‘Embedded’ Assistance: Finn Church Aid's Secondment in Somalia

Abstract

Donors face distinct challenges in operating in fragile states and supporting the building of state capacity. This article explores one type of assistance – the ‘embedding' of highly skilled staff members within local government agencies – through a unique case study of Finn Church Aid's experience with secondment in Somalia. Building upon FCA's previous work in Somalia, its staff member worked as part of the Transitional Federal Government's Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and Reconciliation to assist in the implementation of the roadmap designed to end transitional governance in the country. Although a number of such initiatives exist, few studies have explored how, why and whether they work. Drawing on unique access to FCA staff and documents, as well as interviews with Somali stakeholders, donor representatives and others, the article explores FCA's experience and impact through this initiative, one way in which a non-state actor has provided tangible, relatively low-cost support to a fragile state.

On 2 April 2012, three Finn Church Aid (FCA) specialists met with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's (TFG) Minister of Constitutional Affairs and Reconciliation, Abdi Hosh. They asked Hosh how FCA could support his Ministry, which had just been entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing significant parts of the implementation of a roadmap to guide the ending of political transition in Somalia by 20 August 2012.¹ The TFG had been established in 2004 with the goal of restoring national institutions to Somalia following the country's 1991 collapse. In August 2012, the TFG was set to be replaced by elected representatives of the Somali people serving under a new constitution in the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), marking the achievement of a crucial statebuilding process. Minister Hosh replied that he wanted FCA peacebuilding specialist Mahdi Abdile seconded to work with him at the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and Reconciliation (henceforth the Ministry). Abdile assumed his post on 23 April 2012, charged with the task of supporting the Ministry in its assigned duties.

Operating in fragile states represents a distinct challenge for donors and NGOs. Indeed, in the worst case, their interventions are criticized for serving to erode state capabilities.² This article presents an example of how a non-state actor has provided tangible support to a fragile state government, assisting in the process of building capacity to guide the country towards resilience. Development agencies provide a variety of types of assistance towards such ends. Within the broader framework of statebuilding and peacebuilding development assistance, FCA's secondment may be grouped together with other aid-funded programmes to support external advisers within government ministries – a form of technical assistance, in this case ‘embedded' within local institutions. While a number of such initiatives exist, very little publicly available documentation is available on how, why and whether they work – on the process, challenges, tensions and lessons learned from such embedded assistance. Benefiting from unique entrée into FCA's experience in Somalia, this case study speaks directly to this lacuna in the literature. At the same time, it also highlights several aspects of FCA's initiative that make it unique, and may be worth consideration by other organizations operating in fragile state environments. Given Abdile's position within the Ministry, the case speaks in particular to issues of ‘local ownership' in aid, illustrating some of the tensions faced by external actors in supporting truly locally owned initiatives. Thus, through a detailed case study of a relatively small-scale project, we hope to speak to several broader issues in the literature.

Overall, the article argues that Abdile contributed in significant ways to the Ministry's capacity to implement the transition roadmap, despite his overall limited ability to influence changes in policy. The embedded assistance provided by Abdile's secondment gave the Ministry additional means to achieve its main goal of overseeing the successful political transition in Somalia. Although FCA was not willing to set specific objectives for the secondment as Abdile reported directly to Minister Hosh, the initiative nonetheless gave FCA indirect, albeit limited, presence at the core of the Somali statebuilding process. Thus, even while Abdile worked within an environment that did not always carry out activities as FCA might have preferred, his presence within the Ministry also allowed for the promotion of some of FCA's guiding principles. From FCA's perspective, as well as that of the Minister, the secondment was an overall success, offering a model that both would hope to build upon in future.

The article draws on interviews with Somali stakeholders, selected FCA staff and donor representatives. It also builds on FCA's organizational memory and relevant written documents as well as on secondary sources. Further support is sought from e-mail correspondence that the lead author was given access to during the research phase of the article. This study is intended as an objective study of the secondment arrangement. It should however be noted that one of the authors is a senior adviser on the right to peace at FCA and has worked with FCA since 2008, allowing the article to benefit from FCA's institutional memory.

The first part of this article situates this study within the broader policy and research literature, highlighting FCA's secondment as a form of ‘embedded' assistance for statebuilding with strong potential for helping to address challenges of local ownership. The second situates the case study within the context of FCA's mandate, history and current projects in Somalia. It explores how the organization's understanding of its mandate and role in supporting fragile states evolved to the degree where providing capacity support to a fragile government became possible, and reviews the secondment from a programmatic point of view. The third section explores the impact of the secondment, in particular highlighting the assessments of both participants and observers. In so doing, it also considers some of the extenuating factors in assessing impact, in particular the capacity limitations faced by Abdile during the secondment. A final section concludes.

Supporting Statebuilding and Local Ownership through ‘Embedded’ Assistance

Fragile states and conflict situations have some of the most pressing development and humanitarian needs and addressing these needs will remain central to development assistance post-2015.³ Operating in fragile environments thus remains core to the mandates of many development and humanitarian NGOs, including FCA. Somalia, the quintessential ‘failed' state, has long occupied one extreme of the fragility spectrum, with humanitarian and development needs well documented.⁴

Operating in fragile environments poses distinct challenges in comparison to development assistance in more stable environments – even ones in which economic indicators and levels of poverty may be similar. For instance, addressing issues of security for operations and personnel clearly imposes additional costs, risks and complexity. At a more abstract level, one of the most fundamental tensions relates to issues of local ownership. Donors have committed to local ownership in aid operations, one of the core principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011). At the same time, fragile states are particularly ill-equipped to ‘own’ fully their development processes; notwithstanding the strong will and capacity of many individuals and some organizations within them, a fragile state – by definition – has extremely weak state capacity, legitimacy and authority.⁵ How to support fragile states to build the capacity, legitimacy and authority required to lead and manage effectively and fully their own development processes, in a manner at the same time consistent with local ownership, is thus a major tension for donors operating in these environments.⁶

