Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in bosnia and herzegovina

Abstract

What role do elections play in societies emerging from communal war and what type of institutions can serve as catalysts in deepening peace and compromise? While some analysts argue that ethnicity should be recognized through ‘consociational’ institutions, others maintain that ‘integrative’ devices – in particular, carefully crafted electoral rules – can limit or even break down the salience of ethnicity and increase the possibility for inter-ethnic accommodation. This article examines the post-war electoral experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), arguing that elections had a problematic, unintended impact on peacebuilding. First, timid integrative electoral devices were adopted in a consociational system that reifies ethnic division and complicates compromise; second, peacebuilding agencies needlessly manufactured electoral rules that backfired; third, group-based features of the BiH political system run counter to individual human rights. The article ends with suggestions for improving the electoral framework.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Nikki Deaner and Ben Reilly for their help in revising previous versions of this paper. Research was made possible by the International Security Program and the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University. The support of their respective directors – Steve Miller and Robert Rotberg – is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

See, William Pfaff, ‘Time to Concede Defeat in Bosnia’, International Herald Tribune, 10 Oct. 2002.

Roberto Belloni, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict Profile’, Foreign Policy in Focus, Feb. 2002, accessed at www.pfif.org.

Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.216.

Most notably Bose (ibid.).

Benjamin Reilly, ‘Elections Post-Conflicts: Constraints and Dangers’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.2, 2002, p.132.

The Bosnian Constitution is silent about the length of mandates at all levels. Consequently, until the adoption of the final election law, the Election Commission (chaired by an American Ambassador) had the discretion to decide the frequency of elections.

For example, about a quarter of all parliamentary sessions between 1996 and 2000 were wasted because of internal wrangling over the agenda. International Crisis Group, Is Dayton Failing? 28 Oct. 1999, Sarajevo, p.53, n.99.

David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto, 1999; Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, ‘Travails of the European Raj’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.3, 2003, pp.60–74.

Donald Horowitz, ‘Democracy in Divided Societies’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.4, No.4, 1993, p.35.

Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.7.

Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.7.

Donald Horowitz, ‘Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management’, in Joseph V. Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multi-Ethnic Societies, New York: Lexington, 1991, p.471.

Bose (see n.4 above), pp.223–4.

Association of Election Officials of BiH, ‘Technical Series No. 1/2001’, accessed at www.aeobih.com.ba/tech_series1p7.htm.

OSCE-BiH, ‘Fact Sheet on the 2002 BiH Elections’, Sarajevo [nd], p.4.

Association of Election Officials in BiH (n.15 above), p.9.

Reilly (see n.11 above), p.153.

For an opposite view see Bose (n.4 above) who suggests that ‘it is really difficult to find fault with this measure’, p.228.

OSCE-BiH, ‘Domi Reaffirms Draft Election Law’s Preferential Voting System', Sarajevo, 5 Jan. 2000.

Association of Election Officials in BiH (n.15 above), p.8.

Bose, pp.231–2.

Bose, pp.231–2.

Bose, p.238.

Roberto Belloni, ‘Towards a Multi-Ethnic Bosnian State? Promoting Peace and Reconciliation Through Minority Return’, East European Human Rights Review, Vol.8, No.1, pp.1–43.

Press release, OSCE-BiH, ‘PEC Adopts Rules on Federation House of Peoples and Federation President, Vice President’, Sarajevo, 19 Oct. 2000.

Florian Bieber, ‘Croat Self-Government in Bosnia – A Challenge for Bosnia?’, European Centre for Minority Issues, Brief 5, 2001.

ICG, Turning Strife to Advantage, Sarajevo, 15 Mar. 2001, p.6.

Text accessed at www.izbori.ba/English%20Law.htm.

For the opposite view see Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic, ‘The Limits of Electoral Engineering’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.3, 2003, pp.45–59.

The Council of Europe, in approving BiH's membership, also noted how ‘the provisions regulating elections to the Presidency and the House of Peoples … raised some questions in terms of their compatibility with international standards.’ Council of Europe, ‘Electoral Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Council of Europe's Venice Commission Issues its Opinion’, Press Release, Strasbourg, 30 Oct. 2001.

In response to the charge of timidity, the OSCE argued that because the law had to be consistent with the constitutional provisions in Annex 4 of the DPA the range of options to foster electoral moderation was severely limited. OSCE, Press statement on the Election Law, Sarajevo, 21 Jan. 2000.

Mathieu Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, No. case 9/1985/95/143, of 2 Feb. 1987, accessed at www.menneskeret.dk/englishdoc.

Vildana Selimbegovic, Dani Interview, ‘Robert Barry “Nije to ta diskriminacija” [No to Discrimination], Dani (Sarajevo), 20 April 2001.

As the Court explained: ‘The Belgian system does not preclude per se the right to stand as a candidate solely on the ground of language. Every citizen can stand as a candidate, but has – upon his election – to decide whether he will take oath in French or Flemish … whereas provision of the Constitution of the Federation of BiH provide for a priori ethnically defined Bosniak and Croat delegates, caucus and veto powers for them’. Partial Decision of the Constitutional Court, 1 July 2000, para.120, accessed at www.ccbh.ba/en/decisions.

UNDP, ‘Early Warning System’, UNDP Report, Sarajevo, April–June 2001, p.12, accessed at www.ews.undp.ba/eng.

OSCE-BiH, ‘Press Statement on the Election Law’, Sarajevo, 21 Jan. 2000.

The lack of enforceability was suggested by the OSCE Director of Elections in a personal interview, 13 July 2002, Sarajevo.

UNDP, ‘Early Warning System: Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 – Election Special’, UNDP Report, Sarajevo, accessed at www.ews.undp.ba/eng.

International Election Observation Mission: 2002 General Elections – Bosnia and Herzegovina, IEOM Report, Sarajevo, 6 Oct. 2002, p.4.

Reilly (see n.11 above).

Knaus and Martin (see n.9 above).

Manning and Antic (see n.30 above).