The seven deadly sins of quality management: trade-offs and implications for further research

ABSTRACT

Quality management in higher education is generally discussed with reference to commendable outcomes such as success, best practice, improvement or control. This paper, though, focuses on the problems of organising quality management. It follows the narrative of the seven deadly sins, with each ‘sin’ illustrating an inherent trade-off or paradox in the implementation of internal quality management in teaching and learning in higher education institutions. Identifying the trade-offs behind these sins is essential for a better understanding of quality management as an organisational problem.

KEYWORDS:

• Quality management
• higher education
• governance
• trade-offs
• teaching
• research

Introduction

In the last decades, research on quality management in higher education has investigated adaptation efforts and implementation problems with many different foci (Harvey & Williams, 2010). This has considerably increased the cumulative knowledge but has also led to further research questions. Consequently, many studies analyse quality management in research or in teaching and learning taking into account institutional environments and the complexity of organisational settings (Jarvis, 2014).

It is the interrelatedness of various factors that has also inspired the present study. Quality management is not free from ambiguities and contradictions. Therefore, the paper focusses on seemingly inevitable trade-offs of quality management in teaching and learning. Therefore, the paper applies the analogy of the seven ‘deadly sins’ with each sin representing one trade-off, that is, tensions that presumably cannot be finally resolved but only mitigated. Those trade-offs pose challenges and problems for practitioners of quality management and provide excellent research objectives to learn more about organisations, individuals and institutions for scientists.

The present article’s authors, having conducted a four-year research project into the effects of quality management and construed several insights regarding which factors may inhibit or promote quality management, have been unable to specify which mechanisms make quality management work in a deterministic sense. In such instances, when researchers are not able to grasp the very nature of a phenomenon, it is sometimes useful to develop a negative definition. Accordingly, in the current case, the research question may be reconfigured as follows: what are the ‘deadly sins’ that should be avoided to establish a successfully functioning quality management system?

For the sake of clarity, this paper is restricted to considering internal quality management in teaching and learning, although many of the arguments may be transferrable to external quality management, quality management in research, quality management in services and so on. It is assumed that there are key factors and preconditions (‘deadly sins’) that are embedded in trade-offs and influence the development of quality management in teaching and learning. These trade-offs require further empirical analysis in the form of an integrated perspective or an enhanced understanding of management reforms. Here, the research on the introduction of quality management seems to represent a very promising field, as it has been undertaken worldwide and across various disciplines during the recent decades, and shows no signs of coming to an end yet.

The article sets out the research design and methods used, then, in the next seven sections, core problem and characteristics of each sin is explained by accentuating its consequences for the implementation of quality management in teaching and learning. The seven sins presented below relate to problems of the implementation of quality management. It should be emphasised that it is not the mere act of implementation that constitutes a sin but the exaggeration of it. Appropriate quotes illustrate the issues. The concluding section derives specific trade-offs related to each sin.

Research design and methods

The seven ‘deadly sins’ of quality management in teaching and learning are formulated on the basis of the results of the research project ‘Impact research on quality assurance in teaching and learning’ (WiQu), using a mixed-methods approach (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; Kelle, 2006). Each of the sins has the potential to ruin quality management in teaching and learning within higher education institutions for academics and managers, resulting in an implementation dilemma. That is, the characteristics described below may have potentially negative effects on teaching and learning, even though they are supposed to improve them.

The empirical results of the project were derived from two main sources: semi-structured interviews with vice presidents and quality managers in universities or polytechnics and a nationwide survey among quality managers conducted in the German higher education sector. The survey addressed the central quality management in German higher education institutions and included individuals responsible for quality management at central level. The above-mentioned research project covered topics such as the perceived effectiveness of quality management as well as scepticism and resistance in respect of it (Seyfried & Pohlenz, 2018; Reith & Seyfried, 2019; Seyfried, 2019; Seyfried et al., 2019).

The qualitative data came from 56 interviews with quality managers and academic staff from 23 universities and polytechnics. The case selection followed a strict variance maximising approach by systematically varying organisational forms of quality management, sponsorship models, current status and progress of the quality management system. Hence, the selected cases reflect different forms of how higher education institutions organise quality management. The topics of the interviews were similar to the topics of the survey.

