If At First You Don't Succeed, Try, Try Again: (Re)Designing Referenda to Ratify a Peace Treaty in Cyprus

Abstract

The latest round of negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem commenced in 2008 with a pledge to submit any agreement to separate simultaneous referenda. Unlike the aborted Annan Plan that was rejected in referenda in 2004, this round of negotiations was meant to be qualitatively different in being for and by “Cypriots.” This article assesses the negotiations given the 2004 precedent and legacies. Does the current process entail a qualitatively different approach to design that could affect the outcome of a future referendum? Opportunities to bring citizens into the process have been missed. Moreover, due to stalemates, the international mediators have had to exert more pressure, leading to internationalization and nullifying the “Cypriot-led” process.

Notes

1. UN News Centre, “Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Leaders Announce ‘Full-Fledged’ Negotiations,” (2008), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID_27489&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1 (accessed 6 Feb. 2012).

2. Following years of protracted negotiations a UN Blueprint entitled “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” was submitted to both parties on 22 April 2004 to be put to separate, simultaneous referenda on both sides of the divided island. The particular blueprint and its various iterations over two years of revision has been informally dubbed the “Annan Plan.”

3. Mandate of the SASG, (n.d.), http://www.uncyprustalks.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2480&tt=graphic&lang=l1 (accessed 15 Aug. 2010).

4. E. Kaymak, and A. Lordos, “The Cyprus Peace Polls: Contribution to the Peace Process,” (Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 17–20 February 2010.

5. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognized by the Republic of Turkey. As the government of the (Greek Cypriot-led) Republic of Cyprus remains internationally recognized as the government of the whole of the island, the entire island is now considered to be a member of the European Union. However, the acquis communautaire is not in force in North Cyprus pending a political settlement to the Cyprus problem (see Protocol No. 10 of the Accession Treaty). In this article, TRNC is used in this context. Similarly, in order to demarcate regimes, as opposed to geography, where appropriate this article uses the terms North (TRNC) and South (Republic of Cyprus).

6. The referenda results were considered valid; although the regulation of the referendum campaigns themselves was subsequently scrutinized. See Matt Qvortrup, “Fair Voting? The Regulation of Referendums in Cyprus in Comparative Perspective,” Cyprus Review 17(2):13–25 (2005).

7. Viola Drath, “The Cyprus Referendum: An Island Divided by Mistrust,” American Foreign Policy Interests 26: 341–51 (2004).

8. Neophytos G. Loizides, “Referendums in Peace Processes” (Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, 15–17 February 2009).

9. See Matt Qvortrup, Balloting to Stop Bullets? Referendums and Ethnic Conflict (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming).

10. See Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes, 21–22.

11. For example, the Mozambique Peace Pact of 1992 and the Bosnia Dayton Accord of 1995.

12. Kudret Ozersay, “Separate Simultaneous Referenda in Cyprus: Was it a ‘Fact’ or an ‘Illusion’”?, Turkish Studies 6(3): 379–99 (2005).

13. See http://www.uncyprustalks.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=5059&tt=graphic&lang=l1.

14. Drath, “The Cyprus Referendum,” 341–51.

15. Similarly, contradictions between the 1960 system and the acquis communautaire were not accounted for through the act of accession. Some claim the two are fundamentally incompatible. See W. Mallinson, “Foreign Policy Issues of a Part-Occupied EU State,” Cyprus Review 23(1): 155–60 (2011).

16. James Ker-Lindsay, “A Second Referendum: Parliamentary Elections in Cyprus,” Mediterranean Politics 11(3): 441–46 (2006); Also see Harry Anastasiou, “Nationalism as a Deterrent to Peace and Interethnic Democracy: The Failure of Nationalist Leadership from the Hague Talks to the Cyprus Referendum,” International Studies Perspectives 8: 190–205 (2007).

17. See Alexandros Lordos, “Rational Agent Or Unthinking Follower? A Survey-Based Profile Analysis Of Greek Cypriot And Turkish Cypriot Referendum Voters,” in T. Diez and N. Tocci, eds., Cyprus: A Conflict At The Crossroads (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); see also Alexandros Lordos, Civil Society Diplomacy: A New Approach For Cyprus? An Evidence Based Report In Cooperation With Cymar Market Research And Kadem Cyprus Social Research (2005), http://www.help-net.gr/civilsocietydiplomacy.pdf (accessed 10 March 2005).

18. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFCYP), “UN in Cyprus: An Inter-communal Survey of Public Opinion by UNIFCYP,” Feb.–June (2007), http://www.unficyp.org/media/Survey_24_04_2007_ENG.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2009).

19. A. Lordos, E. Kaymak, and N. Tocci, A People's Peace in Cyprus (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009).

