The Problems of French-led Peace Operations in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract

By examining peace operations in Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this article shows that French-led peace operations in francophone Sub-Saharan Africa are highly problematic. This is especially true for those countries towards which France simultaneously pursues a bilateral military policy. The maintenance of the policy makes the political neutrality of the operations difficult and undermines international peacekeeping efforts. Furthermore, it gives African actors the opportunity to instrumentalize the policies and use them against each other. Therefore, only a full multilateralization of French military engagement, as well as a stronger commitment by other external actors, can make peace operations in the region more credible and more effective.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank the editors of the special issue and the journal editor for their fruitful comments on an earlier version of this article. The drafting of this article was made possible by a post doc scholarship granted by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

Notes

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, since 1999; renamed UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in 2010), UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB, 2004–06), UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT, 2007–10) and UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI, since 2004).

Operations Artemis (2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) in the DRC as well as operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008–09).

Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, ‘Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo’, International Affairs, Vol.86, No.5, 2010, p.1146.

The case of Burundi will not be discussed here, as France did not play a pivotal role in it.

These policies are based on a number of bilateral defence and/or military cooperation agreements. In the 1960s and 1970s, France signed such agreements with several African states. Today, defence agreements exist between France and Cameroon, the CAR, the Comores, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and Togo. Following a programmatic speech on French African policy by President Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2008, it was decided that the agreements would be revised and fully published (which was not the case before). Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘Speech to the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa’, Cape Town, South Africa, 28 Feb. 2008 (at: www.ambafrance-rsa.org/IMG/doc/Sarkozy_discours_parl-ang.doc). At the time of writing, seven have been renegotiated and signed. Only the agreement with Senegal is still in the process of renegotiation. The most visible characteristic of French bilateral policy is the maintenance of a permanent military presence in several African countries. It takes the form of military bases or permanent military operations. Currently, two French military bases exist on the African continent (Djibouti and Gabon). A French White Paper published in 2008 called for the maintenance of only one military base ‘on each of Africa's Atlantic and Indian Ocean seaboards’; Ministère de la défense, The French White Paper on Defence and National Security – Press file, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008, p.6 (at: www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf). Accordingly, the military bases in Côte d'Ivoire (June 2009) and in Senegal (July 2011) were formally closed down. Both are set to be transformed into military cooperation platforms supporting the military capacities of African national armies and/or sub-regional organizations. In addition, France has permanent operations stationed in Chad (Operation Epervier) and in the CAR (Operation Boali).

Thomas Hofnung, La crise en Côte d'Ivoire: Dix clés pour comprendre [The Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire: Ten Keys for Understanding], Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2005, pp.43–52.

For an extensive account of the rebellion's background and motivations, see International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Côte d'Ivoire: ‘The War Is Not Yet Over’, Africa Report 72, Freetown/Brussels: ICG, 28 Nov. 2003, pp.5ff.

Andreas Mehler, ‘Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements’, Working paper 83, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2008, pp.23–24.

Thomas Hofnung, ‘En finir avec la “Françafrique”‘ [Ending ‘Françafrique’], Politique internationale, No.112, 2006, pp.384–85.

UN Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004), UN doc., S/RES/1528, 27 Feb. 2004.

Hugo Sada, ‘Séisme politique en Côte d'Ivoire’ [Political Earthquake in Côte d'Ivoire], Défense nationale, Vol.56, No.2, 2000, pp.179–81.

However, note that France did not take on the role of a peacekeeper by design, but rather by default. Some in France, especially in the military, wanted to stick to the provisions of the defence agreement and repel the rebellion. Others, mainly in the Elysée, were more hostile to Gbagbo and certainly would not have bemoaned his departure. In the end, it was notably Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin who lobbied for the middle position of deploying an interposition force. Laurent D'Ersu, ‘La crise ivoirienne, une intrigue franco-française’ [The Ivorian Crisis, a Franco-French Intrigue], Politique africaine, No.105, 2007, pp.88–91.

Mehler (see n.8 above), p.24.

Amnesty International, Côte d'Ivoire: Affrontements entre forces de maintien de la paix et civils: leçons à tirer [Côte d'Ivoire: Confrontations between Peacekeeping Forces and Civilians: Lessons Learned], London: Amnesty International, 2006, pp.6ff.

D'Ersu (see n.12 above), p.89.

Ibid., p.94.

UN Security Council (see n.10 above).