Likewise, supporting local ownership while also facilitating improvements in state capacity and better governance remains a major tension for donors in developing countries more generally.⁷ Indeed, critics argue that development assistance can both contribute to the weakening of state capacity and legitimacy, as well as effectively hinder the ability of states to raise their own revenues.⁸ In addition, in terms of ‘how to' support more capable and legitimate states, there remains considerable debate among researchers and practitioners over best practices in core thematic areas, such as reform of the civil service, public financial management, tax systems and policing.⁹

Efforts by development actors to support the emergence of more capable and legitimate states can be grouped into four broad categories. The first consists of support or incentives for institutional reforms of existing state organizations and practices, such as major restructuring of the civil service, public financial management system, judiciary, legislature or electoral system. A second broad category consists of capacity building efforts, such as job training or ‘train the trainers' initiatives, geared to developing the skills and experience of individuals working within such institutions. A third broad category, technical and capacity assistance, provides additional external support when domestic capacity is insufficient. Finally, a fourth category includes efforts to act in place of the state to fulfil functions normally undertaken by more capable states, such as the provision of public services – labelled ‘parallel institutions' for short. Humanitarian assistance might loosely be classified here. In terms of development, efforts tend to involve support for more durable ‘independent' institutions operating in parallel to government agencies. Given the difficulties in reforming existing institutions, such institutions are seen to benefit for instance from their autonomy from existing (dysfunctional) organizations and their ability to work outside the traditional civil service, which may facilitate payment of higher salaries and attracting of more skilled employees. While development assistance has generally focused more on interventions of the other three types, Collier for one advocates more development attention to such parallel institutions for service provision.¹⁰

Within this framework, FCA's secondment may be grouped broadly with other aid-funded programmes to support external advisers within government ministries – a form of technical and capacity assistance. Within Somalia, during both the TFG and later the FGS, there were also several other external advisers supporting various Somali institutions: the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had several persons working for the Ministry of Finance, the United Kingdom seconded a person to the Ministry of Interior and National Security and an Irish security expert was responsible for the security arrangements of the meetings of the Elders Council. While more standard technical assistance often involves considerable coordination and work with government agencies, such assistance takes a step further in the degree to which external advisers are ‘embedded' within local institutions and accountable directly to supervisors within these institutions. Some such initiatives also involve elements of capacity building as the embedding of external advisers may be seen as playing a role in building domestic capacity through example and interaction, ‘knowledge transfer' and (sometimes) direct training of local colleagues. Depending on the size of such programmes, an element of ‘parallel institutions' may also be at work.

Among such programmes internationally, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)'s Fellowship Scheme is perhaps the best known. Since it began in 1963, it has placed over a thousand post-graduate economists and statisticians in the public sectors of developing countries to work as local civil servants.¹¹

The Scott Family Liberia Fellows is another such programme, although smaller than the ODI's with roughly six fellows per year since it began operations in mid-2007. Initiated with a grant from Ed Scott, the programme was originally managed by the Center for Global Development (CGD) and subsequently by John Snow, Inc. (JSI). Liberia Fellows ‘typically work as “special assistants” to Ministers or other officials, taking on a wide variety of tasks, ranging from economic affairs, public policy, agriculture, health, legal, speechwriting, ministerial coordination and administration'. They aim to ‘support the Ministers in their full range of activities and to make them more effective and efficient in all that they do'.¹²

Also in Liberia is the more recently initiated Carter Center (TCC) and Transnational Law Institute of Washington and Lee University School of Law (W&L) Liberia Law Fellows Programme, which expects to place law school graduates in government offices at the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Health, Judicial Institute and Land Commission. Both the Carter Center and W&L have been engaged in other projects on access to justice in Liberia, since 2006 and 2008, respectively, and the programme builds upon these activities.¹³

An earlier example is the Africa Fellows programme led by Professor Carroll Wilson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It operated from 1959 to the mid-1960s, sending primarily MIT business and law school graduates to work in ministries in various African countries – most either newly independent or on the verge of independence. A report on the programme's founder notes that ‘Wilson is said to have considered it the highest compliment to the program when the U.S. ambassador to Uganda complained that the African Fellow in Kampala was acting as if he were working for the Ugandans. “He is”, Wilson agreed.’¹⁴

While at least the first two of these initiatives are quite well-known within international development policy circles, to the best of our knowledge no major comprehensive study has been done to enumerate all such efforts, much less to analyse them systematically within the context of one of their key aims – to support governance and state capacity in weak and fragile states. Nor is there much publicly available documentation on the process, challenges, tensions and lessons learned from such efforts at embedding employees within local government institutions – in particular from the perspective of the external agencies supporting them. As Wilson's comment above underscores, clear tensions are apparent in terms of local versus external accountability and, by extension, ownership. How do the external agencies supporting such initiatives view and address such tensions? The unique entrée we had into FCA's experience in Somalia allows us to speak directly to this lacuna in the literature through this case study. Thus, while FCA's secondment in Somalia was a relatively small-scale project – even in comparison to other such initiatives of this broad type – this case can contribute to the discussion of broader issues in the literature on statebuilding and local ownership.

Finally, it is also worth noting that while FCA's secondment in Somalia is like these better-known international initiatives in many ways, it is also unique in some key ways, which might be built upon in other initiatives in future. First, as noted, it operated on a smaller-scale (one seconded employee only) and over a limited time period, without an expectation of continuation. Second, it functioned during a period of more extreme political instability than any of the other programmes outside of Somalia. While Liberia for instance is also a fragile state, the Scott Fellows programmes there began only in the post-conflict period.