20. Cyprus 2015 is a unique project in that it is a program implemented by the Joint Program Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives (JPU) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program Action for Cooperation and Trust in Cyprus (UNDP ACT). A core element of Interpeace's approach to peace-building is to create environments and facilitate encounters between people that strengthen trust and the ability to collaborate across divides. See http://www.undp-act.org/data/factsheet_cyprus_2015%281%29.pdf; also see www.interpeace.org; and www.cyprus2015.org (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

21. For instance, in March 2011 the Secretary General took issue with “blame game” tactics: “In my previous report to the Security Council in November 2010 (S/2010/603), I made several observations related to the need for the two leaders to be mindful about creating an environment conducive to successful talks and to eventual support for a settlement by Cypriots on both sides. I pointed out with concern the growing public skepticism that a settlement will be reached. The low expectations of the public are in contrast to the exciting possibilities being discussed by the sides. While I respect the need for confidentiality in the process of achieving compromise, I continue to believe that the official secrecy of the negotiations, broken only by the selective leaking of texts through the media, is not conducive to constructive negotiations. This trend has continued since November and public opinion continues to predict failure of the negotiations. Both leaders need to make a convincing case to the public that good progress is being made, that the status quo cannot continue, and that a united Cyprus can be achieved that will be to the benefit of both communities.” (S/2011/112, paragraph 17) See UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on his Good Offices mission in Cyprus,” 24 Nov. 2010, S/2010/603, http://www.uncyprustalks.org/media/SG%20Reports/S_2010_603.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2012); see also UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on his Good Offices mission in Cyprus,” 4 March 2011, S/2011/112, http://www.uncyprustalks.org/media/SG%20Reports/SG_Report_Good_Offices_4_March_2011.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

22. In the UN Secretary General's report of 3 March 2011, he “made it clear when I met with the leaders in New York in November, and again in Geneva in January, that the United Nations respects the talks as a Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned process and that it is precisely for this reason that we expect the two sides to assume their responsibility to drive the process. The destiny of Cyprus is in the hands of its leaders. It is they who must act to reconcile their differences. Without their dedication and commitment to reunifying the island, the process cannot move forward.” (S/2011/112, paragraph 16). See note 21.

23. See reports ranging from reconciliation to demographics. On reconciliation see Aris Sitas, Dilek Latif, and Natasa Loizou, Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-Existence and Forgiveness in Cyprus in the Post-Referendum Period, Report 4/2 (Nicosia, Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007). The potential for macroeconomic convergences and gains in trade have been analyzed in a series of reports published by the PRIO Cyprus Centre. The most recent report on the topic is Ozlem Oguz Cilsal, Praxoula Antoniadou Kyriacou, and Fiona Mullen, The Day After III: The Cyprus Peace Dividend for Turkey and Greece, Paper 1/20 (Nicosia, Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2010), http://www.prio.no/upload/The%20day%20after%20III.pdf. PRIO reports on property have been published elsewhere as well. For an analysis of the politics of property in Cyprus, see Ayla Gurel and Kudret Ozersay, “Cyprus and the Politics of Property,” Mediterranean Politics 11(3): 349–69 (2006). Also see Ayla Gurel and Kudret Ozersay, “Property and Human Rights in Cyprus: The European Court of Human Rights as a Platform of Political Struggle,” Middle Eastern Studies 44(2): 291–32 (2008). For an analysis of the political integration of Turkish “settlers,” see Mete Hatay, Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish “Settlers” in Northern Cyprus, Report 4/2005 (Nicosia, Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2005), http://www.prio.no/Cyprus/Publications/.

24. See http://www.ahdr.info/home.php (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

25. See http://www.undp-act.org (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

26. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 389/2006 of 27 Feb. 2006. For details on implementation, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/aid_implementation_en.htm (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

27. Optimists in 2008 considered that Talat and Christofias were an unique negotiating pair, sharing the goal of reunification. See A. Varnanva, “Why the Latest Initiative to Reunify Cyprus Will Fail: The Six Pillars of the Cyprus ‘Problem’ and the Impregnable Roof,” Cyprus Review 23(1): 147–54 (2011).

28. See note 5.

29. A federation has been the basis of negotiations since the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the sides in Cyprus. The 1977 agreement foresaw an “independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic.” Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions have confirmed that the solution sought would provide for the establishment “of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects.” See UN Security Council 649 (1990), http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm (accessed 16 Aug. 2010).

30. See http:www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1588 (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

31. For instance, see S/2011/112, paragraph 17.

32. Joint Statement of the Cyprus Leaders, read out on their behalf by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 1 Feb. 2010. See http://www.uncyprustalks.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2879.

33. See the Joint Statements of the Leaders, 1 Feb. 2010, http://www.uncyprustalks.org/ nqcontent.cfm?a_id2879 (accessed 5 Feb. 2012); See also the 30 March 2010 statement, http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2922 (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

34. See the Joint Statements of the leaders of 1 Feb. 2010 and 30 March 2010.

35. See “Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus” of 24 Nov. 2010 (S/2010/603). Also see “Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus” of 11 May 2010 (S/2010/238), http://www.uncyprustalks.org/media/SG%20Reports/S_2010_238.pdf (accessed on 15 Aug. 2010).

