling and the Democratic Veneer in a Hybrid Regime’, Democratization 27, no. 5 (2020): 737–57.
12 P. Mahdavi, ‘Explaining the Oil Advantage: Effects of Natural Resource Wealth on Incumbent Reelection in Iran’, World Politics 67, no. 2 (2015): 226.
13 A. Raisi, ‘Electoral Participation in Iran’s Parliamentary Politics: Between Two Competing Explanations’, Political Behaviour, 23 March 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09605-6.
14 C. J. Harvey, ‘Changes in the Menu of Manipulation: Electoral Fraud, Ballot Stuffing, and Voter Pressure in the 2011 Russian Election’, Electoral Studies 41 (2016): 105–17.
15 Beatriz Magaloni, ‘Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule’, Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4/5 (2008): 715–41; Scott Gehlbach and Alberto Simpser, ‘Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control’, American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 1 (2015): 212–24; and H. E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
16 Frantz, ‘Voter Turnout’.
17 Ettela’at Newspaper, ‘Political Figures and Political Organizations Opposed Two-Ballot Rule in the Electoral System’, 25 February 1980.
18 J. Cancela and B. Geys, ‘Explaining Voter Turnout: A Meta-analysis of National and Subnational Elections’, Electoral Studies 42 (2016): 264–75.
19 S. Levitsky and L. Way, ‘Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–65; and M. Wigell, ‘Mapping “Hybrid Regimes”: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics’, Democratization 15, no. 2 (2008): 230–50.
20 L. Blaydes, ‘Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt’ (paper presented at the Princeton University Conference on Dictatorships, Princeton, NJ, April 2008), https://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf; and Lust-Okar, ‘Democratization’.
21 L. Wantchekon, ‘Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin’, World Politics 55, no. 3 (2003): 399–422; Magaloni, Voting; P. C. Vicente and L. Wantchekon, ‘Clientelism and Vote Buying: Lessons from Field Experiments in African Elections’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 25, no. 2 (2009): 292–305; and J. Guardado and L. Wantchekon, ‘Do Electoral Handouts Affect Voting Behavior?’ Electoral Studies 53 (2018): 139–49.
22 F. Finan and L. Schechter, ‘Vote‐Buying and Reciprocity’, Econometrica 80, no. 2 (2012): 863–81; and Stokes et al., Brokers.
23 Harvey, ‘Changes’.
24 T. Frye, O. J. Reuter, and D. Szakonyi, ‘Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace’, World Politics 66, no. 2 (2014): 195–228.
25 E. Lust-Okar, ‘Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition’, Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 159–79; and Michael Wahman, ‘Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa’, Party Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 309–22.
26 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
27 Wahman, ‘Nationalized Incumbents’.
28 Leonardo R. Arriola, ‘Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies’, World Politics 65, no. 2 (2013): 233–72.
29 Michael Wahman, ‘Opposition Coalitions and Democratization by Election’, Government and Opposition 48, no. 1 (2013): 3–32; and Jan Teorell and Michael Wahman, ‘Institutional Stepping Stones for Democracy: How and Why Multipartyism Enhances Democratic Change’, Democratization 25, no. 1 (2018): 78–97.
30 Hendrik Kraetzschmar, ‘Mapping Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: From Single-Issue Coalitions to Transnational Networks’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 3 (2011): 287–302.
31 G. Buttorff, ‘Coordination Failure and the Politics of Tribes: Jordanian Elections under SNTV’, Electoral Studies 40 (2015): 45–55.
32 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: Wiley, 1954).
33 William H. Riker, ‘The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science’, The American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 753–66; and M. Gallagher, M. Laver, and P. Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011).
34 G. Sartori, ‘Political Development and Political Engineering’, Public Policy 17, no. 2 (1968): 273.
35 Sarah Birch, Electoral Malpractice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
36 Pippa Norris, Why Electoral Integrity Matters (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
37 Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi, ‘Political Machines’.
38 Ali Ahmadi, Election in Iran [in Persian] (Tehran, Iran: Mizan Press, 2010).
39 Ibid..
40 R. Taagepera and M. S. Shugart, ‘Designing Electoral Systems’, Electoral Studies 8, no. 1 (1989): 49–58; G. W. Cox, ‘Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote System’, American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 608–21; and G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
41 Ettela’at Newspaper, ‘Political Figures’.
42 A. Blais and P. J. Loewen, ‘The French Electoral System and Its Effects’, West European Politics 32, no. 2 (2009): 345–59; and B. Dolez, A. Laurent, and A. Blais, ‘Strategic Voting in the Second Round of a Two-Round System: The 2014 French Municipal Elections’, French Politics 15, no. 1 (2017): 27–42.
43 Ahmadi, Election, 100.
44 See Shugart and Taagepera, Votes.
45 Cox, Making Votes, 5.
46 G. W. Cox and E. Niou, ‘Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan’, The Journal of Comparative Politics 26, no. 2 (1994): 221–36; and E. C. Browne and D. Patterson, ‘An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behavior Applied to Japanese District Elections’, British Journal of Political Science 29 (1999): 259–89.
47 B. Baktiari, Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1996), 68–72.
48 M. Boroujerdi and K. Rahimkhani, Postrevolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2018), 49.
49 Baktiari, Parliamentary Politics, 100–108; and Moslem, Factional Politics, 47–82.
50 Birch, Electoral Malpractice; and Norris, Why Electoral Integrity.
51 Vetting candidates in Iran’s parliamentary election is two-stage process. First, a committee from the Interior Ministry does the vetting. Then the list of qualified candidates is sent to the Guardian Council.
52 M. Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002).
53 G. Abdo and A. H. A Montazeri, ‘Re-thinking the Islamic Republic: A “Conversation” with Ayatollah Hossein’Ali Montazeri’, The Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001): 9–24.
54 Moslem, Factional Politics, 160. In the two-step process of vetting candidates, first the Interior Ministry does a background check on the criminal and ideological orientation of the candidates. Then the approved list of candidates goes to the Guardian Council to do more robust vetting.
55 Moslem, Factional Politics.
56 A. Ehteshami, Iran: Stuck in Transition (London: Taylor & Francis, 2017), 47.
57 Moslem, Factional Politics, 180; and Menashri, Post-Revolutionary.
58 Menashri, Post-Revolutionary; and D. Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (London: Psychology Press, 2001).
59 A. W. Samii, ‘Iran and Chechnya: Realpolitik at Work’, Middle East Policy 8, no. 1 (2001): 48.
60 Ehteshami, Stuck, 55–56.
61 Ehteshami, Stuck.
62 N. Hassanpour, ‘Voting Together: Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout in Authoritarian Elections’, HSE University, 26 October 2017, https://social.hse.ru/data/2017/10/26/1157715528/Voting_Together_NHassanpour_HSE.pdf.
63 Ibid.
64 B. B. De Mesquita and G. W. Downs, ‘Development and Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 77–86; and B. B. De Mesquita and A. Smith, ‘Political Succession: A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 4 (2017): 707–43.
65 Norris, Why Electoral Integrity.
66 Ibid.
67 Duverger, Political Parties; Marcos Chamon, João M. P. de Mello, and Sergio Firpo, ‘Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities’, IZA Discussion Paper 4658, IZA Institute of Labour Economics, Bonn, Germany, December 2009; and M. Bordignon, T. Nannicini, and G. Tabellini, ‘Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round Versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule’, American Economic Review 106, no. 8 (2016): 2349–70.
68 Cox, Making Votes.