Third, in terms of the core purposes of the initiative, FCA's sole purpose in the secondment was to support statebuilding in Somalia by lending capacity during a crucial phase of the peace process. By contrast, while support for state capacity is also a goal of the other better-known initiatives, all also equally highlight benefits for ‘fellows' in addition to those for the host country. Fellows in turn generally apply through competitive recruitment processes and many, if not most, have few prior ties to their host countries. Abdile, on the other hand, is of Somali-decent, with strong personal ties and commitment to the development of the country. Perhaps only some of the Scott Fellows are somewhat similar in this latter sense – as a handful of Liberian fellows have participated, some of whom have stayed on in Liberian government.¹⁵

Fourth, in contrast to the other initiatives outside of Somalia, FCA's secondment provided more ‘capacity' assistance than ‘technical' assistance. Indeed, while clearly capable and highly skilled in peacebuilding work, Abdile did not possess the sort of technical skills in economics, statistics or law emphasized by the other programmes. Thus, the sharing or transfer of this sort of ‘technical' knowledge was not core to the effort. Rather, Abdile brought a less clearly defined set of management and analytical skills and peacebuilding experience.

Fifth, the secondment is notable in the degree to which it supported local ownership of assistance. While local ownership plays a role in all of the initiatives noted above in the sense that fellows work directly for local government agencies and report to local supervisors, even if paid by external agencies, the FCA secondment was notable in that it was also locally initiated: the Minister specifically requested the secondment.

FCA and Its Work in Somalia

FCA is the largest development cooperation NGO in Finland, with an annual turnover of 35 million Euros. It works extensively in situations of fragility with a twin focus on advocacy and development support. FCA's work began in Somalia in 2007, that is, during the period of the TFG. Its programmatic entry in Somalia was focused, concentrating on supporting religious leaders in local-level conflict resolution in northern Somalia and Somaliland (Peace Initiative Project, PiP). Given the intertwined nature of religious and traditional (clan) leaders in Somalia, FCA and its partners, the Danish Refugee Council and International Horn University, broadened the scope of the conflict resolution project to encompass both social groups. Project reports note that it facilitated the resolution of more than a dozen clan-based conflicts in Somalia between 2008 and 2012.¹⁶

FCA discussed and decided upon key advocacy targets in 2009 and selected ‘Peace in Somalia' as one of the main focuses. Within Somalia, FCA sought to support the advocacy of religious leaders for peace and reconciliation in mosques, communities and conflict hotspots (as part of PiP). Internationally, FCA's plan stressed influencing UN decision making on Somalia especially with the goal of supporting open and participatory peace processes. In Finland, FCA pursued closer coordination and collaboration with the Somali diaspora.¹⁷

FCA's engagement with the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was initiated in earnest during the latter half of 2010.¹⁸ FCA and UNPOS formed a joint project in November 2010, Somalia Outreach and Reconciliation (SOR) Initiative, which sought to incorporate Somali religious and clan elders into the federal-level peace- and statebuilding work from which they had been sidelined for decades.¹⁹ This project was seen by FCA as a groundbreaking step as it provided a concrete case for the organization to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between grassroots actors (with whom FCA had cooperated for years) and the Security Council-mandated UN agency.

FCA's Mandate: A Rights-Based Approach to Development Assistance in Fragile Situations

FCA's commitment to a rights-based approach (RBA) underlies its programmatic work. It describes the core RBA principles as follows:

Contrary to needs, rights always trigger obligations. They exist in a relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers, which highlights the importance of accountability and dialogue between them. Change requires working in a strategic way towards the duty-bearers that hold decisive positions of power and control. The recognition of this dual relationship is key to the practical implementation of RBA.²⁰

Central to the approach is to identify the root causes of poverty and lack of realization of rights. As poverty is not considered merely as a lack of material goods but as injustice, denial of human rights and equal participation, the tools to promote positive development, derive from creating possibilities to access power and resources, for example through advocacy and capacity building.

RBA as a way of work stresses the imperative of local ownership. In FCA's work, this is highlighted in the stated focus on strengthening the accountability between (local) ‘rights-holders' and ‘duty-bearers', as well as in the emphasis that the process is as important as the outcome.²¹ Such was the approach adopted in Somalia; FCA's role in PiP was designed to be in the background, concentrating on facilitating mediation processes and capacity building, rather than driving them. Such a focus on process and participation implies that change is gradual and patience is required by all stakeholders.

In 2009, FCA assumed the lead in an advocacy working group that chose fragility as its main theme.²² Although fragility had been touched upon by the FCA prior to Abdile's secondment, FCA had not deeply discussed its own actions in support of a duty-bearers' capacity. Rather, the focus was on analysis of the implications of fragility to rights-holders and suggestions of action by the EU and international community as moral duty-bearers.²³ After 2010, FCA's engagement with UNPOS as part of the SOR Initiative was an important step for FCA in this sense, in providing the organization an opportunity to move from theory to practice on RBA and its stated focus on ‘the interrelationship between the individual at the micro level and the state and the international community at the macro level'.²⁴

FCA's Capacity Support to Somalia's TFG

FCA's secondment of Abdile emerged through the SOR Initiative. In terms of addressing explicitly state fragility in Somalia, and the responsible duty-bearer, the TFG, the SOR Initiative started slowly. While dialogue between representatives of local communities and UNPOS was seen as successful,²⁵ the TFG became part of the activities only towards its end.²⁶ FCA representatives met Minister Hosh for the first time in November 2011 upon the recommendation of UNPOS's Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Christian Manahl. Subsequently, FCA staff met the TFG's Ministers several times, especially Hosh and the Minister of Interior and National Security, but also the Prime Minister, in the margins of the London Somalia Conference in February 2012.²⁷ Similarly FCA saw increasingly the significance of cooperation with the TFG as there was now a great convergence between the objectives of the SOR Initiative and the transition roadmap, which had been specified through the National Constitutional Conferences in Garowe in December 2011 and February 2012, the Galkayo Communiqué of the Principal Political Stakeholders from March 2012 and the Addis Ababa Communiqué from May 2012. In particular, the importance of participation by the clan elders was incrementally pronounced in the outcomes of these meetings.

