ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN RUSSIA: CHECHNYA AND DAGESTAN COMPARED

Muslims in Russia are often alleged (most recently by President Putin) to be potential Islamists, ready to support the radical Chechen separatist project of establishing an Islamic state in the Caucasus. This article challenges this claim, which assumes that Muslims in Russia form a coherent group based on religious identity, and as such, share a set of common political preferences that oppose the central state. The article demonstrates instead that: (1) Russian Muslims practice various forms of Islam; (2) religious belief and practice is not always correlated with anti-Moscow political mobilization; (3) ethnicity, rather than always reinforcing Muslim identity, interacts with Islam in complex ways throughout Russia's ethnic republics, and (4) Muslims in Russia have largely opposed radical Islamic movements during the past 15 years and most likely will continue to do so. These points are supported by an analysis of Islam, identity and politics in Dagestan and Chechnya, the two republics in Russia that have witnessed the largest amount of Islamic mobilization.

Acknowledgements

Financial support for this article was provided by the Kroc Institute for International Peace at the University of Notre Dame and the University of Miami James W. McLamore Summer Award in Business and the Social Sciences.

Elise Giuliano is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Miami, specializing in ethnic politics and post-Soviet politics. She is completing a manuscript on why popular support for nationalist movements emerged and then declined in Russia, entitled “Why Secession Fails: The Rise and Fall of Ethnic Minority Nationalism in Russia.”

Notes

1. Quoted in Vladimir Bobrovnikov, “Islamophobia and Religious Legislation in Daghestan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus No. 2 (2000), pp. 138–50.

2. Quoted in Amy Waldman, “Russia's Muslims Unchained, but still Chafing,” New York Times, 9 November 2001, p. A10.

3. Transcript of first part of President Putin's meeting at Novo-Ogarevo. Notes from Jonathan Steele. See Johnson's Russia's List #14, 8368.

4. “Piecing Together the Caucasus,” New York Times, 19 September 2004, p. 12.

5. It is relevant to note that many Russians are utterly convinced by Samuel Huntington's claims about civilizational divides. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

6. Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yemelianova (eds.), Islam in Post-Soviet Russia (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 10.

7. Muslims are concentrated in the republics of Adygeya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karbardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkassia, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan, as well as in parts of central Russia.

8. A discussion of Euro-Islam—a moderate set of beliefs that accepts rule by a secular state—is outside the scope of this article. For an interesting analysis of Euro-Islam, see Kate Graney, Ch.4 in Blair Ruble and Dominique Arel (eds.), Re-Bounding Identities in Russia and Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

9. Georgi Derlugian, “Che Guevaras in Turbans: The Twisted Lineage of Islamic Fundamentalism in Chechnya and Dagestan,” New Left Review, Vol. A, No. 237 (1999), pp. 3–27.

10. Galina Yemelianova, “Ethnic Nationalism, Islam and Russian Politics in the North Caucasus,” in C. Williams and T. Sfikas (eds.), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States (London: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 120–48.

11. Pilkington and Yemelianova, p. 93 and Chapter 1.

12. Mathew Evangelista, “Dagestan and Chechnya: Russia's Self-Defeating Wars,” October 1999, PONARS Policy Memo 95.

13. Pilkington and Yemelianova, pp. 91–6.

14. Derlugian argues that Wahhabism in Dagestan developed in order to challenge traditional Islamic institutions (specifically the Naqshabandia Sufi brotherhood) and to challenge powerful local ethnic clientelist networks. Derlugian, 1999.

15. Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.); Philip Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1991), pp. 196–233.

16. Why Secession Fails: The Rise and Fall of Ethnic Minority Nationalism in Russia, manuscript in progress.

17. Shaimiev was less tolerant of “unofficial” Islam in Tatarstan, in the late 1990s closing down several medresses that were putatively funded by fundamentalist schools of Islam in Middle Eastern states.

