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ABSTRACT
The article aims at investigating how do mechanisms of bureaucratic politics contribute to the decision of deploying troops and in so doing to mold the national motivations underscoring the deployment. The text takes Brazil as a case and researches the decision-making process in the country, using past cases of deployments that actually happened. The bulk of the analysis, however, is dedicated to the negative case where Brazil decided not to contribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The analysis provides a breakdown of the 2017–2018 domestic political and bureaucratic decision-making process in Brazil as regards the possibility of deploying troops to MINUSCA and traces the mechanisms in action that resulted in the negative decision by the government. Based on the case of Brazil, considerations are made on the importance of investigating negative scenarios to better understanding how developing countries, such as the BRICS, value the motivations and ultimately decide to contribute to a UN mission.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions and Ambassador Maria Elisa Berenguer for her suggestions on an earlier version of the article.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Gjevori and Visoka, “Albanian Peacekeepers,” 532.
2 Bellamy and Williams apud Harig and Kenkel, “Are Rising Powers Consistent,” 629.
3 Bove and Elia, “Supplying peace”; Coleman and Nyblade, “Peacekeeping for Profit?”; Cunliffe, Legions of Peace; Harig, “Re-importing the Robust Turn”; Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate”.
4 Research aiming to explain why Brazil did not do something is rare. As Mahoney and Goertz, “The Possibility Principle,” it is so because non-events blur the border between cases, negative cases and irrelevant cases. Researchers tend not to problematize the non-deployment, assuming that something that was not simply was not. The central question of this research derives, however, from the assumption that the deployment was constantly possible and could even be considered a ‘near miss’, an event that ‘ … was possible and plausible, considered, and ultimately rejected’, Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 352.
5 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate” is an exception, but the author focuses on military doctrine and diplomatic worldview rather than in more immediate interests and the ensuing bureaucratic politics.
6 ibid, 173.
7 Process tracing draws on Bennet and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 7: ‘ … the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjectures of events within a case for the purpose of either developing or testing hypothesis about causal mechanisms that might actually explain the case.’ The use of mechanism here follows Gerring, “The Mechanismic Worldview,” 178 core meaning: ‘the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished.’
8 Bellamy and Williams, “Broadening the Base,” 6.
9 Daniel, “Why so Few Troops,” 58.
10 Duursma and Gledhill, “Voted Out,” 23.
11 Bellamy and Williams, “Broadening the Base,” 9.
12 Cunliffe, Legions of Peace, 154–5.
13 ibid, 18–19.
14 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 41–2.
15 Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework,” 236.
16 Bendix, “Bureaucracy”; Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 44–5.
17 Preston and ‘t Hart, “Understanding and Evaluating,” 53–4.
18 Access to Brazilian government documentation was provided via Brazil’s Access to Information Law (Law 12.527 of 2011). The law allows for classification between 5 and 25 years, although it is believed most documents regarding MINUSCA are restricted for 15 years from their creation. Initially, broad requests were made to the MFA and MoD for documents produced about MINUSCA between mid-2017 and early 2019. The search was refined with follow up from references in the documentation originally obtained. In addition, lists of declassified documents released monthly by the two organs were checked in search for relevant items. Citations that were written in languages other than English were translated by the authors.
19 Because the diplomats requested complete secrecy, they were not named, only numbered (I, II, III and IV) and the date of the interview indicated.
20 In the terms of Beach and Pedersen, “Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms,” MINUSCA would fit quadrant IV, because the expected result is not present. However, it is arguable that their expectation of the deterministic character of mechanisms is excessive, given the mechanisms’ complexity. As will be explained, in the current research, causes and mechanisms might be present and the result not obtain because of different initial conditions and because the mechanisms themselves are not set to produce always positive results. As a consequence, the framework for analysis follows the possibility principle, within which negative cases are not necessarily deviant.
21 It is accepted practice for the Mission in New York to provide an opinion on the convenience of the contribution. Delbrasonu focuses on how the possible deployment would affect the political position of Brazil in UN fora – the Security Council in particular. Ambassadors in New York tend to be officials with political connections and experience, and their opinion bears weight. Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança.
22 Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança; Fontoura, O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz; Naves, “O Processo Decisório Brasileiro”.
23 Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança, 90.
24 Fontoura, O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz; Uziel and Vargas, “Twenty Years Wandering,” 16.
25 Coleman, “Building International Legitimacy”.
26 Peacekeeping missions proper were overwhelmingly favoured, although the country also seconded militaries to emergency forces authorized by the Security Council (UNSC) in two occasions, in Timor-Leste (1999) and the Congo (2003). Peacekeeping missions are under command and control of the UN and emergency forces merely report post facto; troop contributing countries in peacekeeping mission are partially reimbursed by the UN, contrary to what occurs in the case of emergency forces. Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança.