In general, the analysis followed a multi-cycle coding strategy, as described by Saldaña (2013). In the first coding cycle, the interviews were primarily structured following the main lines of the interview framework. In the second coding cycle, the codes were reorganised to highlight various topics. After that, another cycle was added based on certain theoretical assumptions, conceptual systems and sometimes specific findings from quantitative data sources.

‘Gluttony’: formalisation and bureaucratisation

In comparison to other occupations, academics enjoy considerable control over their working lives (de Boer et al., 2007) and independence of research and teaching is well established in developed democracies as a value in itself. Arguably, quality management could be seen as interfering with academics’ freedom of teaching as a result of increased formalisation, for example, new statutes and increased documentation requirements (Ramirez & Christensen, 2013, p. 707). This was also expressed by the interview partners:

With the Bologna Process etcetera, so many requirements have been added in recent years, some of which are contradictory and have to be dealt with quickly in some way, and where so much bureaucracy has arisen that not only are the definitions of quality management or individual instruments no longer attractive, but the whole thing is somehow suddenly perceived as more of a ballast in everyday life than it is helpful. (FH5QM, 112)

Quality management does not work without formal rules, clarification of responsibilities and duties, reporting obligations, monitoring as well as evaluation and accreditation procedures. Particularly at the beginning of the establishment of a quality management régime, academics become aware of the administrative burden that is associated with quality work. At the same time, formalisation may be regarded as a feature of higher education institutions becoming ‘complete organisations’ (Seeber et al., 2015, p. 1451) or of turning into ‘organisational actors’ (Elken & Røsdal, 2017, p. 377).

The increased formalisation goes hand in hand with ‘academic bureaucratisation’ (Gornitzka et al., 1998, p. 21; Elken & Stensaker, 2018, p. 199), implying a ‘growth of the part of the organisation that does not directly carry out the work but which regulates, supervises and supports those who do’ (Gornitzka et al., 1998, p. 23). Gornitzka et al. (1998, p. 26) calls this a ‘silent managerial revolution’ that is also perceived by academics, due to the long-established requirement to spend more and more time on administrative duties instead of focussing on their core tasks, such as research and teaching (Dill, 1995, p. 101).

Overall, this situation may lead to multiple paradoxes. First, while internal quality management is designed to assure or enhance quality in teaching and learning, it may also absorb valuable resources and simultaneously create administrative burdens. At the same time, new formal rules and evaluation bureaucracies serve as source of legitimacy for quality management but at the cost of undermining the core processes it should support. In its worst expressions, formalisation and bureaucratisation due to quality management for the purpose of improvement of teaching and learning may become no more than a ‘rational myth’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 360). That means higher education institutions conduct quality management rather ceremonially for the sake of conformity with external demands, which may influence the efficiency of the organisation and may create conflicts.

‘Wrath’: standardisation

The combination of formal requirements and a conviction to improve teaching and learning may lead to standardisation as a fundamental precondition of higher education. These efforts are the main reasons why higher education systems and the frameworks of study programmes are becoming more and more alike on a global level. Equally, standardisation in combination with value-laden convictions could become a serious threat to quality in teaching and learning, leading to a so-called ‘standards paradox’ (Brady & Bates, 2016, p. 155) due to a ‘pedagogy of confinement’ (Brady & Bates, 2016, p. 163) in which standards set a narrow but backward frame that undermines creativity and innovation. Academics tend to put more efforts in meeting standards and external demands, which decreases the time available for core tasks like research and teaching. This problem already occurs at the measurement level and quality managers try to provide instruments that allow for more sensitivity in assessing teaching and learning:

We also offer the academic staff [an option] to ask their own questions [with regard to quality management surveys], as long as some core questions are used in all departments to preserve the opportunity for comparisons. (Uni1QM1, 38)

Research, teaching and learning are increasingly developing towards a logic of product or consumer orientation and are moving away from intellectual individualism and originality (Brady & Bates 2016; Alvesson & Sandberg 2013). Paradoxically, students’ and societal demands require a diverse higher education system (Barr, 2004; Beerkens, 2015), yet diversity and variation may signify systematic hindrances with respect to the implementation of quality management. Modern management system theory advocates that measurement and comparability are essential for an efficient and effective quality management system, without considering that these ostensibly threatening forms of reductionism ‘might destroy the university’ (Ball & Wilkinson, 1994, p. 419) in practice. In combination with quality managers’ conviction that they are following the ‘right’ principles, a quality management system could create attitudes that force actors in higher education institutions to fulfil standardised targets (Neave 1988). Beyond these concerns, standardisation also connotes an important precondition for the next sin, ‘envy’, which makes excessive use of conformity among structures, programmes and aligned worldviews. In combination, both sins describe new mechanisms in higher education that have at least (paradoxically) the potential to undermine academic work in general.