18. Pilkington and Yemelianova, pp. 73, 78.

19. Bashkirs in Bashkortostan is another.

20. The Tsumadinskii, Botlikhskii and Novolakskii raions (districts) of Dagestan.

21. “Russia Retaliates against Armed Insurgents in Dagestan: More Than 10,000 Newly Uprooted in August,” Worldwide Refugee Information, September 1999, www.refugees.org/world/articles/russia_rr99_8.htm [accessed 13 August 2002].

22. “Dagestani Leadership Protests Incursion” 9 July 1999 (based on RFE/RL Newsline) NUPI Center for Russian Studies Chronology of Events, www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/ [accessed 15 August 2002].

23. Franz Schurmann, “If Dagestan Islam Spreads it Could Bring Down Russia” (19 August 1999), www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/5.17/990819-dagestan.html [accessed August 15, 2002].

24. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript. Interview with Fiona Hill and Philip Kohl. (August 12, 1999), www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec99/dagestan_8-12.html [accessed 13 August 2002]. Also see: Thomas Goltz, “Moscow's Dagestan Dilemma-Prelude to the Breakup of An Empire” (14 September 1999), www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/5.19/990914-russia.html [accessed 12 August 2002].

25. In Dagestan alone there are 11 official ethnic groups and more than 30 local languages.

26. Enver Kisriev, “Islam's Political Role in Dagestan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (2000), pp. 65–70.

27. Galina M. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Politics in the North Caucasus,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2001), p. 666.

28. There are a total of 32 officially recognized ethnic groups in Dagestan and 15 recognized Sufi brotherhoods. The two main ones are the Nakshbandia tariqat and the Kadyria tariqat.

29. However, there is another group of Dagestani Naqshbandiis led by shaykhs with deeper knowledge of Islam who oppose Sayid-efendi and the official Muftiyat. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Politics” p. 674.

30. Despite the DUMD's power, it does not monopolize Islam in Dagestan and controls only four or five mosques out of 57 in the capital Makhachkala. Kisriev, 2000.

31. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Politics,” pp. 668–71.

32. Vakhid Akaev “Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Caucasus: Myth or Reality?,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (2000), p. 141.

33. Aleksei Kudriavtsev, “Wahhabism: Religious Extremism in the Northern Caucasus,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (2000), p. 1.

34. Robert Bruce Ware, “Why Wahhabism Went Wrong in Dagestan,” Central Asia Caucasus Monitor, 2000. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. www.cacianalyst.org. [accessed 11 August, 2002].

35. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Politics,” p. 677. Italics in original.

36. One scholar maintains that Wahhabism developed in Dagestan in the 1970s without any support from Arab missionaries. Bobrovnikov, “Islamophobia,” 2000.

37. See Yemelianova, footnote 81.

38. Dagestan is ranked 87th out of Russia's 89 territories in terms of economic development. Its subsistence level is one of the lowest in the country and its mortality rate and infant mortality rate increased during the 1990s.

39. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Islam,” pp. 675, 678.

40. Ibid., p. 676.

41. Kisriev, 2000. p. 68.

42. Igor Dobaev, “Islamic Radicalism in the Northern Caucasus,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (2000). Kudriavtsev mentions a third, smaller kind of genuine Wahhabism centered in Astrakhan, which follows the teachings of Ibn Abd-el-Wahhab and views Saudi Arabia as the ideal model. Kudriavtsev, p. 133.

43. The IRP later developed into the All-Russia Islamic Party of Revival.

44. The demonstration ended with armed clashes against Dagestani police forces.

45. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Islam,” p. 677.

46. Dobaev, 2000, p. 77.

47. Ibid., p. 78.

48. Yemelianova, “Sufism and Politics, p. 679.

49. Also at this time mufti Saidmukhamed Abubakarov was murdered, causing further instability. Kisriev, p. 69; Robert Bruce Ware, 2002 Central Asia Caucasus Analyst.

50. ‘No Surprises in Dagestani Election,” Chronology of Events, NPI Center for Russian Studies. (26 June 1998), http://nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/ krono.exe?2379. [accessed 10 August, 2002].