FCA did not expect a request to second an FCA staff member to the TFG. While the proposed secondment was well aligned with the RBA and could be seen as a logical continuation of the SOR Initiative, it still posed several challenges for FCA, starting with the fact that Abdile was also involved in other ongoing projects at FCA. Financial issues were even more concerning. Even though the estimated cost of the secondment was quite small, FCA lacked the internal resources to support Abdile's secondment fully on its own and looked for additional sources of funding.²⁸ UNPOS endorsement was considered at first, but it soon became clear that obtaining any funds or clearance from UNPOS, in a manner that Abdile could speak on behalf of UNPOS, was out of the question. FCA then turned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA). MFA staff at the mediation unit immediately understood the value of the proposed secondment, yet it took until the end of May 2012 for FCA to receive the formal approval, during which time FCA continued working with the TFG through its own funding.²⁹ Upon request, Minister Hosh submitted Abdile's Terms of Reference (ToR) to FCA. It was framed as follows: ‘Mahdi Abdile would be a consultant on the implementation of Road map as it relates to end of transition processes, including the convening of the Constituent Assembly on May 15, 2012 and the traditional elders on April 25, 2012.’³⁰

Minister Hosh asked FCA not to second Abdile as FCA staff as this could provide ammunition for someone who would wish to harm the process of ending the transition by falsely portraying FCA as a missionary organization, and by doing so put not only the Minister himself, but also the whole government, under unwanted accusations. FCA thus let Abdile take a leave of absence for the duration of the secondment and hired him as consultant without formal bond to FCA, yet with the opportunity to take advantage of FCA's service functions such as contractual help, travels, financial arrangements and support on security arrangements. The secondment was extended twice, from the initial end date of 31 July 2012 to 20 August 2012 (end of transition) and, after a request by then caretaker Minister Hosh, to 15 September 2012. Already during the first term of the secondment, it was clear that the MFA's original funding would not be sufficient to cover all expenses. Security-related costs in particular burdened the budget more than anticipated.³¹ In the end, the secondment programme was 65 per cent covered through the MFA funds and 35 per cent through FCA's funds.³²

Assessing the Impact of FCA's Secondment

Abdile's main responsibility during the secondment was to support the planning and organization of meetings of the traditional leaders (elders) held from 5 May 2012 until the end of the transition period.³³ These meetings of the ‘Elders Council' played a crucial role in bringing about the end of the transition period. The composition of the Elders Council was decided in late March 2012 in Galkayo at the Consultative Meeting of the Somali Signatories of the Process for Ending the Transition. In Galkayo it was decided that the Elders Council would consist of 135 members chosen according to clan affiliation. A ‘4.5 clan' formula was adopted whereby the four main clans in Somalia (Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyn) were given a representation of 30 elders in the council and the remaining 15 places were reserved for smaller clans. The Elders Council was given the responsibility to nominate the 825 members of the National Constituent Assembly, tasked with voting on the Provisional Constitution of Somalia. The Council also selected the member candidates for the 275 member Federal Parliament of Somalia,³⁴ which, in addition to its legislative role, voted on the future President of Somalia and elected the Speaker of the Parliament.

A second key responsibility for Abdile was in designing and facilitating civic education workshops that provided information to the elders about their role in this process and a forum for discussion among them about this role, as well as training on reconciliation and mediation. Third, Abdile was responsible for acting as a coordinator and liaison on issues related to the transition roadmap with the elders, the TFG, UNPOS and other relevant actors, including government ministries and the United Nations Development Programme. As part of this work, he served as a focal point between the Ministry and project sponsors, such as the European Union. Although the EU was not present in the Mogadishu coordination meetings, EU representatives had regular bilateral meetings with the Ministry and UNPOS in Nairobi. These meetings aimed to support the timely execution of the roadmap. Finally, Abdile was also involved as necessary with other Ministry activities that supported the implementation of the roadmap, including consultations with women's groups and the drafting of concept notes and memos.

This section draws heavily on interviews with those involved in the secondment – particularly Abdile – to consider the impact of this initiative on the overall objective of supporting a locally owned statebuilding process. Such self-reporting should always be considered critically in assessing aid effectiveness, particularly as participants may have obvious incentives to view their role in favourable terms. However, in a small-scale project such as this one, such interviews also constitute an invaluable source of information. Thus, while we acknowledge key limitations of our approach, we also note that steps were taken to assess biases by comparing perspectives from multiple actors involved in the secondment. In addition, we note Abdile's own critical reflections on his role.

Overall, we find that the secondment contributed to the Ministry's capacity to implement the transition roadmap, despite Abdile's overall limited ability to influence changes in policy. The embedded assistance provided by the secondment gave the Ministry additional means to achieve its main goal, but the initiative was not without tensions and challenges. Broadly, we find clear tradeoffs between FCA's commitment to the local ownership of the secondment and some of FCA's core rights-based principles and objectives. In other words, in being directly accountable to the Minister, not FCA, Abdile did not always pursue activities as he would have had his work been directed by FCA. At the same time, his direct accountability to the Minister was a condition of his presence within the Ministry and his presence within the Ministry also allowed for the promotion of some of FCA's guiding principles and core commitment to supporting the statebuilding process in Somalia.

