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ABSTRACT
In order to pressure Israel to withdraw from the lands it took following the 1956 Suez War, the United States made two key commitments. It promised Israel it would open the Straits of Tiran if Egypt reimposed a blockade and that if the blockade nevertheless persisted, Israel would have the right to act on its own to ensure free passage of Israeli ships. When Nasser closed the Straits in 1967, President Johnson reneged on both commitments. LBJ chose not to act to end the blockade and warned Israel not to act alone. The failure to live up to these commitments contributed to the outbreak of the 1967 War, hampered efforts to get Israel to give up the territories it conquered as a result of the war, and reinforced in Israel the conviction that it could not depend on others for its security. Israel and the Middle East would be very different places today if those commitments had been fulfilled.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Three valuable accounts of the Suez War that examine the conflict from different perspectives are Zekilow, ed., Suez Deconstructed; Doran, Ike’s Gamble; and Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War.
2. An especially good account of Israeli decision making regarding the Suez War can be found in Zekilow, Suez Deconstructed, 41–57; 194–205.
3. For a concise view of Eisenhower’s motives, see Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace, 39–40.
4. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 77–78; Merta, “Washington,” 278–292; Love, Suez, 623; Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions, and Peace, 41–42; and Rostow, Peace in the Balance, 258–260.
5. Ben Gurion later explained that his speech stemmed from his being ‘drunk’ with victory. See Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 282.
6. Ross, Doomed to Succeed, 37–38.
7. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 186.
8. Reprinted in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 684–685.
9. Eisenhower, “President Eisenhower Radio Address.”
10. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 300.
11. Golda Meir, “Statement to the General Assembly.” And Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History, 532.
12. Ross, Doomed to Succeed, 38.
13. Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History, 532–533.
14. Kalb, The Road to War, 209.
15. Of the many books on the events leading up to the Six Day War, two of the very best are, Oren, Six Days of War; and Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally.
16. Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 388 and 396.
17. On Eshkol’s wavering, see Safran, Israel, 396; Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 68; and Oren, Six Days of War, 87–90.
18. For a detailed look at LBJ’s relationship with Israel, see Ross, Doomed to Succeed, ch.4. See also, Oren, Six Days of War, 111–112.
19. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 47; and Oren, Six Days of War, 105.
20. Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 401.
21. Johnson, “Middle East Crisis,” Box 20, p. 2; and Oren, Six Days of War, 104.
22. Yitzhak Rabin was especially vocal in asserting that an Israeli delay in launching a strike would increase the length of the war, the number of Israeli casualties and might even affect its outcome. See Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 70.
23. Israel’s director of Mossad, Major General Meir Amit told Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara that even with air superiority, Israel could expect 4,000 casualties in the event of war. See ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Conversation between Major General Meir Amit and Secretary McNamara – late afternoon, 1 June 1967’ in Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 124.
24. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 326.
25. Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 401.
26. Ross, Doomed to Succeed, 43.
27. Kalb, The Road to War, 212; and Oren, Six Days of War, 104.
28. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 291.
29. For the results of Harman’s trip to visit Eisenhower, see Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, 354; and Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 384.
30. Eban, Abba Eban, 353.
31. Raviv, Israel at Fifty, 96.
32. Eban, Abba Eban, 344–347; and Safran, Israel, 401–402.
33. Raviv, Israel at Fifty, 98.
34. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 69.
35. “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX, Document 64; Johnson, “Middle East Crisis,” Box 20, p. 54; Quandt, Peace Process, 31–33; and Oren, Six Days of War, 105–108.
36. “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX, Document 69.
37. Quoted in Oren, Six Days of War, 109. See also p. 108 for a discussion of the Rostow meeting.
38. Eban, Abba Eban, 351–352.
39. Oren, Six Days of War, 108.
40. Ibid., 114.
41. “Notes of Meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson and Foreign Minister Abba Eban at the White House, 26 May 1967,” Israeli Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30, appearing in Shalom, “Lyndon Johnson’s Meeting with Abba Eban,” 227; See also, Eban, Abba Eban, 355.
42. Raviv, Israel at Fifty, 100.
43. Eban, Abba Eban, 356.
44. Excellent accounts of the meeting can be found in Shalom, “Lyndon Johnson’s Meeting with Abba Eban,” 221–236; “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX, Document 77; Eban, Abba Eban, 354–359; and Oren, Six Days of War, 114–115.
45. See note 39 above.
46. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 293.
47. “Notes of Meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson and Foreign Minister Abba Eban at the White House, 26 May 1967,” Israeli Foreign Ministry Memo, HZ 5937/30, appearing in Shalom, “Lyndon Johnson’s Meeting with Abba Eban,” 233; and Oren, Six Days of War, 115.
48. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 293.
49. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 392.
50. Ibid.
51. Oren, Six Days of War 115.
52. Kalb, The Road to War, 215, quoting former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis.
53. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 71–72.
54. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 414.
55. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 75.
56. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 420.
57. Kalb, The Road to War, 215.
58. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 314.
59. Eban, Abba Eban, 328.
60. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 41.
61. Safran, Israel, 395– 396.
62. Oren, Six Days of War, 120.
63. Raviv, Israel at Fifty, 100.
64. Kalb, The Road to War, 216.
65. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 341.
66. Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire, 48.
67. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 447.
68. Oren, Six Days of War, 113.
69. “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX, Document 343, cited in Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire, 54.
70. Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire, 48 and 56.
71. Ross and Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace, 51.
72. Kalb, The Road to War, 340.
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Notes on contributors
Steven R. David
Steven R. David is Professor of Political Science Johns Hopkins University