‘Envy’: benchmarking

Instruments like benchmarking are closely related to formalisation and standardisation, because, without identical measures, benchmarking would not be possible. Benchmarks induce improvements by fostering learning and focus on best practices via mechanisms of competition (Kouzmin et al., 1999, p. 125). The general idea of benchmarking is to compare different entities (organisations) or actors on the basis of selected indicators. Regarding quality in teaching and learning, this would pertain to academics and the improvement of the quality of their lectures. However, the incentive structure in the academic system commonly circles around a trade-off between teaching and research (Askling, 1997; Deem & Brehony, 2005). The highest rewards with respect to reputation, for example, are granted for excellent publications in top-ranking journals and the attraction of high-ranking third-party funds, which may bring about significant opportunity costs at the individual level, for example, reduced time budget for updating and preparing teaching (King & Sen, 2013).

Also, the benchmarking approach only functions under conditions of normal competition, involving many equal competitors, yet the ‘academic market’ is characterised by dysfunctional competition. However, markets ‘are efficient when there is little ambiguity over performance’ (Billing, 1998, p. 142), which includes information on the quality of products. This implies that participants with low performance and poor quality disappear from the market or, conversely, that participants with high performance and quality remain in the market. Yet this seems to be not the case within academia. There is evidence that, for example, scientific quality and scientific innovations are contested in the current academic market (Ioannidis, 2005; Alvesson & Spicer, 2019).

Beyond the problem of dysfunctional competition in the academic system, though, critics of benchmarking procedures are sceptical about how benchmarking influences its environment at the very beginning of its introduction (Lange, 2010). Again, in the worst cases, actors and organisations will care more about their image and collecting the ‘right’ numbers than about fulfiling their core duties and tasks (van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). The distorted attention to external demands via internal instruments is present in many organisations and reflect the unintended consequences of procedures like benchmarking that were originally introduced to improve processes such as teaching and learning. Specifically, benchmarking may provoke conflict between different groups and disciplines within higher education institutions and can foster the development of dissenting interests that may weaken the strength of a higher education institution as a corporate actor by increasing the potential for internal conflict. This is mainly because benchmarking is not only used as a tool of comparison; it may instead be bound to quasi-competition within higher education institutions (Adcroft & Willis, 2005). A vice-president of a university of applied sciences highlighted this point as he stated: ‘I wouldn’t do benchmarking. That leads to internal competition’ (FH2VP, 70).

Moreover, quality management could lay the basis for existential competition between lecturers, administrators of study programmes or other actors within higher education institutions for strategic reasons. If this is the case, quality management will not be perceived as a support system with which to improve teaching and learning but, rather, as a manipulation strategy.

‘Lust’: control and scrutiny

Critique, debate and review are essential parts of academic life. At the same time, academics enjoy a considerable amount of freedom while conducting research and teaching and setting their own standards but ‘universities have not always done as good a job as they might have done’ (Elton, 1988, p. 378). Therefore, quality management may be regarded as opener for the introduction of accountability in higher education (Huisman & Currie, 2004, p. 531) to exert ‘bureaucratic authority’ (Brennan & Shah, 2000, p. 347).

The technical developments of the past decades enable actors to not only collect and store big data but also to analyse complex data structures. Today, it is possible to apply standardised data analysis routines as well as individualised instruments and to obtain more and more detailed information. Recent research has focused on these developments from a general perspective. Dahler-Larsen (2011, 2015), for example, identified that we are entering an ‘evaluation society’ (Dahler-Larsen, 2015, p. 21) with constitutive effects for behaviour and human interrelations. Nearly 15 years before, Power (1999) wrote a prescient book about the ‘audit society’, a topic which has lost nothing of its ‘explosive’ character (Power, 2003, p. 188). Quality management is closely related to the societal developments that are analysed in these books and articles. The ability to audit, monitor or control others is of increasing relevance, particularly in relation to intensified accountability demands (Power, 2003, p. 191) and the efforts of various actors or organisations to gain legitimacy (Jann, 2016, pp. 34–38).