France significantly reduced the Licorne force, from 5,000 soldiers at the end of 2004 to 900 in June 2009. Ministère de la défense, ‘Côte d'Ivoire: chronologie et repères historiques’ [Côte d'Ivoire: Chronology and Historical Markers] (at: www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/cote-d-ivoire/dossier/cote-d-ivoire-chronologie-et-reperes-historiques). During the same period, UNOCI was further propped up, attaining a troop strength of about 8,000 at the end of 2010. UN Security Council, ‘Twenty-sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire’, UN doc., S/2010/600, 23 Nov. 2010. But due to their superior equipment and local experience, the French forces remain as an essential backbone for the UN operation to be able to carry out its tasks.

Amnesty International (see n.14 above).

Ibid., p.5.

Ibid., p.2.

Mehler (see n.8 above), pp.26–27.

See e.g., Michel Barnier, Dominique de Villepin's successor as French foreign minister, in an interview with France Inter, 16 Feb. 2005 (at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20050218.html).

UN Security Council, ‘Twenty-seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire’, UN doc., S/2011/211, 30 Mar. 2011, §16ff.

UN Security Council, ‘Twenty-eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire’, UN doc., S/2011/387, 24 June 2011, §8.

‘Quel rôle a joué la France dans l'arrestation de Gbagbo?’ [What role did France play in Gbagbo's arrest?], L'Express.fr, 12 April 2011 (at: www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/quel-role-a-joue-la-france-dans-l-arrestation-de-gbagbo_981908.html). An extensive account of events in early April 2011 was given by a French diplomat at a workshop on Côte d'Ivoire at the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris, 27 Nov. 2011.

Ibid.

Thomas Hofnung, ‘Paris change son fusil d’épaule en Côte-d'Ivoire', [France Changes Tack in Côte-d'Ivoire], Libération.fr, 27 Jan. 2012 (at: www.liberation.fr/monde/01012386110-paris-change-son-fusil-d-epaule-en-cote-d-ivoire).

UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic Pursuant to Paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006)’, UN doc., S/2006/1019, 22 Dec. 2006, §27/39.

Ibid., §10.

UN Security Council, Resolution 1706 (see n.25 above).

UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic’, UN doc., S/2007/488, 10 Aug. 2007, §6.

Jean-Pierre Tuquoi and Laurent Zecchini, ‘Le “couloir humanitaire” vers le Darfour se révèle difficile à réaliser’, [The Humanitarian Corridor to Darfur Proves Hard to Implement], Le Monde, 2 June 2007.

UN Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007), UN doc., S/RES/1778, 25 Sept. 2007, §§3–8.

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic’, Official Journal of the European Union, L 279, 23 Oct. 2007, pp.21–24.

Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ‘EU-Krisenmanagement in Afrika: die Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA’ [EU Crisis Management in Africa: Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR], Integration, Vol.31, No.2, 2008, p.153.

Bruno Charbonneau, ‘Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa’, Modern & Contemporary France, Vol.16, No.3, 2008, pp.291–93.

Ibid; Patrick Berg, ‘EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests’, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds), ‘The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence?’, Research paper (2009/RP 14), Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2009, pp.57–69.

Björn H. Seibert, ‘Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy’, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Oct. 2010, p.10.

Philippe Bernard and Philippe Ricard, ‘Paris augmente sa participation en hommes et en matériels pour sauver l'Eufor’ [Paris Increases its Personnel and Equipment to Rescue EUFOR], Le Monde, 12 Jan. 2008.

Seibert (see n.39 above), p.10.

Roland Marchal, ‘Undersanding [sic] French Policy toward Chad and Sudan? A Difficult Task’, Sudan Tribune, 7 June 2009 (at: www.sudantribune.com/Undersanding-French-policy-toward,31423).

Serge Malle, the then UNHCR resident representative, is cited in a cable by the US Embassy in Chad saying that ‘it was the preexistence of Epervier that had made swallowing the [EUFOR, T.K.] pill acceptable to Deby’. US Embassy N'Djaména, ‘Chad: Kouchner Plan Accepted’, 18 June 2007 (at: www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07NDJAMENA504).

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP of 28 January 2008 on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA)’, Official Journal of the European Union, L34, 8 Feb. 2008, p.39.

Seibert, (see n.39 above), p.18.

Ibid., p.18.

‘Tchad: la France reconnaît avoir acheminé des munitions libyennes’ [Chad: France Acknowledges Forwarding of Libyan Ammunitions], Agence France Presse, 14 Feb. 2008.