51. Dobaev, 2000, p. 78.

52. Kudriavtsev. 2000, p. 136.

53. According to The Moscow Times, Dagestan's Interior Minister Adilgirei Magomedtagirov, told the civilian volunteers at the time: “You may have whatever you wish—pistols, assault rifles, grenade launchers, even a tank. But come to us and register it.” Nabi Abdullaev, “Dagestanis Try to Stick to Their Guns,” The MoscowTimes.com.7 August 2002, p. 1.

54. Dobaev, 2000, p. 82.

55. Ibid., p. 85.

56. Derlugian, p. 9.

57. See Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities Annual Convention, New York, 2004 and forthcoming in Europe-Asia Studies. Also see, Edward W. Walker, “Islam in Chechnya,” BPS Caucasus Newsletter, p. 10. Paper based on summary of talk given at Berkeley-Stanford Conference “Religion and Spirituality in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” 13 March 1998.

58. Francesca Mereu, “Russia: Islam Plays Fundamental Role in North Caucasus Life (Part 2)” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 January 2002, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/04012002113316.asp [accessed 17 August 2002].

59. Walker, 1998.

60. Specialists disagree, however, on whether foreign states themselves provided support to the Chechens. Groups and individuals within the states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, Pakistan, Turkey, and Afghanistan are said to have supported the Chechen cause. See Dobaev, 2000, p. 79.

61. Ibid.

62. The Chechen custom of holding expensive feasts when a family member died or got married was always difficult for poor families who therefore welcomed the end of this practice, according to Sergei Arutyunov, the head of the Caucasus section of the Institute of Ethnology in Moscow. Quoted in Mereu.

63. People apparently also saw Shari'a rule as hypocritical as they learned that they could bribe their way out of Shari'a punishment. Kudriavtsev, p. 134.

64. Akaev, “Religious-Political Conflict,” p. 8.

65. Quoted in Dobaev, p. 79. Khattab's full name is Habib Abd el-Rahman Khattab.

66. Liz Fuller, “Putin Names Interim Chechen Leader,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Caucasus Report, Vol. 3, No. 24 (16 June 2000), pp. 1–2.

67. Vakhit Akaev, “Religious-Political Conflict in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” in Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, www.ca-c.org/dataeng/05.akaev.shtml [accessed 18 August 2002].

68. Ibid., p. 7.

69. Ibid., p. 8, and Kudriavtsev, p. 135.

70. Dobaev, p. 82.

71. The role of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in funding the incursion (and in Chechnya in general) is highly controversial. Some believe bin Laden saw military incursion into Dagestan as an opportunity to spread his influence beyond Chechnya into the North Caucasus. According to Gennadi Troshev, the Russian Commander of the North Caucasian Military District (admittedly a biased observer), “Bin Laden transferred over $30 million to Basaev and Khattab. He organized deliveries of weapons and military training. What is more he personally visited the training camps at the Chechen village of Serzhen-Iurt on the eve of the invasion of Dagestan.” President Maskhadov vehemently denies that bin-Laden has ever been on the territory of Chechnya. G.N. Troshev, quoted in Igor Dobaev, “Radical Political Institutions of the Islamic World: Escalation of Violence” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (12) 2001.

72. Dmitry Makarov, “Who is Behind the Terrorist Act in Beslan?” RIA Novosti, 21 September 2004, in Johnson's Russia List, #16 (22 September 2004), No. 8378.

73. “Chechen rebel president says talks could end war in 30 minutes,” BBC Monitoring. Source: Daymokh news agency web site, 16 September 2004, in Johnson's Russia List, #7 (17 September 2004), No. 8372.

74. Ned Walker argues that the war in Chechnya created and strengthened Islamic identities among the Chechen population, rather than Islamic identity giving rise to armed conflict with the Russians. Walker, “Islam in Chechnya,” 1998.

75. Mathew Evangelista, “Dagestan and Chechnya: Russia's Self-Defeating Wars,” October 1999, PONARS Policy Member 95, Cornell University, p. 3.