Yet, there is a fine line between control and an exaggeration of control. The control of targets and measures and the fixation on results and output stand in sharp contrast with scholarship, which should allow for the trials and errors of research and the individuality of teaching. Both are not directly attributable to output (Dahler-Larsen, 2014, p. 970). However, an escalation of control may provoke the opposite behaviour of what was originally intended. Thus, on the one hand, control is necessary to make clear that existing rules and norms have to be followed but, on the other hand, sanctions may set negative incentives. As the following quote of a university vice-president shows, cooperation and communication are perceived as very important in avoiding an impression of control:

We believe that this [cooperation with faculty staff] is necessary, also because of the self-motivation of the faculty staff; otherwise, the whole quality assurance is of no use. If this is understood as control, nothing happens. (Uni7VP, 85)

If actors perceive that they become controlled they may develop avoidance strategies to circumvent controls, or they will commence ‘gaming the system’ (Becket & Brookes, 2006, p. 129; Dahler-Larsen, 2014, p. 973) to behave as though they are fulfiling all accountability obligations, while, in fact, they are not (for example, undertaking forms of ‘cherry picking’ or ‘cream skimming’ of performance data, Dahler-Larsen, 2014, p. 970).

‘Greed’: self-interests and maximisation

Quality management has advanced in recent years such that it is now considered part of the so-called ‘third space’ (Whitchurch, 2008; Whitchurch & Law, 2010) from which new higher education professions have emerged (Schneijderberg, 2017). Contemporary debates about quality culture, institutionalisation and professionalisation exemplify that quality management in teaching and learning is no longer a task at the margins of higher education institutions but, rather, claims its place within and tries to influence the development of universities and polytechnics. Beyond this, quality management departments and their resources continue to grow. Initially, quality managers were struggling for legitimacy and had to cope with different forms of resistance and to compete for scarce resources. Accordingly, the economic theory of bureaucracy would expect resource-increasing strategies of quality managers (Niskanen, 1968, p. 304) to be applied, and that organisations would tend to overemphasise their tasks and duties and look for new tasks to legitimise their existence.

Once quality managers have gained certain levels of legitimacy and overcome or mediated particular forms of resistance, they may engage in what is known as ‘agency’ or ‘bureaucratic drift’. In this setting, quality management can distort and develop its own missions without consideration of its specific use for higher education institutions, as the following quality manager explained:

In quality management, you have the peculiarity that specifically this is not regulated much or not regulated at all … . This means that we are in a separate position to create our own area of responsibility to a greater or lesser extent. This means that we look at what quality management is, how it works and so on, and thereby set ourselves goals that, in our opinion, correspond to those of this position. What we have learned in the past, however, is that these are not necessarily the goals pursued by the university management. (Uni9QM, 119)

Such a drift can lead to ‘agency loss’ (Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 5) and is analogous to, for example, massive data collections without analysis of all these data, extending forms of control and consulting, monitoring and evaluation or auditing. Such behaviour would be rational from the perspective of quality management and is in line with agency theory but it also puts quality management at risk because there is a trade-off: the more quality leaves or extends its portfolio, the more it will lose its core functions. Paradoxically, quality managers may expose themselves to risk in such circumstances too, through stretching the scope of their duties too far, which in turn could lead to identity conflicts and incommensurability between academics’ conceptions of quality management and quality managers’ perceptions of their duties.