27 Fontoura, O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz; Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança. Pereira explicitly wants to find a reason, however flimsy, to justify the contribution to MINUSCA because he is aware of the political momentum in that direction. Pereira, “A participação brasileira”.
28 These figures are taken from papers produced by the Brazilian MoD. They are generally accepted in the literature, but there is doubt concerning early contributions and no method to discount double count.
29 Vargas, Campanha Permanente.
30 Aviso of 12 February 2004 from the MFA to the MoD. Fontoura and Uziel, “A MINUSTAH, o Brasil e o Conselho de Segurança.”
31 Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança; Naves, O Processo Decisório Brasileiro; Verenhitach, A MINUSTAH e a Política Externa Brasileira, 53–6.
32 Exposição de Motivos Interministerial EM 121 of May 2004, from the MFA and the MoD; ‘Brasil já pode enviar tropa para o Haiti e ampliar contingente no Timor Leste’ Senado Notícias, 19 May 2005. Available at: https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2004/05/19/brasil-ja-pode-enviar-tropa-para-o-haiti-e-ampliar-contingente-no-timor-leste (accessed March 20, 2020).
33 Supreme Federal Court. The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Brasília, 2019. Available at: http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/legislacaoConstituicao/anexo/brazil_federal_constitution.pdf.
34 Luís Kawaguti ‘Almirante sem navio’ Folha de São Paulo, 29 June 2011. Available at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft2906201116.htm (accessed March 20, 2020).
35 Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança.
36 Fontoura, O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz, 307.
37 Alsina Júnior, “Grand Strategy and Peace Operations,” 14.
38 Alsina Júnior, “Grand Strategy and Peace Operations”.
39 Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança.
40 General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, MINUSTAH FC from 2007–2009, was invited by the UN to serve as FC (2013–2015) in the UN mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) and to contribute to the ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers’ report (‘the Cruz Report’).
41 Hamann, “O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz”. Interview with member of the Brazilian Armed Forces, August 2019.
42 Harig, “Re-importing the Robust Turn.”
43 Parecer n. 24/SRI-3/SCAI/CAE/EMCFA-MD of 17 December 2012.
44 Ibid, 10.
45 This was likely because of the experience of General Santos Cruz as MONUSCO’s FC.
46 SETA (‘arrow’, in Portuguese) stands for ‘Adjudicated Troops Deployment Selection’ (Seleção de Emprego de Tropas Adjudicadas), marking a preference for the acronym over the naturality of the expression.
47 “Forças Armadas estudam envio de militares para auxiliar ONU em missões de paz”, Agência Brasil, 23 September 2017. Available at: https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2017-09/forcas-armadas-estudam-envio-de-militares-para-auxiliar-onu-em-missoes-de-paz (accessed March 20, 2020).
48 Ibid. Interview with Brazilian diplomat I, November 2019; interview with Brazilian diplomat II, December 2019.
49 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Decreto/D7347.htm (accessed March 20, 2020). Telegram 434 from Brazilian Embassy in Brazzaville to SERE date: 28/08/2014.
50 Source: http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2017-10/apos-saida-do-haiti-brasil-podera-atuar-em-missao-de-paz-na-africa (accessed March 20, 2020).
51 Source: Vladimir Patonow ‘Após saída do Haiti, Brasil poderá atuar em missão de paz na África’ Agência Brasil, 22 October 2017. Available at: http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2017-10/apos-saida-do-haiti-brasil-podera-atuar-em-missao-de-paz-na-africa (accessed March 20, 2020).
52 Fontoura and Uziel, “A MINUSTAH, o Brasil e o Conselho”.
53 Remarks made during a session held on 18 November 2017. Available, in Portuguese, at: https://www.camara.leg.br/internet/sitaqweb/TextoHTML.asp?etapa=3&nuSessao=398.3.55.O&nuQuarto=62&nuOrador=1&nuInsercao=4&dtHorarioQuarto=22:04&sgFaseSessao=OD%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20&Data=18/12/2017&txApelido=BRUNA%20FURLAN&txFaseSessao=Ordem%20do%20Dia%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20&dtHoraQuarto=22:04&txEtapa=Com%20reda%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20final (accessed March 20, 2020).
54 Henrique Gomes Batista, ‘Brasil enviará tropas para missão na África até julho de 2018’O Globo, 17 November 2017. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/brasil-enviara-tropas-para-missao-na-africa-ate-julho-de-2018-22078155 (accessed March 20, 2020).
