Police-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Reform

Abstract

Despite considerable effort and large sums of money spent over five years of police reform in Afghanistan, the investment has yet to yield significant results. Among the reasons outlined in this article are the failure to distinguish clearly between the different roles of the police and the military in contributing to security sector reform; a lack of strategic vision and effective planning; and a failure to capitalize on the insights, best practices and lessons learned from the last 30 years of police reform in the West. Finally, recommendations are made for remedying current problems and re-directing reform to achieve greater effectiveness.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks are due to Stephen Kinloch Pichat for supplying his notes and providing friendly support.

Notes

1. Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Police reconstruction essential for the protection of human rights’, ASA 11/003/2003, 12 Mar. 2003, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa110032003, p.6.

2. Although shifting alliances at different times blurred the distinction, the Khalqis were mainly Pashtun and the Parchamis of mainly Tajik ethnicity.

3. Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, London: I.B. Tauris, 2003, pp.96–7.

4. Amnesty International (n.1 above), p.8.

5. Ibid.

6. Despite international donations to ensure regular payment of salaries, there are still occasional reports of police not being paid. Allowing for the occasional administrative error, it is likely that non-payment is due to local diversion of funds intended for salaries.

7. UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and Security, Report of the Secretary-General, sec.67, Fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, agenda item 43, 18 Mar. 2002, A/56/875–S/2002/278.

8. German Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of the Interior, Assistance for rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan, 2006, www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2006/Polizeiliche_Augbahil.

9. UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, ‘Police advisors monthly operational report’, Kabul: UNAMA, July 2003.

10. UN Security Council, ‘Preparations For 9 October Afghanistan Elections On Track, Peacekeeping Under Secretary-General Tells Security Council’, Security Council 5045^th Meeting (AM), Press Release SC/8199, 28/09/04. The Under Secretary-General told the Security Council that the JEMB had developed an election security plan in which, inter alia, the national police would provide security at polling sites, with the national army ensuring the security of the areas around sites, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or the coalition, providing outer ring support.

11. For example, the members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police attached to the Canadian PRT in Kandahar advise on logistics support, and review and make recommendations on police standard operating procedures, advise on the command and control structure of the local Afghan police forces, advise on the relationship between local police and their communities, and conduct police training.

12. See for example, Human Rights News, ‘Afghanistan's Bonn Agreement One Year Later: A Catalogue of Missed Opportunities’, Human Rights Watch World Report, Dec. 2002, www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan/bonn1yr-bck.htm; Claude Rochon, Serge Barbeau, François Hummell and Tonita Murray, ‘Mission to Support Police Reform in Afghanistan’, unpublished report, Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 2003; International Crisis Group, ‘Peacebuilding in Afghanistan’, Asia Report No.64, 29 Sept. 2003; and United States Institute of Peace, ‘Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan’, Special Report No.117, Mar. 2004.

13. UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, ‘Police advisors monthly operational report’, Kabul: UNAMA, July 2003.

14. The US practice of outsourcing recruitment and management of police advisers for international police missions has been questioned in many quarters, and the use of Dyncorp as the contracting agent has been particularly criticized. Police and retired police contracted by Dyncorp vary in quality and have been accused of scandalous personal behaviour in at least one mission. The profit motive also makes Dyncorp vulnerable to charges, even from its own personnel, of making very low bids to gain contracts, thereby compromising the quality of the service delivered. The difficulty for the United States is that the federal government has no general policing resources at its disposal to commit to international missions. All the federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, are specialist organizations that do not carry out basic policing duties. Moreover, given the long-standing constitutional and administrative practices of the US government, outsourcing is the way it delivers a significant number of its programmes. For a discussion of the difficulties of the US government in fulfilling its international policing responsibilities, see Nina M. Serafino, ‘Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions’, Congressional Research Service Report, Washington DC, Library of Congress, 30 Mar. 2004.

15. ‘National Police and Law Enforcement: Technical Annex’, January 2004, prepared for Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, A Government/International Agency Report, Kabul: Government of Afghanistan, Mar. 2004.

16. Berlin Declaration (Summary), adopted 1 April 2004, Berlin Conference on Afghanistan.

17. Depending on what is being discussed, the Afghan police is said to comprise either 50,000 or 62,000 members. The figure of 50,000 refers to those performing normal policing duties. 12,000 border police performing immigration, customs and border protection functions also come within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, bringing the number of police to 62,000.

18. One of the 31 names of generals was missing from the list received from the Ministry of Interior Affairs.

19. Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2006, p.29.

20. UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 12 Sept. 2005, www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan_2005/annex_opium-Afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf.

21. See Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Women still under attack – a systematic failure to protect, 2005’, AI Index, ASA 11/007/2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110072005; Irin News, ‘Interview with UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women’, Ankara, 24 Nov. 2005 at www.irinnews.org.

22. Tonita Murray, An Evaluation of the Police District 10 Family Response Unit, Kabul: CANADEM, 2006.

23. Tonita Murray, The Status of Women in the Afghan National Police, Kabul: CANADEM, 2005.

24. A contribution of US$1 million from the Swiss government for gender matters in policing was in the offing in June 2006.

25. US Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigation Assistance Program (ICITAP), Afghanistan Training Program, 31 May 2006. Figures compiled at the Central Training Centre, Kabul. The training figures are higher than the number of police owing to attrition and police taking more than one training course.

26. Witnessed by the author.

27. Otwin Marenin, Restoring Policing Systems in Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects, Occasional Paper No.7, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005.

28. Ibid., p.16.

29. Until early 2006 the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was known as the Office of Strategic Cooperation Afghanistan (OSC-A).

30. Marenin (n.27 above), p.19.

31. Curt Taylor Griffiths, Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, ‘Development Assistance and Police Reform: Programming Opportunities and Lessons Learned’, Canadian Review of Policing Research, Issue 2, 2005, http//crpr.icaap.org.

32. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Police Law, Official Gazette, no.862, Kabul, 22 Sept. 2005.

33. This matter is discussed in some detail with respect to both the deployment of serving police officers and the contracting of retired police officers in Serafino (n.14 above).

34. Marenin (see n.27 above), p.20.

35. Griffiths, Dandurand and Chin (n.31 above).

36. There was wide news-media coverage of the Kabul riots and contradictory reports of the number of deaths and injuries. A week after the riots, there were reports of about 20 people dead, 140 injured and 250 arrested.

37. Observers noted that Afghan police had been issued with modern sidearms by the United States and Germany, but training had not kept pace with the distribution. Firearms issue was then halted until training is completed.

38. See for example, Declan Walsh, ‘UN report sheds light on Afghans darkest deeds’, San Francisco Chronicle, 17 June 2006, www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf; Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, ‘Afghan police part of the problem’, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, 6 June 2006, www.rawa.org/police-3.