Still Homeland Defenders at Heart? Norwegian Military Culture in International Deployments

Abstract

This article analyses a cultural transformation taking place in Norwegian units deployed abroad as the framework for these operations shifted from UN to NATO command in the mid-1990s. In UN operations during and shortly after the Cold War, there was a cultural gap between the military at home and the units deployed abroad, and experiences from overseas operations were perceived as without relevance for national defence. After NATO became the preferred framework for Norwegian deployments, national military culture, which focused primarily on war-fighting skills and discipline, replaced the UN culture's focus on non-combat skills and practical problem-solving. This transformation had an impact on the Norwegian units' interaction with local cultures in the deployment area. But, since the identity of individual service members remained primarily linked to Norway and the Norwegian armed forces, the changes were of a practical rather than an ideological or motivational nature.

Notes

Even though Norwegian authorities thus far have refused to move Norwegian forces to the southern parts of Afghanistan, where the fiercest fighting has taken place, there is nevertheless a qualitative shift in Norwegian priorities, which has led to the deployment of fighter jets, special forces and combat infantry forces in Afghanistan.

Jean Callahan and Mathias Schönborn (eds), Warriors in Peacekeeping. Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters. A Comparative Study Based on Experiences in Bosnia, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004.

Ibid., p.14.

Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, London: Routledge, 2001, p.95.

Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.3. In a study of Dutch peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, Liora Sion found that combat-oriented training before deployment instilled a culture and language among the troops which made them unsuitable for non-combat missions (‘“Too Sweet and Innocent for War?” Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol.32, No.3, 2006, pp.454–74). See also John Hockey, ‘No More Heroes: Masculinity in the Infantry’, in Paul Higate (ed.), Military Masculinities, Identity and the State, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Hockey found that physical endurance, loyalty to one's mates, and blowouts with ‘booze, birds, and brawling’ were central elements of military masculinity. In actual operations ‘heroic’ or (unnecessarily) courageous behaviour was considered to be stupid.

Robert A. Rubinstein, ‘Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations’, Security Dialogue, Vol.36, No.4, 2005, p.537.

Torunn Laugen Haaland, Small Forces with a Global Outreach. Role Perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces After the Cold War, Oslo: Unipub forlag, 2008.

This ideal is typically associated with the classical work of Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait, New York: Free Press, 1971.

This international trend has been analysed by, for instance, Charles C. Moskos, ‘From Institution to Occupation. Trends in Military Organization’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol.4, No.1, 1977, pp. 41–50; Martin Shaw, Post-military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; Coker (see n.4 above).

This ideal is typically associated with Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957.

The memory books are compiled by each six-month contingent during deployments. The authors are mostly anonymous. The books contain an informal account of events that the contingent participants would like to remember. Some of these books are available in the libraries at the Norwegian Defence University College, the Army's War Academy and the Armed Forces Defence Museum, all in Oslo. Others have been lent to this author by members of the contingent.

‘NORMEDCOY (Norwegian Medical Company) Bosnia–Hercegovina, Kontingent II 1994’ (memory book; see n. 11 above), p.24.

Martin Hjelmervik Ness, ‘FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner. UNIFIL – Deltakerne – Forsvaret. En tilbakemelding fra de første 17 bataljonene’ [The UN's Peace Operations. UNIFIL – Participants – the Armed Forces. Experiences from the First 17 Battalions], NUPI report, No.127, Oslo: NUPI, 1989.

Jegerkorpset Akershus Regiment evaluation of education of NORMEDCOY, Oct. 1994 (UNPROFOR archive at the National Archival Services [Riksarkivet] [hereafter referred to as UNPROFOR/NAS], case 6). (Case number given because these documents were not organized according to any detectable order.)

For instance, education evaluation report, ‘NORMEDCOY II’, April 1994 (UNPROFOR/NAS, case 6); education evaluation report, ‘NORENGPLT (Norwegian Engineer Platoon)’, 15 Dec. 1992 (UNPROFOR/NAS, case 11); education evaluation report ‘NORCOY (Norwegian Company), MACEDONIA’, undated (UNPROFOR/NAS, case 11).

Contingent reports ‘NORMOVCON (Norwegian Movement Control) VI’ and ‘NORMOVCON (Norwegian Movement Control) VII’, 13 April and 30 Oct. 1995 (Norwegian Defence International Centre [FOKIV] archives [hereafter referred to as AFOKIV], organized according to dates only).

Evaluation report, ‘NORCOY (Norwegian Company), MACEDONIA’, undated (UNPROFOR/NAS, case 11).

See, for instance, ‘NORMEDCOY Bosnia–Hercegovina, Kontingent II 1994’ (memory book; see n.11 above).

Kaare Th Granå, Hærens sanitet 1888–2002 [Army Medical Services, 1888–2002], Oslo: Infomediahuset, 2004, p.314.

Typical examples were the deployment of a coastguard vessel to the Gulf War in 1991 and the helicopter wing deployed in Bosnia in the UNPROFOR period. The personnel in these units were mostly professional officers and they were therefore more strongly influenced by the national military culture.