55 Cláudia Trevisan, Rodrigo Cavalheiro e Tânia Monteiro ‘Plano de enviar tropas brasileiras para missão na África enfrenta resistência’ O Estado de São Paulo, 18 November 2017. Available at: https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,plano-de-enviar-tropas-brasileiras-para-missao-na-africa-enfrenta-resistencia,70002088786 (accessed March 20, 2020).
56 Interview with Brazilian diplomat II, December 2019.
57 The MFA, as behooves the diplomatic tradition, was very economical with public statements, and relevant archival material mostly has not been declassified yet. The fact that the deployment did not materialize makes it even harder to identify the perceptions of the MFA.
58 Interview with Brazilian diplomat I, November 2019; Interview with Brazilian diplomat II, December 2019; Interview with Brazilian diplomats III and IV, April 2021; Telegrams 475 of 22 May 2019, 2823 of 29 October 2018 and 1287 of 5 June 2017 from Delbrasonu to SERE; and Telegrams 475 of 22 May 2019 and 156 of 29 October 2018 from SERE to Delbrasonu. Also Harig, “Re-importing the Robust Turn”. The issue, however, cannot be conceptualized as that of a parochial corporatism opposing diplomats and military. General Santos Cruz, for instance, commenting on the possible deployment to MINUSCA argued: ‘The MFA is responsible for justifying the deployment in a peace mission, and not the MoD. The MoD executes. The MoD can provide its opinion, its consideration, but the justification to the nation, the justification to the Brazilian Congress, is the MFA that has to do.’ Castro and Marques, Missão no Haiti, 107–9.
59 Jamil Chade ‘Espero ter novas contribuições do Brasil em missões’ O Estado de São Paulo, 18 November 2017.
60 Vijay Rangarana & Michel Miraillet ‘O Brasil em missões de paz da ONU — a cobra ainda está fumando’, Folha de São Paulo, 15 November 2017 Available at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2017/11/1935490-o-brasil-em-missoes-de-paz-da-onu----a-cobra-ainda-esta-fumando.shtml (accessed March 20, 2020).
61 ‘MINUSCA - Incerteza quanto à participação do Brasil’, Defesanet, 29 November 207. Available at: http://www.defesanet.com.br/africa/noticia/27816/MINUSCA---Incerteza-quanto-a-participacao-do-Brasil/ (accessed March 20, 2020).
62 ‘Minusca: Brasil manda comitiva de dez oficiais para reconhecimento na República Centro-Africana’. 9 January 2018. Available at: https://www.forte.jor.br/2018/01/09/minusca-brasil-manda-comitiva-de-dez-oficiais-para-reconhecimento-na-republica-centro-africana/ (accessed March 20, 2020).
63 Henrique Gomes Batista ‘Maia promete acelerar envio de soldados à República Centro-Africana’ O Globo, 15 January 2018. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/maia-promete-acelerar-envio-de-soldados-republica-centro-africana-22290679 (accessed March 20, 2020).
64 Based on calculations by the Brazilian Armed Forces, analysts estimate that UN reimbursement to Brazil represents only 40% of the total costs associated with participating in UN missions. (Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança, 107; Hamann, “O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz. ”
65 Laís Alegretti & Gustavo Uribe ‘Temer diz que Brasil deve enviar tropas a força de paz da ONU na África’ Folha de São Paulo, 20 January 2018. Available at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2018/01/1951960-temer-diz-que-brasil-deve-enviar-tropas-a-forca-de-paz-da-onu-na-africa.shtml (accessed March 20, 2020).
66 In the Brazilian system, the initial deployment of troops is financed by an additional appropriation of resources to the Armed Forces. In subsequent years, once the annual costs are clearer, the necessary resources are incorporated to the regular budget. Reimbursements by the UN cover around 40% of the expenses and are seized by the public treasury, not allocated to the military. If the episode actually took place, president Temer suggested changing the first part of the equation, but keeping the second. This would have made the deployment far costlier and less interesting to the Armed Forces. Hamann, “O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz,” 104.
67 Interview with Brazilian diplomat I, November 2019; interview with Brazilian diplomats III and IV, April 2021.
68 Fontoura, O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz, 213.
69 Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança, 84.
70 The small Brazilian contribution was criticized in the Brazilian press. See: Eduardo Hollanda ‘Representação pífia’ Istoé, 22 September 1999. Available at: https://istoe.com.br/33904_REPRESENTACAO±PIFIA/ (accessed March 20, 2020).