Essentially the work of the secondment was to oversee the implementation of a political process where significant decisions had already been made. Any perceived impact of the secondment further has to be considered as originating from the Ministry's work. Minister Hosh reports that Abdile's contribution was very valuable, but the process would also have been completed without him.³⁵ Abdile's own account suggests the same. He describes how he had to remain constantly (in his words) ‘neutral', including when he felt that some issues were not followed through in an ideal or sustainable manner.³⁶ The Somali interlocutors were nonetheless content about the arrangement highlighting the benefits from the direct relationship between themselves and Abdile.³⁷ Abdile's colleague from the Ministry stresses the fact that Abdile was able to come physically to Somalia and work with them on a daily basis, which was a most definite asset for them.³⁸ For Hosh, it also seemed to increase the level of local ownership as Abdile worked directly under the Ministry, without outside entanglements. Indeed the direct relationship seemed to have extra meaning in this particular case, due to the politically charged nature of the secondment. Abdile also introduced ideas of his own during the process. He could not claim ownership of these ideas, however, and had to circulate the ideas through the Ministry's bureaucracy. This was another element that Hosh appreciated as it made him feel that Abdile was truly a part of his team and not a solo player with his own agenda.³⁹

Limited Capacity

Among the key factors highlighted by those involved in the secondment in influencing Abdile's ability to perform within the Ministry was the existing capacity of the Ministry itself – which in turn was part and parcel of the fragile nature of the Somali state. Prior to Abdile's secondment, the Ministry was only two persons strong, consisting of Minister Hosh and his cabinet secretary.⁴⁰ Limited resources prevented Hosh from hiring more staff and in this regard it was essential that Abdile's secondment was financed externally.⁴¹ In addition, Abdile notes the lack of expertise within the Ministry, particularly on the constitutional matters core to its work. While Minister Hosh had a legal education, he did not have experience on constitutional matters. The lack of institutional memory and basic recordkeeping within the institution further meant that basic and key documents such as concept notes and other memos had to be drafted from scratch, rather than based on existing models.⁴² Hosh narrates how during the long war several ministers had been killed and virtually everything had collapsed. Offices, ministries and libraries were destroyed which led to a ‘loss of memory'. Hosh says that among other things, Abdile's assistance was much appreciated as there were no potential employees available with the required experience.⁴³

During the SOR Initiative in 2010, UNPOS saw that there was a need to give political support to the elders in order to prevent them from being ridiculed or exposed to corruption. UNPOS worked together with FCA to inform the elders about the process of ending the transition. Due to this history, it did not come as a surprise to Abdile that the elders' limited experience with politics prior to the constitutional process formed a challenge for the overall process. Thus, it was natural that Abdile's ToR included a duty to provide for civic education, which essentially meant informing the elders about their role in the process via seminars and workshops which Abdile designed and facilitated.⁴⁴ Regardless of the past support, there was still a great demand for such education as many of the elders had not yet been fully informed about their exact role and responsibility in the process. Sometimes this need to provide education for the elders meant that activities which would have required a day under more organized conditions, took a week.⁴⁵

To summarize, Abdile's work was made more challenging because of lack of human resources, lack of technical expertise within the government and limited understanding of the elders regarding their exact role in the process of ending the transition. These obstacles illustrate the nature of some of the challenges that both the host government's officials and external actors come across when working within fragile states to support capacity development. What may follow is that extremely weak institutional capacity hinders the very initiatives designed to address it, even when political will supports capacity development – as in this case. While the definition of fragility does include both a lack of will and a lack of capacity, these two elements are a world apart. The risk of an unwilling state (duty-bearer), however, did not materialize with Abdile's secondment as the TFG explicitly expressed its willingness to receive capacity support to carry out its duties.

Deficiencies in Representation

The key focus of Abdile's work was to coordinate the Elders Council. Therefore it was imperative to find and invite the right people to the meeting. Finding the ‘real' elders – that is, the ones who truly represented their communities – was, according to Abdile, the greatest single challenge that the Ministry had during the process.⁴⁶ Abdile had struggled with the same problem already during the SOR Initiative. The questions that had to be constantly reassessed then were: who were the real elders who could truly represent the various Somali clans, and how to keep the delicate clan balance in order? It was initially thought that every Somali can tell the name of his or her clan elder, so consequently one should only ask and the list of elders would write itself.⁴⁷ However, this was not the case.⁴⁸ In Abdile's opinion, the identification of the elders posed some fundamental challenges that had the potential to put the whole process at risk. The process of ending the transition had a sense of urgency to meet the agreed deadline (20 August 2012) which accordingly had an impact on the appointment of elders. In Abdile's assessment, the clans did not always have enough time to discuss properly who would represent them. In such cases the resulting decisions suffered from a lack of consultation from the respective communities, paving the way for potentially wrong decisions. The potential for corruption and political manipulation also increased as the respective communities had less time to oversee properly the activities of their leaders.⁴⁹

Abdile had to proceed in his work regardless of knowing that the Elders Council was formed on the basis of politics, not tradition. Traditional leaders are chosen however in a way that follows tradition, not politics, which raises a question over whether it is possible to apply the 4.5 formula and still have such representation as originally intended. Abdile estimates that the true number of ‘first tier elders', that is Dubaabs, is somewhere between 60 and 70 in the whole of Somalia.⁵⁰ Thus, 135 elders would have been too many. The Ministry estimated that from the 135, between 37 and 40 could be described as ‘real’ elders. If the estimates are accurate, one can safely assume that politics did play a significant role when the composition of the Elders Council was decided, excluding some of the real elders from the process and adding some extra. In Abdile's view, the consultation process fell short in this regard as the primacy in the process of ending the transition was to take the process from one stage to another. Such prioritization limited the Somalis’ chances to discuss thoroughly the quality of the process, potentially planting seeds for future tension.⁵¹ Some have even argued that the process reminded them more of a project than a genuine process, moving from one stage to another, aiming to meet deadlines rather than to build the necessary consensus among Somali actors.⁵²

