Great powers and UN force generation: a case study of UNAMID

ABSTRACT

How are UN peacekeepers recruited? While we know a lot about UN member states’ general predispositions to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, we know very little about the actual UN force generation process. What role do the UN and its powerful member states play in this process? How do they interact to recruit UN forces? This article seeks answers to these questions by means of an in-depth case study of the force generation process for the UN–AU operation to Darfur (UNAMID). The case study relies on over 50 interviews with high-level decision-makers as well as newly declassified documents from the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. Overall the case study depicts a tantalizing division of labour between the technical expertise of the United Nations and the political power of key UN member states. It appears that UN peacekeeping contributions sometimes require the provision of financial and/or other incentives that go beyond regular UN reimbursements. As a result, powerful UN member states need to step in. However, UN officials play an important brokerage role in this process informing interested UN member states which countries would be suitable for bilateral démarches and why.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Ayo Abogan and his family for their hospitality during her stay in Nigeria. She also thanks the editor of International Peacekeeping and the anonymous reviewers who have helped shape and polish this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Marina E. Henke is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University.

Notes

1 UNDPKO, ‘Fact Sheet'.

2 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 57.

3 Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers; Cunliffe, Legions of Peace; Sorenson and Wood, The Politics of Peacekeeping; Stähle, ‘China's Shifting Attitude; Andersson, ‘Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations; Lebovic, ‘Uniting for Peace?; Perkins and Neumayer, ‘Extra-Territorial Interventions. General peacekeeping predispositions and political decisions cannot be confounded. Bellamy and Williams note in this regard: ‘A positive disposition towards the UN or peacekeeping in general does not determine individual decisions about contributing to particular missions; these depend on specific state policies and commitments at particular moments in time. In similar fashion, even states, which are not positively predisposed to UN peacekeeping, might contribute if the right circumstances present themselves.' Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, 18.

4 UNAMID, ‘Background'.

5 UNDPKO, ‘UNAMID Fact Sheet'; Réseau Francophone de Recherche, ‘MINUAD'.

6 The regime in Khartoum was vehemently opposed to a UN operation in Darfur. Nevertheless, in November 2006, at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, the compromise of an AU–UN hybrid operation was forced upon Sudan. One of the conditions inserted into the compromise by Sudan was that UNAMID would have a predominant African character: to the greatest extent possible, first priority in the UNAMID force generation process would go to suitable pledges from African countries. Only if the Africans were unable to meet force requirements would pledges from other troop contributors be considered.

7 See, for example, Henke, ‘The International Security Market.

8 Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, 57.

9 Coleman, ‘Token Troop Contributions’, 51.

10 De Jonge Oudraat, ‘The United Nations’, 491.

11 Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 22–3; see also Jakobsen, ‘National Interest; Beardsley and Schmidt, ‘Following the Flag; Mullenbach, ‘Deciding to Keep Peace; Gilligan and Stedman, ‘Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?’. Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? is an exception. Fortna argues that the demand for peacekeeping from local actors is just as important as the supply from the international community.

12 Hawkins, Delegation and Agency, 13–14.

13 Barnett and Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power.

14 E.g. Cable, Embassy Manila to Secretary of State, ‘The Philippines to Support UNSCR Resolution on Darfur’, 27 July 2004, Darfur Collection, box 2, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.

15 Black and Williams, The International Politics, 197.

16 Interview by author with John Bolton, US Ambassador to the UN, Washington, DC, Feb. 2012.

17 Taylor, ‘The People's Republic of China’, 183.

18 This compelled Nicholas Kristof to write in his blog on 11 Sept. 2007: ‘France and Germany, I sympathized with your opposition to the war in Iraq. But are you really now so petty and anti-Bush that you refuse to stand with the U.S. against the slaughter in Darfur, or even to contribute significant sums to ease the suffering? Does the Chirac government really want to show the moral blindness to Sudan's genocide that the Vichy regime did to Hitler's?’ Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, 11 Sept. 2007.

19 Huliaras, ‘Evangelists, Oil Companies’, 711.

20 Samantha Power, ‘Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan Be Stopped?’, New Yorker, 31 Aug. 2004, 56–63; Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur.

21 Huliaras, ‘Evangelists, Oil Companies', 712–13.

22 Ibid., 168; Michael Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, was a significant figure in bringing about this alliance. ‘Christians are the Jews of the 21st century’, he claimed prominently in the Wall Street Journal on 5 July 1995, referring to the persecution of Christians in Sudan.