These views were conveyed to the armed forces. For example, in January 1997, the Navy Staff at Headquarters Defence Command (HQDC) wrote, ‘Norway's political leadership wants to use participation in military operations as a means to secure positions and influence in international relations. Logistical support, medical units and similar contributions do not provide the basis for securing such influence. Signals from the Ministry of Defence indicate a greater willingness to participate with combat units even though this will imply a greater risk for loss of Norwegian soldiers.’ Note from HQDC/Navy Staff to HQDC/Operations, 14 Jan. 1997 (Archives of Headquarters Defence Command [hereafter referred to as AHQDC]/012).

For example, contingent reports of the Norwegian battalion in IFOR I and II concluded that the military standard of the units had been unacceptably poor for deployment to a war area, and recommended several changes in the Army's education and training procedures. Contingent report NORLOGBAT IFOR, 22 July 1996 (FOKIV archives); Contingent report NORLOGBAT IFOR II, 31 Jan. 1997 (AHQDC/012).

Letter from Land Command East to HQDC, FOKIV and Chiefs of Staff, 10 Dec. 1996 (AHQDC/012).

Opposing views were expressed by different authors in the same reports: Contingent report, ‘IFOR NORMEDCOY/NORPOLBDE (Norwegian/Polish Brigade)’, 1 June 1996 to 1 Feb. 1997; Contingent report, ‘Observation and Staff Officer Report – SFOR JOC (Joint Operation Command)’, 12 Jan. 1998 to 17 June 1998; Contingent report, ‘Observation and Staff Officer Report – SFOR/NORPOLBRIG/Deputy Chief PIO (Press and Information)’, 3 Aug. 1998 to 15 Dec. 1998; Contingent report, ‘NORBATT (Norwegian Battalion) SFOR 02’; Contingent report, ‘NORBATT SFOR 03’, Jan.–June 1998 (all sources at AFOKIV).

FOKIV report, inspection trip to SFOR, Mar. 1997 (AHQDC/014).

Contingent report, ‘NORBATT SFOR 05’, Jan.–June 1999 (AFOKIV).

Minutes from FOKIV seminar on lessons learned, 20 May 1997, stating that 90 per cent preferred UN operations (AHQDC/012). A letter from Headquarters Defense Command to the Ministry of Defence, 1 June 1997, said that 70 per cent preferred UN missions (AHQDC/014).

Contingent report, ‘Kosovo/NORBN (Norwegian Battalion) III/Kp-C (Company C)’, Jan.–June 2001 (AFOKIV).

Contingent report, ‘NORBN III KFOR, 29 Sept. 2000, 22 June 2001’ (AFOKIV).

‘KFOR I’ (memory book; see n. 11 above), p.52.

‘KFOR Kontingent VI, 15. juli 02 – 15. januar 03’ (memory book; see n.11 above), p.75.

‘KFOR VII’ (memory book; see n.11 above), p.83.

‘SFOR II’ (memory book; see n.11 above), p.104.

‘KFOR VII’ (memory book; see n.11 above), p.98.

For more details, see Haaland (see n.7 above).

Surveys have shown that in contingents serving abroad in the 1980s between 30 and 40 per cent of the personnel said they had bought sex from prostitutes during the deployment. Kari Lysaker and Gunn Elisabth Håbjørg, ‘Aidsproblematikk – et forsvarsanliggende’ [Aids problem – for the armed forces], Report for Chief of Army Staff, 1 Dec. 2002. In the 1990s the percentage was reduced to about ten. There is, however, great uncertainty attached to these figures. Marriages between Norwegian military personnel and local women have been analysed by Kari Karamé, ‘Military Women in Peacekeeping. Experiences of the Norwegian Battalion in UNIFIL 1978–1998’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.2, 2001, pp.87–9.

See, e.g., Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, for an elaboration of these mechanisms.

A study of Norwegian KFOR officers found such perceptions of the local population among the officers: Bård Mæland, Skadeskutt idealisme. Norsk offisersmoral i Kosovo [Idealism Shot down. Morale among Norwegian Officers in Kosovo], Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004.

These claims rest on views conveyed to the author by Norwegian Defence University College students.

This consistent viewpoint was underlined by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Sverre Opedal, in a public lecture, ‘Å bygge en Hær’ [Building an army], Oslo militære samfunn [Oslo Armed Forces Society], 8 Feb. 2010, at: www.oslomilsamfund.no/oms_arkiv/2010/2010-02-08_GIH.pdf.

Letter from Norwegian Contingent Commander/KFOR to Headquarters Defence Command Oslo, 26 Oct. 1999 (AHQDC/012).

‘KFOR II’ (memory book; see n.11 above), p.41.

The development of a warrior culture in parts of the Army was publicly acknowledged by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Sverre Opedal, in February 2010 (see n.40 above). However, he also acknowledged that the term warrior culture, and its content, was controversial within the armed forces.