Working for Gender Equality

Another key issue highlighted in Abdile's reflections on his experience concerned issues of gender equality. For Abdile, gender equality was a familiar and natural priority in his work at FCA, where it had been one of FCA's strategic focuses since 2009⁵³ and FCA had already advocated better inclusion of women into Somali politics.⁵⁴

In his embedded role within the Ministry, one of Abdile's tasks was working with women's rights groups which advocated for gender equality. The key issue in this regard was to see the fulfilment of a 30 per cent quota for female representation in the new Federal Parliament of Somalia, a quota which was introduced during the creation of the roadmap and was one of most noticeable features in the Garowe Principles. Subsequently, the quota was very much on the Ministry's agenda.⁵⁵ Towards this end, Abdile met regularly with women's groups and worked to find ways to bring them together to discuss jointly how to promote their agenda. He also carried their message forward to the TFG and other Somali stakeholders.⁵⁶ The elected parliament, however, did not meet the agreed quota. It included 275 representatives, of whom only 14 per cent were women.⁵⁷ This was only a slight improvement from previous women's representation in the attempt to establish a parliament in Somalia (12 per cent in the Transitional Federal Parliament). In explaining this outcome, Abdile notes that the UN could have promoted the quota more forcefully, but did not wish to risk the implementation of the roadmap which was close to fulfilment.⁵⁸ It was then left in the hands of Somalis and particularly to the elders to make sure that the quota would be met. As the principal guardians of the traditional customs of the Somali people, the elders however were not the force that would have driven change in gender equality. As one commentator noted: ‘Putting the faith of women in the hands of elderly men in a patriarchal society was misguided ideology.'⁵⁹ The (female) co-chair of the Technical Selection Committee (of eligible Members of Parliament) also made a similar observation, arguing that the three main factors that kept women's representation lower than agreed were the male- dominant culture, (some) religious interpretations which argued against the inclusion of women into Somali politics and finally selfish views of too many men who did not want to share the results gained in the political process with women.⁶⁰ While working with women's groups, Abdile also observed that women were divided in their opinion on whether they should focus on achieving the quota or rather should have strong women politicians as leaders who could drive change more forcefully.⁶¹

The example illustrates the difficulty of effectively implementing gender equality objectives, regardless of whether these objectives on paper enjoy a strong backing of the international community. Abdile draws an interesting comparison to peacebuilding: ‘In peace work the state of affairs is such, that once a deal is done, there must be someone who will oversee its implementation. Otherwise everyone knows already beforehand that it will not hold. With political deals, it is almost the same.’⁶²

Conclusion

Although FCA's secondment in Somalia was a relatively small-scale project, analysis of this experience, we argue, can contribute to broader discussions in the literature on statebuilding and local ownership. In particular, it contributes to discussion on aid-funded programmes to support ‘embedded' external advisers within government agencies – a form of technical and capacity assistance. A number of such initiatives exist, but little analysis is available about how, why and even whether they work. Drawing on unique entrée into FCA's experience in Somalia, this case study speaks directly to this lacuna in the literature. Several unique aspects of FCA's secondment – such as the fact that it was locally initiated and, in comparison to other ‘embedded' assistance efforts, operated in a more unstable political environment – may also be worthy of consideration by other development actors.

The relevance of FCA's experience to peacebuilding and statebuilding is underscored by the continuing emphasis on local ownership in development assistance and the New Deal's emphasis on ‘country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility'.⁶³ FCA's experience suggests that addressing fragility through such embedded assistance may well increase in popularity in the future. This would require that such assistance be seen by both fragile states and donors alike as an effective and ‘locally owned' means to support state capacities. Notably, feedback from both Hosh and his cabinet secretary suggests that the secondment was praised especially from the perspective of perceived Somali ownership. Furthermore, it is clear that Abdile's secondment contributed to the Ministry's basic capacity: at the very least, Abdile's secondment increased the Ministry's staff from two to three individuals.

Although FCA was not willing to set definite objectives for the secondment, Abdile's mission was nonetheless considered a ‘success' by FCA as well. Through Abdile, FCA received an indirect presence at the core of the transition process where it was able to support the TFG's capacity and simultaneously support Somali ownership. The secondment served FCA's commitment to a RBA, providing an opportunity to support an incapacitated duty-bearer. The secondment further took FCA forward in its thinking and action when operating in a fragile context. This experience helped to build FCA's own capacity and served to encourage FCA to expand its work to other fragile states, including through contributions to the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

More broadly, it is still too early to say whether the successful ending of the transition will result in peaceful development in Somalia. At the time of this writing, there is no peace in Somalia. Somalia is still among the most fragile states in the world. On 20 August 2012, the Federal Parliament of Somalia took over its responsibilities, testament in part to the Ministry's successful overseeing of the roadmap. Observers have raised several strong critiques about the process.⁶⁴ Indeed, several key critiques are suggested above, and it is worth noting the limitations faced during the secondment in terms of impact on key aspects of the transition process. For instance, as discussed above, the composition of the Elders Council was to some degree based on political interests and not genuine clan representation, and gender quotas were not met in parliament.

Such critiques notwithstanding, it is debatable whether alternative designs for the secondment would have resulted in greater impact on the process. In particular, although the Ministry's limited capacity certainly affected the degree to which Abdile could influence the transition process, it seems unlikely that Abdile would have had more influence had he been embedded within another government ministry, for example. The Ministry's limited capacity was reflective to a large extent of the limited capacity of Somali government institutions in general, and despite its limited capacity, the Ministry played a unique role within the TFG during the transition process. Furthermore, the degree of influence that Abdile exercised directly on outcomes reflected also the FCA's commitment to a locally owned process and the inherent challenges of this commitment.