36. See Günter Verheugen's statement upon Republic of Cyprus President Papadopoulos’ call for a no-vote in the Greek Cypriotreferendum where he draws the “conclusion from his [Papadopoulos’] words that the government of Cyprus opposes the international settlement.” Verheugen moreover continued: “I will be very undiplomatic now in saying that I personally feel that I have been cheated by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.” Chris Patten, then EU commissioner for External Relations, referred to an overall feeling within the EU Commission of “being badly let down” and repeated Verheugen's comment about deception; for both, see http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2004/04-04-22.ana.html#29 (accessed 20 Feb. 2005).

37. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/treaties/dat/12003T/htm/12003T.html (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

38. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L2003:236:0931:0956:EN:PDF (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

39. See http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/turkish_cypriots/index_en.htm (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

40. Report of the UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus to the Security Council of 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), 27. “The Secretary-General applauds the Turkish Cypriots, who approved the plan notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it entailed for many of them. He regrets that the Turkish Cypriots will not equally enjoy the benefits of EU membership as of 1 May 2004, but he hopes that ways will be found to ease the plight in which the people find themselves through no fault of their own.”

41. With resolution 541 (1983), the UN Security Council on 15 Nov. 1983 condemned this declaration of independence, defining it as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. The Council also called on all states to refrain from recognizing the TRNC. Resolution 550 (1984) of the Council, regarding the exchange of ambassadors between the TRNC and Turkey, called upon all states not to facilitate or in any way to assist the TRNC. These resolutions, as well as the decision of the European Court of Justice in 1994 concerning the import of products from the TRNC have collectively led to the economic, social, cultural, and political isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.

42. “I welcome the decision of the Turkish Cypriots. They have clearly and convincingly come out in favor of the reunification of Cyprus in a bicommunal, bizonal federation. They have done so despite the pain and dislocation that would have been caused by the relocation of about one third of the Turkish Cypriots under the plan, given the territorial arrangements and property provisions. Clearly, the benefits of European Union membership were an important factor in this. In opting for a settlement, the Turkish Cypriots have broken with the decades-old policies of seeking recognition of the ‘state’ they purported to create in 1983.” See UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on his Good Offices mission in Cyprus,” 28 March 2011, S/2011/603, http://www.un.int/cyprus/s4372004.htm (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

43. In the main articles of the 2004 blueprint, self-determination is exercised jointly: “We, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, exercising our inherent constitutive power, by our free and democratic, separately expressed common will adopt this Foundation Agreement.” The new state of affairs, they were described in Article 2: “The new state of affairs 1. This Agreement establishes a new state of affairs in Cyprus. 2. The treaties listed in this Agreement bind Cyprus and the attached legislation shall apply upon entry into force of this Agreement. 3. The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance remain in force and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, Cyprus shall sign a Treaty with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, along with additional protocols to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance.” See “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” Foundation Agreement, Main Articles, http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/AppendixA/FOUNDATION-AGREEMENT.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

44. The Republic of Cyprus was established through international treaties (collectively, the Nicosia Agreements) signed on 16 Aug. 1960. These include the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Establishment, and the Treaty of Alliance. The Treaty of Guarantee is between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The treaty guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity, security, and the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus itself was established through the Treaty of Establishment, through which Cyprus became an independent state and by which British sovereign bases are regulated and retained in Cyprus. Finally, the Treaty of Alliance foresaw cooperation in security matters regarding acts of aggression directed against the independence. Archbishop Makarios and Fazil Kucuk signed the Nicosia Agreements as the democratically elected representatives of the Republic of Cyprus (as the President and Vice-President, respectively).

45. Unlike in the case of German reunification where the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and the rules of customary international law applied, various TRNC treaties were to carry over into the new state of affairs in Cyprus had the Annan Plan been adoopted. For an analysis of the Annan Plan, see A. Sozen and K. Ozersay, “The Annan Plan: State Succesion or Continuity,” Middle Eastern Studies 43(1): 125–41 (2007).

46. ANNEX IX: COMING INTO BEING OF THE NEW STATE OF AFFAIRS Entry into force of the Foundation Agreement

1.

The Foundation Agreement shall enter into force and bring into being a new state of affairs, following its approval by separate simultaneous referenda on 24 April 2004 asking the following question: “Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?” Yes [ ] No [ ] and the signature by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom no later than 29 April of the attached Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus at a signing ceremony in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (or his representative).

2.

Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate simultaneous referenda, or any guarantor fail to sign the Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus by 29 April 2004, it shall be null and void, and have no legal effect. Entry into force of the Treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on Matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus Article 1 Article 2 Article 3 Immediately upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, the Co-Presidents of the United Cyprus Republic shall sign into force the Treaty with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, which shall be registered as an international treaty in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

See “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, Annex IX, The Coming Into Being of a New State of Affairs, http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/AnnexIX/AnnexIX.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

47. See http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/AnnexIX/AnnexIX.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2012).

48. Kıbrıs Sorununun Çözümüne İlişkin Halkoylaması (Özel ve Geçici Kurallar) Yasası (Law on Referendum With Regard to the Solution of the Cyprus Problem [Special and Transitional Provisions]) (22 March 2004, Number 2/2004).