23 Huliaras, ‘Evangelists, Oil Companies', 170.

24 Interview by author with Charles Snyder, Washington, DC, Mar. 2012.

25 Woodward, US Foreign Policy, 113.

26 Samantha Power, ‘Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan Be Stopped?’, New Yorker, 31 Aug. 2004, 56–63.

27 De Waal, War in Darfur.

28 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 22.

29 Ibid., 23.

30 Lanz, ‘Save Darfur', 673; Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 41.

31 Interview by author with Andrew Natsios, US Special Envoy to Darfur, Washington, DC, Mar. 2012.

32 Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur, 111.

33 Ibid., 85.

34 Ibid., 127.

35 In early 2008, after being criticized for its relationship with Sudan, China also claimed that if not for its lobbying with Khartoum, UNAMID would not have deployed.

36 Interview by author with John Bolton, US Ambassador to the UN, Washington, DC, Feb. 2012.

37 Taylor, ‘The People's Republic of China’, 176.

38 Ibid., 183.

39 Holslag, ‘China's Diplomatic Manoeuvring’, 74.

40 ‘Sudan; Security Council Explores Transition from African Union to UN,’ Africa News, 3 Feb. 2006.

41 Input was also solicited from other bureaus. The list was one of the topics of discussion of several high-level meetings inside the State Department.

42 ACOTA originated as an Africa Bureau programme in 1997 under the name of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). President Bill Clinton established ACRI as the first of a whole array of new military programmes aimed at expanding US military activities on the African continent. In 2004, ACRI was expanded and renamed ACOTA. Today the Africa Bureau maintains the policy lead and regional political expertise for ACOTA input, while the POLMIL bureau oversees the budget process and contractors implementing ACOTA training. GPOI extended the ACOTA programmes to countries outside of Africa. GPOI is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which is managed by the POLMIL Bureau. It had a budget of $660 million (FY2005–FY2008) to fund potential TCCs’ training and deployment needs. Countries which were beneficiaries of ACOTA or GPOI are not legally required to deploy to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, it ‘is a process the U.S. encourages’. ACOTA Fact sheet February 2006, 4 November 2012, available online at www.nps.edu/services/usmc/Docs/ACOTA_FactSheetFeb06.pdf?OpenDocument

43 Volman, ‘US to Create’.

44 Interview by author with Charles Snyder, Washington, DC, Mar. 2012.

45 Cable, Secretary of State to Embassies Berlin, Cairo, Copenhagen, Moscow, New Delhi, Pretoria, Kyiv, The Hague, Seoul, ‘Urgent Darfur Demarche for Aviation Support and Transportation Assets’, 23 Oct. 2007. Document available from author.

46 Ibid.

47 Cable, Secretary of State to Embassies Dhaka, Islamabad, Jakarta, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Khartoum, New York ‘Sudan – Confirmation of Force Contributions to UNAMID’, 9 Oct. 2008. Document available from author.

48 Letter, John Bolton, US Ambassador to the UN to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General UN, 8 Feb. 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.

49 Fax, Secretariat of the UN to Permanent Mission of the United States to the UN, 6 Nov. 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.

50 Joint NGO Report, UNAMID Deployment.

51 Cable, Secretary of State to Embassies Dhaka, Islamabad, New Delhi, Pretoria, Luanda, New York, Darfur Collective, ‘Démarche Request: Transport and Logistics Units for the UN-AU-Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)’, 7 Mar. 2008. Document available from author.

52 Ibid.

53 Cable, Secretary of State to Embassies in Amman, Colombo, Dhaka, Islamabad, ‘Urgent Darfur Démarche for Aviation Support and Enabling Assets’, 9 May 2008. Document available from author.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Cable, UN Mission in New York to Secretary of State, ‘U/SYG Guéhenno: Still No Agreement on UNAMID TCC List', 15 Nov. 2007. Document available from author.

57 Cable, Secretary of State to Darfur Collective, UNSC Collective, Embassies Abuja, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Kiev, Prague, Pretoria, Warsaw, New York, ‘Deputy Secretary Negroponte's Meetings with U/SYF Guéhenno’, 9 Nov. 2007. Document available from author.

58 Cable, Embassy Delhi to Secretary of State, ‘India Pondering a Possible Expanded Role in Sudan Peacekeeping’, 14 Mar. 2006. Document available from author.