On balance then, the secondment provides a positive example of tangible external support to a fragile state, assisting in the process of building capacity to guide the country towards resilience. In Abdile's assessment, the most notable success of the process was the consultation and representation of the clans, which, while imperfect, was followed through better than in previous peace processes. Working with clans, he argues, is essential given the structure of Somali society:

If you want to build a state, you look at the clans … I for example am a Somali, a Muslim and a member of my clan, but the clan comes first. These three support each other but clan is the most important … If decisions are not done respecting this, agreed negotiation results are not respected because the clan support is not there.⁶⁵

As Antti Pentikäinen stresses, the final outcome was generally accepted as legitimate, and the achieved result was not violently contested by the parties that participated.⁶⁶ While opposition was raised, opposition groups – with the important exception of al Shabaab – did not resort to violence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was commissioned by the United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Rauli S. Lepistö is an independent researcher. His expertise is on conflict studies, studying both war and peace with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle-East. His previous research interests have discussed military crisis management and peacebuilding. He holds MA from both King's College London and University of Aberdeen.

Rachel M. Gisselquist, a political scientist, is Research Fellow with UNU-WIDER. She works on the politics of the developing world, with particular attention to ethnic politics and group-based inequality, state fragility, governance and sub-Saharan African politics. Her research is published in multiple scholarly journals and edited volumes. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Jussi Ojala is a senior adviser on right to peace with Finn Church Aid. His work is focused on Africa, peace mediation and situations of fragility. He has previously worked with the European Union and United Nations in peacebuilding and mediation tasks.

Notes

1. Somalia has been a subject of interim governance since 2000 when Transitional National Government (TNG) was established. Transitional Federal Government replaced TNG in 2004. It should be noted that throughout the existence of these governance structures, their ability actually to govern has been very limited.

2. L. Zanotti, ‘Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: Setting the Stage for Disaster, Envisioning the Future', Third World Quarterly, Vol.31, No.5, 2010, pp.755–71; Rosan Smits and Deborah Wright, ‘Engagement with Non-State Actors in Fragile States: Narrowing Definitions, Broadening Scope', CRU Report, The Hague: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2012, p.8.

3. OECD, Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Fragile States, Paris: OECD, 2014; World Bank, ‘World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development', Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011.

4. See, e.g., Ken Menkhaus, ‘State Failure, State-Building, and Prospects for a “Functional Failed State” in Somalia', ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.656, No.1, pp.154–72.

5. Rachel M. Gisselquist, ‘Aid and Institution-Building in Fragile States: What Do We Know? What Can Comparative Analysis Add?', ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.656, No.1, pp.6–21; OECD, The Missing Piece: Improving International Support to the Peace Process, Paris: OECD, 2012; OECD/DAC, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, Paris: OECD, 2007.

6. Derrick W. Brinkerhoff, ‘Developing Capacity in Fragile States', Public Administration and Development, Vol.30, No.1, pp.66–78; UNU-WIDER, ‘Position Paper: Aid, Governance, and Fragility', Helsinki, Finland: UNU-WIDER, 2014.

7. David D. Booth, ‘Aid Effectiveness: Bringing Country Ownership (and Politics) Back in', Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.12, No.5, 2012, pp.537–58; Rachel M. Gisselquist and Danielle Resnick, ‘Aiding Government Effectiveness in Developing Countries', Public Administration and Development, Vol.34, No.3, 2014, pp.141–8; Martin Sjöstedt, ‘Aid Effectiveness and the Paris Declaration: A Mismatch between Ownership and Results-Based Management?', Public Administration and Development, Vol.33, No.2, 2013, pp.143–55.

8. See, e.g., Deborah Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, ‘Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.52, No.2, 2004, pp.255–85; Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock and Matt Andrews, ‘Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation', Journal of Development Studies, Vol.49, No.1, 2013, pp.1–18.

9. See, e.g., Matt Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013; Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, ‘Tax and Development: Donor Support to Strengthen Tax Systems in Developing Countries', Public Administration and Development, Vol.34, No.3, 2014, pp.182–93; Otwin Marenin, ‘Styles of Policing and Economic Development in African States', Public Administration and Development, Vol.34, No.3, 2014, pp.149–61; Sarah Repucci, ‘Designing Effective Civil Service Reform: Lessons from Past Experience', Public Administration and Development, Vol.34, No.3, 2014, pp.207–18.

10. Paul Collier, ‘How to Spend It: The Organization of Public Spending and Aid Effectiveness', WIDER Working Paper WP/2012/005, Helsinki: United Nations University–World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).

11. See www.odi.org/fellowship-scheme.

12. JSI, ‘Liberia Fellows Program', n.d. (at: www.jsi.com/JSIInternet/IntlHealth/project/display.cfm?ctid=na&cid=na&tid=40&id=5028), last accessed 11 Dec. 2014.

13. TCC and W&L, ‘Liberia Law Fellows Program', n.d. (at: law.wlu.edu/deptimages/carter%20fellows/Law%20Fellows%20report-April%2024.pdf), last accessed 11 Dec. 2014.

14. ‘Activist on the World Stage: Carroll Wilson Remembered', The MIT Tech Review, Feb./Mar. 1984. Made available by Carroll L. Wilson Award Committee (at: web.mit.edu/idi/carroll_wilson_award/CLW-Activist.pdf).

15. Todd Moss and Stephanie Majerowicz, ‘Beam Me Back, Scotty: How Young Liberians Are Coming Home', Center for Global Development, 17 Apr. 2012 (at: http://www.cgdev.org/blog/beam-me-back-scotty-how-young-liberians-are-coming-home-0).

16. The PiP project is credited for having provided successful dispute resolution to 11 conflicts in Somaliland and Puntland between 2008 and 2010 and to 3 conflicts in Central Somalia regions of Mudug and Galguduud.