‘Sloth’: no coordination and no communication

Existing research indicates that coordination and communication are two critical elements in the day-to-day business of processes like quality management and particularly in higher education institutions, where quality managers have to work together with many different stakeholders, which heavily affects the daily practices of quality management as the following quote illustrates:

First of all: a lot of talking. Not always using the authority of the president, which I have, but asking, ‘What do YOU want? Can you think about something we can do to support you?’ You have to show that you get it, and, if you don’t, explain why not, why it doesn’t work. I sought allies among the academics. ‘People,’ I thought, ‘They talk to me. They are interested in the topic.’ (FH7QM1, 210)

However, prior studies have also found that there is an immanent trade-off in coordination. Ideally, actors who formulate policies should coordinate with all the other possible actors. This kind of coordination, when all actors are involved, regardless of whether they are affected, is called ‘positive coordination’ (Scharpf, 1994, p. 38). In contrast, coordination that involves only selected actors and addresses only actors who are directly affected by the respective policy is known as ‘negative coordination’ (Scharpf, 1994, pp. 38–39). The trade-off between these two forms is well documented in theories of decision-making. While positive coordination has very high ex ante costs (such as finding consensus in various meetings with numerous actors), it reduces possible externalities (for example, low levels of acceptance or misunderstandings during the implementation) to a minimum. The opposite is true for negative coordination, wherein ex ante costs of decision-making are very low, due to the reduced number of decision-makers but, therefore, the externalities (such as resistance against new policies or avoidance practices during the implementation) may be very high (Scharpf, 1994, p. 48).

Such theoretical considerations lead to a coordination paradox. While a higher education institution system typically requires encompassing forms of coordination and communication especially initiated by the quality management officials, the system tends to reduce ex ante costs of decision-making; not least, because quality management is also perceived as being a promoter of increased levels of bureaucracy (as discussed above in the section on formalisation). Hence, the more that resource-consuming coordinating action is needed, the less actors are willing to take part in these costly coordination efforts. However, this reduction in ex ante costs increases simultaneously ex post costs due to possible negative externalities. Consequently, the knowledge about problems and possible solutions generated by the internal quality management may be not translated into concrete actions to avoid increased coordination efforts.

‘Pride’: increased hierarchy

It is important to understand that, within higher education institutions, there are two separate realms. First, there are academics, who demand freedom of thought and operation in both research and teaching. Second, there is an administrative body, which itself consists of two parts: one is academic self-administration, dealing with all the issues of academic life, while the other is what most people know as normal administration or bureaucracy. Quality management, as a ‘third space’ (Whitchurch, 2008), is at the border of these two worlds, combining academic features (for example, pertaining to institutional research) and administration (for example, the writing of reports or carrying out standardised evaluations); and, within it, actors are carrying out tasks that cannot be described as purely academic or administrative, yet there are close connections to both groups.

The profusion of quality management among higher education institutions is closely related to organisational change and a change of governance with respect to quality in teaching and learning. Many higher education institutions have been introducing new positions and structures (for example, staff units, committees, departments) that position quality managers somewhere in the existing chains of delegation: they are part of the hierarchy. Superiority and subordination are important elements of all administrative structures and can influence policy outcomes (Egeberg, 1999). However, although hierarchies are a means by which to delegate tasks and resolve conflicts (Egeberg, 1999, p. 164), they can at the same time be a cause of problems because they increase coordination and demand accountability (Weber & Winckelmann, 2002). Hence, the question of how quality management is organised is a fundamental one and the tasks and duties that are assigned to quality management and quality managers may influence how they are perceived by academics. If quality management is rather close to the ideas of (institutional) research, it may be less challenged but if it comes closer to management and administration it enters the conflict lines of managerialisation in higher education as the following quote indicates:

I believe it is rather this hierarchical relationship that fuels reservations [from the academics] like, ‘So, now someone from the rectorate is coming’ or ‘Now someone from the administration is coming who has nothing to do with us at all’. (Uni3QM, 102)

Beyond quality management in higher education

In this article, the seven deadly sins were used to illustrate immanent trade-offs and paradoxes regarding quality management in teaching and learning in higher education. Thus, the article provides a counterpoint to the predominant aim in the literature of identifying success factors and best practices with regard to quality management. Instead, it was argued that the problems highlighted above are inevitable not only for higher education institutions but for organisations in general and that they address core questions of organisational practice, research and theory.

Accordingly, this final section summarises the main trade-offs and provides further research perspectives. Table 1 summarises the trade-offs identified in the study. These trade-offs are interdependent and do not only relate to higher education. Moreover, they lead towards a more sophisticated research perspective in the implementation of quality management in organisations.

Table 1. Trade-offs concerning quality management when applied to teaching and learning in higher education institutions.

