A new integrated model of the formation of coalitions: perspectives on the Twentieth Knesset

Abstract

This article integrates various aspects of the office-seeking approach, the policy-seeking approach and the institutional rule approach to theories about establishing coalitions to create a new model that takes into account the mutual influence between the formation and stability of the coalition, party policies and the difference between the status of the party that formed the coalition and that of its coalition partners. It also introduces a new index based on mechanical physics to measure the degree of fragmentation in the coalition. Using data from the 20 terms of the Israeli Knesset, particularly the Twentieth Knesset, as our case study, the article demonstrates that large ideological distances between the political parties can be an advantage for the coalition’s formateur. The results confirm the validity of the proposed model, which awaits further validation in other parliaments worldwide.

Keywords:

• The Twentieth Knesset
• Theory of Coalitions
• parliamentary democratic regimes
• threshold
• security dimension
• party
• stability

Notes

1. Baron and Ferejohn, “Bargaining in Legislatures,” 1181–1207; Diermeier et al., “A Structural Model of Government Formation,” 27–70; Diermeier and Merlo, “An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures,” 783–797.

2. Plott, “A Notion of Equilibrium,” 787–806; McKelvey, “General Conditions of Global Intransitivity,” 1085–1111.

3. Black, Theory of Committees and Elections; Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy; Davis and Hinich, “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation,” 175–208.

4. Schofield, “Existence of Structurally Stable Equilibrium,” 267–284.

5. The definition of the yolk is in: McKelvey, “Intransitives in Multidimensional Voting Models,” 472–482; The definition of the Uncovered Set is in: Schofield and Sened Multiparty Democracy.

6. Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions, 102–123.

7. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” 373–383.

8. De Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation.

9. Axelrod, Conflict of Interest; Diskin, “The New Political System of Israel,” 498–515.

10. Austen-Smith and Banks, “Election, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes,” 405–423.

11. Sened, “A Model of Coalition Formation,” 350–372.

12. Lupia and Strøm, “Coalition Termination and the Strategic,” 648–665.

13. Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments.

14. Müller and Strom, Policy, Office, or Votes?, 3–23.

15. Druckman and Warwick, “Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality Payoffs,” 627–649; Warwick and Druckman, “The Portfolio Allocation Paradox,” 635–665.

16. Rae, Political Consequences of Electoral Laws; Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies; Schofield, “Coalition Politics,” 245–281; Cox, “Making Votes Count”; Diskin et al., “Why Democracies Collapse,” 291–309.

17. The definition of the Rae index is in: Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws; the definition of the ENP is in: Laakso and Taagepera, “Effective Number of Parties,” 3–27.

18. Maoz and Somer-Topcu, “Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability,” 805–833.

19. Arian and Shamir, “The Primarily Political Functions,” 139–58; Diskin, Elections and Voters in Israel; Diskin, “The New Political System of Israel,” 498–515; Shamir and Arian, “Collective Identity and Electoral Competition,” 265–277; Shamir et al., “Kadima – Forward in a Dealigned Party System.”

20. Sheafer, “The Media and Economic Voting,” 33–51.

21. Shamir and Gedalya-Lavy, “A Gender Gap in Voting?”, 231–255.

22. Krippendorff, Content Analysis; Benoit and Laver, Party Policy in Modern Democracies.

23. The surveys are published on the Israel National Election Studies website: www.ines.tau.ac.il/

24. Netemeyer et al., Scaling Procedures.

25. Tsebelis, Veto Players.

26. According to Rosenthal and Wolfson (“The Determinants of Government Budgetary Implementation,” 432–451), the budgetary allocations between the coalition partners is part of the formateur’s proposal to the coalition parties partners; although these data were collected for all the coalitions that were established until the last coalition (March 2015), we did not use the budgetary allocations in this paper because the relevant budget data are the budget that actually was used (expenditure) not the proposed budget. These data will be published on April 2016. The budgetary expenditure shows the political pressures that exerted by coalition partners on coalition formateur.

27. Diskin and Diskin, “The Politics of Electoral Reform”; Sened “A Model of Coalition Formation,” 350–372; Nachmias and Sened, “The Bias of Pluralism,” 269–294; Meydani, “Political Transformations and Political Entrepreneurs”; Rosenthal, “Policy Instability in a Comparative Perspective,” 172–196.

28. Kadima was established by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the head of the Likud, together with senior leaders from the Likud and Labour. The establishment of Kadima was considered a major shock to the Israeli political landscape.

29. Netanyahu is not the only one who has held cabinet posts while serving as Prime Minister. David Ben-Gurion, who served as PM from the 1st Knesset until the 4th Knesset took over as Defence Minister. Similarly, Levi Eshkol, the PM in the 5th Knesset, also held the posts of Defence Minister and Agriculture Minister.

30. See note 4.