17. FCA, ‘Peace in Somalia 2009–2012', unpublished document on advocacy plan, Helsinki, 2009.

18. See Rauli Lepistö, ‘Building a Piece of Peace: Finn Church Aid's Outreach and Reconciliation Project in Somalia', CMC Finland Studies in Peacebuilding and Civilian Crisis Management, Vol.4, No.1, 2013, Kuopio: Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland), pp.12–14.

19. Ibid., p.5.

20. FCA, ‘Rights Based Approach – Principles for FCA Programme Work', unpublished FCA document, Helsinki, 2012.

21. Ibid., p.1: ‘We should always prioritize local ownership and the agency of the rights-holders.'

22. APRODEV (the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organizations in Europe), ‘Background Paper on Fragile States and Situations', unpublished paper, Brussels, Mar. 2009. The document emphasized the role of NGOs, coherence and local ownership in fragile settings. It also stressed the ‘importance of supporting … state-building focus to inclusive society building'.

23. Boesen J. Kirkemann and T. Martin, Applying a Rights-Based Approach – an Inspirational Guide for Civil Society, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of Human Rights, 2007 (at: http://www.humanrights.dk/files/pdf/Publikationer/applying a rights based approach.pdf), p.12.

24. Ibid., p.12.

25. United Nations, Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’, [S/2011/549,] 30 Aug. 2011 (at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202011%20549.pdf), the Secretary General of the UN offers a paragraph to the activities of the joint project. New York, 2011, p.9.

26. The funds of the final planned activity of the joint project with UNPOS were transferred to the TFG as it was convening the Somali elders in Mogadishu in April 2012. See Lepistö (n.18 above), p.28.

27. Interview regarding the role of Somali elders and FCA's contribution to ending the transition, with Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali and Minister of Interior Abdisamad Moallim Mohamoud, London, 23 Feb. 2012.

28. The total budget of the capacity support to TFG was €60,400.

29. The MFA subsequently allowed FCA to count the start of the project from 22 Apr. 2012.

30. Telephone interview with Hosh, Helsinki, 8 Sept. 2013.

31. Abdile had personal security that cost roughly 400 USD per day.

32. Private donations and other un-earmarked funding.

33. This paragraph is based on the interview with Hosh (see n.30 above).

34. In practice the Elders Council carried the main responsibility in selecting the members of the Parliament. Technically the Elders Council proposed the names of Members of Parliament, who had to go through a vetting process by the Technical Selection Committee (TSC). The TSC excluded some 70 of the proposed names who did not meet the set criteria.

35. Interview with Hosh (see n.30 above).

36. Interview with Abdile, Helsinki, 2 Aug. 2013.

37. Telephone interview with Hosh (see n.30 above) and also telephone interview with K. Hassan, Helsinki, 2 Jul. 2013.

38. Interview, Hassan (see n.37 above).

39. Interview, Hosh (see n.30 above).

40. Interview with Abdile, Helsinki, 2 Jul. 2013.

41. Interview with Hosh (see n.30 above).

42. Interview, Abdile (see n.36 above).

43. Interview, Hosh (see n.30 above).

44. The topics also included reconciliation and mediation.

45. Interview, Abdile (see n.36 above).

46. Ibid.

47. Lepistö (see n.18 above), p.26.

48. Another complicating feature was the existence of many self-appointed elders, who were active in the media aiming to increase their status in the eyes of the public. Often it turned out that these people were not real elders.

49. Interview, Abdile (see n.36 above).

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. A. Atta-Asamoah, ‘Situation Report. Long Walk to Restauration: Lesson from Somalia's Transition Process', Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, report, Jul. 2013, pp.1–10.

53. FCA Strategy, ‘Finn Church Aid's Strategy 2009–2012’, Helsinki, 2009 (at: http://www.archive-fi.com/page/34974/2012-06-02/http://www.kua.fi/filebank/811-Strategia_englanti.pdf), p.7.

54. FCA facilitated a workshop during the PiP where the elders had gathered to discuss sharia law. In this meeting, the role of women arose on the agenda resulting in an understanding that there were no theological obstacles to including women in politics.

55. Interview, Hosh (see n.30 above).

56. Telephone interview with H. Ismail, Helsinki, 28 Aug. 2013.

57. A. Cawo, ‘Marginalising Women in Somali Politics', Al Jazeera, 24 Aug. 2013 (at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/201282385318698928.html).

58. Interview, Abdile (see n.40 above).

59. A. Farhia, ‘Somali Women Parliamentarians: The Predicament of Finding a Voice', Hiraan online, 15 May 2013 (at: http://www.hiiraan.com/op4/2013/may/29375/somali_women_parliamentarians_the_predicament_of_finding_a_voice.aspx).

60. Interview, Ismail (see n.56 above).

61. Interview, Abdile (see n.36 above).

62. Ibid.

63. See www.newdeal4peace.org/.

64. For example, the International Crisis Group commented: ‘The current political process has been as undemocratic as the one it seeks to replace, with unprecedented levels of political interference, corruption and intimidation.' See ICG, ‘Somalia: From Troubled Transition to a Tarnished Transition?', press release, 20 Aug. 2012 (at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2012/africa/somalia-from-troubled-transition-to-a-tarnished-transition.aspx). The Economist wrote: ‘In practice, the “wise men” were largely chosen by existing leaders of the UN-backed transitional federal government (TFG), which has spent the past eight years stealing aid money while leaving AU peacekeepers to fight the Shabab. Money has also played a role in the selection of new MPs. Parliamentary seats were apparently sold for up to $25,000.' ‘Somalia's Government, Baby Steps', 25 Aug. 2012 (at: http://www.economist.com/node/21560905).

65. Interview, Abdile (see n.36 above).

66. Interview with A. Pentikäinen, Helsinki, 13 Jun. 2013.