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ABSTRACT
Spanish society was severely affected by the post-2008 economic recession. The country’s political institutions were faced with a major crisis of legitimacy that gave birth to new social and political movements. In this context, the response of the Roman Catholic Church to the recession was threefold. Firstly, the recession had an impact on the Church itself, as it reactivated the recurring public debate on Church–State relations and the institutional benefits enjoyed by the Church. Secondly, the recession also provided a limited opportunity for the Church. On a normative level, the Catholic hierarchy used the recession to give voice to its discourse on the moralization of the economy and politics, relating it to recurrent campaigns by the Church on family policies and the territorial unity of Spain. In addition, the social sector of the Church responded to the recession through a program of social work intended to offset the failures of both the market and the public authorities. Thirdly, the social work undertaken by specific sectors of the Church unexpectedly led to forms of political advocacy, independently or alongside anti-austerity or pro-migrant social movements. All these effects sharpened previously existing dividing lines within the Catholic landscape.
Acknowledgements
Part of the work presented in this article originated in a two-year stay at the European University Institute in Florence (2012–2013), which was supported by the European Commission in the form of a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship. The author thanks Emilie Cooke-Martageix, Lina Molokotos-Liederman, and Mike Fay for their help in translating this article as well as Lina Molokotos-Liederman, Elisabeth Arweck, and the two anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Contemporary Religion for their comments. CORRESPONDENCE: CNRS-Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux, 11 allée Ausone, 33607 Pessac, France.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. This session also signalled a change of style at the head of the SEC since the Cardinal Archbishop of Valladolid Ricardo Blázquez succeeded Cardinal Rouco Varela, considered to be more conservative.
2. The authors note, however, that “the more religious the respondents declare themselves and the more frequent church-goers they are (at least once a month) the more they trust institutions in both countries” (Stathopoulou and Kostaki Citation2014, 262), They also note that, while, in Greece, religiosity has had a negative impact on tolerance and social trust, this correlation was less obvious in Spain.
3. I would like to thank one of the reviewers of the Journal of Contemporary Religion for pointing out this change.
4. As a non-profit association, the Spanish Church qualifies for the special provisions laid down by Law 49/2002 regulating the tax scheme for non-profit organizations and tax benefits for patronage.
5. The agreement also put an end to the exemption from Value Added Tax (VAT), in compliance with a European requirement.
6. All quotations from SEC declarations are translated from Spanish by the author.
7. FOESSA is a research foundation related to the Spanish Caritas.
8. The Organic Law 2/2009 of 11 December 2009 reforms the Organic Law 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration.
9. The Church’s third-sector social action should be distinguished from its normative influence on social policies. Following Luis Moreno and Pau Marí Klose (Citation2014), Margarita León and Emmanuele Pavolini (Citation2014, 363) point out that, in times of recession, the Church’s positions on family policies have had less impact in Spain than in Italy.
10. Political factors also played a role, such as a leftist government in Barcelona, where FBOs play a role in the local welfare regime, while in Madrid, ruled by a conservative party, “the access of FBOs to social policy is as service providers in competition with for-profit organizations” (Elander, Daavelar, and Walliser Citation2012, 91). In 2015, however, it was the popular platform Ahora Madrid, supported by the left-wing political party Podemos, that governed the city of Madrid.
11. For example, the campaign in 2013 undertaken by the Servicio Jesuita a Migrantes and Pueblos Unidos about the regulation of internment centers for foreigners. (Interview Centro Ignacio Ellacuria, Bilbao, 20 June 2013).
12. In April 2013, defenders of the popular legislative initiative (Iniciativa Legislativa Popular—ILP) to stop evictions withdrew the ILP from the Congress of Deputies, given the opposition of the Popular Party.
13. The election in March 2017 of the head of the SEC did not necessarily result in promoting Pope Francis’s views. Cardinal Blázquez remained as chairman, but Cardinal Cañizares, Archbishop of Valencia, seen as conservative, became vice-chair.
14. Podemos (meaning ‘We Can’) is a Spanish political party founded in March 2014 in the aftermath of the 15-M Movement protests against inequality and corruption.
15. The ‘0.7% Movement’ is a non-profit organization founded in 1994, which aims to eradicate poverty and works toward sustainable development all over the world.
16. The ‘Order of Poor Clerics Regular of the Mother of God of the Pious Schools’ or, in short, the Piarists, is a Catholic educational order, also known as the ‘Scolopi, Escolapios’. It was founded in 1617 by Saint Joseph Calasanz.
17. The Bidari collective in Bilbao, counting around 15 members in 2013, is characterized by a commitment to social action, development aid, and degrowth. In 2013, each Bidari member contributed 10% of his/her income to a common fund, which was redistributed as follows: 10% to the receiving parish, 10% to community functioning, 40% to the diocesan Caritas, and 40% to development projects in countries of the South, channeled via the NGO Alboan.
18. This reading was reinforced by the presence of experts with links to FOESSA in some left-wing regional governments, as in Navarra, where in 2015 the vice-presidency of social affairs was given to Miguel Laparra, a sociologist and member of the scientific board of FOESSA.
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Xabier Itçaina
Xabier Itçaina is a CNRS Senior Researcher at Sciences po Bordeaux (France) and director of the Centre Emile Durkheim (UMR5116 CNRS, Sciences po Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux). He is a former Marie Curie Fellow at the European University in Florence (2012–2013). His current research is concerned with three areas: Roman Catholicism and local politics in Southern Europe, the territorial dynamics of the social and solidarity-based economy in Southern Europe, and identity politics in the Basque Country. CORRESPONDENCE: CNRS-Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux, 11 allée Ausone, 33607 Pessac, France.