Jean-François Bayart, ‘Obscénité franco-tchadienne’ [French–Chad Obscenity], Le Monde, 12 Feb. 2008; Denis M. Tull, ‘The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR’, Comments 2008/2,Berlin: SWP, Feb. 2008.

Thierry Oberlé, ‘La France et l'Eufor prises dans la tempête tchadienne’ [France and EUFOR Drenched by the Chad Storm], Le Figaro, 9 Feb. 2008.

Berg (see n.38 above), p.65.

Catherine Gegout, ‘The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2006)’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2, 2009, p.234.

UN Security Council, Resolution 1279 (1999), UN doc., S/RES/1279, 30 Nov. 1999.

See for a summary of the Ituri conflict, ICG, ‘Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri’, ICG Africa Report 64, Nairobi/New York/Brüssel: ICG, 13 June 2003, pp.2–6.

UN Security Council, ‘Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN doc., S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, §10.

UN Security Council, Resolution 1484 (2003), UN doc., S/RES/1484, 30 May 2003.

Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, ‘Operation “Artemis”: The Shape of Things to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.3, 2004, p.511.

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003 on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Official Journal of the European Union, L147, 14 June 2003, p.42.

Chafer and Cumming (see n.3 above), p.1145; Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (see n.56 above), pp.511–20.

Denis M. Tull, ‘Herkulesaufgabe Kongo: Die MONUC zeigt die Grenzen komplexer Friedenssicherung auf’ [Herculean Task Congo: MONUC Shows the Limits of Complex Peacekeeping], Vereinte Nationen, Vol.54, No.3, 2006, pp.92–93.

Peter Schmidt, ‘“Freiwillige vor!” Bundeswehreinsatz im Kongo – zur Dialektik einer Führungsrolle wider Willen’ [‘Volunteers Step Forward!’ The Bundeswehr Mission in Congo – The Dialectics of an Unwilling Leadership Role], Internationale Politik, Vol.61, No.11, 2006, p.70.

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP of 12 June 2006 on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in Support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the Election Process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo)’, Official Journal of the European Union, L163, 15.6.2006, p.16.

Claudia Major, ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006’, occasional paper 72, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Sept. 2008, p.18. For a detailed account of the decision-making process in the forefront of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, see Helmut Fritsch, ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?’, Martello Paper 33, Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, 2008.

Mel McNulty, ‘France's Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double Discrediting’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.4, No.3, 1997, pp.28–30.

Romain Yakemtchouk, ‘Les deux guerres du Shaba: les relations entre la Belgique, la France et le Zaïre’ [The Two Wars of Shaba: Relations between Belgium, France and Zaïre], Studia diplomatica, Vol.41, No.4-6, 1988, pp.375–742.

Tony Chafer, ‘Franco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional?’, African Affairs, Vol.101, No.404, 2002, p.349.

Gegout (see n.51 above), pp.234–35.

Raf Custers, ‘Arrières-pensées européennes’ [European Hidden Agenda], Le monde diplomatique, July 2006, pp.12–13.

Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (see n.56 above), pp.517–19.

Ibid., pp.519–20.

Ibid., p.520.

Denis M. Tull, ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model’, in Asseburg and Kempin (see n.38 above), pp.53–54. These insufficiencies led observers to conclude that the DRC operations were nothing more than an attempt by the EU to position itself as a military actor, without really considering what was happening in the field. Gegout (see n.51 above); Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2, 2009, pp.245–60.

Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (see n.56 above), pp.517–19.

Tull (see n.71 above), pp.51ff.

ICG, ‘Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown’, Africa Briefing 42, Nairobi/Brussels: ICG, 2 Oct. 2006.

Damien Helly, ‘Operation Artemis (RD Congo)’, in Giovanno Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds), ESDP: The First Ten Years, Paris: EU Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp.181–85.

Tull (see n.71 above), p.53.

Denis M. Tull, ‘Die Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo’ [Bundeswehr Leadership and Participation in EUFOR DR Congo], in Stefan Mair (ed), Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren, SWP-Studie 27/2007, Berlin: SWP, Sept. 2007, pp.72–73.

Chafer and Cumming (see n.3 above), p.1146.

Alvaro Vasconcelos, ‘Should Europe have a Policy on Africa?’, in Winrich Kühne, Guido Lenzi and Alvaro Vasconcelos (eds), ‘WEU's Role in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Chaillot Paper 22, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, Dec. 1995 (at: www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp022e.pdf)