Sin	Trade-off
Gluttony (formalisation)	Professionalisation vs. de-professionalisation
Wrath (standardisation)	Reductionism vs. complexity
Envy (benchmarking and competition)	High competition vs. low competition
Lust (control and scrutiny)	Control vs. avoidance
Greed (self-interest and maximisation)	Altruism vs. egoism
Sloth (no coordination and no communication)	Networks vs. silo mentality
Pride (hierarchy)	Self-governance vs. management

The first trade-off is related to the professionalisation of actors: new professions emerge, while other traditional occupations can become de-professionalised. This is a complex issue but there is no doubt that reforms following, for example, the ‘new public management’ approach, such as the introduction of quality management, have the potential to induce de-professionalisation, due to a stronger focus on clients (Schimank, 2015, p. 186). However, the advent of new techniques is also a general problem that may undermine existing ones and challenge organisations (Oliver, 1992, p. 571).

Increased efforts in measuring not only inputs and outputs but also effectiveness, outcomes or impact can lead to standardisation efforts, which may in turn give rise to highly reductionist or even misleading indicators. That is, standardisation reduces information at the cost of complexity, which could lead to misunderstandings and decoupling, on the one hand, but might also promote institutionalisation if standards are accepted (Brunsson et al., 2012, p. 618).

The third trade-off concerns the interplay between high and low competition and it is embedded in benchmarking and all its functional equivalents (for example, rankings). Although the literature argues that organisations such as higher education institutions are in competition (Bailey et al., 2004), there is much evidence that, at least for some countries, this competition is constructed (Hasse & Krücken, 2013, p. 3) or, in relation to economic theory, distorted. There is a tendency towards dysfunctional competition, such as in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets,

The fourth trade-off focuses on control or auditing and avoidance strategies. Many researchers have asserted that control does not only lead towards a better fulfilment of tasks but also may inhibit the execution of the tasks under control (Funnell & Wade, 2012). These ambiguous effects of control are also well theorised because much of the principal–agent literature assumes that maximising behaviour causes many different problems of action, such as hidden information or hidden intention (Waterman & Meier, 1998). However, the assumption of pure rational behaviour is contested, due to the restrictions it imposes on the framing of social interaction. Yet, the trade-off regarding quality management points towards a balance of accountability measures.

The fifth trade-off also has its theoretical foundations partly originating from the principal–agent problem, which assumes that the agents’ action deviates from the principals’ instruction and quality management is particularly vulnerable to normative and value-laden implications and attributions that may distort instructions by the general higher education management. Thus, while the idea of quality management is to improve things and services, it risks simply perpetuating the concepts and developing its own mission.

Rather than the underlying strategies of actors, the sixth trade-off centres on the forms of interaction. It becomes relevant if quality management is insulated and only focused on its own ideas and concepts, or if it is embedded in networks that require an exchange of views. While the latter would require higher levels of coordination and communication in advance, the former indicates tendencies towards a silo mentality that may cause acceptance and implementation problems later on (Frølich et al., 2013, p. 82; Cameron & Green, 2015, p. 194). In both cases, quality management will cause additional efforts.

Finally, there is also a trade-off between academic self-governance and how management relates to the overall problem of power struggles within organisations. These are rarely positive-sum games and mostly zero-sum games, which means that an increase in competencies for some actors would lead to a decrease of competencies for other actors (de Boer et al., 2007). For example, conflicts may arise if administrative units have to give responsibilities and competencies to quality management or even if quality management becomes part of an administrative unit. Furthermore, various actors complained about resource conflicts, particularly redistribution of funds and staff being taken away from the faculties and assigned to the central level.

The implications of these trade-offs are quite striking: they are theoretically well founded and point towards problems that cannot be addressed through singular and definite solutions. Further research should above all address the interrelations between the trade-offs, which would also require reasonable combinations between different theoretical models and approaches. However, while the seven deadly sins of quality management presented in this paper may not be regarded as heuristic in a scientific sense, they do offer an empirical research perspective that allows for a better understanding (and acceptance) of the interdependencies of quality management.

Acknowledgments

We want to thank the three anonymous reviewers of this paper and the editors for their very helpful comments. Furthermore, we want to thank Susan Harris-Huemmert and the participants of the SRHE group discussions on quality in higher education in 2017.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung) under Grant number [49 01PY13003A/B].