(Relative) autonomism, policy currents and the politics of mobilisation for food sovereignty in the United States: the case of Occupy the Farm^*

* Note that the empirical core of this piece overlaps with Roman-Alcalá (2013, 2015, 2017).

ABSTRACT

Food sovereignty movements (FSMs) globally have sought to rearrange relations between land, power, state actions and societal forces outside the state, towards a new ideal of democratised, egalitarian and ecological food systems. The question of how best to reach this ideal has vexed movements and scholars alike, with many anti-capitalist theorists proposing that because of the historical dedication of states to maintaining unequal and unsustainable capitalist relations, change must be pursued outside and against the state rather than through it (i.e. through “autonomism”). Yet, analysis of FSMs globally shows that autonomism is relative, partial and best seen as an aspirational ideal rather than a fixed dogma. This paper deepens this insight by analysing a case within the United States where a local direct action group promoted food sovereignty by illegally occupying public land. The case shows how even apparently autonomist movements can through influence on state and societal actors contribute to state-based “policy currents” that flow in the direction of food sovereignty. This mutual codetermination by actors in and out of state institutions of the possibility and shape of “policy currents” renders state–society relations as important, even to those interested in (relative) autonomism. This paper thus leaves behind dichotomous interpretations of (and recommendations for) FSMs vis-à-vis autonomism, in order to unpack the influence (in thought) and impact (in action) of autonomist tendencies in food sovereignty construction.

KEYWORDS:

• Food sovereignty
• urban agriculture
• state–society relations
• land occupation
• autonomism

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Rebecca Tarlau, Gustavo Lt Oliveira, Alison Hope Alkon, Stefanie Rawlings and Krystof Lopaur for comments on earlier versions of the manuscript; Occupy the Farm and Gill Tract Community Farm participants and (ongoing) instigators; and Jun Borras for his ever-valuable guidance. Any remaining errors, omissions or misinterpretations are mine to own up to.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID

Antonio Roman-Alcalá http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9209-8786

Notes

* Note that the empirical core of this piece overlaps with Roman-Alcalá (2013, 2015, 2017).

1. Participant names have been kept anonymous at their own request; quotes are from interviews held between 2012 and 2016 and personal communication from 2012 to 2017.

2. These trends have been described by other names (e.g. anarchist, neo-anarchist, horizontalist, prefigurative), with varying but overlapping definitional components, similar to the four elements outlined in the introduction. These elements are not claimed to be exhaustive, nor are autonomism’s nuances, genesis or internal debates dealt with comprehensively here. Sympathetic treatments of autonomism include Day (2005), Dixon (2012), Hammond (2015), Holloway (2002), Maeckelbergh (2011), Zibechi (2012) and (regarding indigenous movements) Coulthard (2014); less sympathetic include Dean (2012), Gerbaudo (2017), Harvey (2012) and Smucker (2014).

3. “Anti-oppression” indicates a politics that explicitly seeks to counter oppressive social relations based on gender, class, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, disability and so on (Dixon 2012).

4. An important caveat is to not ascribe “fixity to organizations in the food movement, [and to appreciate] … their heterogeneous and fluid political nature” (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011, 132), a point which will become more apparent as the paper progresses.

5. Length limitations prevent a more thorough unpacking the differences and overlaps between “food justice” and “food sovereignty”, as concepts and movements. In essence, food justice denotes efforts to rectify injustices in the food system, often based in class and race inequities (Alkon and Agyeman 2011). Importantly, because food justice is rooted in the North American context, U.S. food movements more commonly use that term. Relatedly, Cadieux and Slocum (2015, 7, emphasis in the original) note that “[food sovereignty] discourse tends to play out around food production, while food justice tends to be more associated with food consumption and access”. These authors claim both movements “typically have an oppositional relationship to the state” (7). Although food justice projects have indeed shown elements of autonomism (i.e. taking direct action, focusing on community-level power and capacity, and seeing political action as ends not just means), the movement also has roots in environmental justice movements, which have tended to make demands directly to governments. Like food sovereignty, I would argue that food justice’s orientation to autonomism is multivalent and ambiguous.

6. The clandestine nature of organisation, tactically important pre-occupation, became more open afterwards, when those participating in the action were invited to join meetings and make decisions with the group.

7. Recognising that “relative autonomy” has a theoretical tradition distinct from my usage here (Poulantzas 1973), I wish to be clear about the difference. First, that tradition focuses on state actors/action, while this analysis is looking at social movements outside the state. Second, “autonomy” in those analyses tends to centre on the ability of state actors to make “autonomous” decisions without external influence. Tarlau (2014) and Fox (1993) share a similar but reverse interpretation in looking at societal actor autonomy: to what extent their decisions are made independently of state influence. Here I am concerned with this, and the three other elements I have outlined in the introduction, and the relative extent to which they are combined with state-oriented tactics.

8. See www.cofed.coop, www.canunite.org, www.realfoodchallenge.org and www.sustainableaged.org.

9. As mentioned, it is unclear who made the decision to transfer management to CNR, or why this was decided.