59 Iliffe, Obasanjo, Nigeria, 283.

60 ‘African Leaders Reject Foreign Intervention in Darfur’, Taipei Times, 19 Oct. 2004.

61 Iliffe, Obasanjo, Nigeria, 218.

62 Ajayi, ‘Why Did Nigeria Go’, 399.

63 Ibid.

64 Adebajo, ‘Nigeria’, 266.

65 Because of its ethnic composition, Nigeria is an extremely volatile state almost permanently ‘dancing on the brink’ of civil war. Campbell, Nigeria.

66 Interview by author with Martin Luther Agwai, Abuja, May 2012.

67 Cable, Embassy Abuja to Secretary of State, ‘Sudan: Nigeria Agrees to Deployment of Vmt Monitors to Darfur’, 15 Apr. 2004. Document available from author.

68 Cable, Embassy Abuja to Department of State (AF/RSA) and (AF/W), ‘Nigeria Requests Assistance for Darfur Deployment’, 19 July 2004. Document available from author.

69 Cable, Secretary of State to All African Diplomatic Posts, ‘Africa Press Guidance October 28, 2004’, 18 Oct. 2004, Darfur Collection, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.

70 Cable, Secretary of State to All African Diplomatic Posts, ‘African Press Guidance December 3, 2004’, 3 Dec. 2004, Darfur Collection, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.

71 Campbell, Nigeria, 17–18.

72 Moss, ‘Double-Standards’, 22.

73 In his speech Obasanjo mentioned Nigeria's peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Darfur strongly implying a debt of gratitude owed to Nigeria by the United States. Cable, Embassy Abuja to AF Assistant Secretary Newman, ‘U.S./Nigeria Bilateral Relationship: Obasanjo Lays Down Marker’, 17 Sept. 2004. Document available from author.

74 Cable, Embassy Abuja to Department for African Affairs (Dan Epstein), OECD Paris, ‘Letter from President Obasanjo to President Bush re Follow-up on December 2, 2004 Meeting at White House’, 23 Dec. 2004. Document available from author.

75 Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 The same week that the delegation was visiting Washington, DC, Congress had passed a resolution calling on Nigeria to turn Charles Taylor over to the International War Crimes Tribunal. The United States was also offering a US$2 million reward for Taylor's capture.

79 Hayner and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Negotiating Peace.

80 Michael A. Fletcher, ‘Nigerian Leader Says He Won't Turn Taylor over for Trial', Washington Post, 6 May 2005, available online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/05/AR2005050501738.html

81 Ibid.

82 Campbell, Nigeria, 19.

83 Interview by author with Gen. Pennap, Abuja, May 2012. There are also rumours that Obasanjo resolved the controversial dispute with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in an attempt to get troops out of Bakassi and into Darfur.

84 Interview by author with Martin Luther Agwai, Abuja, May 2012.

85 Cf. Beswick, ‘Peacekeeping, Regime Security.

86 Cable, Embassy Kigali to Department of State, ‘Rwanda Accepts 20 Million of USG Darfur Equipment’, 4 Sept. 2008. Document available from author.

87 Foreign Military Training Joint Report.

88 ‘Rwanda: U.S. Splashes Military Aid on Country', All Africa, 24 Jan. 2008, available online at http://allafrica.com/stories/200801240943.html.

89 Cable, Embassy Cairo to Department of State, ‘Egypt: Darfur Troop Deployment Highlights Intent to Maintain Significant Role’, 10 Jan. 2008. Document available from author.

90 Ibid.

91 Chanlett-Avery and Dolven, ‘Thailand.

92 Interview by author with John Blaxland, Australian Military Attaché to Thailand, Canberra, Nov. 2011.

93 Chanlett-Avery and Delven, ‘Thailand'.

94 Interview by author with Andrew Natsios, US Special Envoy to Darfur, Washington, DC, Feb. 2012.

95 Joint NGO Report, UNAMID Deployment.

96 Woehrel, ‘Ukraine’, 12.

97 Ibid.

98 ‘IMF Approves U.S. $16.4 Billion.’

99 Interview by author with US diplomat, Washington, DC, July 2012.

100 Woehrel, ‘Ukraine', 7.

101 The parliament had only resumed operations after it passed a resolution stating that the parliament would consider legislation to join NATO only after a public referendum approved NATO membership.

102 Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, 5.

103 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for this excellent suggestion.