71 Source: Sérgio Pardellas and Hugo Marques ‘Brasil gasta fortuna no Haiti’ Jornal do Brasil, 16 January 2006.
72 Harig, “Re-importing the Robust Turn”. Meredith Kohut, ‘Their country is being invaded’: Exodus of Venezuelans overwhelms Northern Brazil’ The New York Times, 28 April 2018. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/28/world/americas/venezuela-brazil-migrants.html (accessed March 20, 2020).
73 apud Alves, Da Itália à Coréia, 250.
74 Alves, Da Itália à Coréia, 199; interview with diplomats III and IV, April 2021.
75 Bruno Góes ‘Brasil desiste de participar de missão de paz na República Centro-Africana’ O Globo, 9 April 2018. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/brasil-desiste-de-participar-de-missao-de-paz-na-republica-centro-africana-22573896 (accessed March 20, 2020).
76 Luis Kawaguti ‘Brasil recusa convite da ONU para integrar missões de paz na África; motivo seria financeiro’ UOL, 10 April 2018. Available at: https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2018/04/10/ministerio-da-defesa-brasil-nao-atendera-convite-da-onu-para-enviar-tropas-a-missoes-de-paz.htm (accessed March 20, 2020).
77 Ata da XIV Reunião de Estados-Maiores Conjuntos de Defesa Brasil-França, Brasília, 03 e 04 de julho de 2018.
78 The speech is available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/speeches-articles-and-interviews/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-speeches/20896-speech-by-brazil-s-president-jair-bolsonaro-at-the-opening-of-the-74th-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-september-24-2019-photo-alan-santos-pr (accessed July 20, 2020).
79 The document is available in Portuguese at: https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy_of_estado-e-defesa/pnd_end_congresso_.pdf; quote from page 33 (accessed March 20, 2020).
80 ‘Cerimônia de desincorporação e despedida do navio-capitânia da FTM-UNIFIL é realizada no Líbano’ Marinha do Brasil, 2 December 2020. Available at: https://www.marinha.mil.br/noticias/cerimonia-de-desincorporacao-e-despedida-do-navio-capitania-da-ftm-unifil-e-realizada-no (accessed July 11, 2020).
81 Pereira, “A participação brasileira”.
82 Coleman, “United Nations Peacekeeping Decisions,” 324.
83 Diplomat José Viegas served as Defence Minister in the 2003–2004 period, when Brazil deployed troops to MINUSTAH. When the frigate was deployed to UNIFIL in 2011, diplomat Celso Amorim was Minister of Defence. In that case, however, it was his international experience that emboldened the Brazilian Armada to proceed with the deployment, and the MFA bandwagoned in the initiative. The deployments to MINUSTAH and UNIFIL benefitted from interbureaucratic coordination between the MFA and the MoD, including in Port-au-Prince and Beirut.
84 Marques, “Peace Missions and Civil-military Relations.”
85 Alsina Júnior, “Grand Strategy and Peace Operations,” 12; Hamann, “O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz,” 105.
86 Alsina Júnior, “Grand Strategy and Peace Operations,” 16.
87 Burges and Bastos, “The Importance of Presidential Leadership”.
88 Sotomayor, “Why Some States Participate,” 172.
89 Uziel apud Harig and Kenkel, “Are Rising Powers Consistent,”636.
90 Alsina Júnior, “Grand Strategy and Peace Operations,” 16.
91 Lundgren, Oksamytna, and Coleman, “Only as Fast as its Troop Contributors”.
92 Weber, Essays in Sociology, 234.
93 Leandro Mazzini ‘Congresso é quem deve decidir futuro das tropas’ Jornal do Brasil, 18 January 2010.
94 Cunliffe, Legions of Peace, 182–6.
95 Cunliffe, Legions of Peace, 18-19.
96 Bellamy and Willliams “Broadening the Base,” 9.
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Notes on contributors
Eduardo Uziel
Eduardo Uziel is a Brazilian diplomat and a PhD candidate at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. He worked in the United Nations Division (2002–2006) in Brasília and at both the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations (2006–2009) and the Brazilian Embassy in Tel Aviv (2009–2012). He was professor of International Organizations in the Instituto Rio Branco—Brazilian Diplomatic Academy. He has published a book and several articles on United Nations peacekeeping and Security Council affairs and currently serves at the Brazilian Embassy in New Delhi.
Danilo Marcondes
Danilo Marcondes is an Assistant Professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he coordinates the Defence Diplomacy Studies Centre (Núcleo de Estudos de Diplomacia de Defesa-NEDD). Danilo holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge. His research areas include Brazilian foreign and defence policy and Latin American engagement with NATO and the OECD.