Peace operations and the international financial institutions: insights from Rwanda and Sierra Leone

Abstract

This essay reflects critically upon the question of why peace operations become necessary in certain parts of the world. It does so by exploring why the policies of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should be understood as part of the explanation for war and genocide in Rwanda (1990–94) and war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), which, in turn, eventually necessitated the presence of UN peace operations in these two states. The first section summarizes IFI engagement with the issue of violent conflict. This is followed by a critical evaluation of the ways in which in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, IFI policies helped fan the flames of war and genocide which UN (and other) peacekeepers were subsequently asked to put out. The final part reflects upon the relationship between IFI policies and peace operations in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The essay concludes that the current regulation of the global capitalist economy and the philosophy underpinning IFI policies have fuelled patrimonial and authoritarian systems of governance in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. This has had disastrous consequences for both the citizens of these states and UN peace operations.

Acknowledgements

The research for this essay was made possible with funding from the British Academy under award No. SG-34103. Thanks go to Rita Abrahamsen, Alex Bellamy and an anonymous reviewer for their constructive criticisms.

Notes

Here, the ‘UN system’ refers to the UN itself, its subsidiary bodies and specialist agencies which operate under its auspices.

Thomas Weiss cited in Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, pp.86–87.

Jonathon Stevenson, Preventing Conflict: The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions, London: Adelphi Paper No.336, Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2000, pp.12–13.

Paris (n.2 above), pp.66–7.

Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, Security-sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies, London: CDS Group, Kings College London, Working Paper No.5, 2002, p.39.

Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, London: Zed, 2000, p.5.

For more detail see Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge: Polity, 2004.

Paris (n.2 above), p.89.

Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.107–9.

Roland Paris, ‘Broadening the study of peace operations’, International Studies Review, Vol.2, No.3, 2000, p.32.

David Williams, ‘Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-states and the International Financial Institutions’, Review of International Studies, Vol.26, No.4, 2000, pp.568–72.

Valpy Fitzgerald, ‘The International Political Economy of Conflict in Poor Countries’ in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald et al., War and Underdevelopment: Volume I: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.207–8.

Ibid. p.211.

Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald, ‘Introduction’ in Stewart, Fitzgerald et al. (n.12 above), p.3.

Fitzgerald, ‘Paying for the War’ in Stewart, Fitzgerald et al. (n.12 above), pp.21–38.

Cited in Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.15.

See for example, IMF, World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C.: IMF 1997; World Bank, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996; World Bank, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank, Washington DC: World Bank, 1998; World Bank, Development Cooperation and Conflict, Washington DC: World Bank, Operational Policy 2.30, 2001. It should also be noted that the IFI's usage of civil society is usually synonymous with liberal, law-abiding and peaceful civic associations.

See Fitzgerald, ‘The IPE of Conflict in Poor Countries’.

See for example, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘How Much War Will We See? Estimating the Incidence of Civil War in 161 Countries’, Washington DC: World Bank, 2000, accessed at www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers.

See for example Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.165.

See for example, Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective’ in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp.91–111.

David Keen, ‘The Political Economy of War’ in Stewart, Fitzgerald et al., War and Underdevelopment: Volume I, pp.39–66.

See Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 1996.

See William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Kofi Annan, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the UN Secretary-General, April 1998, para. 67.

Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung-Joo and Rufus M. Kupolati, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999, p.42.

For example, Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, London: Zed, 1997.

Andy Storey, ‘Structural Adjustment, State Power and Genocide: the World Bank and Rwanda’, Review of African Political Economy, No.89, 2001, p.366.

Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998, p.227.

Ibid. p.7.

Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management, Study II of, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996.

Literally meaning ‘little house’ in Kinyarwanda, in the 1980s the phrase was used to refer to the country's ruling clique centred around President Habyarimana's family, especially his wife, Agathe. This clique hailed from north-east Rwanda.

Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994: History of a Genocide, London: Hurst, 1998, p.77.

At 1992 exchange rates where US$1 = RF120.

Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp.40–42 and Storey, ‘Structural Adjustment’, p.370.

Ironically, the World Bank's policy of encouraging the Ugandan government to demobilize large numbers of its armed forces resulted in the subsequent surplus of weaponry being given to the RPF. These weapons ‘enabled the RPF to rearm during the uneasy period between the signing of the Arusha peace agreement on 4 August 1993 and the country's explosion on 6 April 1994. So the World Bank contributed unwittingly to the RPF victory in the Rwandese civil war’, Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p.119.

