Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan

Abstract

Local perceptions of aid in crisis contexts is an under-researched area. This article, which is based on extensive interviewing of affected individuals and communities in Afghanistan, sets out key issues affecting the provision of international assistance and in particular analyses the ‘perceptions gap’ between outsiders and local communities and its implications for the aid community. Humanitarian action is seen by local people as part of a ‘northern enterprise’. Even if the universalist values of the enterprise do not clash with local views of the world, the baggage, modus operandi, technique and personal behaviour of aid workers often do. Suggestions on how this gap could be addressed are also put forward.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges the inputs and comments provided by Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam.

Notes

1. This article presents the preliminary findings of the Afghanistan portion of a research project on The Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power and Perceptions (HA 2015) conducted by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, Medford, MA. It is based on fieldwork undertaken in Afghanistan in February 2006. The findings resulting from the Afghanistan fieldwork will be included in a major consolidated report covering Colombia, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan and Afghanistan, issued in August 2006 and available at www.fic.tufts.edu.

2. The work on perceptions builds on the findings of our earlier study in 2005: Mapping the Security Environment – Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations and Assistance Agencies, which was conducted in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone (the study is available on line at www.fic.tufts.edu) which analysed this disconnect with respect to the differing perceptions of peace and security.

3. Three focus groups with female participants were conducted by Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam. The others were conducted by the author.

4. Focus groups are not without problems, however. Participants are sometimes wary of expressing their views in public or may defer to older or senior people present. They sometimes aim to please the foreigner and/or expect that he/she is linked to an assistance programme (even if the opposite is clearly stated). The interviewees' desire for mimetism and to tell the foreigners what they want to hear should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, despite these constraints, the focus groups yielded a wealth of data and interesting insights into the views of individuals and communities.

5. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed Books, 2001.

6. See Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The NGO Scramble. Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action’, International Security, Vol.27, No.1, 2002, pp.5–39.

7. Remarks to the national Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of NGOs, US Department of State, Washington DC, 26 Oct. 2001, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/powell_brief31.htm.

8. Michael Hardt and Antronio Negri, Empire: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2001, p.34.

9. Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

10. Sarah Chayes, ‘Afghanistan: The night fairies’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2006, Vol.62, No.2, www.thebulletin.org/print.php?art_ofn = ma06chayes.

11. Interviews with aid workers, Kabul, Feb. 2006.

12. Statement attributed to Mullah Omar as relayed by Taliban spokesman Qari Mohammad Yousuf, 12 Mar. 2006.

13. See Antonio Donini, ‘Principles, Politics and Pragmatism in the International Response to the Afghan Crisis’, in Antonio Donini, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester (eds), Nation-building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2004.

14. Norah Niland, ‘Justice Postponed: The Marginalization of Human Rights in Afghanistan’, in ibid., p.62.

15. A point first made by Nick Stockton in ‘The Failure of International Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan’, Global Governance, Vol.8, No.3 (July–Sept. 2002).

16. Statement by ICRC participant at a donor/NGO meeting, Kabul, Feb. 2006.

17. Ibid.

18. Interview by author, Kabul, Feb. 2006.

19. Unless otherwise indicated, the messages in these bullet points are constructed on the basis of perceptions collected in the focus groups and interviews conducted by the researchers. As such they are symptomatic rather than representative of quantifiable opinions or realities.

20. 75 per cent of international assistance by-passes the government completely. Interview with World Bank official, Kabul, Feb. 2006.

21. An experienced observer notes: ‘Not all NGOs are the same – we really need an anatomy of the aid community. Some NGOs have been around for years and years. Some turned up last year. Some deal with leprosy and some deal with hairdressing. There's a vast array. Some exist in one person's briefcase, some have established offices in many parts of Afghanistan. Some are like wadis and exist in good seasons when there's funding, some have been going for years and have a great reputation. Some are at the forefront of humanitarian debates and some don't know anything about any debate.’ S. Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, personal communication, April 2006.

22. In February 2006, 11 months into the fiscal year, only 27 per cent of the government's development budget had been spent.

23. On the compact and the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy, see the Afghanistan government website, www.ands.gov.af.

24. Stephen Ellis makes a comment on indigenous structures and institutions that is relevant to Afghanistan. ‘One of the few hopeful developments to come out of Africa's many dysfunctional states is the way power vacuums have been spontaneously filled by new structures with deep roots in African history. These institutions, such as Somalia's subclans or West Africa's initiation societies, do not figure in textbooks on government and sometimes play a negative role. In other cases, however – as in the self-governing Somaliland – they have made a positive contribution. At present UN administrators tend to ignore such networks and often spend an entire tour of duty rebuilding formal new governments without noticing the alternate structures already in existence right under their noses.’ ‘How to Rebuild Africa’, Foreign Affairs, Sept.–Oct. 2005, accessed online (subscription required).