Building Democracy in Afghanistan: The Statebuilding Agenda and International Engagement

Abstract

This article examines the international community's commitment, since the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, to build democratic institutions and practices at national and local levels in Afghanistan. The tensions between democracy promotion activities and the statebuilding exigencies of political stabilization are identified through an examination of the 2005 elections and creation of the National Assembly, Provincial Councils, and Community Development Councils. The analysis demonstrates the existence of multiple, competing agendas in Afghanistan, embodied in contradictory elements found in those institutions. Policy recommendations are advanced for forging a coherent statebuilding agenda that can garner the legitimacy needed to complete the important transition signalled by the Interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the Afghanistan Compact, concluded in January 2006 in London.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors take entire responsibility for the conclusions, but gratefully acknowledge comments by Craig Collins, Christopher Freeman, Sarah Lister, Paul Lundberg and Michael Pugh.

Notes

1. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction, Vol.I, 31 Jan. 2006, p.15.

2. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p.xix.

3. Ibid.

4. Helena Malikyar and Barnett Rubin, ‘The Politics of Center–Periphery Relations in Afghanistan’, New York: Center on International Cooperation, April 2003, p.20.

5. Barnett Rubin, ‘Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.15, No.3, July 2004, pp.5–19.

6. Simon Chesterman, ‘Tiptoeing through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building’, New York: International Peace Academy, Sept. 2002, pp.3–6.

7. ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ [Bonn Agreement], Bonn, 5 Dec. 2001, p.1.

8. Ibid.

9. Alexander Thier and Jarat Chopra, ‘The Road Ahead: Political and Institutional Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, in Sultan Barakat (ed.), Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan, London: Palgrave, 2004, p.95.

10. As Malikyar and Rubin contend: ‘If [Afghans] reject control by unaccountable regional warlords in favor of what they call “strong central government,” it does not mean they would accept an unaccountable, strong, central government, even if the latter somehow eradicated the warlords. Given the geographic and ethnographic realities of Afghanistan, such participation will require significant devolution of power, though not to the current regional armed groups’ (see n.4 above), p.12.

11. The terms shura (adopted relatively recently and influenced by Arabic sources) and jirga are the most common terms for such bodies. Some commentators stress relative permanence in shura councils, and the temporary and problem-solving emphasis of jirga, a mainly Pashtun institution.

12. Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, ‘Participatory Peacebuilding’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol.10, No.3, 2004, p.294.

13. On the SNTV system in the Afghan context, see Andrew Reynolds and Andrew Wilder, Free, Fair or Flawed: Challenges for Legitimate Elections in Afghanistan, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, September 2005, p.12 and Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2005.

14. International Crisis Group, ‘Political Parties in Afghanistan’, Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.39, 2 June 2005.

15. This discussion of the composition of the new parliament and its implications draws on Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? (see n.13 above). Observation of early parliamentary sessions confirmed lengthy and repetitive debate partly due to a lack of organized parliamentary groups.

16. The provision for a nationwide census by the end of 2008 in the I-ANDS is a sensitive issue, as it is likely to affect seat allocations by province, and thus indirectly, the ethnic make-up of representative bodies.

17. Marvin Weinbaum, ‘Afghanistan: Nonparty Parliamentary Democracy’, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.7, No.1, Oct. 1972, p.61.

18. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Articles 138–140.

19. The discussion of Provincial Councils here draws on Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon, Provincial Governance Structures in Afghanistan: From Confusion to Vision?, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, May 2005.

20. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Law on Provincial Councils (15 Aug. 2005).

21. On the formal structure of the Afghan state and its fiscal, appointments and reporting arrangements, see Anne Evans, Nick Manning, Yasin Osmani, Anne Tully and Andrew Wilder, A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the World Bank, 2004; Anne Evans and Yasin Osmani, Assessing Progress: Update Report on Subnational Administration in Afghanistan, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the World Bank, 2005.

22. Law on Provincial Councils, art.4.

23. Provincial Councils have already begun collectively arguing for an independent budget, although at the time of writing the long-term budget structure remained unclear.

24. On community-driven development, see Operations Evaluation Department, ‘Community-Driven Development: A Study Methodology’, Washington: World Bank, 2003. On the National Solidarity Programme, see Palwasha Kakar, Discussing Problems, Finding Solutions: Fine-tuning the NSP, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, November 2005; Inger Boesen, From Subjects to Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Programme, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004.

25. On informal socio-geographic organization in Afghanistan see Raphy Favre, ‘Interface between State and Society: An Approach for Afghanistan’, unpublished discussion paper, 2003.

26. For comparisons of the resources devoted to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan with other historical and contemporary cases, see: James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Tetschnik and Anga Timilsina, The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

27. Malikyar and Rubin (n.4 above), p.19.

28. Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

29. Cited in Vito Tanzi, Ke-yound chu, and Sanjeev Gupta (eds.), Economic Policy and Equity, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1999, p.1.