According to the World Bank it collaborated closely with the IMF throughout the adjustment process in Rwanda. See World Bank, Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 14.0 million to the Republic of Rwanda for a Food Security and Social Action Project, Washington DC: Report No.P-5727-RW, 27 May 1992.

Melvern, A People Betrayed, pp.66–68.

World Bank, Implementation Completion Report: Rwandese Republic: SAC No.2271-RW, Washington D.C.: Report No.14873, 19 July 1995, p.iv para. 8. Indeed, the Rwandan government publicly denied their intention to embark upon a structural adjustment package and conducted negotiations with the IFIs in secret until the agreements were actually concluded.

See Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Development policy and the democratic peace in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol.1, No.3, 2001, p.87.

World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, p.13 para. 50.

Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen, The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda, Washington D.C.: World Bank, Social Capital Initiative, Working Paper No.23, 2000, p.20.

Adelman and Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management.

World Bank, Memorandum and Recommendation of the President, p.4 para. 10 and p.14 para. 53.

World Bank, Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth, Washington D.C.: Report No.12465-RW, 16 May 1994, para. viii.

Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p.113.

World Bank, The Rwandese Republic: Emergency Reintegration and Recovery Credit: Technical Annex, Washington DC: Report No.T-7149-RW, 11 June 1997, para. 33.

Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda.

Valpy Fitzgerald, Frances Stewart and Michael Wang, ‘Overview of the Case Studies’ in Stewart, Fitzgerald et al., War and Underdevelopment: Volume I, p.116.

My account draws upon William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Warlord Politics and African States; and Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest.

Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p.116.

World Bank, Sierra Leone: Public Expenditure Policies, p.88.

William Reno, ‘Economic Reform and the Strange Case of “Liberalization” in Sierra Leone’, Governance, Vol.6, No.1, 1993, p.27.

World Bank, Sierra Leone: Public Expenditure Policies for Sustained Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation, Washington DC: Report No.12618-SL, 16 February 1994, para. 5.1.

Reno, ‘Economic Reform’, p.38.

The Sierra Leonean military grew from about 4,000 in 1990 to 12,000 by 1993. Cited in Howe, Ambiguous Order, p.57.

William Reno, ‘Ironies of Post-cold War Structural Adjustment in Sierra Leone’, Review of African Political Economy, No.67, 1996, p.15.

Ibid. p.15.

World Bank, Sierra Leone: Public Expenditure Policies, para. 2.23.

Reno, ‘Economic Reform’, p.26.

Ibid.

World Bank, Sierra Leone: Governance Capacity Building, Washington DC: Report No.PID9030, 2000, p.3.

Although originally intended to run until 20 February 2000, the Public Sector Management Support project was extended until 31 December 2001.

The persistent use of this phrase is indicative of the Bank's reluctance, probably for political reasons, to openly describe the Sierra Leone polity as neo-patrimonial.

See World Bank, Sierra Leone: Public Expenditure Policies.

Ibid. para. 1.20.

Although it does not appear that unemployed civil servants swelled the ranks of the RUF directly, a convincing argument has been made that various rebellions in Sierra Leone, the RUF in the hinterland and the NPRC and AFRC in Freetown, drew support from a large number of unemployed youths who faced no reasonable prospect of legitimate employment. See Ibrahim Abdullah, ‘Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.36, No.2, 1998, pp.203–35.

World Bank, Sierra Leone: Public Expenditure Policies, para. 3.11.

Author's interviews with World Bank officials, Washington DC, August 2002.

World Bank, Sierra Leone: Public Expenditure Policies, para. 1.19.

Ibid. para. 3.16.

Ibid. para. 3.22.

Reno, ‘Economic Reform’.

Articles III 5b, IV 10, and V 5c.

Paul Nelson cited in Uvin, Aiding Violence, p.45.

Fitzgerald, ‘The IPE of Conflict in Poor Countries’, p.207.

See Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald, ‘The Costs of War in Poor Countries’ in Stewart, Fitzgerald et al., War and Underdevelopment: Volume I, p.241.

Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.20.

Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p.45.

Stevenson, Preventing Conflict, p.75. Emphasis added.

See Uvin, Aiding Violence.

Ibid. p.9.

See Reno, Warlord Politics and African States.